In the US Navy having a 1930s Moment?

[tmasi]

It sort of feels like its 1938 only we lack the political leaders with the foresight and leadership to fund and pass the much needed "Two Ocean Navy Act" to build up the fleet, the support infrastructure and the productive capacity required to deter/confront looming adversaries.

[Albany Rifles]

It sort of feels like its 1938 only we lack the political leaders with the foresight and leadership to fund and pass the much needed "Two Ocean Navy Act" to build up the fleet, the support infrastructure and the productive capacity required to deter/confront looming adversaries.

Well I think it is also a resources issue. The Infrastructure Acts were intended to rebuild are massively underfunded and crumbling roads, bridges, etc. Also some for ports and navigable bridges. But the refusal to a GOP Congress under Obama to address the needs and instead imposed sequestration. All this did was kick cans down many roads. Trump did nothing. Additionally, with the War On Terror we refused to pay to upgrade our nuclear arsenals. There are just too many pots that are empty which will not allow us to redo a 2 Ocean Navy Act. But I also see a failure in vision and requirements generation by the Navy. What have they laid out in requirements which made it into annual defense budgets to meet these shortfalls? It took the GAO to report to Congress that the Navy was broke dick on ports and shipyards capabilities and not the Navy.

[tmasi]

Well put. It’s not a problem of the last 5-7 years. It’s more an issue of stunted thinking, irresolution, short-term ”solutioning” and issue avoiding happening over the last 25 — all exacerbated by a poor foreign policy that ultimately created more problems & dangers that now need to be addressed without the needed resources.

[Albany Rifles]

Well put. It’s not a problem of the last 5-7 years. It’s more an issue of stunted thinking, irresolution, short-term ”solutioning” and issue avoiding happening over the last 25 — all exacerbated by a poor foreign policy that ultimately created more problems & dangers that now need to be addressed without the needed resources.

Don't wholly agree with this. There has been significant changes to structure within the Navy in recent years...just not enough hulls to execute all tasks and crews rested and trai to meet them. LCS was a terrible own goal by the Navy. But I believe the new frigate program is going well. A lot of the lessons learned from the early failures of the F-35 program office have really gotten the applicable acquisitions lessons learned applied. Same for the new SSBN program. As usual, it is a resource issue...which all 5 services are suffering through.

[tmasi]

Fair -- I have a tendency to be too negative, perhaps. I'm not a military member or a defense contractor, so what I know is only what I read in the papers and my criticism falls more on frustrations I have with the President and Congress for the lack of proper requests & adequate funding for items we know will be needed to create a credible deterrent against so-called "pacing" threats. The lack of timely and full replacements for the cruisers and the SSGNs which were obviously aging out, for example. A lot of wasted years -- BUT I'll concede to NOT knowing the intricacies and totality of these projects & their problems.

[Albany Rifles]

Fair -- I have a tendency to be too negative, perhaps. I'm not a military member or a defense contractor, so what I know is only what I read in the papers and my criticism falls more on frustrations I have with the President and Congress for the lack of proper requests & adequate funding for items we know will be needed to create a credible deterrent against so-called "pacing" threats. The lack of timely and full replacements for the cruisers and the SSGNs which were obviously aging out, for example. A lot of wasted years -- BUT I'll concede to NOT knowing the intricacies and totality of these projects & their problems.

I was an Army officer but have been a civil government member of the Army Acquisition Corps since 1993...before it was named that! I have seen a lot of stops & starts over the years. Started in the Bradley Program Office as a captain and retire shortly as the PM for the Army's Ammunition Program. The downsize Post Cold War threw Army futures in the trash. Same with the Navy...no need seen to replace the Ticos and SSBN replacement pushed down the road. Aviation programs issues really were hard lessons learned by the community which have been plowed back in across the board. This has dramatically improved acquisition. For the requirements the Army was right into going to Futures Command...the Navy needs to catch up.

[Albany Rifles]

I am placing this story here as I see it as similar to what the US Navy went through in the 1930s. In the 1930s we saw the new South Dakotas go to 16 inch guns and move away from 5"/51 & 5"/25 caliber secondaries and settle on the 5"/38 as the standard secondary BB/CA/CL and DD main armament. It also saw an expansion in the types of weapons used from carriers.

The NSM greatly enhances the long range SS strike capabilities of surface combatants. It is also good to see our Allies being equipped with the NSM as well!

US and Australian Navy Destroyers Spotted with Naval Strike Missiles – Defense Archives

US and Australian Navy Destroyers Spotted with Naval Strike Missiles



The Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) seen here equipped with Naval Strike Missile canisters (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jordan Jennings)

USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62), one of the 40 surface ships participating in the 29th Iteration of Exercise Rim of the Pacific, was spotted equipped with Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace’s Naval Strike Missile.

The Royal Australian Navy’s Hobart-class destroyer, HMAS Sydney, was also spotted with a full load of four NSMs aboard. Marking the first instance where vessels of both classes were seen equipped with Naval Strike Missiles.



HMAS Sydney seen here coming into Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam equipped with Naval Strike Missiles (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Gavin Arnoldhendershot)

The NSM, which is designated as the RGM-184A by the US Navy, is currently scheduled to be fielded aboard the Navy’s Freedom and Independence classes of Littoral Combat Ships as well as the Constellation class guided missile frigates.

The Navy picked the NSM as the winner of its Over The Horizon Weapon System (OTH WS) competition which sought a new missile to equip the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships and future guided-missile frigate which became the Constellation class.

USS Gabrielle Gifford was the first US Navy vessel to get the missile back in 2019, which also carried out the first test firing of the missile that same year.

Ever since then the Navy has been equipping more Independence class ships with the missile. The first Freedom class ship to be equipped with the missile will be the USS Nantucket (LCS-27).

Alongside the Navy, the Marine Corps also operates the NSM, which makes up the missile component of the Navy/Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS). This system combines the NSM with Oshkosh Defense’s Remotely Operated Ground Unit for Expeditionary (ROGUE) Fires vehicle.

The Naval Strike Missile:


The NSM is a modern multi-mission cruise missile that is meant to strike defended maritime and land targets. It has a range of 100-nmi (185 km) when flying in a Lo-Lo flight path aided by its onboard inertial and terrain-following guidance setup, which is complemented by GPS.

The missile incorporates an S-ducted serrated inlet, with flush mounted panels and mid-body chines; these design characteristics reduce the missile’s signature aiding its survivability.

The missile also incorporates a passive dual-band infrared seeker for terminal homing instead of an active radar seeker that would set off any electronic support systems (ESM) aboard enemy ships.

The Naval Strike Missile is produced by Raytheon Missile & Defense in the United States in partnership with Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace. Raytheon also produces the Joint Strike Missile, which is an air-launched variant of the missile.

Author Comments:


For the US Navy, it currently remains unclear whether this is a one-off test for RIMPAC or else the beginning of something much wider. Although the NSM is currently scheduled to go on the LCS-1, 2, and FFG-62 classes, the Navy has also touted putting the missile on the San Antonio class amphibious landing dock ships in the past. However, any mention of this in the budget documents have since disappeared.

Furthermore, the Navy’s yearly buys for the NSM continue to be minuscule with the service only requesting 12 missiles this fiscal year and 13 last year. The Navy’s budget documents also state that Raytheon’s current NSM production line can produce a maximum of 125 missiles a year.

If the Navy plans to equip its Arleigh-Burke class destroyers with NSM, a substantial increase in production is needed unless production is outsourced to Kongsberg. The company currently has two production lines that can produce a maximum of about 350 missiles each, with the company recently standing up a third line in Australia.

[Monash]

The published stats for the NSM certainly makes it look like an impressive system, stealthier than the harpoon with better targeting systems and a longer range. My only concern? It appears to have a much smaller explosive payload than the harpoon. So the test sort of becomes how much damage would one AB (or equivalently sized warship) suffer if it was hit by an NSM fired at it by another AB vs the damage caused by a single Harpoon hit.

If on average it takes two NSMs hits to inflict as much damage as a single Harpoon hit would do?

[Albany Rifles]

The published stats for the NSM certainly makes it look like an impressive system, stealthier than the harpoon with better targeting systems and a longer range. My only concern? It appears to have a much smaller explosive payload than the harpoon. So the test sort of becomes how much damage would one AB (or equivalently sized warship) suffer if it was hit by an NSM fired at it by another AB vs the damage caused by a single Harpoon hit.

If on average it takes two NSMs hits to inflict as much damage as a single Harpoon hit would do?

I see it as for extended range you have to have tradeoffs. If I can do a mission kill at 150-200 NMs vice hard kill at 80 NMs is that a win? And will it start degrading you before you are in your weapons range?

I look at it this was using Gettysburg & Civil War artillery. During Pickett's Charge, the 3 divisions had to cover 1.25 miles at open ground. As the Confederates emerged from the woods and commenced their fateful attack they came under fire by US 3-inch ordnance rifles. They were not as effective antipersonnel weapons as the smoothbore M1857 12 pound Napoleons. At 1.25 against massed Infantry the 3 inch shells produced 3-6 casualties...at a range the 12 pounder couldn't reach accurately. 12 pounder stated hitting 65% at a mile. So for a 1/4 mile the Confederates started taking casualties before they came within a 65% of the 12 pounders.

It causes casualties at ranges well beyond the Harpoon. And what will it do against a frigate?

It's another arrow in the quiver.

[Monash]

'It's another arrow in tbe quiver'. Assuming the USN pursues a policy going forward of equipping it's DDs and FGs with both systems and I was under the impression the Harpoon was going to be phased out/replaced.

Regardless perhaps the USN should start mounting 3 inch ordinance rifles on it's warfighters.

[Albany Rifles]

'It's another arrow in tbe quiver'. Assuming the USN pursues a policy going forward of equipping it's DDs and FGs with both systems and I was under the impression the Harpoon was going to be phased out/replaced.

Regardless perhaps the USN should start mounting 3 inch ordinance rifles on it's warfighters.

Henry Hunt would love you!!!

Henry Jackson Hunt - Wikipedia

[Maxor]

A lot of the overall issue is systemic and related to other questionable moves within society.

Before world war 2 there was no question that General Electric and General Motors were "American" companies and that a huge portion of their productivity would/could go into emergency wartime production. What would you say about Intel, or Apple what does GM manufacture in the US these days outside of heavy Military Vechiles at Lima?

So a vastly different economy is a big part of this, and that same economy is also more geared towards service and intellectual design over production. Yes Honeywell is good in defense and electronics and they have a lot of their assembly in the Us but lots of their components are also imported.

Now relating that more towards shipbuilding. The US has basically stopped building merchant shipping which has deeply effected various trades and also stopped mining the resources that lead to those. US steel production peaked in the 1970s and the US had already been an importer of steel for a decade at that point.

Now add in that the navy had a pair of major building projects basically fail in the early 2000s with the litoral combat ships and the Zumwalt classes and you have a navy with some issues on the capabilities front without the shipbuilding capabilities to easily overcome this.

We also have some issues of hull/class bloat in place. It would be pretty reasonable for a escort frigate in today's navy to have the hull tonnage of a Fletcher class. Heck the Perry class was larger. That's a huge difference, as well when you consider that a worlds largest destroyer at the time had a hull tonnage less than a small frigate today the total numbers of hulls goes way way down.

I am not exactly saying that we should go back to the living conditions aboard WW 2 ships for our modern Navy but I also can see revisiting the idea of the LCS without the modular crap and build hulls that can be outfitted differently on a normal small warship hull.

[Albany Rifles]

A lot of the overall issue is systemic and related to other questionable moves within society.

Before world war 2 there was no question that General Electric and General Motors were "American" companies and that a huge portion of their productivity would/could go into emergency wartime production. What would you say about Intel, or Apple what does GM manufacture in the US these days outside of heavy Military Vechiles at Lima?

So a vastly different economy is a big part of this, and that same economy is also more geared towards service and intellectual design over production. Yes Honeywell is good in defense and electronics and they have a lot of their assembly in the Us but lots of their components are also imported.

Now relating that more towards shipbuilding. The US has basically stopped building merchant shipping which has deeply effected various trades and also stopped mining the resources that lead to those. US steel production peaked in the 1970s and the US had already been an importer of steel for a decade at that point.

Now add in that the navy had a pair of major building projects basically fail in the early 2000s with the litoral combat ships and the Zumwalt classes and you have a navy with some issues on the capabilities front without the shipbuilding capabilities to easily overcome this.

We also have some issues of hull/class bloat in place. It would be pretty reasonable for a escort frigate in today's navy to have the hull tonnage of a Fletcher class. Heck the Perry class was larger. That's a huge difference, as well when you consider that a worlds largest destroyer at the time had a hull tonnage less than a small frigate today the total numbers of hulls goes way way down.

I am not exactly saying that we should go back to the living conditions aboard WW 2 ships for our modern Navy but I also can see revisiting the idea of the LCS without the modular crap and build hulls that can be outfitted differently on a normal small warship hull.

Completely agree here...and it appears the Navy has learned that lesson as well. Yes, the Constellations have grown to be more expensive...but that is because the US Navy has learned the lessons of the LCS and put capabilities in all ships of the class. And I bemoaned the loss of the Spruance class...I thought they had a lot of life left in those hulls. But it allowed them to go all in on the Burkes...a MUCH more capable platform!

But yes, we need increases in our shipyards. Infrastructure means something!

[Monash]

Countervailing some of those arguments is the fact that for decades now those in charge have seen larger hulls as (a) more versatile and (b) more survivable and they are probably correct, at least to some extent. Certainly most other western navies seem have followed their lead. But the US has definitely ignored small war-fighters to its own disadvantage particularly in terms of mine warfare and brown water/anti-submarine capabilities. You can certainly pack a reasonable amount of ASW capability into hulls in the 3000 ton range (just so long as you are prepared to accept and recognize some loss in versatility).

[Albany Rifles]

Countervailing some of those arguments is the fact that for decades now those in charge have seen larger hulls as (a) more versatile and (b) more survivable and they are probably correct, at least to some extent. Certainly most other western navies seem have followed their lead. But the US has definitely ignored small war-fighters to its own disadvantage particularly in terms of mine warfare and brown water/anti-submarine capabilities. You can certainly pack a reasonable amount of ASW capability into hulls in the 3000 ton range (just so long as you are prepared to accept and recognize some loss in versatility).

I think what the Navy has to recognize is the ASW platform has to be able to fight in both deep water & brown water the globe over. And it also has to do this in a fairly small manpower pool. But the 7k tons of the Constellation seems to fit a happy medium. As for smaller warfighting platforms...well that goes straight to why we often have coalition partners to fill capabilities gaps. It is why we ignored MCM warfare vessels for decades. We depended on NATO navies for that. We have since added MCMs to the fleet but they stay pretty tied up in the Persian Gulf areas. But I'll let the Navy squids figure that out...I'm trying to reorganize the Army of 2023!!!