In the US Navy having a 1930s Moment?

[Albany Rifles]

So we have all seen the news coming out of the Red Sea and the US & Allies shooting down attacks. It got me wondering where is today's Navy in terms of where it stood historically. I thought of Chinese Pirates and then *bing* this essay showed up in Defense One daily feed I get.

I wanted to start this thread to discuss how the Navy goes into the future. I REALLY hope many of our international friends weigh in and post their opinions and their nation's national security maritime needs and how the USN plays into that for your country. I miss some of our oldest and now departed members on the topic but let's here it!

Post anything and everything, as usual!



This is from Defense One News https://www.defenseone.com/policy/20...moment/393229/

CNO: US Navy is having a 1930s moment

ADM Franchetti highlights “warfighting” and “warfighters” as key priorities.

BY PATRICK TUCKER
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY EDITOR, DEFENSE ONE
JANUARY 9, 2024

The U.S. Navy’s surface fleet finds itself in a position not unlike the 1930s, when it needed new focus and energy to prepare for a potential war, the chief of naval operations said Tuesday.

“In the 1930s, constrained defense budgets following the Great Depression resulted in reduced construction, a shrinking shipbuilding industry, and a widening gap between the capability and capacity of our Navy and that of Imperial Japan. America in the 30s possessed a fleet that was too small and insufficiently resourced for war,” Adm. Lisa Franchetti said at the Surface Navy Association’s annual conference in Virginia.

Franchetti, who stepped into the Navy’s top job in November, recalled how her long-ago predecessors needed to boost production of new ships and develop new tactics to face a new adversary, the Japanese. Key to meeting that challenge: figuring out how to integrate air operations into fleet maneuvers. A handful of minds at the Naval War College helped turn the American naval fleet into a living laboratory for new concepts.

“They used information from key problems to simulate a whole naval campaign, hypothesize what a future war might look like against the Japanese and other potential adversaries. Those results directly informed a series of war plans that not only analyzed how to fight but what the fleet needed to look like to seize advantage at sea. The Navy would shift from a platform-centric strategy, which was centered on battleships, to one that saw the future as an integrated naval force on, under and above the seas,” she said.

That shift played a decisive role in the Navy’s ability to mount a campaign against the Japanese Navy.

“They increased manpower; they ramped up production based on a joint demand signal from the White House, Congress and the Navy historians will tell us that the peacetime efforts of the 1930s contributed 95% of the modern ships that were available to fight in the war,” the admiral said

The U.S. Navy today finds itself in a similar situation with a small window in which to rapidly innovate and strengthen the fleet.

“We have energized our working enterprise as a Naval War College and our warfighting development centers to empower leaders at all levels, to think differently about how we need to operate in uncertain complex and rapidly changing environments,” she said. The Navy will look to empower new generations of leaders to experiment with “new concepts and tactics in a series of fleet exercises and power problems.”

Franchetti said her top three priorities are warfighting, warfighters, and the foundation of both.

Navy officials acknowledge that they have a way to go to meet their own goals. Vice Adm. Brendan McLane, U.S. Naval Surface Forces commander, on Friday told reporters that the Navy cannot yet muster 75 fully mission-capable ships on any given day. (They are closer to 60.)

McLane also acknowledged the current situation in the Red Sea is less than ideal. The U.S. Navy has been very successful shooting down the drones and rockets fired by Houthi and other militia forces. But the Standard missiles they often use are is far more expensive than their targets. He said has highlighted a long-running inability to turn promising prototypes into deployed weapons—for example, lasers and other directed energy weapons.

“You know, when I was in Bahrain 10 years ago, the [USS Ponce] had a laser on it. And we're 10 years down the road and we still don't have something that we can field I mean. I find that frustrating. And I really want to put a lot of effort into accelerating that because that gives you so much when it comes to magazine capacity and, and speed and distance.”

But McLane said that the Navy is already putting lessons from Red Sea deployments to use, revamping how it deals with emerging problems like large volumes of cheap drones.

“We have our warfare tactics instructors involved in analyzing the data that we're getting…from the tapes on the [USS Carney] and the other ships and we're looking very closely at the profiles and what we have to do when it comes to radar tuning. And what we have to do when it comes to setting up our weapons systems on the ship to make sure that we have maximum defensive capability at all time.”

[Monash]

If only the US Navy had a small, cheap, effective and possibly modular warship design that could handle low intensity operations in confined waters thereby releasing it's larger, more expensive assets for the work they were really designed to do.

[Officer of Engineers]

If the USN is having a 1930s moment, it's having a 1930s RN moment. In the 1930s, the USN was sailing alone, taking on missions in support of its national objectives. In the 1930s, the RN was begging allies (including the USN) to start patrolling their own spheres of influence. The USN today does not patrol alone. Canadian and Australian warships are denying Chinese claims all over the Pacific.

[Albany Rifles]

If only the US Navy had a small, cheap, possibly modular warship design that could handle low intensity operations in confined waters effectively thereby releasing it's larger, more expensive assets for the work they were really designed to do.

We have finally woken up and have gone with building a true frigate built by license on the European FREMM design by Fincantieri Marinette Marine. They are being built on the Great Lakes (shades of World War 2) and are hitting the Fleet next year. They meat the niche you are addressing. I just wish it had a 5 inch gun!!!

[Albany Rifles]

If the USN is having a 1930s moment, it's having a 1930s RN moment. In the 1930s, the USN was sailing alone, taking on missions in support of its national objectives. In the 1930s, the RN was begging allies (including the USN) to start patrolling their own spheres of influence. The USN today does not patrol alone. Canadian and Australian warships are denying Chinese claims all over the Pacific.

Absolutely, Sir. We are in a coalition and not going it alone. And I won't leave out the Japanese and Korean navies as well!

[Monash]

We have finally woken up and have gone with building a true frigate built by license on the European FREMM design by Fincantieri Marinette Marine. They are being built on the Great Lakes (shades of World War 2) and are hitting the Fleet next year. They meat the niche you are addressing. I just wish it had a 5 inch gun!!!

At 7000 tons its hardly 'small', more like a low calorie Arleigh Burke. In fact it's obviously designed to plug into large combat task forces as and when needed. So while it appears to be an excellent design I'm not sure it solves the 'small ships for small jobs' problem.

[Albany Rifles]

At 7000 tons its hardly 'small', more like a low calorie Arleigh Burke. In fact it's obviously designed to plug into large combat task forces as and when needed. So while it appears to be an excellent design I'm not sure it solves the 'small ships for small jobs' problem.

Yeah...she is a lot bigger than an OHP but it is a very robust escort vessel. As for a brown water navy...the littoral combat ships (LCS) have been a total bust. Hell, the Coast Guard doesn't want them! That said I think we are dependent on Allies for the brown water ops much like the Mine/CounterMine mission during the Cold War under NAVEUR fell to the Europeans with better shallow water vessels. But it is still a hope that requirement synthesizes out of this process and we expand our brown water capability past the Cyclone class.

[Albany Rifles]

What was once the past is now the future.

FOr years DOD did maintenance on our systems based on a systemic plan...we changed the oil in our armored vehicles once a quarter. Glow plugs annually. Etc, etc.

Then about 15 years ago we switched to condition based maintenance...i.e. don't do a service until something breaks. Why? IOt was what industry did.

Once again, commercial off the shelf thinking is proving to not work in DOD.

https://www.defenseone.com/defense-s...enance/393451/

How the Navy is using deployed ships to improve maintenance

The goal is to keep ships at sea and those in queue up to date, the service’s surface warfare director said.



BY LAUREN C. WILLIAMS
SENIOR EDITOR
JANUARY 18, 2024

The Navy is using data from warships deployed in the Red Sea to improve its predictive maintenance and modernization efforts.

“We have opportunities to leverage real-world data given what the team is doing in the Red Sea right now,” Rear Adm. Fred Pyle, director for the surface warfare division in the office of the chief of naval operations, said Thursday at Govini’s Defense Software and Data Summit in Washington.

The Navy’s Surface and Mine Warfare Development Center manages and analyzes that data, then pushes it back to the deployed fleet.

“We take the lessons learned, we feed that back to the ships that are in theater to make sure they have the most current tactics. And at the same time, we're feeding into the next deployers so as they work up and they certify, they have that information as well,” Pyle said.

The Navy is also leaning on its software factory at land-based sites, he said, such as Wallops Island, Va., to reduce maintenance risks so that “whatever they're gonna deploy onto an afloat platform has at least been tested on a like system ashore.”

The Navy has been broadening its predictive maintenance efforts, weaving in automation, robotics and artificial intelligence. But the service still struggles to manage the data it has.

“We have 73 destroyers in the fleet today. We've been building this program for four years; we've been modernizing these ships for over three decades. So there's a ton of data out there,” Pyle said. “But the question is, do we have it in the right format so we can actually leverage that data? And that's something we're working on.”

One of the challenges is scheduling work far enough in advance—about 120 days— to give contractors time to make sure they have labor and parts ready for when a ship comes into drydock. That monthslong lag is partly due to the need for ship checks, a historically manual process the Navy wants to modernize.

“We're working to automate that process so we can leverage that data from four-plus decades and get to a more predictive…work package,” Pyle said. And “reducing the number of days in delayed maintenance.”

More automation could also prevent major surprise repairs, which can cause significant delays.

“That's an area where we struggle,” Pyle said. To fix that, the Navy must define the work package and use data to “make sure we understand the condition of the ship as it goes in.”

“Ships are coming into drydock and they need…to be scanned, you need to know where the defects are, what the problems are. Then you have to put it against the budget, to put it against the timeline, create a repair. So doing that in an automated fashion gets the ship in the ocean faster and increases battle readiness” and ultimately efficiency, Bruno Pontes Soares Rocha, chief operating officer for Gecko Robotics, said at the conference.

Gecko Robotics is currently using its predictive maintenance technology—a combination of robots and AI—to inspect the Navy’s Columbia-class nuclear submarines.

“But the problem is, we have parts from hundreds of suppliers that need to fit together. And there is a lengthy process” to make sure “they're actually going to fit,” he said. “There's a lot there, we're starting to see orders of magnitude gains in efficiency, but it's just the tip of the iceberg.”

[tbm3fan]

Then about 15 years ago we switched to condition based maintenance...i.e. don't do a service until something breaks. Why? IOt was what industry did.

That is not how I do things with my fleet of cars. Me, always stay up to date and a step ahead.

[Albany Rifles]

An intriguing read from a history professor who is also an adjunct professor at the US Merchant Marine Academy. The scenario is a pretty realistic one in the US Naval Institute's February issue of Proceedings. Wargaming scenarios like these was one way the US Navy prepared for World War 2 in the lean 1920s-1930s.



Logistics Wins (and Loses) Wars | Proceedings - February 2024 Vol. 150/2/1,452 (usni.org)

Logistics Wins (and Loses) Wars
The United States must build an afloat prepositioning force that is more nimble and adaptive to win in a potential conflict in the Pacific.
By Salvatore R. Mercogliano
February 2024
Proceedings
Vol. 150/2/1,452

THE AMERICAN SEA POWER PROJECT

In the run up to the scenario’s 2026 Chinese invasion of Taiwan, issues surrounding the U.S. Navy were well known. Numerous politicians, professionals, and experts criticized programs and shortfalls in the service. The inadequacy of the littoral combat ship, the decommissioning of Ticonderoga-class cruisers and loss of their vertical launch systems, and the delays in numerous ship construction programs all contributed to opening the famous “Davidson window.”¹
Amid this clamor, a smaller group highlighted an even more significant shortfall that had the potential to cripple the U.S. military—logistics, in particular, sealift. Unfortunately, while many highlighted the issues, few remedies were adopted before China launched its offensive in the western Pacific.

In a potential war scenario, China could use its economic clout to coerce the Panama and Suez Canal authorities to adopt a neutrality policy—effectively closing the canals to U.S. warships—or face an intentional repeat of the 2021 Ever Given incident. U.S. Navy (Donovan K. Patubo)

Fewer Ships, Greater Threat

One of the United States’ most powerful weapons in World War II was its ability not merely to produce “the Arsenal of Democracy,” but to deliver it to the battle front and to its allies anywhere on the globe, across contested seas. The U.S. Merchant Marine lost one in every ten ships and one in 26 personnel during that conflict, but by war’s end, it was the largest commercial fleet in the world, alongside the most powerful Navy. However, as the decades passed, while the U.S. Navy remained dominant, the U.S. Merchant Marine fell.
By 2026, China possessed the second largest Navy and commercial fleet in the world. The United States, while still possessing the number one Navy (in tonnage though not in hull numbers), had a merchant marine that ranked 21st.²
In Korea, Vietnam, Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the United States had the benefit of military bases and host-nation support close at hand. Logistics at sea were taken for granted, as material and supplies arrived just a few hundred miles from the war zones with no threats. In 1990 and again in 2003, the Afloat Prepositioning Force—created in 1985 to support the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, which evolved into Central Command—provided some of the first heavy sealift for land and air combat forces in theater. The Marine Corps initially had three brigades afloat. The Army placed an armored brigade and the combat support and combat service support for an entire brigade, along with a port opening package, on board ships. The Air Force loaded four ships with all the bombs, ammunition, and engineering support material to sustain combat operations for weeks.
By 2026, the Marine Corps had reduced its afloat prepositioning presence to just one brigade, split between Diego Garcia and the western Pacific. The ships in the latter sailed and operated around Korea, Japan, and the Marianas. The Army and Air Force had similarly cut back but retained portions of their earlier fleets, also equally divided. When China struck, these ships became prime targets.
The MV Maj. Bernard F. Fisher (T-AK-4396) was reaching the end of a long period of service with the Navy’s Military Sealift Command. First chartered in 1999, she was slated to come off contract in 2027, and it was unlikely the 41-year-old ship would be renewed for another five-year charter carrying U.S. Air Force ammunition.
That morning, the ship was riding at anchor at Chinhae, Republic of Korea. Because of her cargo, she rarely went pierside or in port; ships laden with explosives were set into anchorages far from populated areas. Commander, Fleet Activities Chinhae, arranged for all the services needed for the ship, including security.
Given the rising tension between China and the United States and the lack of suitable escort vessels, it was determined the best defense for the Fisher and other ships in the Afloat Prepositioning Force was to keep them at anchor or in port. The appearance of an unscheduled provision barge heading toward the Fisher triggered a security alert. Crews were aware of what had befallen the USS Cole (DDG-67) while in port in Yemen in 2000.
As patrol boats moved to intercept the barge and the on-duty helicopter moved into position, a trio of unmanned surface vessels—basically modified jet skis—launched from a nearby cove moved slowly toward the Fisher. Once the escort was distracted, the controllers of the USVs, well away from the area and linked to the craft via mobile array, throttled up and headed for the ship. With everyone’s attention drawn to the provision barge, it was the first assistant engineer having a cigarette break on the fantail who sighted the three USVs. By the time he called the bridge, the USVs were nearly on the Fisher.
The master on the bridge alerted the helicopter and patrol craft, but it was too late. All three USVs struck the starboard side of the Fisher, two amidships and one aft. The aft USV blew off the rudder, crippling the ship’s ability to maneuver, but it proved unnecessary. The two hits amidships penetrated the hull, and their explosive charges were enough to cook off several containers of ammunition. This initiated a domino effect of ammo containers exploding.
The master, seeing the initial cargo detonations, ordered the crew to abandon ship. As the portside lifeboat reached the main deck, the Fisher erupted into a massive ball of flames.

Unrep Under Attack

The Military Sealift Command (MSC) had been crewing and operating the U.S. Navy’s fleet of underway replenishment (UnRep) ships since the USS Taluga (AO-62) was transferred to its control in 1972. By the end of the Cold War, it was operating all the Navy’s auxiliary vessels. One of every five vessels in the fleet was manned by merchant mariners employed by MSC.³
In 2026, MSC employed nearly 5,600 merchant mariners to crew the UnRep fleet, but that represented only 1.2 people per billet, or six people for every five positions. This meant reliefs often were delayed well past the authorized four months, and what leave mariners were afforded did not last long before they were called back to work. While large signing and retention bonuses were available, crewing proved an issue.⁴
MSC divided its UnRep fleet equally between the Atlantic and Pacific, with more than half the ships assigned to the Pacific Fleet forward deployed to Japan, Korea, Singapore, and the Philippines. The morning of the attack found two oilers and one dry cargo/ammunition ship in Subic Bay.
The USNS John Lewis (T-AO-205), lead ship of the newest class of oilers in the MSC fleet, entered service in 2022 but did not actually deploy until 2024, well behind schedule. She rode at anchor at Subic Bay, while the USNS Charles Drew (T-AKE-10) set pierside taking on stores. Across the bay, at Keppel Marine, the venerable Henry J. Kaiser–class replenishment oiler USNS Tippecanoe (T-AO-199) sat in drydock undergoing repairs.
The Philippines had once been home to MSC’s first underway replenishment oilers, supporting the end of the Vietnam War and the carriers at Yankee Station. With the end of the Cold War, damage to U.S. facilities from the Mount Pinatubo eruption, and declining relations with the Philippine government, however, the United States left the base at Subic. China’s expansion into the South China Sea—both its militarization of newly created islands and challenges to Philippine sovereignty over several areas, including Second Thomas Shoal—led to a revitalized U.S. presence in the islands.
Along the shore of Subic Bay, new fuel tanks had sprouted up. With the closure of the Red Hill Fuel Facility in Hawaii, the United States adopted a policy of distributed fuel logistics, which meant more fuel prepositioned and stationed around the area.
The launch of medium-range ballistic missiles from southern China triggered alarms globally. The fear of nuclear strikes was ever present, but these missiles were not going far. As they completed their arcs and descended back to Earth, they headed for Subic Bay. The strike on Alava Wharf flattened the Port of Subic Administration building. The Charles Drew took a direct hit through the superstructure, and the explosion blew out her sides, causing her to roll against the wharf.
As the missiles angled toward the fuel farms, they broke apart into smaller weapons, starting a chain of explosions and incinerating millions of barrels of diesel and jet fuel. The Tippecanoe in the drydock also was a target, with hits against the ship and shore facilities. In the anchorage, the John Lewis conducted an emergency sortie to flee into the open waters off Luzon. The ship faced the difficult decision of where to head: sail north and place the ship between occupied Taiwan and Luzon or sail south and west within range of the contested islands in the South China Sea.
The loss of the UnRep ships and the capture of several survey and Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System vessels led the crews on several MSC ships to walk off and not return. Not guaranteed escorts, veteran benefits, or even military status of prisoners of war, many mariners sought safer and more gainful employment ashore.

Intimidation and Instigation

Merchant mariners on board the USNS Carl Brashear (T-AKE-7) conduct replenishment at sea with the USS Shoup (DDG-86). By the end of the Cold War, one of every five vessels in the Navy’s fleet was manned by merchant mariners. Should these auxiliary ships face loss or capture, the crews could leave for safer and more gainful employment ashore. AP Images (Mahmoud El-khawas/picture-alliance)
As the United States moved what was left of its afloat prepositioning forces from Diego Garcia to positions in northwest Australia and reinforced Guam and the Marianas, MSC sailed UnRep ships from the Atlantic and Mediterranean toward the war zone. A few days into the war, Chinese representatives met with the directors of the Panama and Suez Canal authorities. In both meetings, the representatives reaffirmed China’s friendship and called attention to the major role of Chinese shipping and trade in the financing and operation of the canals.
Both administrators were receptive to the meeting; however, they noted that the United States also was a major player in canal traffic and indicated they would keep the canals open for the movement of U.S. naval forces. At that point, assistants who had traveled with the Chinese group used their phones to send a signal. At the Agua Clara Locks in Panama and in the one-lane southern section of the Suez Canal were two Taiwanese-owned Evergreen ships. Both were transiting the canals, and both had been built in China.
During the ships’ construction, several hardware and software implants had been inserted. As the first Evergreen ship entered the Agua Clara Locks, a Chinese command overrode the throttle controls and kicked the ship ahead. By the time the crew reacted and were able to manually cut fuel to the engine, the ship had struck the forward tugboat and rammed into the gate of the lock. In the Suez, a different set of commands not only propelled the ship faster, but also sent the rudder hard over, repeating the Ever Given scenario of five years earlier.
In the administrators’ offices, the Chinese representatives warned of even greater threats, including destruction of Madden Dam, which would drain Gatun Lake, and mining of the Bab el-Mandeb near the southern end of the Red Sea from the Chinese base in Djibouti. It was enough to lead Panama and Egypt to announce a neutrality policy and prohibit the passage of any warship of a belligerent nation through their waters, akin to the policy used by Turkey a few years earlier.
Still reeling from the Chinese attack, the United States mobilized forces to deploy. This required the ships laid up in the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) and those of the U.S. Merchant Marine, in particular those enrolled in the Maritime and Tanker Security Programs.
The RRF, with an average ship age of 45 years, had seen its better days. There had been an effort to bring in new vessels, but it was hindered by the market and costs of even used ships. With U.S. shipbuilding on the decline and no incentive to build in the United States, the 48 ships of the RRF—divided between the East, Gulf, and West Coasts—were called on to transport reinforcements to Hawaii, the Marianas, Japan, and potentially Taiwan. Orders went out to activate the ships.
The SS Cape Island and her sister, the SS Cape Intrepid, were each 46 years old. Not only were they old, but they also used steam turbines for propulsion, and steam power had been rendered obsolete by IMO 2020. However, as government-owned ships of the U.S. Maritime Administration (MarAd), they could avoid these regulations.
It was supposed to take five days to activate the ships, but finding steam engineers with current U.S. Coast Guard credentials proved difficult. Added to this was the decision to mobilize all 48 RRF ships at the same time. MarAd had conducted test activations in the past, including a large one in 2019, but it had never pushed the personnel and crewing system to this level. Unions scoured their records for engineers and deck officers, and the Coast Guard was prepared to grant temporary certificates to get the ships underway.
China, using an aggressive social media presence and financing, was able to whip up opposition to the war to a greater level than imagined. Near the Old Tacoma, Washington, dock where the Cape Island and Cape Intrepid were outported, demonstrators gathered in Garfield Park. The group grew as the day went on, and the local police realized they had a larger issue when the crowd suddenly surged across North 30th Street and broke through the gate and headed toward the Cape Intrepid.
Not expecting the rush, the crew had the ship’s stern ramp down. The master ordered the crew to head to the upper deck and the gangway that connected to the outboard Cape Island. On board the Cape Island, the crew had been running a check on some of the ship’s generators. With power available, they laid out fire hoses on the deck and prepared to cover the egress of crew from the Cape Intrepid.
As those mariners retreated, the Cape Island crew turned their fire hoses toward the demonstrators who had illegally boarded the Cape Intrepid. The sounds of sirens from both shoreside and Commencement Bay indicated the arrival of police and Coast Guard reinforcements. While the Cape Island crew was able to keep the intruders off their ship, demonstrators set fire to the bridge of the Cape Intrepid and damaged equipment in her engine room. Demonstrations at similar sites around the United States led to other incidents and impeded the activation of several ships.
While ships of the RRF were undergoing activation, ships in the Maritime Security Program and Tanker Security Program were pulled from their worldwide routes to come under military charter. Included in these groups were the ships of APL (formerly American President Line), which provided service in the Pacific and were essential for delivering U.S. military cargo to Japan, Okinawa, and Korea. The APL ships were all foreign built and therefore could not be used in the closed Jones Act cabotage trade. Because of this, and because U.S. shipyard capacity on the West Coast was dominated by Navy and government contracts, APL had sent most of its ships into Chinese shipyards over the years.
The MV President Eisenhower had loaded out of Oakland and was sailing unescorted across the northern Pacific for Japan. Normally this run would not have been a concern, but with the outbreak of war, the passage raised concerns among the crew. They were told by the unions they would be eligible for bonuses when the ship crossed into the war zone and an additional amount should they be attacked. The exact location of the war zone had not been determined by the time the ship sailed, but the crew assumed that in the larger scheme of conflict, they would not draw much attention.
The President Eisenhower sailed a southerly route to Japan, avoiding the highly trafficked areas. Her AIS transponder was turned off, as ordered by the government, and the ship’s master took the added safety measure of collecting all the crew’s phones. This nearly generated a confrontation with some of the ship’s stewards, but she was able to convince them of the danger of being tracked by the Chinese.
Unfortunately, these efforts proved futile. During a recent shipyard period in China, agents had fitted a transmitter that linked to satellites and relayed the real-time position of the President Eisenhower. Off the Galapagos Islands, a massive Chinese fishing fleet had been under surveillance by the United States, but one aged Coast Guard medium-endurance cutter could not track all several hundred vessels. A few of these ships slipped away, while decoys and false signals confused the actual tracking.
One of these fishing vessels, part of China’s maritime militia, headed to intercept the President Eisenhower. As it tracked the U.S. container ship, the ship launched a series of unmanned aerial vehicles. The composite material UAVs were nearly undetectable and headed in formation toward the President Eisenhower.
The President Eisenhower’s crew had no indication of the threat until the first UAV crashed into the bridge. The UAVs did not carry large warheads, but the hit was sufficient to kill the mate on watch and wound the helmsman. Additional UAVs hit the superstructure and on-deck containers. The fire in the superstructure was quickly extinguished, but the cargo on deck proved more challenging. The Mayday call eventually was answered by the sole MSC salvage ship in the Pacific, the new USNS Navajo (T-ATS 6). The ship performed heroically in extinguishing the fire and towing the President Eisenhower toward Midway Island, where it remained until after the war to be salvaged.

Unready for War

The ships of the U.S. Merchant Marine were unready for the war that was thrust on them in 2026. As had happened time and time again, the nation had taken its sealift forces for granted. While in past wars, the United States had never come up short, in 2026, the situation proved dramatically different and undercut the military’s ability to come to the defense of Taiwan and counter the Chinese strikes in the western Pacific.
The logistical situation facing the United States today is perhaps the most precarious in the nation’s history. The 2026 scenario highlights current and prospective dangers that require immediate attention. The potential for action in and around the western Pacific necessitates reconstituting and building an afloat prepositioning force that is nimbler and more adaptive to potential peer-to-peer conflicts. With many of MSC’s UnRep ships forward deployed, creating a new Tanker Security Program and outfitting commercial tankers for consolidation operations are the first steps in reconstituting the shuttle ships that would be needed to support naval units in the western Pacific.⁵
The decline in repair facilities in the continental United States means many U.S. ships are maintained in overseas shipyards, the majority in China. The United States needs to resume construction of commercial ships, which would stimulate domestic shipyards and expand ship repair capabilities. The size of the Chinese merchant marine, fishing fleet, and maritime militia versus that of the diminutive U.S. fleet provides a quantity and quality advantage on the world’s oceans.
After World War I and before the outbreak of World War II, the Merchant Marine Acts of 1920 and 1936 set the stage for construction of the commercial fleet that transported the Arsenal of Democracy and facilitated the building of the Two-Ocean Navy. A new Merchant Marine Act is needed to restore the United States as a true sea power that can project both naval and commercial sea power. Without renewed high-level interest and investment in the maritime sector, the logistical scenario of 2026 looks bleak for the United States.

1. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2021, Admiral Phil Davidson, then Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, warned China could take action against Taiwan before the end of the decade. This has become known as the “Davidson window.”
2. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Review of Maritime Transport 2023 (United Nations, 2023), unctad.org/publication/review-maritime-transport-2023.
3. Military Sealift Command, 2022 in Review (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2022), www.msc.usff.navy.mil/Portals/43/Publications/Annual%20Report/MSCAnnual22.pdf?ver=OKxmbutejhaTez5PYdiOWg%3d%3d).
4. See Military Sealift Command, sealiftcommand.com/.
5. See Irene Smith, “DLA Expands Refueling Capability and Pacific Resiliency,” DLA Energy News, 28 May 2015.

[Albany Rifles]

The USNI journal, Proceedings, is really having some great stories this issue. Proceedings was launched in 1874, and is one of the oldest continuously published magazines in the United States. Proceedings covers topics concerning global security and includes articles from military professionals and civilian experts, historical essays, book reviews, full-color photography, and reader commentary. This one is on the US shipbuilding industry. I have not provided a link as it is a pay only site but here is the article.

The United States Must Improve Its Shipbuilding Capacity
Major Jeffrey L. Seavy, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
February 2024

Proceedings

Vol. 150/2/1,452
Today, China’s shipbuilding industry and the growing capacity of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) gives China an overwhelming strategic advantage against the United States in a potential sustained conflict. To withstand the bow wave, the U.S. Navy must field complete and proven capabilities in an efficient, effective, and timely manner—which will require addressing shortcomings in ship design, production, maintenance, and repair, as well as challenges with the supply chain and human capital.
Currently, the United States and China have relative parity in overall economic output. In terms of shipbuilding, however, China has 46.59 percent of the global market and is the largest builder, with South Korea second at 29.24 percent, and Japan third with 17.25 percent. The United States has a relative insignificant capacity at 0.13 percent.
Design
Until the end of the Cold War, the Navy did a good job designing its own ships. However, as more work shifted to private industry, the Navy reduced its in-house naval architecture and engineering staff from roughly 1,200 to 300. Unproven critical ship systems and subsystems were allowed to move to production before they were validated. This led to design and production issues with the littoral combat ship and Zumwalt-class destroyers. There have been similar design missteps with the Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carriers, San Antonio- and America-class amphibious ships, and Virginia-class submarines.
Critical systems must be proven and tested with other critical systems and subsystems before a ship is produced. To do so, the Navy needs to fully own the technology and data. Further, the systems must be designed so sailors can maintain the equipment while deployed.
Build
The greatest challenge the Navy faces in preparing for a potential war with China is reestablishing its ability to build, maintain, and repair ships. China subsidizes its shipping industry, with 20 large shipyards building military and civilian commercial ships and 140 dry docks to enable rapid expansion and a massive maintenance and damage repair capability.
The United States once considered its merchant fleet and shipyards as strategic capability, and ships and shipyards were subsidized by taxpayers. Unfortunately, subsidizes were eliminated in the 1980s, and the U.S. contribution to global output shrank from 0.50 percent to about 0.05 percent. On a labor and construction cost basis, U.S. shipyards cannot compete with foreign yards. Without a steady supply of contracts, they cannot maintain the industrial infrastructure or employ skilled workers.
Most U.S. naval warships have only one builder, heavily specialized for the specific ship type. To keep cost down, Congress ensures a predictable and stable flow of contracts, which is more affordable for the taxpayer, and provides the builder with stable flow of funds to keep their workforce stable. However, because of this specialization, there is no efficient way to surge or delay production. The shipyards and suppliers do not have alternate customers to take up the slack if the government interrupts a contract. If the government asks a builder to speed up, there is no ready pool of skill workers or equipment in standby. If the U.S. government cannot provide the naval contracts to support the shipyard and its workers, it will need to subsidize the yards to build other commercial ships.
Maintain and Repair
The United States does not have the shipyard capacity to build new ships and fully maintain or repair ships it currently holds in inventory. Given current shipyard capacity, the Navy is estimated to be 20 years behind in maintenance work. Viable ships are being decommissioned because of the inability to maintain, overhaul, modernize, or complete service life extensions. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is concerned about the backlog, noting in a 2021 report, “In light of ongoing shipyard challenges to keep up with regular maintenance demand, battle damage repairs may further exacerbate these challenges.” The report further noted, “The rise of 21st century adversaries capable of producing high-end threats in warfare—referred to as great power competitors—revives the need for the Navy to reexamine its battle damage repair capability to ensure it is ready for potential conflict.”
Public Yards
Currently, there are four public shipyards in the United States with 17 dry docks. These yards are owned by the U.S. government and support maintenance, depot-level maintenance, emergency repairs, and modernization. In a 2022 report, GAO noted it previously had calculated maintenance delays in aircraft carrier and submarine repairs from fiscal year 2015 through 2019 were equivalent to losing use of more than half a carrier and three submarines each year. “Delays in shipyard maintenance directly affect the Navy’s readiness by hindering its ability to conduct training and operations with its ships,” it added.
To address these issues, the Navy started a 20-year, $21 billion program to replace and modernize infrastructure in 2018. Unfortunately, GAO noted in the 2022 report, “While the condition of the shipyards’ facilities generally improved, they are still among the lowest scored depot facilities across DoD. All shipyards have an average facility condition that is in the ‘Poor’ category.”
To address these critical deficiencies, the public yards should be allocated an additional $30 billion over five years to bring them up to a status of a status of “good”—the best possible score. Further, a separate allocation of $20 billion should be provided to establish a new public yard in San Diego or San Francisco.
Private Yards
The United States should move to increase private ship building capacity from 0.13 percent to 1.3 percent within two years, with an aim to reach 5 percent in five years. This would require economic incentives—i.e., subsidizes—to expand the shipbuilding industry.¹ The United States already incentivizes hundreds of industries with subsidizes; having shipyards that can build, maintain, and repair ships in an efficient and effective manner is a national security imperative. Private yards, and the supply chain behind them, should be allocated $50 billion over five years to jumpstart the industry.
Flexibility for Navy and Jobs for Americans
The new subsidizes and direct government investment would drive jobs at the shipyards, providing an opportunity for U.S. industry to rebuild its industrial manufacturing base. Once the industrial base expands, U.S.-based suppliers could decouple critical supply chain items, which are numerous, from China’s supply chain.
It will take time to build, renovate, and reopened shipyards. Specialized equipment will need to be built. It also will take time to recruits and train the workforce. Concurrently, subcontractors and suppliers will need to build their own infrastructure and work forces.
Once the new capacity is in place, the shipyards will be able to throttle up and throttle down naval production or maintenance without putting workers and companies out of business, as they will be subsidized to work on commercial ships when they are not building or repairing naval ships. The increase in shipyards capacity would lower the risk of sole-source contractors producing single ship types and help drive down costs while supporting innovation.
The expanded facilities would have the capacity to tackle the yearslong maintenance backlog, providing the fleet with more advantageous maintenance windows to ensure operational efficiency for maintenance, training, and deployments. Time also would be available for emergency combat repair training at public and private yards, developing the skills needed to quickly return ships to the fight. Capacity could also be allocated to better maintain Ready Reserve Force and National Reserve Fleet ships for emergency use.
Onboard Maintenance and Battle-Damaged Repair
At the end of the Cold War, the Navy also cut or eliminated Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities (SIMAs); afloat destroyer and submarine tenders that provided intermediate (I-level) maintenance support for deployed ships and submarines; and organizational (O-level) maintenance onboard combat ships. This resulted in a significant loss of fleet maintenance skills, including onboard ship self-sufficiency, material readiness, and battle-damage repair capability. These capabilities must be brought back to the fleet; crews must know how to fix their own ships. The Navy should expand forward SIMAs facilities with its partners worldwide, with emphasis on those adjacent to the South and East China Seas. Afloat destroyer and submarine tenders need to be reestablished. An allocation of $2 billion should be provided to establish these three capabilities.
Allies and Partners
To be successful, the United States needs to integrate with its allies and work closely with numerous partner nations. In the event of war, allies and partners will need to rely South Korea and Japan, the only two counties with enough shipyard capacity to have a meaningful impact.
For now, the United States and other allies could partner with South Korean and Japanese shipbuilders to co-own entities and open additional commercial shipyards as combined national security programs. The United States supported Japanese and South Korean industry during the Cold War to fend off the Soviet Union; the same logic now holds to fend off China.
Options
Until the United States can fully address capacity and shipyard deficiencies, the following stopgap measures could be taken:

• Purchase and store equipment and floating drydocks for later wartime use, ensuring the tools are available to build and repair ships.
• Build proven designs in nonstandard ways—for example, the Arleigh Burke class is built in 70-plus subsections, some of which could be built across the United States. Subsections could be further broken down to allow for shipment via truck, railway, or down the Mississippi or through the Great Lakes to shipyards for final assembly.
• Design and build midsize shallow diving diesel-electric submarines and semisubmersible ships. These could include a mix of manned and unmanned vessels with limited sensors focusing on antiship or antiair missions. The design should allow them to be mass produced in subsections throughout the United States.
• Retrofit civilian ships with limited sensors focusing on antiship and antiair missions.
• Increase the number of aircraft to fill strike and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions.
• Convert civilian ships into small pocket carries for vertical take-off aircraft and convert smaller ship into lily pads for refueling and rearming.
• Saturate the battle space with small, unmanned ships for ISR and strike capabilities. These platforms could be built in a few small sections throughout the country.
• Increase production of ultra-long-range antisubmarine and antiship missiles. The expanded use of ISR platforms would feed targeting information for extended range weapons.

Looking Forward
The price of peace is high. However, the price of war is far higher. The United States must invest in its public and private shipyards to ensure it has the legs to win a long war. It must get back to the basics and build the industrial and human capacity to compete with China.
1.Congress passed numerous Merchant Marine Acts in 1916, 1920, 1928, 1936, 1946, and 1970 to address to shortfalls with the maritime industry in the belief that they were essential to the nation’s defense. The acts were far less effective than advertised; however, they did provide the United States with significant more capability than it currently possesses.

[tbm3fan]

Well, first off, ship building was always going to move overseas for the lower wages once those countries could evolve enough to acquire the tools. Less private building here, equals less private yards, means indirectly affecting Navy ship building. Two, somewhere, somehow, the checks and balances for designing a ship and it's systems so that they work together and perform the task we want went off the rails. I'm going to say at about the same time we transitioned to private yards. Bringing me to three, and that is I always thought the day would come when closing down yards like Mare Island and LBNSY would bite us in the ass. Those yards did tons of work on existing ships by men highly experienced in warships. LBNSY is completely gone while Mare is still there.

As far as tenders we have two Sub (AS) Tenders at Guam and we have zero Destroyer (AD) Tenders. In fact we have zero ship repair assets outside of those two sub tenders based on what I see at NavSource.

[Albany Rifles]

Well, first off, ship building was always going to move overseas for the lower wages once those countries could evolve enough to acquire the tools. Less private building here, equals less private yards, means indirectly affecting Navy ship building. Two, somewhere, somehow, the checks and balances for designing a ship and it's systems so that they work together and perform the task we want went off the rails. I'm going to say at about the same time we transitioned to private yards. Bringing me to three, and that is I always thought the day would come when closing down yards like Mare Island and LBNSY would bite us in the ass. Those yards did tons of work on existing ships by men highly experienced in warships. LBNSY is completely gone while Mare is still there.

As far as tenders we have two Sub (AS) Tenders at Guam and we have zero Destroyer (AD) Tenders. In fact we have zero ship repair assets outside of those two sub tenders based on what I see at NavSource.

Exactly. We ate our seed corn. We need to bite the bullet and reestablish the capabilities.

[tbm3fan]

Exactly. We ate our seed corn. We need to bite the bullet and reestablish the capabilities.

I'm sure that if Rusty were still around he would have a thing or two to say about closed bases and what the impact would be of losing the knowledge base going forward.

[Albany Rifles]

I'm sure that if Rusty were still around he would have a thing or two to say about closed bases and what the impact would be of losing the knowledge base going forward.

You took the words out of my mouth!