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I'm pretty sure I just saw a F-35 in the landing pattern at MCAS Miramar, which would be a first for me. It didn't look like an F/A18, but it was rather hard to see (stealth!) as it was hazy this afternoon. I was on the I-15 and as I came in line with the runway, it looked like he executed a missed approach.
I'm pretty sure I just saw a F-35 in the landing pattern at MCAS Miramar, which would be a first for me. It didn't look like an F/A18, but it was rather hard to see (stealth!) as it was hazy this afternoon. I was on the I-15 and as I came in line with the runway, it looked like he executed a missed approach.
Anyways, thought it was rather cool to finally see one out here.
Clearly the system can generate bearings of an active source at long range. What is interesting is that it credits it with being able to establish range in one of two conditions: close range or active jammer. The key phrase seems to be 'narrowband interleaved search and track', which honestly I don't know the meaning of. A google search did turn up a article reference on F-16.net:
"High-priority emitters -- such as fighter aircraft at close range -- can be tracked in real time by the ALR-94. In this mode, called narrowband interleaved search and track (NBILST), the radar is used only to provide precise range and velocity data to set up a missile attack. If a hostile aircraft is injudicious in its use of radar, the ALR-94 may provide nearly all the information necessary to launch an AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missile (AAM) and guide it to impact, making it virtually an anti-radiation AAM."
So it looks like for the crucial range component something would have to be active...but since the bearing and azimuth have been determined, the frequency of the range measurement doesn't matter: you aren't attempting to localize the target, just get the ping return time to determine range. So I think your assessment that the antennas are low power emitters that could ping a target at close range probably is accurate from the open source descriptions I've seen.
The other stipulation, that the aircraft is jamming, presumes long range detection is possible if there is an active ECM. That part I definitely don't understand - I would think ECM like active radar could be tracked by bearing but I don't see how you would get any range component without the fighter using its radar.
"At close range or against targets using Jammers it is capable of narrowband interleaved search and track, which provides precise range and velocity that can then be used to shoot a missile without the need of the APG-81, allowing a 360 degree sphere of targeting other aircraft."
This is a little hard to parse. I still took that to mean that the system is operating in a passive mode and that if two conditions are met - very close range (and presumably quick bearing changes to average out ambiguities) or active jamming (presumably a more powerful signal? Or else potentially using a false target jamming mode against it self for localization? Hard to say). To me that still implies a passive track, although I still don't see how you could establish range without target speed. Maybe the speed can be extrapolated from doppler shift of the carrier wave plus bearing change? I'd hate to have to make THAT calculation by hand.
That said, that wouldn't exclude an active mode that created false targets (of F-35ish size) or other more specific push off/pull off deceptive modes, though in the case of the latter I'd expect the towed decoy to be the primary emitter as it implies a missile has a lock.
I interpreted "search and track" to mean actively radiating (at low power) to find and target objects at close range in areas the APG-81 doesn't cover. In which case radiating other signals for ECM purposes shouldn't present a challenge.
If it's referring to a passive function that picks up and localizes emission sources such as hostile fighter radar, that wouldn't be a close range function. Detection and localization of hostile radar emissions looking for the F-35 should have a much greater effective range than even the APG-81's ability to find that target due to not requiring a return bounce. I would think an actively radiating target could be engaged at significant while the F-35 stays entirely passive by using a data link to guide the AIM-120 like an anti-radiation missile.
I'm just not sure where the "close range" stipulation would come into play if the system is entirely passive.
"At close range or against targets using Jammers it is capable of narrowband interleaved search and track, which provides precise range and velocity that can then be used to shoot a missile without the need of the APG-81, allowing a 360 degree sphere of targeting other aircraft."
This is a little hard to parse. I still took that to mean that the system is operating in a passive mode and that if two conditions are met - very close range (and presumably quick bearing changes to average out ambiguities) or active jamming (presumably a more powerful signal? Or else potentially using a false target jamming mode against it self for localization? Hard to say). To me that still implies a passive track, although I still don't see how you could establish range without target speed. Maybe the speed can be extrapolated from doppler shift of the carrier wave plus bearing change? I'd hate to have to make THAT calculation by hand.
That said, that wouldn't exclude an active mode that created false targets (of F-35ish size) or other more specific push off/pull off deceptive modes, though in the case of the latter I'd expect the towed decoy to be the primary emitter as it implies a missile has a lock.
So you are confident that the antennas on the wings and stabilizers function as low power emitters? I suspect minimal power would be required for most forms of deceptive jamming considering how little energy would reflect off the airframe, but I've never seen any written description of the ASQ-2239 explicitly state that the antennas are transmitters as well as receptors. It would be a rather capable system in terms of band and bearing coverage.
Reasonably confident. I don't know how it could perform the functions listed below without transmitting, and the article specifically states that it isn't the APG-81. Naturally anything in the realm of EW is shadowy at best when it comes to public information, but I think it's a relatively safe assumption that the ASQ-239's antennas are capable of transmitting. If they have enough juice to perform search and track functions for 360 degree targeting they should certainly be able to mimic the F-35's radar echo and throw in a little doppler shift to screw with hostile SAMs or fighters.
The AN/ASQ-239 “Barracuda” is an integrated Electronic Warfare (EW) and self-defense system. It is able to operate not just with other components within the aircraft such as the APG-81 but it can also operate with other F-35’s over MADL to perform EW operations together.
It’s able to precisely geo-locate emission locations hundreds of kilometers away, further then it’s radar can see and from there the APG-81 can be slaved to that data track and then detect and track the object with a very narrow beam, increasing power and detection on target while decreasing detection by other aircraft.
At close range or against targets using Jammers it is capable of narrowband interleaved search and track, which provides precise range and velocity that can then be used to shoot a missile without the need of the APG-81, allowing a 360 degree sphere of targeting other aircraft.
The Barracuda can refer to its data-banks of known emissions and identify the source vehicle or store it for future classification. Other features are false target generation and range-gate stealing, offensive EW is possible, a towed RF decoy is also a part of the package as is a MJU-68/B Flares system.
So you are confident that the antennas on the wings and stabilizers function as low power emitters? I suspect minimal power would be required for most forms of deceptive jamming considering how little energy would reflect off the airframe, but I've never seen any written description of the ASQ-2239 explicitly state that the antennas are transmitters as well as receptors. It would be a rather capable system in terms of band and bearing coverage.
Somewhat off topic question: is the F-35's active ECM system limited to the AGP-81 only? that would have directional and frequency limits. I'm aware the ASQ-239 covers 360 degrees and most of the radar spectrum in terms of geolocation, but the only other active emitter besides the radar seems to be the towed decoy.
The ASQ-239 is pretty versatile. It detects, and locates emission sources, as you mentioned. It can also perform search and track functions to provide range and velocity against targets at close range or that are using jammers. This allows it to cue a missile for 360 degree targeting of other aircraft without using the APG-81, much like the DAS but via radar rather than IR. This indicates that the 10 antennas the system has are capable of emissions and not just passive reception. It can also use these antennas for ECM functions that don't require the high power of the AESA radar such as false target generation and range-gate pull off/stealing.
The ASQ-39 also quarterbacks the F-35's autonomous responses. It can utilize the APG-81, towed decoys, flares, etc. for ECM responses but also operates over MADL with networked F-35s to perform EW operations cooperatively.
Somewhat off topic question: is the F-35's active ECM system limited to the AGP-81 only? that would have directional and frequency limits. I'm aware the ASQ-239 covers 360 degrees and most of the radar spectrum in terms of geolocation, but the only other active emitter besides the radar seems to be the towed decoy.
f-35 is just a hardware.... while Turkey is a vital part of NATO southern flank. If it turns into Russian ally, it will be more damage than any f-35 secrets in Russian hands. Plus.... I doubt F-35 is that capable to be that valuable loss. Have read this thread some time back - US Defence Sector has lost its reasonableness completelly with this program
The F-35 is certainly valuable, but Russian agents looking up the F-35's skirt isn't necessarily a terrible strategic threat. Russian industry just isn't capable of building anything comparable whether they have the hardware specs or not. Additionally much of the F-35's capability is software driven and not even allied operators have access to the core code.
This is a trend that actually started with the F-22, where the situational awareness and computational power is more valuable than the physical hardware of the jet. F-22 pilots have repeatedly said that the F-22's speed, maneuverability, acceleration, and even stealth are some of the least impressive aspects of the jet. The F-35 takes the informational and networking dominance even further and that kind of capability isn't readily replicated by examining the jet itself.
Turkey doesn't even share a border with Russia. It is hardly pivotal as it was during the cold war. It has a much bigger role to play in Mid East politics, but in that arena it is largely antagonistic to US interests. Two centuries of history along with The Sultan's ego will ensure that Turkey and Russia are never close allies. They cooporate in Syria to a limited extent out of necessity and convenience. Even now Russia is disregarding Turkish interests and concerns in Idlib and this will likely extend to Afrin and Al Baub once Idlib is reconquered.
The F-35 should be denied to Turkey and it probably would be if Turkey didn't produce a small number of parts for the aircraft that would be time consuming to re certify from another source. Unfortunately that delay in production will probably result in the aircraft still being delivered to the Recepticons.
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