Russia claims new tank invisible to radar/IR

[citanon]

If we goto DEFCON 3, US nukes are automatically readied. If we don't goto DEFCON 3, that means this is a surprise nuclear strike on a NATO ally which automatically necessitate at the very least, the cocking of the nuclear trigger and no one, not even Putin, can predict a panic response. That is why we don't have a launch on warning. It's way too dangerous. What do you would happen if we have a confirmed nuclear impact? On an ally?

Also, 65% of NATO's nuclear arsenal (and that's including the Brits and French) are ready to launch within 30 minutes. The Russians are at 10%. They're counting on crisis management to give them the time to ready their nukes. They have their SSBNs to respond to a surprise attack but other their ICBMs are dormant. How do we know this? We have inspectors on the ground ... as they do us ... as per the START.

So no, this article when it comes to nukes is not useful and in fact, extremely misleading. The Russians are not prepared to use nukes. Their force structure precludes it and if they did launch with their current force posture, they will be on the worst receiving end of the exchange.

Col,

How current is the information on the 65% / 10%, and where is the trend line going?

[Officer of Engineers]

I've always heard the distinction as one based primarily on target set.

Hit a column of armor or military base= Tactical nuke
Hit industry or a city = Strategic nuke

Was the distinction between devices as tactical or strategic made obsolete with the advent of variable yield devices or was there never a distinction to begin with?

This is Europe. A nearby city is always needed to support an army base. Canadian Forces Base Lahr was located 6 km from Lahr Germany. At 3x120kt devices, you can see how much damage Lahr is going to suffer.

This is a bit of a surprise to me. I knew that offensive use of nukes invited retaliation and escalation, but hitting the enemy on your own territory as well?

That was always the case and in fact, standard NATO policy. We officially never subscribed to no first use but also look at it from the attacker's POV. You've just used a nuke. Do I sit back and allow you to win this war? To allow you to destroy my invasion force and leave my homeland defenceless to a counter invasion or worst, nuclear blackmail?

In the case of the Chinese, if the Soviets allow the Chinese to use their nukes (they only have less than 12 at the time) just once, then how long do the Chinese have before their launch pads are overrunned? It's a case of use them or lose them. And do you think the Soviets are going to allow the Chinese the time to use them?

Which is why this article makes no sense. Putin is ready to lose 90% of his nukes by launching a surprise nuclear attack.

[Officer of Engineers]

How current is the information on the 65% / 10%, and where is the trend line going?

It's from the NUCLEAR NOTEBOOK, the BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS but I can't find the year at the moment. It's been going down. During the Cold War, we were at 80% and the Soviets at 25%. Budget cuts have mainly cause the readiness reduction.

[Officer of Engineers]

And if the Russians need a nuke to take on Estonia, Latvia, AND Lithuania, then they're in worst shape than we can imagine. It's damned ludicrous to even suggest they need a nuke to even scare those countries.

[jlvfr]

And if the Russians need a nuke to take on Estonia, Latvia, AND Lithuania, then they're in worst shape than we can imagine. It's damned ludicrous to even suggest they need a nuke to even scare those countries.

The problem isn't Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. It's after things get messy with the rest of NATO...

[Officer of Engineers]

The problem isn't Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. It's after things get messy with the rest of NATO...

What's the target? What target can you hit that won't invite automatic retaliation? Even if you don't believe NATO won't defend Eastern Europe, what target can you nuke that would force a NATO backdown and hand you the territories you've just conquered? Bucharest? Would that scare Washington? London? Paris? Or even Bonn? How about Warsaw? Can Europe allow Poland to fall under Moscow once again? How about something smaller? Like an American assembly point?

Once you start going through the details, there is no nuclear demonstration that would force a NATO backdown. If anything, it would strengthen their resolve not to let Moscow get away with it because if you let Moscow get away with it once? What makes you think they won't try again?

We know it. They know it. What's more, Putin, being a Cold Warrior, knows it more than anyone else.

[Stitch]

There is no such thing as tac nukes. One flies. They all fly. We have gone over this a 1000 times during the Cold War. Israel explodes a nuke on Syria. China explodes a nuke on a Russian column inside Chinese territory. There is not one scenario that did not go out to a full nuclear exchange.

Yeah! Haven't you watched War Games?

[jlvfr]

What's the target? What target can you hit that won't invite automatic retaliation?

Don't get me wrong. I don't believe in limited nuclear exchange. It's a falacy, easily disproved by anyone that games any proper scenario or game (as opposed by stuff fabricated to achive the result certain people want). The point is, imho, nukes would most likely start being used tatically once Russia starts loosing a ground war vs NATO... and then it's game over.

[Doktor]

Don't get me wrong. I don't believe in limited nuclear exchange. It's a falacy, easily disproved by anyone that games any proper scenario or game (as opposed by stuff fabricated to achive the result certain people want). The point is, imho, nukes would most likely start being used tatically once Russia starts loosing a ground war vs NATO... and then it's game over.

Let's see, Russians move to the Baltics or Poland, NATO groups to repel them... How far any of the two armies moves before the lobbing starts?

[jlvfr]

Let's see, Russians move to the Baltics or Poland, NATO groups to repel them... How far any of the two armies moves before the lobbing starts?

I think it depends a lot on who's in charge on both sides. Putin, for exemple, doesn't seem the "back down to west" type... and if the US has a Trump in charge...

[Officer of Engineers]

Nuclear-armed forces have fought each other before and not gone nuclear. Sino-Soviet, Israeli-Soviet, Sino-US (Vietnam), Soviet-US (Korea).

[SteveDaPirate]

Let's see, Russians move to the Baltics or Poland, NATO groups to repel them... How far any of the two armies moves before the lobbing starts?

I think it depends on when one side experiences what it considers an existential threat. If NATO pushed the Russians back to their current borders and stopped, it may stay as a conventional fight. If NATO starts a serious drive on Moscow, it probably won't stay a conventional fight for long.

I'm curious where the "Red Line" would be for NATO to respond with nukes rather than conventional forces. Warsaw? Oder–Neisse? Berlin?

The fact that reinforcements from CONUS can't arrive instantly, means that plans must assume the Russians will be able to push into NATO territory for some distance before NATO rallies to push them back out again. I would assume that as long as NATO figured they could reverse Russian gains with conventional power once the alliance brings it's weight to bear, the nukes will stay in their silos.

[Doktor]

Nuclear-armed forces have fought each other before and not gone nuclear. Sino-Soviet, Israeli-Soviet, Sino-US (Vietnam), Soviet-US (Korea).

Except Sino-Soviet conflict none were on a nuclear power turf. How far could Chinese missiles reach at the time?

[Officer of Engineers]

They were IRBMs stationed at Lop Nor, the furthest Western base in China. In theory, they could have reached Moscow. Doesn't mean that they could hit Moscow, hence the reliance on a 5 megaton warhead.

[S2]

I'm presuming the Colonel's objections to Rathke's commentary lies here-

"...The uncertainty over the security of northeast Europe is compounded by geography and ambiguity about whether and how Russia would use its nuclear arsenal. Russia’s military doctrine, which was updated in 2014, formally reserves nuclear weapons for use only in response to an attack on Russia using nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, or in response to a conventional attack when Russia’s existence as a state is at risk. But public comments by Russian officials and retired military officers, as well as Russian exercise scenarios, suggest that Moscow could also contemplate limited nuclear strikes as a way of raising the stakes in a conflict and “de-escalating” by confronting its opponent with the possibility of a nuclear response. This divergence between doctrine and other indications of Russian planning gives rise to a nightmare scenario for countries in NATO’s east: a Russian land grab (similarly swift as in Crimea) and the threat of nuclear “de-escalation” to confront Washington, Berlin, Paris, and London with the catastrophic choice of risking a nuclear conflict over several thousand square miles in northeast Europe. This could freeze the conflict in place, with NATO territory lost and credibility of the United States and the West vitiated worldwide.

Is that Russia’s goal? The re-drawing of Ukraine’s borders, and Russia’s continued occupation of 25% of the Republic of Georgia’s territory feeds increasing doubts about its intentions that cannot be ignored. Russia’s intentions toward NATO are harder to judge; Russia traditionally has been cautious towards NATO, but that caution may not be shared by a new generation of Russian military and political leaders – Russia increasingly engages in assertive and dangerous activities such as violations of NATO airspace by Russian warplanes, and nuclear saber-rattling against NATO members (and NATO partners such as Sweden and Finland). The alliance’s priority is avoiding a scenario ever arising in which the United States and NATO have to contemplate how to regain an ally’s conquered territory, so an updated policy and deterrence posture is prudent and necessary for stability on NATO’s eastern border. Without evidence to suggest that Russia’s posture will change, NATO and the United States must be prepared to deal with this situation for at least the coming 5-10 years..."

If so, how Rathke achieved dismissal by the Colonel from this is difficult to fathom?

It is indisputable that Russia holds a compelling interest in re-drawing borders along its western and southern peripheries. They've proven willing to do so already at the cost to others in thousands of lives despite the surreptitious yet unplausibly deniable nature of their so-called "hybrid" conflict. How?

IMV, the key component lies in our present strategic security architecture and the paralysis generated by dilemmas not fitting a pre-conceived box. Anybody here who is prepared to argue that NATO/Europe/U.S. immediately presented Russia with a coherent, firm and rapid response to Georgia, Crimea or Donetsk/Luhansk is full of sh!t. Further, anybody who'd suggest that paralysis in decision-making is resolved is, equally, full of it.

If so, you'd damned well best be ready for the worst...and least likely. It's a gambit to present NATO's leadership with a fait accompli occupation of eastern Estonia, maybe all of Latvia and Poland east to the Bug. I believe they've the forces to accomplish this and the means to assemble inside our response cycle. If compounded with a limited tactical nuclear strike(s) on ostensibly militarily-significant targets absent in large measure of civilians, our present civil-military leadership would be utterly freaked...

...and paralyzed.

By the time they arose from their insensibility and collectively got their act together, we'd be faced with military operations to recapture seized NATO territory...or acquiesce to the accomplished fact and begin spinning our after-the-fact rationales/blame game.

What makes Rathke's commentary relevant is recognition that circumventing such a nightmare BEGINS with rotating ground forces of no less than battalion size into each threatened environ as a matter of present defense policy. Doing so immediately ups the ante for the Russians and increases likelihood of early detection of assembling forces. Slinging even a few tactical nukes might cause U.S. or German troops to immediately become victims of a pre-emptive nuclear strike. That would dispel, by itself, much of the haze and paralysis within our respective NCAs that might otherwise accompany a limited land grab. The Russians likely appreciate this would cap the benefit to a limited tactical strike and leave them having to immediately confront NATO ground forces conventionally on the intended objective.

The key is the constant forward positioning of NATO ground forces as an active deterrent which must be immediately included into any Russian calculus for attack.