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1969: Massive Soviet invasion; nuclear option

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  • 1969: Massive Soviet invasion; nuclear option

    This might be more appropriate for the What-if section, but it's more of a question rather than a scenario worthy of discussion.

    The Scenario: It's the year or two after the Tet Offensive. U.S. forces approach their peak in quantity and operational tempo in Vietnam. This is the moment when the Soviets smell weakness, and launch their conventional thrust into West Germany.

    This has been wargamed, played out, discussed in immense detail. But the main question that has bothered me...

    Would the U.S. commitment in SEA 1969-1970 fatally weaken NATO defenses, leading to a rapid collapse of conventional forces? And if so, what would the likelihood be of a tactical nuclear response by NATO? I'll bet we have more than one WABbit who had been actually involved in such planning.

  • #2
    IIRC, didn't NATO assume-- all the way up until the 1980s-- that the Soviets would inevitably win a conventional war, and thus nukes would inevitably be used?

    it seems to me that the only real reason why LBJ didn't wholly utilize US forces in NATO was just fear that the europeans would freak out. instead he depended on conscripts instead of the professionals or the national guard, and we all saw how that turned out.
    There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that "My ignorance is just as good as your knowledge."- Isaac Asimov

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    • #3
      Asia weakened both the Soviets and the Americans. The Soviets in fact had committed more firepower and more manpower to their Chinese problem than the US did to Vietnam. Even when discouraged by the Americans, the Soviets could not move any troops away from the East to the West, else to invite Chinese adventurerism.

      So China weakened the Warsaw Pact far more than Vietnam hurt NATO.

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      • #4
        Originally posted by astralis View Post
        IIRC, didn't NATO assume-- all the way up until the 1980s-- that the Soviets would inevitably win a conventional war, and thus nukes would inevitably be used?
        Pretty sure you're correct about that; that's what the Pershing I & II IRBM's were for.
        "There is never enough time to do or say all the things that we would wish. The thing is to try to do as much as you can in the time that you have. Remember Scrooge, time is short, and suddenly, you're not there any more." -Ghost of Christmas Present, Scrooge

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        • #5
          In 69, NATO is at low ebb, only the BAOR is modern and ready to fight. Germany is still modernizing (Leo 1 entered service in 65) and using mainly cast off/ modified US equipment. The NATO advantage in the air is at low ebb as well. The F-4 Phantom is better than anything the Soviets have, but munitions stocks are low.

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          • #6
            i wonder why LBJ didn't bother just to send all the conscripts to Europe and rotate out the professionals to SEA, at least partially turn by turn if not en masse.

            what europe needed was an american tripwire, because NATO assumed that it would lose a standing conventional fight anyway.

            avoiding the domestic meltdown of the late 60s and the destruction of public belief in the USG would have had huge positive benefits for the US, but i repeat myself.
            There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that "My ignorance is just as good as your knowledge."- Isaac Asimov

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            • #7
              Originally posted by astralis View Post
              i wonder why LBJ didn't bother just to send all the conscripts to Europe and rotate out the professionals to SEA, at least partially turn by turn if not en masse.

              what europe needed was an american tripwire, because NATO assumed that it would lose a standing conventional fight anyway.

              avoiding the domestic meltdown of the late 60s and the destruction of public belief in the USG would have had huge positive benefits for the US, but i repeat myself.
              Benefit of hindsight.

              Remember that up until the Tet Offensive the Pentagon & especially Westmoreland were telling LBJ that the war was being won. MacNamara had ceased to believe that, but he quit rather than staying to push his case (one of the great acts of moral cowardice in the postwar world). Johnson thought he could ride out the flak because his strategy was working. It wasn't. His metrics for victory were a bad joke dreamed up by Mac-style technocrats in the Pentagon and the Army. The realworld drop off in VC activity turns out to have been prepations for the 'big one'. By the time he realised the war had a long ways to go it was too late.

              The other side of this was the nature of the war. It wasn't seen as a war for the sort of professional units training to face the Russians. On the ground it was mainly a light infantry war against an enemy seen as more of an informal force than a 'regular' one. No massed formations streaming across plains. Artillery & tanks parcelled off into unusual formations. It was different for the Air wings (all 3), but I'm pretty sure they were overwhelmingly professionals. Of course, there were a lot of regular units & regular soldiers in Vietnam - a comfortable majority if I recall. But they weren't being used in the way a generation who cut their teeth in WW2 & Korea expected. The Marines were also heavily committed, but that also tells you something about how the war was viewed. The Marines had a history of fighting 'unconventional' wars, so this was seen as very much up their alley.

              Vietnam was never supposed to be a 'big' war. it was never supposed to be a 'proper' war. The manner by which it became so was not by careful strategic planning but almost by accident - being pulled by events. Under those circumstances it simply didn't make sense to be putting conscripts in the way of the Red Army while an army full of regulars fought a war against little guys in black pyjamas that not only wasn't a 'real' war, but would be over soon anyway.

              Vietnam was a clusterfvck start to finish. Trying to apply rational thoght processes to anything more than isolated bits of it will just do your head in. You work in the puzzle palace, you must see shit like this more often that you'd care to, if on a somewhat less spectacular scale.
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              Win nervously lose tragically - Reds C C

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              • #8
                Ummm...I'm sorta confused by this whole "regular vs. conscript" thingy. Who do you guys think were filling enlisted slots in Europe? As to the leadership chain, if you were a career professional combat arms NCO/Officer you very, very likely saw combat in S.E. Asia between 1965-1971.
                "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
                "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

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                • #9
                  Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
                  Asia weakened both the Soviets and the Americans. The Soviets in fact had committed more firepower and more manpower to their Chinese problem than the US did to Vietnam. Even when discouraged by the Americans, the Soviets could not move any troops away from the East to the West, else to invite Chinese adventurerism.

                  So China weakened the Warsaw Pact far more than Vietnam hurt NATO.
                  Ah, I did not consider the Chinese in this scenario, an oversight.

                  If it was "understood" that NATO would lose a stand-up conventional war in Europe in the early 70's, then it begs a basic question - why place much emphasis and expenditure in those conventional forces in the first place?

                  Pick up the red telephone to the Kremlin and tell Khrushchev - "If Warsaw Pact forces enter NATO territory in any significant force, we will launch both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons in response."

                  Tripwire? Were European NATO allies concerned that we would not be properly invested in the conflict unless we suffered losses side by side? Afraid we'd bail and hand Europe to the USSR? The politics and decision-making behind nuclear deployment is damned complex.

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                  • #10
                    chogy,

                    that's precisely my question. i mean, everyone knew the old cold war joke-- where two soviet colonels are sitting in a cafe in Paris, and one asks the other, 'so who won the air war?' i don't think anyone actually thought NATO was going to prevail in a conventional war; the numerical disadvantage was just too great.

                    moreover, i don't think i heard of a single nuclear strategist whom actually thought we would just have a tactical nuke exchange, or that any war would stay conventional. for that matter, the entire US armed forces, up until perhaps the late 80s, built around an inefficient officer-heavy system that was designed as a relic of WWII-- the officers being there to provide leadership for the massive callup.

                    Tripwire? Were European NATO allies concerned that we would not be properly invested in the conflict unless we suffered losses side by side? Afraid we'd bail and hand Europe to the USSR?
                    yes, and that applies to south korea and japan. south korea still thinks this today.

                    regarding the difference between the conscripts and the professional troops; IIRC, didn't REFORGER start at the very height of the Vietnam War? IE, the DoD was thinking about putting together a conventional response to a Soviet invasion. which was sort of weird, considerin how nuke-focused the US was in the 50s and early 60s.

                    i could understand it in the context of the 1980s when US technological advantage started to pull away, making a conventional response do-able, but not in the 1960s.
                    There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that "My ignorance is just as good as your knowledge."- Isaac Asimov

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                    • #11
                      Originally posted by astralis View Post
                      i wonder why LBJ didn't bother just to send all the conscripts to Europe and rotate out the professionals to SEA, at least partially turn by turn if not en masse.
                      That's because the troops in USAREUR were also draftees. The entire US Army from 1941 to 1973 was primarily a draftee Army. Sure, some folks enlisted but most were draftees. The NCOs were soldiers who were drafted, found out they liked it and were good at it and reenlisted. The Navy and Air Force were mostly enlistees as was the USMC until things started to get bad for them around 1967.

                      The first combat units sent sent to Viet Nam were just like those USAREUR units. The Pentagon chose to leave the colors in place and rotate personnel into the fight so they quickly lost their professional edge. Those first units had many NCOs and officers who were earning their first or second star for their CIB. And as The Dude pointed out the officer and NCO corps of USAREUR from 1965 to 1990 was full of combat veterans.

                      As to the subject.....I predict many a glow along the IGB. By 1965 the US had 3 Pershing battalions and the Luftwaffe 2 Pershing missile wings in the field. The P1As had a range of 450 miles, so they were perfect for destroying the Warsaw Pact LOCs. There were also Honest John units in all the following, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark (non-nuclear), France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway (non-nuclear), and Turkey. And the US maintained nuclear ordnance companies comamnded by majors in all the various areas to provide the warheads if needed.
                      “Loyalty to country ALWAYS. Loyalty to government, when it deserves it.”
                      Mark Twain

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                      • #12
                        AR,

                        That's because the troops in USAREUR were also draftees.
                        good god, i knew the 1950-1980 US Army was conscript intensive but i didn't imagine the actual core of professional troops was -that- small.

                        you'd think there would have been some lessons learned from the Korean War.
                        There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that "My ignorance is just as good as your knowledge."- Isaac Asimov

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          Originally posted by astralis View Post
                          AR,



                          good god, i knew the 1950-1980 US Army was conscript intensive but i didn't imagine the actual core of professional troops was -that- small.

                          you'd think there would have been some lessons learned from the Korean War.
                          it was a 3 year draft though, long enough to maintain a professional edge.

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                          • #14
                            Originally posted by Chogy View Post
                            Ah, I did not consider the Chinese in this scenario, an oversight.

                            If it was "understood" that NATO would lose a stand-up conventional war in Europe in the early 70's, then it begs a basic question - why place much emphasis and expenditure in those conventional forces in the first place?

                            Pick up the red telephone to the Kremlin and tell Khrushchev - "If Warsaw Pact forces enter NATO territory in any significant force, we will launch both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons in response."

                            Tripwire? Were European NATO allies concerned that we would not be properly invested in the conflict unless we suffered losses side by side? Afraid we'd bail and hand Europe to the USSR? The politics and decision-making behind nuclear deployment is damned complex.
                            I can't find it now online but I recall a Czech war plan dated 1964 that saw the usage of 130+ nukes on the first two days of the war by the Czech front alone.

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                            • #15
                              Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
                              I can't find it now online but I recall a Czech war plan dated 1964 that saw the usage of 130+ nukes on the first two days of the war by the Czech front alone.
                              This one maybe?

                              PHP - WARSAW PACT WAR PLAN OF 1964
                              No such thing as a good tax - Churchill

                              To make mistakes is human. To blame someone else for your mistake, is strategic.

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