Pakistan Taliban 'attack eastern Afghan district'

[S2]

ASparr Reply

My suspicion is that you've your own thoughts sufficient to allow mine only short shrift. Given my comments and the conditions I've described that have been enablers of the taliban reconstitution, you might consider some possible actions NOT taken in late 2001-early 2002 that would have precluded the taliban of making effective use of Pakistan's tribal areas.

Consider why the world's seventh largest army didn't deploy in ricky-tick fashion sometime very shortly after 9/11 to close down their western borders. India as a threat? Perhaps we should have allowed Pakistan to consider America superceding that role and thus re-prioritized their deployment considerations to a somewhat more balanced posture.

Do you think the tattered remnants that made their way into Pakistan that late fall and early winter of 2001-2002 couldn't have been prevented that opportunity. Think closely. Kabul didn't fall until early November 2001-a full two months after 9/11. The retreat didn't ensue until shortly afterward. Was the retreat of the taliban into their strategic depth, the tribal areas, beyond prediction?

"How, exactly, would leaving help the situation?"

Leaving when and, specifically, what situation?

[ASparr]

I hope I have not given off the wrong impression; I am fully willing and able to give other points of view a chance to influence and change my thinking.

But I also fail to see what could make the FATA and KPH environments not suitable for the militants. Pakistan has struggled to extend the rule of law there and, as most people fail to notice, has lost well over 3000 soldiers there trying to do so. Pakistan may not be making this its first priority, but they are bleeding and suffering considerably.

And India is most defiantly seen as a threat in Pakistan. The Kargil War in 1999 and the stand-off in 2001-2002 are poignant reminders of the strained relations between the two countries.

Are you saying that the US should try and make itself a threat to Pakistan, to say that the choice is between fighting in the KPH and fighting the US? I'm pretty sure they'd call our bluff on that one.

No, of course we could have foreseen a retreat into the tribal areas. But I don't know what we could have done to prevent it.

And I'm referring to your suggested "small footprints" strategy.

You're also failing to reply to the article I posted.

[astralis]

S-2,

Since then we've squandered vast billions of dollars and thousands of maimed, wounded, and killed soldiers to achieve nothing that couldn't have been achieved, as you say...

i'd rather pay that price than another devastating attack on US soil, which would probably be a necessary prerequisite to a solution you've mentioned in the past, ie turning afghanistan into glass.

"...are you advocating the "small footprint" approach where we keep a small troop presence and conduct air strikes against enemy targets?"

seeing how that's where we're most likely going to be by june/july 2011, i do not think one year is too high a price to pay to see if we can pull another petraeus-like miracle in the meantime.

[S2]

ASparr Reply

"...I also fail to see what could make the FATA and KPH environments not suitable for the militants."

Given the ethnic pre-dispositions of the area and its previous use as sanctuary during the Afghan-Soviet war, nothing now makes it unsuitable. NOW, though, is 8 2/3rds years removed from 9/11. Just as we failed to make use of the four year window of opportunity available in Afghanistan, the absence of a prompt reception from the Pakistani Army for those tattered remnants staggering across the border in disarray late fall and early winter of 2001-2002 allowed the taliban and A.Q. opportunity to assert control.

Since then, the GoP has repeatedly but unsuccessfully treated with these men-thus elevating their stature within pashtun society while benignly and impotently watching the taliban/A.Q. both intermarry within that society while laying waste to the network of tribal leadership.

Of the casualties and deaths suffered by the Pakistani army and people even you would have to admit that's only occurred largely since April of last year. The army's lassitude in battling the taliban led to their expansion as far as Swat/Buner before lifting a finger otherwise. In so doing they've pointedly ignored both the punjabi taliban and the afghan taliban while directing their efforts MOST SELECTIVELY.

Those 3,000 dead soldiers are the product of Pakistan's government/military/ISI permitting an in-house Pakistani taliban (TTP) to rise forth. Mimicry is the highest form of praise. Those Pakstani pashtun saw which way the wind was blowing and, in the space and time provided by the GoP, replicated the actions of their Afghan taliban mentors. Their retaliation against the Pakistani people for the belated military operations generated by the Pakistani Army after much prodding by America is designed to split Pashtun society from their punjabi masters. That retaliatory war on Pakistani society, too, was predictable.

Meanwhile, the afghan taliban and their Haqqani/Bahadur/Nazir associates STILL remain undisturbed.

All of the above is simply a historical summary. It is from asking WHY that the answers are found. The principle of STRATEGIC DEPTH remains very much alive in Pakistani security doctrine.

"Are you saying that the US should try and make itself a threat to Pakistan, to say that the choice is between fighting in the KPH and fighting the US? I'm pretty sure they'd call our bluff on that one."

It would be today a bluff, wouldn't it?

Only one thing could have possibly altered that sacred principle in Pakistani thinking and that was for Armitage's purported threat to have been a salient fact-

Ex-Diplomat Denies "Stone-Age" Remark-CBS News Sept. 22, 2006

At no time since has our credibility to threaten Pakistan directly or indirectly been as believable and possible as in the the aftermath of the Afghan taliban's collapse that late fall of 2001. We possessed the means to coerce a profound change in Pakistan's strategic calculus. Globally, many believed we possessed the determination as well. Afterall, had our President then not stated that you're either with us or against us?

Instead, our forebearance has resulted in all that's subsequently followed. The threat wasn't communicated in adequate fashion. It was suggested but not demonstrated. There was, therefore, sufficient manuevering space perceived by the GoP to feign compliance and support while simultaneously accomodating their Afghan taliban proteges.

"You're also failing to reply to the article I posted."

Mr. Heghammer suggests, what, exactly? That we not withdraw our presence as currently constituted? Sorry. That will happen as sure as the sun rises in the east. His friends in the Norwegian government are welcome to replace us if so desired.

Mr. Heghammer, IMV, presumes the return of taliban power to Afghanistan in our absence. He may be correct but that's yet to be determined much less the manner of such a return. Afterall, there's a civil war yet to fight and other interested parties in CAR, Russia, Iran, India, and the PRC whose full weight have yet to be felt.

"Moreover, the surgical strikes would not be that surgical. A significantly smaller U.S. ground presence is likely to produce less good human intelligence, because it will be harder to protect informants. This will increase the risk of hitting, for example, wedding parties."

Maybe. Maybe not. He ignores continuing developments in munitions technologies and surveillance capabilities. Further, he postulates that our currently large ground presence in Afghanistan provides actionable intelligence otherwise not available. One doesn't automatically lead to the other and is presumptuous. Neither he, you, nor I can predict the form of our stay-behind presence and its ability to do the same-assuming he's correct. Without such, he speculates.

"It is ironic that many proponents of troop reduction in Afghanistan are also critical of drone strikes in Pakistan."

I'm not one of them. It is more ironic that many European/Americans and most Pakistanis east of the Indus River cling to some image of vast carnage unleashed in FATAville because of drone attacks. I'm in contact with two pashtuns of the area who firmly suggest otherwise while also strongly encouraging that these attacks not stop. That's just lil' ol' me but I've no reason to believe anybody short of our intelligence collection apparatus, drone BDA experts, and the locals of FATAville know the actual extent of such attacks.

[ASparr]

Given the ethnic pre-dispositions of the area and its previous use as sanctuary during the Afghan-Soviet war, nothing now makes it unsuitable. NOW, though, is 8 2/3rds years removed from 9/11. Just as we failed to make use of the four year window of opportunity available in Afghanistan, the absence of a prompt reception from the Pakistani Army for those tattered remnants staggering across the border in disarray late fall and early winter of 2001-2002 allowed the taliban and A.Q. opportunity to assert control.

Both the Taliban and AQ enjoyed extensive networks of supporters in the FATA at the time, not as much as not, though. Remember al-Qaeda's long standing ties dating back to the arab mujahideen and the al-Ansar guest houses. And remember that the Taliban was born out of Pakistani madrassas. So these were not foreign elements that could have been easily pushed out (less so now, of course but still back then) so any effort to expel them would've required Pakistan to push all the way to the Afghan border. In the process, they would have alienated all of their former militant allies and cut all possible non-kinetic influence they would have had in Afghanistan after we left. Considering you seem to be suggesting that we should have left in 2002, this would do little other than set Pakistan up with a hostile India on one side and a hostile or neutral Afghanistan that offers a reverse-FATA (an Afghan safe haven for operations against Pakistan). Seems like a bummer of a deal to me, and I certainly wouldn't have done it if I were Pakistan.

Since then, the GoP has repeatedly but unsuccessfully treated with these men-thus elevating their stature within pashtun society while benignly and impotently watching the taliban/A.Q. both intermarry within that society while laying waste to the network of tribal leadership.

I agree that, given the circumstances that did happen, that Pakistan has had an anemic response up until a few years ago and the longer they wait, the harder it will be. But I doubt that threateneing to bomb them back to the stone age would've really helped. Besides, how would that help us? All we would do in that is weaken the Pakistani state so as to make it impossible for them to effectively combat the militants in the KPH, solidly turned public opinion against us there and make a minor threat to Islamabad's stability in 2002 into a huge one.

Those 3,000 dead soldiers are the product of Pakistan's government/military/ISI permitting an in-house Pakistani taliban (TTP) to rise forth. Mimicry is the highest form of praise. Those Pakstani pashtun saw which way the wind was blowing and, in the space and time provided by the GoP, replicated the actions of their Afghan taliban mentors. Their retaliation against the Pakistani people for the belated military operations generated by the Pakistani Army after much prodding by America is designed to split Pashtun society from their punjabi masters. That retaliatory war on Pakistani society, too, was predictable.

I'm not so sure I'd say the TTP formed because the Pashtuns saw which way the wind was blowing; a lot had to do with the Red Mosque Siege which rallied militants and hardliners and would be a huge boom for the TTP.

Perhaps back in 2007-ish but I'm not sure how much the TTP and Afghan Taliban are coordinating anymore. AQ and the TTP is HQ'd in North Waziristan and Bajaur whilst the Quetta Shura is in, well, Quetta. That distance is one of the main reasons for the AQ-Afghan Taliban divergence operationally and I imagine it has the same impact on the TTP.

Meanwhile, the afghan taliban and their Haqqani/Bahadur/Nazir associates STILL remain undisturbed.

All of the above is simply a historical summary. It is from asking WHY that the answers are found. The principle of STRATEGIC DEPTH remains very much alive in Pakistani security doctrine.

They're hedging their bets: trying to retain some influence and control over the militants for the inevitable time that we leave Afghanistan and they march on in. The 2011 withdrawal nonsense isn't helping any. Considering recent events, though, it seems as if what few connections remain are going to dissolve eventually. Pakistan would be wise to take Khalid Khawaja's killing as a bellwether of things to come.

Considering they've lost control of territory as close as 60km from the capital, I can't really blame them.

At no time since has our credibility to threaten Pakistan directly or indirectly been as believable and possible as in the the aftermath of the Afghan taliban's collapse that late fall of 2001. We possessed the means to coerce a profound change in Pakistan's strategic calculus. Globally, many believed we possessed the determination as well. Afterall, had our President then not stated that you're either with us or against us?

Instead, our forebearance has resulted in all that's subsequently followed. The threat wasn't communicated in adequate fashion. It was suggested but not demonstrated. There was, therefore, sufficient manuevering space perceived by the GoP to feign compliance and support while simultaneously accomodating their Afghan taliban proteges.

I don't see what it would have accomplished, if we were called on it and actually did bomb them "back into the stone age". What would have happened? Pakistani government gets destabilized? Widespread anti-US sentiment flares up again? We destroy their ability to wage war in the KPH, both practically and literally? Weakened their grip on their stockpile, both literally and figuratively?

Mr. Heghammer suggests, what, exactly? That we not withdraw our presence as currently constituted? Sorry. That will happen as sure as the sun rises in the east. His friends in the Norwegian government are welcome to replace us if so desired.

Mr. Heghammer, IMV, presumes the return of taliban power to Afghanistan in our absence. He may be correct but that's yet to be determined much less the manner of such a return. Afterall, there's a civil war yet to fight and other interested parties in CAR, Russia, Iran, India, and the PRC whose full weight have yet to be felt.

I'm all for withdrawing our forces; I think this campaign is a lost cause and no more reason to send our boys over there to bleed for nothing. Maybe the coming offensive will prove me wrong, but considering how Marjah is going, I'm not very optimistic.

There are other interested parties but after we withdraw, I imagine places like Russia and the PRC will be eager to avoid our quagmire. As for the others, perhaps, but how many have a track record of opposing the Taliban and how many would stand in their way after they [the taliban] sent the most powerful army in history packing?

Maybe. Maybe not. He ignores continuing developments in munitions technologies and surveillance capabilities. Further, he postulates that our currently large ground presence in Afghanistan provides actionable intelligence otherwise not available. One doesn't automatically lead to the other and is presumptuous. Neither he, you, nor I can predict the form of our stay-behind presence and its ability to do the same-assuming he's correct. Without such, he speculates.

Defiantly. You can have the best, top of the line new form of smart bomb but if you don't know where the Taliban are massing, you have no idea where to aim it. And there's little chance we could maintain adequate surveillance capabilities over the entire country to counter every massed formation.

That's how humint works in a counter-insurgency. If you don't have adequate ties with the populace, they'll never approach you with intelligence. If we didn't have the intel to know and preempt the hundreds of fighters discussed in this very topic, we wont have it when we leave or withdraw to FOBs.

What is possible is that Kabul and the North remain in the government's hands while the S and SE become de facto counter-states. This is pretty much the best you can hope for if your goal is merely to strike massed formations to keep them from large scale actions against Kabul. But then what do you have? A militant state stretching from Helmand to Bajaur? Seems pretty much like square one to me.

Of course he speculates. You say that as if it's a bad thing or somehow discredits his point.

I'm not one of them. It is more ironic that many European/Americans and most Pakistanis east of the Indus River cling to some image of vast carnage unleashed in FATAville because of drone attacks. I'm in contact with two pashtuns of the area who firmly suggest otherwise while also strongly encouraging that these attacks not stop. That's just lil' ol' me but I've no reason to believe anybody short of our intelligence collection apparatus, drone BDA experts, and the locals of FATAville know the actual extent of such attacks.

That I had guessed from your previous posts. And you're right, almost nobody outside the FATA knows the true extent of civilians killed in the strikes. But that doesn't really matter. What matters is how many civilians are perceived to be killed by the Pakistani public and the world at large. But that's neither here nor there.

[Mihais]

Mr. Heghammer, IMV, presumes the return of taliban power to Afghanistan in our absence. He may be correct but that's yet to be determined much less the manner of such a return. Afterall, there's a civil war yet to fight and other interested parties in CAR, Russia, Iran, India, and the PRC whose full weight have yet to be felt.

"Moreover, the surgical strikes would not be that surgical. A significantly smaller U.S. ground presence is likely to produce less good human intelligence, because it will be harder to protect informants. This will increase the risk of hitting, for example, wedding parties."

Just a tidbit,but since when HUMINT needs troops for protection?

Sir,just a couple of hypothethical question.Say you're a country X(potential competitor of the US).Where would you like the US troops&money to be?At the ready in CONUS(or whatever base) or sweating in the Afghan hills?Would you,as a competitor of US prefer the US R&D to focus on the next cycle of naval,air&space warfare development or thinking how to make the body armor lighter?
p.s Yep,conspiracies and ''scenarios'' are a national sport.Everyone is an ''expert'' in those as well as in football(that's soccer for you Yanks)

[S2]

Mihais Reply

"Just a tidbit,but since when HUMINT needs troops for protection?"

You'd have to ask Mr. Heghammer. It's neither my quote nor do I believe it necessary.

"p.s Yep,conspiracies and ''scenarios'' are a national sport..."

It's not much of a conspiracy to suggest some are content to see U.S. ground troops remain in Afghanistan for reasons of their own nat'l self-interest.

[Mihais]

Sir,I didn't confused you for Mr Heghammer.You're quite unique anyway

Learning what others interests are is not a big deal.Thinking what they might do (or not) in order for US troops to have a reason to walk the wilderness (again)may lead to a ''conspiracy''.Your country may be duped at grand strategic level(I'm not saying you will be).

[S2]

ASparr Reply

"Both the Taliban and AQ enjoyed extensive networks of supporters in the FATA at the time..."

I disagree to the notion of "extensive [Pakistani] networks" in 2001. A.Q. might have retained contacts (or not) but certainly not networks. Because A.Q. was FOUNDED in Pakistan in 1988 hardly is cause to suggest an enduring NETWORK of support. That's simply not true.

"And remember that the Taliban was born out of Pakistani madrassas."

Their leadership was borne of a variety of influences-some of which includes Darul Uloom Haqqania. I remember that the taliban were born of an Oruzgan-based indigenous Afghan movement 1994 and that their recruits came originally from Afghan madrassahs in the Kandahar area before expanding their recruitment into the Quetta refugee camps.

Again, formalized, extensive and, most of all, existing networks of support didn't exist. Old contacts remained in latency but needed reawakening and linking.

"So these were not foreign elements that could have been easily pushed out (less so now, of course but still back then) so any effort to expel them would've required Pakistan to push all the way to the Afghan border."

Pushed out? The idea was to occupy the border area before their collapse in Afghanistan and repel their ludicrously easy entry. No such effort was made.

"In the process, they would have alienated all of their former militant allies and cut all possible non-kinetic influence they would have had in Afghanistan...".

Yes. This was and remains important unless you believe that Pakistan deserves to dominate the afghan polity to its own ends.

"Considering you seem to be suggesting that we should have left in 2002..."

No. You poorly understand my intent. If our goal was the current state of matters-yes we might as well have left. Please note the tinge of resignation to that comment.

OTOH, I recommended an entirely different and more active involvement in late 2001 and 2002 that would have taken more thorough advantage of the existing window of opportunity I saw then which hasn't existed since 2006.

"...this would do little other than set Pakistan up with a hostile India on one side and a hostile or neutral Afghanistan that offers a reverse-FATA (an Afghan safe haven for operations against Pakistan)."

You legitimize Pakistani use of proxy war then. Pakistan has every opportunity to use its geographic advantage to engage in such novel geopolitical tactics as diplomacy and economic engagement to sway an indecisive afghan polity. Naturally, given their poor skills at such and recognized talents for brutalizing both their own population the GoP prefers proxy diplomacy from the end of a weapon's barrel.

"...Seems like a bummer of a deal to me, and I certainly wouldn't have done it if I were Pakistan."

Seems like America didn't offer Pakistan a deal it couldn't refuse.

"I agree that, given the circumstances that did happen, that Pakistan has had an anemic response up until a few years ago..."

ONE year ago April unless you consider their ongoingly interminable Bajaur operation of September 2008 the turning point. I don't.

"But I doubt that threateneing to bomb them back to the stone age would've really helped."

Conveyed properly, I disagree.

"Besides, how would that help us? All we would do in that is weaken the Pakistani state so as to make it impossible for them to effectively combat the militants in the KPH, solidly turned public opinion against us there and make a minor threat to Islamabad's stability in 2002 into a huge one."

Are you conflating the threat of such bombing with actual air strikes? The threat of such would not be made public by us. It would be intended, however, to achieve the wholesale redeployment of significant Pakistani forces to the Afghan border PRIOR to the collapse of the Afghan taliban gov't. We could have easily attached SF forces under such a threat and used them to monitor Pakistani diligence. We could have easily launched on-call sorties available both as a reminder to Pakistan of our determination to act unilaterally as well as occasional visible strikes against retreating afghan taliban to enforce our apparent determination.

None of that action along the border weakens a Pakistani state that to this day restricts the access of correspondents from that area. As to Pakistani public opinion, please explain to me on what day it was again when that view of America was glowing?

WRT to a minor threat to Pakistan's destabilization in 2002, their intransigence and resistance to exactly what I propose for then has since led to a major threat by 2009. It likely would have been pre-empted by Pakistan DEFENDING its borders from an INVADING FOREIGN TALIBAN ARMY in 2001-02.

Isn't that what armies do?

"I'm not so sure I'd say the TTP formed because the Pashtuns saw which way the wind was blowing; a lot had to do with the Red Mosque Siege which rallied militants and hardliners and would be a huge boom for the TTP."

ASparr, the TTP existed in function LONG before it existed in form. Nek Mohammad was active in FATAville from 2002 until his death in 2004. So too Baitullah Mehsud. The Pakistani Army was then already unsuccessfully treating with these elements. The GoP's vascillation and lassitude prior led to the Red Mosque event. As such it was a culminating event and not a catalyst.

"AQ and the TTP is HQ'd in North Waziristan and Bajaur whilst the Quetta Shura is in, well, Quetta. That distance is one of the main reasons for the AQ-Afghan Taliban divergence operationally and I imagine it has the same impact on the TTP."

While AQ unquestionably has links to the TTP, anti-afghan forces in N. Waziristan such as Hafez Gul Bahadar, Sirajuddin Haqqani, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and Maulvi Nazir maintain no formal relationship with the TTP. Nonetheless, it hasn't stopped Bahadur's men from sheltering many of the TTP lately. They've since ordered the TTP to leave in deference to their treaty relationship with the Pakistani army which all anti-afghan elements reside under and are eager to protect.

So too the Quetta Shura. The absence of geographic proximity has far less to do with maintaining an arm's-length distance from the TTP than self-preservation. In short, the afghan taliban, Haqqani, and Hekmatyar have proven to be good guests of the Pakistani government...and for good reason. They know on which side their bread is buttered.

"They're hedging their bets: trying to retain some influence and control over the militants for the inevitable time that we leave Afghanistan and they march on in."

I find this repugnant, reprehensible, and reflects upon a country for which I personally wish no strategic relationship. You're worried about Pakistan's stability. I'm not particularly. Should the taliban march into Islamabad tomorrow and take control of their nuclear weapons it would be fine with me...assuming that certain actions by my government automatically followed. They are no friend of America and I deeply rue our efforts to accomodate their professed objectives. Seeking Afghani stabilization means only one thing in the Pakistani strategic lexicon-domination. I don't see that as beneficial to any nation in the region nor ourselves and would prefer open war with Pakistan over such an end objective tacitly accepted by us.

"Pakistan would be wise to take Khalid Khawaja's killing as a bellwether of things to come."

Don't count on it.

"I'm all for withdrawing our forces; I think this campaign is a lost cause and no more reason to send our boys over there to bleed for nothing. Maybe the coming offensive will prove me wrong, but considering how Marjah is going, I'm not very optimistic."

On this we're in full agreement right down to the final word.

"...I imagine places like Russia and the PRC will be eager to avoid our quagmire. As for the others, perhaps, but how many have a track record of opposing the Taliban and how many would stand in their way..."

It will become a proxy battlefield as it once was. The taliban government after six years of rule still didn't assert full control over Afghanistan nor shall they again. There are other nations in the region well-practiced in the art of proxy war and will exercise that skill IMHO.

"You can have the best, top of the line new form of smart bomb but if you don't know where the Taliban are massing, you have no idea where to aim it. And there's little chance we could maintain adequate surveillance capabilities over the entire country to counter every massed formation."

I doubt once we depart that formations of taliban-massed or otherwise-will be central to our targeting interests. I suspect some nuance to our targeting capabilities and slightly different target sets. Beyond that I wouldn't comment. Bluesman might.

"What is possible is...A militant state stretching from Helmand to Bajaur? Seems pretty much like square one to me"

Maybe. Your thoughts might hold true-or not. We'll see.

[S2]

Mihais Reply

"Your country may be duped at grand strategic level(I'm not saying you will be)."

American grand strategy centers on our GNP. IMV America's senior economists, bankers and marketing gurus are our true generals and all else constitutes operational enablers that temporize or facilitate larger objectives. Nonetheless we can be easily duped at a variety of levels.

[ASparr]

I disagree to the notion of "extensive [Pakistani] networks" in 2001. A.Q. might have retained contacts (or not) but certainly not networks. Because A.Q. was FOUNDED in Pakistan in 1988 hardly is cause to suggest an enduring NETWORK of support. That's simply not true.

The Taliban's fighters and commanders would either quietly return to their villages and blend in with the Afghan population, or withdraw across the border to Pakistan where they had extensive networks of supporters.

...

Ever since the 1980's, al-Qaeda militants have had ties to militant networks in this region [FATA].

http://counterterrorism.newamerica.n...stenersen2.pdf

Pushed out? The idea was to occupy the border area before their collapse in Afghanistan and repel their ludicrously easy entry. No such effort was made.

Indeed it was, but even if they had acted against their own self interests and tried to seal the border, it's highly unlikely they would have been able to totally prevent any escape. For example, the Battle of Tora Bora:

He explained this to Bush and Cheney personally at the White House and presented satellite imagery showing that the Pakistani military did not have its side of the border covered. CIA Director George Tenet remembers Bush asking Crumpton if the Pakistanis had enough troops to seal the border. “No, sir,” the CIA veteran replied. “No one has enough troops to prevent any possibility of escape in a region like that.” Still, Crumpton thought the United States should try--and that meant more troops would be required.

The Battle For Tora Bora | The New Republic

It certainly could have been harder, and the Pakistanis could have captured some of them when they tried to cross; but it was never going to be sealed.

Yes. This was and remains important unless you believe that Pakistan deserves to dominate the afghan polity to its own ends.

Oh I agree totally, but it's not going to happen.

No. You poorly understand my intent. If our goal was the current state of matters-yes we might as well have left. Please note the tinge of resignation to that comment.

I see. Apologies.

You legitimize Pakistani use of proxy war then. Pakistan has every opportunity to use its geographic advantage to engage in such novel geopolitical tactics as diplomacy and economic engagement to sway an indecisive afghan polity. Naturally, given their poor skills at such and recognized talents for brutalizing both their own population the GoP prefers proxy diplomacy from the end of a weapon's barrel.

Certainly not! At least, not intentionally. I understand (now at least) what you're saying, but I'm just trying to argue why you might be correct, but Pakistan would never do what you suggest. I don't apologize for them at all and they have acted abhorrently in this matter.

ONE year ago April unless you consider their ongoingly interminable Bajaur operation of September 2008 the turning point. I don't.

I was being generous.

Are you conflating the threat of such bombing with actual air strikes? The threat of such would not be made public by us. It would be intended, however, to achieve the wholesale redeployment of significant Pakistani forces to the Afghan border PRIOR to the collapse of the Afghan taliban gov't. We could have easily attached SF forces under such a threat and used them to monitor Pakistani diligence. We could have easily launched on-call sorties available both as a reminder to Pakistan of our determination to act unilaterally as well as occasional visible strikes against retreating afghan taliban to enforce our apparent determination.

None of that action along the border weakens a Pakistani state that to this day restricts the access of correspondents from that area. As to Pakistani public opinion, please explain to me on what day it was again when that view of America was glowing?

WRT to a minor threat to Pakistan's destabilization in 2002, their intransigence and resistance to exactly what I propose for then has since led to a major threat by 2009. It likely would have been pre-empted by Pakistan DEFENDING its borders from an INVADING FOREIGN TALIBAN ARMY in 2001-02.

Isn't that what armies do?

No, I'm just assuming that they would "call" us on it and not do said wholesale redeployment, forcing our hand to actually do those air strikes. Considering how solidly the Pakistani public had been against FATA operations for a long time, I doubt they would have been behind taking troops off the Indian border to fight "America's War" especially considering they fought a war just 2 years prior.

ASparr, the TTP existed in function LONG before it existed in form. Nek Mohammad was active in FATAville from 2002 until his death in 2004. So too Baitullah Mehsud. The Pakistani Army was then already unsuccessfully treating with these elements. The GoP's vascillation and lassitude prior led to the Red Mosque event. As such it was a culminating event and not a catalyst.

Of course and I don't disagree with you there. But I would argue it was both a culmination and a catalyst. Yes, those same forces had been bubbling beneath the surface for a long time but the actual operation helped galvanize support behind and for the militants.

While AQ unquestionably has links to the TTP, anti-afghan forces in N. Waziristan such as Hafez Gul Bahadar, Sirajuddin Haqqani, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and Maulvi Nazir maintain no formal relationship with the TTP. Nonetheless, it hasn't stopped Bahadur's men from sheltering many of the TTP lately. They've since ordered the TTP to leave in deference to their treaty relationship with the Pakistani army which all anti-afghan elements reside under and are eager to protect.

So too the Quetta Shura. The absence of geographic proximity has far less to do with maintaining an arm's-length distance from the TTP than self-preservation. In short, the afghan taliban, Haqqani, and Hekmatyar have proven to be good guests of the Pakistani government...and for good reason. They know on which side their bread is buttered.

And as long as the forces there respect their previous ties to the Pakistanis and refrain from attacking them, Pakistan will not go after them regardless of how much we huff and puff. But I think that the new generation of militants cares far less for those ties. Even moreso than now, I think you'll soon see more and more violence directed at the Pakistani state.

But I also do not think that the Afghan Taliban, Haqqanis nor Hekmatyar will be stupid enough to do that. So, I basically agree, as it stands now the Pakistanis will not be going after these militants unless they try and attack Pakistan. But I also don't know how we would go about motivating them to do as such [Pakistan to go after the militants].

I find this repugnant, reprehensible, and reflects upon a country for which I personally wish no strategic relationship. You're worried about Pakistan's stability. I'm not particularly. Should the taliban march into Islamabad tomorrow and take control of their nuclear weapons it would be fine with me...assuming that certain actions by my government automatically followed. They are no friend of America and I deeply rue our efforts to accomodate their professed objectives. Seeking Afghani stabilization means only one thing in the Pakistani strategic lexicon-domination. I don't see that as beneficial to any nation in the region nor ourselves and would prefer open war with Pakistan over such an end objective tacitly accepted by us.

Indeed it is but our long term security is directly tied to the stability of the Pakistani government. If it wasn't, I'd have no qualms about that country burning to the ground, but it is. We've hitched our wagon for Afghan success to Islamabad, and it may be a non-starter but I don't see as we have any other choice. Nuclear weapons or no, any collapse of the Pakistani government would be a disaster of biblical proportions for our security.

It's unsavory, but we've had to support unsavory regimes before and this is just another example of doing what we have to. Realistically, I don't see we have any other choice.

It will become a proxy battlefield as it once was. The taliban government after six years of rule still didn't assert full control over Afghanistan nor shall they again. There are other nations in the region well-practiced in the art of proxy war and will exercise that skill IMHO.

While the Taliban didn't control all of the country, they would have if not for our response. Any chance the Northern Alliance had to win out was destroyed with Massoud on 10 Sept 2001.

And while I certainly realize it will become a proxy war again, I just don't see any of the major players opposing the Taliban.

Maybe. Your thoughts might hold true-or not. We'll see.

I fervently hope I am wrong.

[S2]

ASparr Reply

"Again, formalized, extensive and, most of all, existing networks of support didn't exist. Old contacts remained in latency but needed reawakening and linking."

I'll stand by this comment I made before. I've read your offered article sufficient to place your quote in proper context and have no fundamental argument with it's description of taliban withdrawal in late 2001 and early 2002. Taliban fighters effectively returned to their family units-whether inside Afghanistan, the FATAville border region or refugee camps and settlements around Quetta. In effect, they went home... wherever home was.

By itself that doesn't constitute formalized and militarized combat networks prepared to immediately render supplies, weapons, ammunition, etc. Those resources required entirely new development or re-activation. This was accomplished in the intervening years between 2002 and late 2005.

I still see a difference between our notions of "networks".

"Indeed it was, but even if they had acted against their own self interests and tried to seal the border, it's highly unlikely they would have been able to totally prevent any escape...It certainly could have been harder, and the Pakistanis could have captured some of them when they tried to cross; but it was never going to be sealed."

Today over 100,000 Pakistani troops are stationed and operating to varying degrees throughout S. & N. Waziristan, Kurram-Orakzai, and Bajaur. That gives you some indication of what was possible in late 2001 WITHOUT denuding Pakistan's eastern frontier. That is the practical fact of the matter even if those troops are now somewhat closing the gate after the cattle have already left.

Secondly, while nobody can reasonably expect to fully seal the inter-border region-and I believe my understanding of the region's terrain is superb for having never served there-legitimately attempting to do so with the above allocated troops would have had a far more salient effect than was actually the case.

To that end, many of those not prevented from crossing into Pakistan might have been captured within Pakistan shortly thereafter. The vast majority were not attempting to penetrate into Pakistan further than FATAville. Many were heading to obvious locales such as refugee camps. Many were clearly wounded. All would have been new to the communities and vulnerable to identification or local coercion despite Paktunwali. Foreign fighters, in particular, would have been particularly vulnerable.

Third, nat'l sovereignty is not eligible for selective application. You either defend your borders against all comers or don't. Permitting my enemy to escape into your lands makes you no friend of mine. Permitting my enemy to use your lands as a base from which to attack my forces and allied partners makes you also an enemy of mine...or should by any reasonable measure. Suggestions that doing so is in your nat'l interest to enable the retention of future influence over adjacent lands confirms hostile intent.

"No, I'm just assuming that they would "call" us on it and not do said wholesale redeployment, forcing our hand to actually do those air strikes."

I disagree. Few were prepared in late 2001 to "call us" on anything. They might have dissembled, vascillated, procrastinated, etc. but in the end, had we been firmly resolved, Pakistan would likely have acceded. Not certainly but likely.

More than anything what we lacked then was the determination to insert large numbers of troops and operate on a full combat footing under austere supply conditions. That's what would have been required in the absence of strong basing agreements with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and supply corridor agreements with Pakistan.

Implicit to operating with large numbers of ground troops in such an austere fashion is that they're there to KILL; that we aren't particularly concerned with long-term basing agreements; we aren't herding cats with nebulous coalitions of the willing; and if we have to send troops across the Pakistani border in pursuit of our enemies and in the absence of friends we'll do so.

"Considering how solidly the Pakistani public had been against FATA operations for a long time, I doubt they would have been behind taking troops off the Indian border to fight "America's War" especially considering they fought a war just 2 years prior."

They're doing so now having been sufficiently conditioned by harsh reality to understand that FATA is the source of their civilian miseries.

"And as long as the forces there respect their previous ties to the Pakistanis and refrain from attacking them, Pakistan will not go after them regardless of how much we huff and puff."

This is proving very true now, but then we've surrendered our practical leverage to have things otherwise some time ago. Circumstances and end-goals are now dramatically differenct than eight and three-quarter years ago.

"Indeed it is but our long term security is directly tied to the stability of the Pakistani government."

I disagree with this view but my nat'l leadership doesn't.

"Realistically, I don't see we have any other choice."

Then you agree with the present and past administration's view of matters. I don't but, either way, we need to dis-engage from Afghanistan. Pakistan has proved incapable of both ending their ambitions to dominate Afghanistan by proxy AND controlling those proxy forces. We may need to reset while allowing this matter to gestate for a few years. Clearly, we've an Iranian conumdrum on our plate to resolve first, N. Korea looms, and God knows what else lurks over the unforeseen horizon.

"And while I certainly realize it will become a proxy war again, I just don't see any of the major players opposing the Taliban."

This is true. OTOH, I don't see how the taliban can avoid opposing the taliban. They aren't a unified body and face their own issues with both Haqqani/Hekmatyar much less among their own lieutenants. Pakistani support might be more circumspect than in the past once we're gone. Taliban-Pakistani relations were hardly smooth between 1996-2001. The Durand Line was not an interest of resolution for the taliban then and Pakistan's internal dynamics are somewhat, if not dramatically, altered.

[1980s]

[ASparr]

Sorry about the late reply, had a devil of a time the past few days.

I'll stand by this comment I made before. I've read your offered article sufficient to place your quote in proper context and have no fundamental argument with it's description of taliban withdrawal in late 2001 and early 2002. Taliban fighters effectively returned to their family units-whether inside Afghanistan, the FATAville border region or refugee camps and settlements around Quetta. In effect, they went home... wherever home was.

By itself that doesn't constitute formalized and militarized combat networks prepared to immediately render supplies, weapons, ammunition, etc. Those resources required entirely new development or re-activation. This was accomplished in the intervening years between 2002 and late 2005.

I still see a difference between our notions of "networks".

Fair enough, I don't see any reason to further beleaguer this point if we are in agreement on our disagreement. I just brought the point up to suggest that they weren't easily identifiable and removable foreign elements in FATA in 2002, if Pakistan had tried that is.

Today over 100,000 Pakistani troops are stationed and operating to varying degrees throughout S. & N. Waziristan, Kurram-Orakzai, and Bajaur. That gives you some indication of what was possible in late 2001 WITHOUT denuding Pakistan's eastern frontier. That is the practical fact of the matter even if those troops are now somewhat closing the gate after the cattle have already left.

Secondly, while nobody can reasonably expect to fully seal the inter-border region-and I believe my understanding of the region's terrain is superb for having never served there-legitimately attempting to do so with the above allocated troops would have had a far more salient effect than was actually the case.

To that end, many of those not prevented from crossing into Pakistan might have been captured within Pakistan shortly thereafter. The vast majority were not attempting to penetrate into Pakistan further than FATAville. Many were heading to obvious locales such as refugee camps. Many were clearly wounded. All would have been new to the communities and vulnerable to identification or local coercion despite Paktunwali. Foreign fighters, in particular, would have been particularly vulnerable.

I will defer to your obviously superior knowledge of the situation on this issue. Could I get your thoughts on something else, though? Where do you think we would be now, wrt Afghanistan, if Pakistan had tried to seal the border as you suggested back in 2001?

Third, nat'l sovereignty is not eligible for selective application. You either defend your borders against all comers or don't. Permitting my enemy to escape into your lands makes you no friend of mine. Permitting my enemy to use your lands as a base from which to attack my forces and allied partners makes you also an enemy of mine...or should by any reasonable measure. Suggestions that doing so is in your nat'l interest to enable the retention of future influence over adjacent lands confirms hostile intent.

In a perfect world, I agree: harboring, actively or no, and you're no friend of mine. But we can't afford to turn Pakistan into an enemy now so we're kind of stuck; success in Afghanistan depends on success in FATA and the KPH.

I disagree. Few were prepared in late 2001 to "call us" on anything. They might have dissembled, vascillated, procrastinated, etc. but in the end, had we been firmly resolved, Pakistan would likely have acceded. Not certainly but likely.

Oh certainly, perhaps eventually, but I doubt in time to seal it against the large scale infiltration we say in late 2001.

If I thought Pakistan would have snapped into order and deployed 200k troops to FATA post haste, I would have no problem threatening to bomb them into the stone age. But, while I think they would have eventually done as such, it would be too little too late. Enough to seem like they're trying, without actually trying.

More than anything what we lacked then was the determination to insert large numbers of troops and operate on a full combat footing under austere supply conditions. That's what would have been required in the absence of strong basing agreements with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and supply corridor agreements with Pakistan.

Implicit to operating with large numbers of ground troops in such an austere fashion is that they're there to KILL; that we aren't particularly concerned with long-term basing agreements; we aren't herding cats with nebulous coalitions of the willing; and if we have to send troops across the Pakistani border in pursuit of our enemies and in the absence of friends we'll do so.

Since we no longer have the luxury of a kinda sorta pro-US military government in Islamabad, I disagree. If Zardari was seen as promoting or encouraging the US incursions, he'd get booted out of office at the next available chance. Under Musharraf, we had the relative luxury of not particularly caring about the opinion and radicalization of the average Pakistani. But if we [hypothetically] continue to inflame opinion against us with counter-productive raids into their territory, Allah knows who they'd put in power. Your said it best yourself: "Third, nat'l sovereignty is not eligible for selective application. You either defend your borders against all comers or don't." If we make ourselves an enemy of Pakistan, we can kiss our all hope of success in Afghanistan goodbye.

They're doing so now having been sufficiently conditioned by harsh reality to understand that FATA is the source of their civilian miseries.

Indeed. Took them long enough.

Then you agree with the present and past administration's view of matters. I don't but, either way, we need to dis-engage from Afghanistan. Pakistan has proved incapable of both ending their ambitions to dominate Afghanistan by proxy AND controlling those proxy forces. We may need to reset while allowing this matter to gestate for a few years. Clearly, we've an Iranian conumdrum on our plate to resolve first, N. Korea looms, and God knows what else lurks over the unforeseen horizon.

I mostly agree. There are other hotspots in the world we need to worry about these days. We can't afford to have huge numbers of troops and machinery stuck in a quagmire with Iran, NoKo and various other unsavory actors. And, of course, we run the risk of losing influence in the Pacific Rim as we continue to pursue these quagmires in the Mid East and pay little attention to China et al. But that's neither here nor there.

This is true. OTOH, I don't see how the taliban can avoid opposing the taliban. They aren't a unified body and face their own issues with both Haqqani/Hekmatyar much less among their own lieutenants. Pakistani support might be more circumspect than in the past once we're gone. Taliban-Pakistani relations were hardly smooth between 1996-2001. The Durand Line was not an interest of resolution for the taliban then and Pakistan's internal dynamics are somewhat, if not dramatically, altered.

Very true. But I just don't see those divisions being enough to either destroy the movement or fracture them enough to allow them to be defeated. And, of course, I don't think any of them will stop supporting or sheltering AQ, which is pretty much the whole reason we got into this god-forsaken mess.