The Eikenberry Cables

[S2]

This is a fascinating and potentially explosive article chronicling a series of cables sent by Amb. Eikenberry last November just prior to President Obama's unveiling of his new strategy. They highlight both the concerns that Eikenberry holds about Karzai's capacity to lead as well as his concerns about the strategies promoted by Gen. Stanley McChrystal.

There are LINKS embedded in the article that will take you to an article in November that broadly alluded to those cables and the subsequent conversations which they generated. More importantly, there's a LINK to the cables themselves that reveal in detail Eikenberry's concerns-

U.S. Envoy’s Cables Show Deep Concerns on Afghan Strategy - NYTimes.com Jan. 26, 2010

His concerns stem from creating near-term dependancies, an unwillingness to confront sovereign responsibilities, an inability to recruit ANA forces at levels sufficient to sustain, much less grow the ANA, and PAKISTAN-

"He also noted worries that the success of Mr. Obama’s Afghanistan policy hinged on Pakistani forces’ eliminating militants’ havens in the mountainous region near the Afghan border.

'Pakistan will remain the single greatest source of Afghan instability so long as the border sanctuaries remain,' he wrote. 'Until this sanctuary problem is fully addressed, the gains from sending additional forces may be fleeting.”

As we contemplate greatly expanding our presence in Afghanistan, the better answer to our difficulties could well be to further ratchet up our engagement in Pakistan,' he wrote without elaboration."

Can't imagine how often ol' S-2 has said that this insurgency has no legs without external sanctuary and that it is the single greatest inhibitor to Afghan stabilization.

No. I don't want the job of Ambassador but thank you for your consideration.

EDIT: Here is a link to the PBS interview Nov. 9, 2009 with Karzai-

Karzai Interview-PBS Nov. 9, 2009

[Bigfella]

No. I don't want the job of Ambassador but thank you for your consideration.

Aw, come on. You'd be great. (what is the fly fishing like in Pakistan?):))

[S2]

Bigfella Reply

"Aw, come on. You'd be great. (what is the fly fishing like in Pakistan?)

Potentially great. I read of a PRT project to assist a trout hatchery somewhere near the upper Konar river in Afghanistan. They already have some great brown trout fishing in the SWAT river and I expect that there are others as well. Beside the point, though, as right now this potential ambassador would quite likely lose his head.

This is serious stuff on a variety of levels. One that intrigues me is the breach of confidentiality expressed clearly by SECRET as a component of these diplomatic cables. The language is the unambiguously clear tone of a former army officer and he's forthright in his assessment of matters. That's now been exposed to all, including Karzai if he didn't know before. Maybe Eikenberry or an associate did so.

Whoever did should fry.

I can't say, though, he's one bit wrong. His reference to the Obama strategy as initially outlined nearly a year ago is profound in that it appears our uber-lib President has had his inclinations massaged by the machine which hums at its deliberative, low-risk/low-reward self.

We needed a radical approach one way or another. My guess is ol B.O. wasn't comfortable swinging hard right or left once faced with the heavy responsibility of command and struck for the comfort-zone of middle ground. So we'll waffle along.

I read these cables and think of the Prague PRT conference ongoing and wonder at the interminable discussions taking place by those there and HERE among us that have long seen the issues starkly and with great clarity. Yet we're impeded in our ability to bring the substantive change we know is possible but remains just beyond our reach regardless of effort for lack of a firm call.

I remain convinced that we should pull out lock, stock, and barrel from both Afghanistan and Pakistan. We've no partner of faith in either for which our countless billions can be assured of good effect and, as such, represents the classic economic maxim of avoiding "sunk costs".

Yes I'm aware of the little girls. Yes I know they and others will again be abandoned but, yes, we've no internal mandate within ourselves to FORCE change where patently necessary. Sadly, without matters deterioriating much further until the threat becomes a paramount concern of nat'l security will we find the collective will to effect the difference needed.

Afghanistan has no right to self-governance. The capacity and will are not present. Pakistan has no right to partnership. They are our enemy and Eikenberry makes that clear in not-so-subtle language-as have I. Yet you and I plainly know that come next fall Obama will certify continued military aid to a military...errr...government that is decisively opposed to our objectives of stabilization.

Eikenberry's call for American leadership in all phases of assistance to Afghanistan also reflects the incoherence and dysfunctionality of our objectives. Likely doing so will mean the abandonment of this project by others who'd resent an overt American face-not unlike the tone faced now in Haiti. That's fine, and in so doing, might mean our own withdrawal. If others aren't sufficiently threatened by the potential of our enemies, neither should we be even if we know better.

The threat is real enough but I'm as convinced as ever that 9/11 DIDN'T serve an adequate wake-up call to the GoP, Afghans, or the rest of us. Maybe a taliban takeover in Afghanistan and overt assault upon Pakistan along with broadened A.Q. assaults in the west might.

[Prof]

"Aw, come on. You'd be great. (what is the fly fishing like in Pakistan?)

Potentially great. I read of a PRT project to assist a trout hatchery somewhere near the upper Konar river in Afghanistan. They already have some great brown trout fishing in the SWAT river and I expect that there are others as well. Beside the point, though, as right now this potential ambassador would quite likely lose his head.

This is serious stuff on a variety of levels. One that intrigues me is the breach of confidentiality expressed clearly by SECRET as a component of these diplomatic cables. The language is the unambiguously clear tone of a former army officer and he's forthright in his assessment of matters. That's now been exposed to all, including Karzai if he didn't know before. Maybe Eikenberry or an associate did so.

Whoever did should fry.

I can't say, though, he's one bit wrong. His reference to the Obama strategy as initially outlined nearly a year ago is profound in that it appears our uber-lib President has had his inclinations massaged by the machine which hums at its deliberative, low-risk/low-reward self.

We needed a radical approach one way or another. My guess is ol B.O. wasn't comfortable swinging hard right or left once faced with the heavy responsibility of command and struck for the comfort-zone of middle ground. So we'll waffle along.

I read these cables and think of the Prague PRT conference ongoing and wonder at the interminable discussions taking place by those there and HERE among us that have long seen the issues starkly and with great clarity. Yet we're impeded in our ability to bring the substantive change we know is possible but remains just beyond our reach regardless of effort for lack of a firm call.

I remain convinced that we should pull out lock, stock, and barrel from both Afghanistan and Pakistan. We've no partner of faith in either for which our countless billions can be assured of good effect and, as such, represents the classic economic maxim of avoiding "sunk costs".

Yes I'm aware of the little girls. Yes I know they and others will again be abandoned but, yes, we've no internal mandate within ourselves to FORCE change where patently necessary. Sadly, without matters deterioriating much further until the threat becomes a paramount concern of nat'l security will we find the collective will to effect the difference needed.

Afghanistan has no right to self-governance. The capacity and will are not present. Pakistan has no right to partnership. They are our enemy and Eikenberry makes that clear in not-so-subtle language-as have I. Yet you and I plainly know that come next fall Obama will certify continued military aid to a military...errr...government that is decisively opposed to our objectives of stabilization.

His call for American leadership in all phases of assistance to Afghanistan also reflects the incoherence and dysfunctionality of our objectives. Likely doing so will mean the abandonment of this project by others who'd resent an overt American face-not unlike the tone faced now in Haiti. That's fine, and in so doing, might mean our own withdrawal. If others aren't sufficiently threatened by the potential of our enemies, neither should we be even if we know better.

The threat is real enough but I'm as convinced as ever that 9/11 DIDN'T serve an adequate wake-up call to the GoP, Afghans, or the rest of us. Maybe a taliban takeover in Afghanistan and overt assault upon Pakistan along with broadened A.Q. assaults in the west might.

Impressive & thoughtful.

Especially to "D"; see? Impressive.

Prof

[S2]

Prof Reply

"Especially to "D"; see? Impressive."

Guess I don't understand, Prof. Care to elaborate, please?

[Stan187]

Can't imagine how often ol' S-2 has said that this insurgency has no legs without external sanctuary and that it is the single greatest inhibitor to Afghan stabilization.

I wish it was that simple, but I do not believe it so. It takes money to run an insurgency. The place where we are seeing the biggest problem is Helmland. Not so surprisingly, this is the province where the poppy production thrives the most, and we are not doing enough to offer farmers proper alternatives to make a living. The Taliban absolutely fuels itself on this drug trade. It is how it is able to recruit and supply itself. The regions of Afghanistan, when they are heavily involved in poppy production in comparison to others, are also hubs of the insurgency, and of civilian and ISAF deaths.

As long as there is a large amount of money to be made off the drug trade, the border won't be sealed even if the Pakistanis surprise us and start cooperating (which they won't).

It is not simply about sanctuary just in Pakistan. The Taliban also operate with sanctuary within Afghanistan's borders too. We're not winning the battle to convince the fence-sitters, not giving them proper incentives.

[S2]

Stan187 Reply

"I wish it was that simple, but I do not believe it so."

Ambassador Eikenberry and I disagree with you. I don't diminish the importance of opium as a source of funding but it's not a sole source nor is it a growing problem. Cultivation has gone from a high of 193,000 hectares in 2007 to 123,000 in 2009. While 80% of what remains is centered in those areas of Helmand, Kandahar, and Oruzgan-the classic areas of taliban influence, it is diminishing there as well so long as ISAF extends its reach.

All that would have been possible some years ago if the British didn't have to fight their way out the front gates of Sangin and Lashkar Gar. The force they fielded was suitable for exactly those kinds of projects. It wasn't suitable for fighting a full scale insurgent war AND those problems.

This insurgency doesn't lift off the ground in 2006 without external sanctuary. Regardless of climate within Afghanistan, there's a reason why Haqqani, Omar, Hekmatyar, and A.Q. keep their abodes elsewhere and it reaches far beyond simply securing the boss men IMHO.

[Stan187]

"I wish it was that simple, but I do not believe it so."

Ambassador Eikenberry and I disagree with you. I don't diminish the importance of opium as a source of funding but it's not a sole source nor is it a growing problem. Cultivation has gone from a high of 193,000 hectares in 2007 to 123,000 in 2009. While 80% of what remains is centered in those areas of Helmand, Kandahar, and Oruzgan-the classic areas of taliban influence, it is diminishing there as well so long as ISAF extends its reach.

All that would have been possible some years ago if the British didn't have to fight their way out the front gates of Sangin and Lashkar Gar. The force they fielded was suitable for exactly those kinds of projects. It wasn't suitable for fighting a full scale insurgent war AND those problems.

This insurgency doesn't lift off the ground in 2006 without external sanctuary. Regardless of climate within Afghanistan, there's a reason why Haqqani, Omar, Hekmatyar, and A.Q. keep their abodes elsewhere and it reaches far beyond simply securing the boss men IMHO.

I don't argue that the drug trade is the sole source of the problem. Far from it. I agree with you about sanctuary, I just think there are more aspects to it, and the drug trade is a particular aspect that is... well incorrect to say overlooked, but we are still having a hard time actually combating it as opposed to recognizing that it is a problem.

[S2]

Stan187 Reply

"It is how it is able to recruit and supply itself..."

As mentioned earlier, opium isn't the sole source. Further, WRT recruitment the monies from such as often as not are going to afghan recruits within Pakistan. So too the supplies.

I believe there exists a nexus between the world's largest private arms dealers in the gulf emirates and the opium coming from Afghanistan. The intersection of such is Balochistan. Look at a map and evaluate proximity and coastline. Then consider the liklihood that illegal global arms networks would easily accomodate dope on the same routes.

Finally, consider this thought, please. I read a lot about pashtu vendetta, or sense of revenge. It's often tossed in ISAF's face as a source of recruitment from our supposedly heavy-handed methods. Don't you know that we BOMB these poor folks into taking up arms against their repressors?

Fair enough but, if true, why isn't the reverse possible? Especially when the facts from UNAMA suggest that it was the afghan taliban that accounted for 67% of civilian deaths in Afghanistan last year while ISAF only was attributed with 25% (1630 or so against 596, IIRC)? Who would logically be the target of anger and retribution under those conditions?

Finally, have you read the latest ABC/BBC/ARD poll? When asked whether the taliban's presence was strongly favored, somewhat favored, strongly opposed or somewhat opposed, only ten percent of afghans somewhat or strongly favored the taliban. Compare that to 67% for America and the high 50s for ISAF.

I think that the taliban can dominate any village in which they might freely enter without resistance. Whether they have the true hearts and minds of those villagers is another matter.

It's why they're called terrorists.

[S2]

Stan187 Reply

"...we are still having a hard time actually combating it as opposed to recognizing that it is a problem."

A 38% net reduction of cultivation over a two year period is nothing to sneeze about-especially in the midst of war. Access the UNODC data for 2009 to confirm such if I'm not adequately credible.

[Stan187]

"...we are still having a hard time actually combating it as opposed to recognizing that it is a problem."

A 38% net reduction of cultivation over a two year period is nothing to sneeze about-especially in the midst of war. Access the UNODC data for 2009 to confirm such if I'm not adequately credible.

Part of the problem with counterinsurgency, many of these gains are reversible. I'm not sure if we've got this figured out for the longer-term.

[S2]

stan187 Reply

"...many of these gains are reversible."

Absolutely but you live with matters as they are and recognize that something had to happen to reverse the trend, I hope.

Many problems were avoidable too. More than a few suggest that we took our eye off the ball in Afghanistan when we moved into Iraq. Perhaps but more importantly we took our eyes off PAKISTAN. I think the forces we had in place inside Afghanistan would have proved adequate in the absence of sanctuary.

I don't believe this insurgency has legs without the taliban having sanctuary available in the late fall of 2001-early 2002 to reconstitute their command leadership and begin to re-connect with those fighters who walked home and buried their weapons.

[Prof]

"Especially to "D"; see? Impressive."

Guess I don't understand, Prof. Care to elaborate, please?

S-2:

It was a compliment. Honest. Y'all don't need to know the details of everything good said about you in the background, surely.

Prof

[S2]

Prof Reply

"It was a compliment. Honest."

Thanks, but I wasn't worried about that. Honest.

"Y'all don't need to know the details of everything good said about you in the background, surely."

Just seeking clarification to an otherwise cryptic reply. That's all.;)