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  • #31
    Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
    Certainly not anywhere in Australia. The best the IJN could have done was northern Australia. And what is so hard about Australia expelling the Japanese?
    How do the Aussies prevent the IJN from going anywhere it wants to go, without USN being in the war on their side? Note that the US was fully or partly responsible for 90+% of Japanese shipping losses during WWII:

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    IIRC, the Royal Navy was well-nigh invisible in the Pacific after the sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse. With its ability to land anywhere it wants on Australia's coast, a Japanese expeditionary force is presumably in a position to defeat Australia's units in detail.

    Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
    You do know that Zukhov gave them a lesson in maneuver war and the Japanese still didn't learn a thing and did the same stupid things during AUGUST STORM.
    If Soviet archival material cited on Wikipedia is to be believed, Khalkin Gol wasn't an unvarnished victory for the Soviets:
    Japanese records report 8,440 killed, 8,766 wounded, 162 aircraft lost in combat, and 42 tanks lost (of which 29 were later repaired and redeployed). Roughly 500 to 600 Japanese and Manchus were taken prisoner during the battles. Due to a military doctrine that prohibited surrender, the Japanese listed most of these men as killed in action, for the benefit of their families.[58] Some sources put the Japanese casualties at 45,000 or more killed, with Soviet casualties of at least 17,000.[31] However, these estimates for Japanese casualties are considered inaccurate as they exceed the total strength of the Japanese forces involved in the battle (estimated at 28,000–40,000 troops, despite Soviet claims that they were facing 75,000).[59][10] According to the records of the Bureau 6A hospital, the Japanese casualties amounted to 7,696 killed, 8,647 wounded, 1,021 missing, and 2,350 sick, for a total of 19,714 personnel losses, including 2,895 Manchu casualties. The Kwantung Army headquarters and their records give a slightly different figure of 8,629 killed and 9,087 injured. The former Japanese Minister of Agriculture and Forestry estimated a total of 35,000 to 36,000 casualties[10] The Soviets initially claimed to have inflicted 29,085 casualties on the Japanese, but later increased this to 61,000 for the official histories.[2]

    In recent years, with the opening of the Soviet archives, a more accurate assessment of Soviet casualties has emerged from the work of Grigoriy Krivosheev, citing 7,974 killed and 15,251 wounded.[60] In the newer, 2001 edition, the Soviet losses are given as 9,703 killed and missing (6,472 killed and died of wounds during evacuation, 1,152 died of wounds in hospitals, 8 died of disease, 2,028 missing, 43 non-combat dead), 15,251 wounded, and a further 701 to 2,225 sick, totaling between 25,655 and 27,179 casualties.[61][15] In addition to their personnel losses, the Soviets lost a large amount of materiel including 253 tanks, 250 aircraft (including 208 in combat), 96 artillery pieces, and 133 armored cars. Of the Soviet tank losses, 75–80% were destroyed by anti-tank guns, 15–20% by field artillery, 5–10% by infantry-thrown incendiary bombs, 2–3% by aircraft, and 2–3% by hand grenades and mines.[16] The large number of Soviet armor casualties are reflected in the manpower losses for Soviet tank crews. A total of 1,559 Soviet "Tank Troops" were killed or wounded during the battles.[62]

    Mongolian casualties were 556–990, with at least 11 armored cars destroyed and 1,921 horses and camels lost.[63]
    In other words, the Russians are said to have lost more men and equipment than the Japanese, despite having more men and superior gear. Did the Japanese back off because the cost was high and the gains to be had were minimal? Let's say keeping the Soviets busy meant crippling losses on Japan's part and a German victory over Russia. Did this mean the Germans would end up on Japan's borders on the Chinese mainland? How was that beneficial for Japan, given the transactional nature of its alliance with Germany, and the German record of discarding alliances once the prospect of further territorial gains presented itself?
    Last edited by Mithridates; 24 Dec 21,, 06:43.

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    • #32
      Originally posted by Mithridates View Post
      How do the Aussies prevent the IJN from going anywhere it wants to go, without USN being in the war on their side? IIRC, the Royal Navy was well-nigh invisible in the Pacific after the sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse. With its ability to land anywhere it wants on Australia's coast, it is presumably in a position to defeat Australia's units in detail.
      Again, logistics. Nearest possible supply base would have been New Guinea. To land a force in Southern Australia, you have to go around Australia. IJN ships would need time and fuel. Time that the landed force would be alone and unsupported while the ships made the round trip back to NG. The shorter distance between NG and N Australia made N Australia viable as an invasion point. The longer distance to S Australia made that point unachievable.

      Originally posted by Mithridates View Post
      If Soviet archival material cited on Wikipedia is to be believed, Khalkin Gol wasn't an unvarnished victory for the Soviets: In other words, the Russians are said to have lost more men and equipment than the Japanese, despite having more men and superior gear.

      Did the Japanese back off because the cost was high and the gains to be had were minimal?
      You've missed the enitre point. The entire Kwantung Army was surrounded and destroyed. There was no Japanese replacement army. Soviet forces, however, never lost combat effectiveness. No matter what the Japanese did, they could not and did not counter the Soviets.

      Originally posted by Mithridates View Post
      Let's say keeping the Soviets busy meant crippling losses on Japan's part and a German victory over Russia. Did this mean the Germans would end up on Japan's borders on the Chinese mainland? How was that beneficial for Japan, given the transactional nature of its alliance with Germany, and the German record of discarding alliances once the prospect of further territorial gains presented itself?
      Would never happen that way. The IJE dies no matter who won in Europe. Hitler could not and would not cross the Urals. Stalin would have turned his attention to get the Japanese monkey off his back and that meant the armies destined for Stalingrad would have been turned on the Japanese and the Imperial Japanese Empire would have died within 2 months. The IJE being Korea and Manchuria. After that, Stalin would have rebuilt his armies from Central Asia as before AND penal IJA battalions.

      Chimo

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      • #33
        Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
        You've missed the enitre point. The entire Kwantung Army was surrounded and destroyed. There was no Japanese replacement army.
        At Khalkin Gol? Wasn't that an engagement involving several divisions of Soviet troops against a single Japanese division? The Wikipedia order of battle, with the Soviets on the left, and the Japanese on the right:
        61,860–73,961[nb 1]
        498–550 tanks
        385–450 armored cars[4][5]
        >900 aircraft (participated)
        • Peak strength: 580[6]
        500[4]–634[2] artillery pieces
        4,000 trucks[7]
        1,921 horses and camels (Mongol only)[8]
        c. 20,000–30,000[9][10][11]
        73 tanks[5]
        19 tankettes
        >400 aircraft (participated)
        • Peak strength: 200[6]
        ~300 artillery pieces[2]
        1,000 trucks[12]
        2,708 horses[13]
        The Wiki description of the Japanese force involved:
        The principal occupying army of Manchukuo was the Kwantung Army of Japan, consisting of some of the best Japanese units in 1939. However, the western region of Manchukuo was garrisoned by the relatively newly formed 23rd Infantry Division at Hailar under General Michitarō Komatsubara and included several Manchu army and border guard units all under the direct command of the Sixth Army. The 23rd was the newest and least experienced division in the entire Kwantung Army. In addition to this, the 23rd Division was equipped with outdated equipment. Japanese army experts rated the combat capability of the 23rd Division as "below medium", comparable to a garrison division on occupation duty in China.[24]
        Given that Japanese tanks were essentially tracked armored cars, it's amazing that the Japanese fared as well as they did. According to Soviet archival material, the confident front they put up in public wasn't necessarily reflected in the ranks of the general staff:
        Following the battle, the Soviets generally found the results unsatisfactory, despite their victory. Though the Soviet forces in the Far East in 1939 were not plagued by fundamental issues to the same extent as those in Europe during the 1941 campaigns, their generals were still unimpressed by their army's performance. As noted by Pyotr Grigorenko, the Red Army went in with a very large advantage in technology, numbers, and firepower, yet still suffered huge losses, which he blamed on poor leadership.[28]

        Although their victory and the subsequent negotiation of the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact secured the Far East for the duration of the Soviet-German War, the Red Army always remained cautious about the possibility of another, larger Japanese incursion as late as early 1944. In December 1943, when the American military mission proposed a logistics base be set up east of Lake Baikal, the Red Army authorities were according to Coox "shocked by the idea and literally turned white".[72] Due to this caution, the Red Army kept a large force in the Far East even during the bleakest days of the war in Europe. For example, on July 1, 1942, Soviet forces in the Far East consisted of 1,446,012 troops, 11,759 artillery pieces, 2,589 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 3,178 combat aircraft.[73] Despite this, the Soviet operations chief of the Far Eastern Front, General A. K. Kazakovtsev, was not confident in his army group's ability to stop an invasion if the Japanese committed to it (at least in 1941–1942), commenting: "If the Japanese enter the war on Hitler's side ... our cause is hopeless."[74]
        Last edited by Mithridates; 24 Dec 21,, 07:14.

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        • #34
          Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
          Again, logistics. Nearest possible supply base would have been New Guinea. To land a force in Southern Australia, you have to go around Australia. IJN ships would need time and fuel. Time that the landed force would be alone and unsupported while the ships made the round trip back to NG. The shorter distance between NG and N Australia made N Australia viable as an invasion point. The longer distance to S Australia made that point unachievable.
          Why wouldn't the Japanese establish a base in Northern Australia, and work their way down the coast?

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          • #35
            Originally posted by Mithridates View Post
            Wasn't that an engagement involving several divisions of Soviet troops against a single Japanese division? The Wikipedia order of battle.
            I don't agree with Wiki for a number of reasons. There was zero doubt that Army HQ was in Siberia. There was a relief attempt for 23Div ... with what but another division (never succeeded) and then Komatsubara tried to assemble a vengence force, again with what? Given that 23Div was destroyed and so was the initial relief force because Komatsubara had to travel to rear areas to assemble the vengeance force. The timing and the operational orders simply do not make sense if there was only one division.

            As for being equipped with older equipment. A large dose of Japanese revisionism. They're all older equipment. The Japanese did not have one modern rifle during the entire war, let alone artillery.

            Originally posted by Mithridates View Post
            The Wiki description of the Japanese force involved:
            Given that Japanese tanks were essentially tracked armored cars, it's amazing that the Japanese fared as well as they did. According to Soviet archival material, the confident front they put up in public wasn't necessarily reflected in the ranks of the general staff:
            Well, they certainly improved 100 fold by AUGUST STORM but the operational doctrines were proven here. Isolation and Reduction. And here's the part that military professionals appreciate. It doesn't matter how well the Japanese performed. The action was already decided once the Japanese were fixed in place.

            Originally posted by Mithridates View Post
            Why wouldn't the Japanese establish a base in Northern Australia, and work their way down the coast?
            Again, simple logistics. Australians have a much shorter distance to travel than the Japanese. Get there the firstest with the mostest. Australian boys can travel from home and bullets can be shipped from Australian factories a hell of a lot faster than Japanese soldiers can sail from one part of Australia to another.
            Last edited by Officer of Engineers; 24 Dec 21,, 07:45.
            Chimo

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            • #36
              Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
              [COLOR=#000000][COLOR=#000000][COLOR=#000000][COLOR=#000000]

              Again, simple logistics. Australians have a much shorter distance to travel than the Japanese. Get there the firstest with the mostest. Australian boys can travel from home and bullets can be shipped from Australian factories a hell of a lot faster than Japanese soldiers can sail from one part of Australia to another.
              As the Colonel has said, the Japanese did not have the logistics capabilities to provide a serious threat to Australia. The power for sea control for the Japanese in World War 2 was landbased bomber aircraft...usually IJN torpedo bombers. The Repulse & Prince of Wales were sunk by landbased torpedo bombers not by aircraft of the Kido Butai. The entire war in the Pacific was to seize real estate to place bombers at to control the sea. That is what the Japanese and the Americans and its Allies did. As the Colonel has said the only way to get ANY fixed wing aircraft available to hit Australia would be to launch from New Guinea...which they did not first control.

              Look at the map below. The Japanese had very few aircraft that could make a round trip from New Guinea to Australia...and all you are hitting is a veneer. If the Japanese had been successful in getting a landing force ashore it could not be sustained. And the Australian Army would make short work of it. Again, the Kido Butai was not strong enough to sustain and support a landing...they IJN was not proficient at UNREP...nothing like the USN Big Blue Fleet. All they could do was refuel using the trailing hose method. That has to occur at 5 knots or slower. No bombs, not spare parts no rations. It was un impossible for the task.


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              NOW WE HAVE WANDERED FAR AFIELD FROM THE ORIGINAL TOPIC. DO YOU WANT ME TO MOVE THIS DISCUSSION TO A NEW THREAD IN WORLD WAR 2 AREA?
              “Loyalty to country ALWAYS. Loyalty to government, when it deserves it.”
              Mark Twain

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              • #37
                Remains to be seen what can be salvaged here

                How Biden Lost Saudi Arabia | WSJ (Edit) | Mar 18 2022

                The President’s brand of liberal internationalism is proving to be costly.

                By The Editorial Board
                March 18, 2022 6:46 pm ET

                In case you missed it amid the war news, the Journal this week reported that Saudi Arabia is edging closer to accepting the yuan as payment for oil shipments to China. This is one more cost, and a potentially significant one, of the Biden Administration’s bungled handling of a strategically important ally.

                Details of the potential new Saudi-Chinese oil-trading arrangements remain vague. The two sides have talked for years about pricing some oil sales in yuan, and it may not happen. Some 80% of global oil sales are priced in U.S. dollars, the yuan is not freely convertible as a reserve currency must be, and Saudi Arabia’s currency, the riyal, is pegged to the dollar.

                Yet the two sides are said to be keen, and news of renewed discussions sends an alarming signal. Saudi Arabia committed in 1974 to conduct its oil trade only in dollars, in exchange for security guarantees from Washington. The Biden Administration has undermined that relationship at every turn, and by all accounts the Saudis are fed up.

                One of the Administration’s first foreign-policy actions was to end U.S. support for the Saudi war against the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen. It also removed the terrorist designation from the Houthis. The White House then postponed a scheduled arms sale to Riyadh—a security slap-in-the-face that wasn’t reversed until late last year.

                The Houthis have returned Mr. Biden’s gift by sending drones and missiles to attack the oil fields and cities of Saudi Arabia and its ally, the United Arab Emirates. Meanwhile, the Saudis watch, aghast, as Mr. Biden chases a new nuclear deal that will give Iran the resources to finance proxy wars against Saudi Arabia—until Tehran gets its own nuclear bomb.

                Mr. Biden and his advisers say this is all about human rights. They rode into town on a high horse concerning the Riyadh-orchestrated 2018 murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Secretary of State Antony Blinken cited humanitarian concerns when lifting the terrorist designation from the Houthis.

                The Khashoggi murder was outrageous and Yemen’s plight is desperate, but Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has made other moves toward domestic liberalization. More to the point, the U.S. needs every friend it can keep in a difficult part of the world. The high-minded internationalists populating the Biden Administration assume, wrongly, that a power such as America has the luxury of cooperating only with the morally pure.

                The Saudis are recalculating their interests now that they fear they can’t rely on the U.S.—amid the Biden Administration’s hostility and the horrifying Afghanistan withdrawal. The Crown Prince has refused Mr. Biden’s entreaties to pump more oil, and he is reported even to have refused to take the President’s phone call.

                Beijing is happy to step into the breach, and it could benefit if it can coax Riyadh into a yuan-for-oil arrangement. Doing so would help Beijing start building the scaffolding for a global yuan, including greater dispersion of the currency around the world. This in turn could open the door for China to offer the yuan as a trading currency to U.S. adversaries such as Russia and Iran. U.S. economic sanctions would be that much less effective.

                There’s a lot of ruin in a reserve currency, and the greenback’s global pre-eminence endures for now. But Washington should push back on any budding challenges—especially from strategic rivals. This is an urgent job for Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, assuming she can pull herself away from campaigning for global taxes and climate regulation.

                The Saudi bungle highlights the failure of Mr. Biden’s brand of righteous liberal internationalism. President Trump too often gave short shrift to American values, but Mr. Biden has swung too far in the opposite direction. He and his foreign-policy advisers seem to think grandstanding about human rights and the climate will win the day for U.S. interests. Successful Presidents, such as Ronald Reagan, have blended idealism with realism about the world’s bad actors and the need for friends.

                In this new era of Great Power competition, the U.S. can’t afford to alienate allies that can help deter authoritarian aggressors bent on harming U.S. interests and values. The U.S. is paying the price in the Ukraine crisis for having lost the Saudis.

                Last edited by Double Edge; 22 Mar 22,, 22:57.

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