Russo-Ukrainian war: Strategic and economic theatres

[astralis]

It is barbaric and a criminally negligent lack of leadership.

I don't think it was an accident or "frustrated conscripts doing a My Lai". the organization indicates that this was a policy.

the Russians brought along a curiously high number of body bags and truck crematoriums for a war they thought was going to be over in 72 hours.

[TopHatter]

Analysis-Easy Russia sanctions exhausted, U.S. and allies face economic bite

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - As the world's wealthy democratic powers prepare to roll out a new round of sanctions against Russia in response to horrifying images of executed Ukrainians in the city of Bucha, it has become clear that the easiest options are now exhausted and stark differences have emerged among allies over next steps.

The European Union is set to take a first stab at Russia's energy sector in response to its invasion of Ukraine launched in February, banning imports of Russian coal. But EU countries remain divided over whether and how to restrict Russia's gas and oil sectors that are more critical to their economies.

The United States and Group of Seven allies also are preparing new sanctions on Russian financial institutions, state-owned enterprises and more Russian government officials and their family members. In addition, they plan to ban new investment in Russia, and the United States has banned Moscow from paying sovereign debt holders with money in U.S. banks.

The moves may increase economic hardship for Russians but may not put much of a dent in Russia's energy revenues, the lifeblood of its economy, according to U.S. sanctions analysts.

Russia supplies around 40% of the European Union's natural gas consumption, which the International Energy Agency values at more than $400 million per day. The EU gets a third of its oil imports from Russia, about $700 million per day.

"We are at the point where we have to take some pain," said Benn Steil, international economics director for the Council on Foreign Relations think tank in New York. "The initial batches of sanctions were crafted as much to not hurt us in the West as much as they were to hurt Russia."

Divisions over imposing sanctions on Russian energy were apparent on Monday, when Austrian Finance Minister Magnus Brunner voiced opposition to sanctions on Russian oil and gas, telling reporters in Luxembourg that these would hurt Austria more than Russia.

Hours earlier, French President Emmanuel Macron said the killings of civilians in Bucha made clear the necessity of a new round of sanctions on Russia targeting oil and coal. Lithuania on Saturday said it would stop importing Russian gas to meet its domestic needs and end "energy ties with the aggressor."

NEXT STEPS
Next steps could include banning more Russian financial institutions from dollar and euro transactions, including Russia's largest lender Sberbank, which was left out of the harshest sanctions already imposed partly to limit the pain for Russia's people, according to Daniel Tannebaum, a former compliance officer at the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control.

Russian bank Gazprombank, thus far spared because of its role in energy finance, also could become a target, sanctions experts said.

The United States has been pushing European allies to inflict more pain on Russia while trying to make sure that the alliance against President Vladimir Putin does not fray, a balance that only gets tougher.

"You've kind of hit the ceiling - on both sides of the Atlantic - for what can be done easily and what can be done in short order," said Clayton Allen, U.S. director at the Eurasia Group political risk consultancy, said of sanctions.

To move to a tougher round of sanctions, U.S. officials will need to provide some assurances to European countries that energy markets and supplies can be stabilized to avoid severe economic hardship, Allen said. An economically weakened EU helps no one, Allen added.

"If Western Europe is plunged into a recession, that's going to drastically limit the amount of support - both moral and material - that they can provide to Ukraine," Allen said.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken is expected to press the case for more actions in Brussels this week at NATO and G7 meetings of foreign ministers. U.S. Deputy Treasury Secretary Wally Adeyemo held similar meetings last week in London, Brussels, Paris and Berlin.

The U.S. Treasury Department said on Monday that Adeyemo at meetings with senior German government officials "discussed ways to increase costs on Russia while mitigating spillover effects."

Despite recent additions of dozens of Russian companies to the U.S. Treasury's sanctions list, "substantial" legal commerce continues between Russia and the West, from energy to metals and grain, said Tannebaum, who leads consulting firm Oliver Wyman's anti-financial crime practice.

There also are still loopholes to close, including continued sales by German and French companies into Russia, and the ongoing hunt for luxury yachts and other assets parked by Russian oligarchs, according to one European diplomat involved in sanctions talks.
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[Monash]

I don't think it was an accident or "frustrated conscripts doing a My Lai". the organization indicates that this was a policy.

the Russians brought along a curiously high number of body bags and truck crematoriums for a war they thought was going to be over in 72 hours.

Possibly, but from my perspective if such conduct was high level policy given the size and scope of the invasion more instances of this behavior would or will become evidence as the war progresses. Even if only from satellite imaging. There have been numerous reports of Russian soldiers committing atrocities (killing civilians) but not on this scale or in such an organized fashion. If this was a policy decision then you would expect to see it's wide scale implementation - otherwise its not 'policy'.

Also I think you have to take into account the circumstances in which this action occurred i.e. as Russian forces had their advance stalled and then prepared to withdraw from the area around Bucha. This was not a scenario where front line units advanced, secured an area and then advanced further, leaving 2nd echelon troops move in to 'pacify' the local civilian population. Large scale killing apparently didn't start until late in the Russian occupation. This speaks more of localized frustration/revenge as the likely motive, not directives being received from above by some the local commander.

Also given the pervasive nature of surveillance in most parts of the world today you would have to assume Russian leaders were aware of the risks if evidence of large scale executions were uncovered. Bucha has become another (serious) headache for Putin & the Russian Army, one they hardly need at the moment given the numerous problems they already face in prosecuting this war. Assuming they won? I have no doubt Putin would favor mass executions of political opponents. He'd just be much better at organizing and concealing it than whoever was in charge at Bucha.

So applying Occam's Razor I'm inclined to think the 'orders' for the crimes at Bucha more likely emanated from the local OIC or perhaps even more likely they started spontaneously and that officer or group of officers chose not to act, perhaps even tacitly encouraging the murders. Mai Lai on a mass scale.

I'm completely open to being proved wrong about this BTW. I might well be assuming other examples of organized killings on the scale of Bucha (or God forbid larger) come to light in future. I'm just assigning the incident to a breakdown in command authority in the absence of more concrete evidence that this wasn't the case.

[zraver]

Possibly, but from my perspective if such conduct was high level policy given the size and scope of the invasion more instances of this behavior would or will become evidence as the war progresses. Even if only from satellite imaging. There have been numerous reports of Russian soldiers committing atrocities (killing civilians) but not on this scale or in such an organized fashion. If this was a policy decision then you would expect to see it's wide scale implementation - otherwise its not 'policy'.

Also I think you have to take into account the circumstances in which this action occurred i.e. as Russian forces had their advance stalled and then prepared to withdraw from the area around Bucha. This was not a scenario where front line units advanced, secured an area and then advanced further, leaving 2nd echelon troops move in to 'pacify' the local civilian population. Large scale killing apparently didn't start until late in the Russian occupation. This speaks more of localized frustration/revenge as the likely motive, not directives being received from above by some the local commander.

Also given the pervasive nature of surveillance in most parts of the world today you would have to assume Russian leaders were aware of the risks if evidence of large scale executions were uncovered. Bucha has become another (serious) headache for Putin & the Russian Army, one they hardly need at the moment given the numerous problems they already face in prosecuting this war. Assuming they won? I have no doubt Putin would favor mass executions of political opponents. He'd just be much better at organizing and concealing it than whoever was in charge at Bucha.

So applying Occam's Razor I'm inclined to think the 'orders' for the crimes at Bucha more likely emanated from the local OIC or perhaps even more likely they started spontaneously and that officer or group of officers chose not to act, perhaps even tacitly encouraging the murders. Mai Lai on a mass scale.

I'm completely open to being proved wrong about this BTW. I might well be assuming other examples of organized killings on the scale of Bucha (or God forbid larger) come to light in future. I'm just assigning the incident to a breakdown in command authority in the absence of more concrete evidence that this wasn't the case.

Actually the mass deportation to filtration camps is prima facia evidence of a pre-planned scheme to engage in genocide as defined under IHL. If you are willing to pre-plan genocide then murder is not much of a leap. Add in the targeting of feeding stations, hospitals and shelters and execution style killings don't look out of place at all.

Also the killings may have been reprisals rather than mere murder. We (the West) would point out reprisals are never legal against civillians but I'd bet a dollar that if pressed Russia will claim any dead civilians that Russians killed were really Francs-tireurs and thus unlawful combatants. Sat images from Bucha show the bodies laying in the street going back 2 weeks.

Oh and Russian/Soviet military history is replete with similar acts, often undertaken by elite units that were sending messages.

[Monash]

Actually the mass deportation to filtration camps is prima facia evidence of a pre-planned scheme to engage in genocide as defined under IHL. If you are willing to pre-plan genocide then murder is not much of a leap. Add in the targeting of feeding stations, hospitals and shelters and execution style killings don't look out of place at all.

Also the killings may have been reprisals rather than mere murder. We (the West) would point out reprisals are never legal against civillians but I'd bet a dollar that if pressed Russia will claim any dead civilians that Russians killed were really Francs-tireurs and thus unlawful combatants. Sat images from Bucha show the bodies laying in the street going back 2 weeks.

Oh and Russian/Soviet military history is replete with similar acts, often undertaken by elite units that were sending messages.

Yes but the question is whether such actions are or were official Policy or not, with all that such would entail in terms of the Russian chain of command and ultimate responsibility for the issuing of such orders. Having a prior history of doing such things isn't the same as being ordered to do it by your high command in an organized and planned manner. As I said the proof one way or the other will depend on discovering evidence of similar planned and premeditated atrocities. If that happens fine we have the execution of civilians as an official component of Russia's war fighting strategy. If not we have n isolated incident involved one or more specific units. And both Ukrainians and NATO will know exactly which units were involved and who was in charge at the time. So those men will have targets painted on their chests for the rest of the lives, both legal ones and literal ones.

[Parihaka]

Possibly, but from my perspective if such conduct was high level policy given the size and scope of the invasion more instances of this behavior would or will become evidence as the war progresses. Even if only from satellite imaging. There have been numerous reports of Russian soldiers committing atrocities (killing civilians) but not on this scale or in such an organized fashion. If this was a policy decision then you would expect to see it's wide scale implementation - otherwise its not 'policy'.
.

What's left of Mariupol is reporting large scale use of the mobile crematoriums. Given the drone footage, that's hardly a surprise. Bucha, they were simply surprised, and ran when attacked. Mariupol, the Donbas, that's where the "mongol" industrial stuff is happening, and has been from the start of the invasion.
The only way we'll know is by population count before and after. And the lack of Ukraine speakers.

[Monash]

What's left of Mariupol is reporting large scale use of the mobile crematoriums. Given the drone footage, that's hardly a surprise. Bucha, they were simply surprised, and ran when attacked. Mariupol, the Donbas, that's where the "mongol" industrial stuff is happening, and has been from the start of the invasion.
The only way we'll know is by population count before and after. And the lack of Ukraine speakers.

Mariupal is unfortunately, in historical terms more or less a classic example of siege warfare. And in such cases the civilian casualties are horrendous. Artillery barrages, bombing, street to street fighting etc etc. So far the evidence (reporting) indicates this is what is killing civilians. That and the collapse of public utilities and health services. If or when we see evidence of systemic, planned extermination of the civilian population we can start making claims about this being a 'policy' decision masterminded in Moscow.

Which is not BTW a claim that events Mariupal are not war crimes. It's just that we need more evidence before we we start talking about a second 'final solution'.

[zraver]

Yes but the question is whether such actions are or were official Policy or not, with all that such would entail in terms of the Russian chain of command and ultimate responsibility for the issuing of such orders. Having a prior history of doing such things isn't the same as being ordered to do it by your high command in an organized and planned manner. As I said the proof one way or the other will depend on discovering evidence of similar planned and premeditated atrocities. If that happens fine we have the execution of civilians as an official component of Russia's war fighting strategy. If not we have n isolated incident involved one or more specific units. And both Ukrainians and NATO will know exactly which units were involved and who was in charge at the time. So those men will have targets painted on their chests for the rest of the lives, both legal ones and literal ones.

That question is legally speaking already answered. You can legally infer a criminal scheme based on actions alone since criminals tend to try and hide the evidence. So we know that A. The Russian's are engaging in mass deportations and kidnappings. B. Deliberate destruction of protected sites. C. The deliberate targeting of residential areas not being used for military purposes. D. An illegal war of aggression. E. Past history of such acts. F. Blocking ICRC access and humanitarian relief. and G. Not bringing any of the perpetrators up on charges.

[TopHatter]

The Ordinary Civilians in Estonia Preparing to Protect Their Country Against Putin

The ambush came at dawn. Moments before, the only sound in the frigid forest of Klooga, 40 km west of the Estonian capital Tallinn, had been light snoring coming from beneath a handful of camouflaged tarps. But seconds after machine-gun fire broke their sleep, several fighters erupted from their makeshift shelters and began returning fire. Flashes from their rifles illuminated the still dark woods, while blue smoke poured from a bomb intended to obscure the enemy’s path.

Within minutes, the battle was over. Although the outnumbered fighters did not manage to vanquish the opposing force, Kaia, an accountant who had left her baby at home that weekend, was pleased with the training exercise. “They did pretty well,” she said of the volunteers in the Estonian Defense League (EDL) she was helping instruct. “They stayed calm, and they held their ground.”

The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have been preparing to do the same. A shared border with Russia, and a painful history of Soviet occupation that began in the 1940s and saw the deportation and imprisonment of hundreds of thousands of citizens, spurred all three nations to join NATO once they regained independence in the 1990s. It has also led them to adopt a broad, society-wide approach to defense that has proved especially relevant more recently, as Russia has ramped up disinformation efforts in the region. Nowhere is that more evident than in Estonia, where 15,000 ordinary citizens like Kaia spend several weekends each year training in guerrilla warfare as part of the EDL. And since Russia invaded Ukraine in February, heightened fears that the Baltics could be the Kremlin’s next target have spurred thousands more to sign up.

“We are not conscripts. We are not regular army,” said Henri, 20, a participant in the Klooga “ambush” who works in sales. (Most members speaking with TIME preferred not to give their last names as a security precaution.) “We are ordinary Estonian men and women ready to put our blood on the line for every inch a possible occupier would want to gain of our land.”

Estonia takes protecting its population of 1.3 million seriously. Its defense budget is proportionately the third highest among NATO countries, and while there are only 7,000 active–duty soldiers in its military, it bulks up its defense and deterrence capabilities with reservists and with the EDL, which is the region’s largest volunteer force. At the start of 2022, it counted some 15,000 members, plus 10,700 in its youth organizations and Women’s Defense League, which provides support to the fighting units. That already added up to nearly 2% of the population, and since Russia invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24, the organization has received roughly 2,000 new applications for membership.

Most members are unpaid, though the Ministry of Defense funds their training and supplies weapons. “I truly believe that Estonians will grab a weapon or a tool against the Russian invaders,” says Lauri Abel, the ministry’s Under Secretary for Defense Readiness. A former commander of the Tallinn EDL, Abel sees the corps’ civilian status as crucial to its success. “They’re the link between the armed forces and society. They are everywhere, working in different companies. They carry the defense spirit to society.”

Even before the war in Ukraine, a full 57% of Estonians said they would be willing to participate in their country’s defense; some 80% approve of the EDL. It helps explain what induced Katlin, a 36-year-old who works in the financial sector, to spend a below-zero Sunday in late March in the snow, learning to make impromptu stretchers that could be used to haul wounded comrades out of the woods. “I wear heels five days a week. So this,” she says, gesturing to her heavy flak jacket and boots, “is a big difference. But I want the knowledge, and I want to be prepared.”

Preparation is at the heart of the league. New recruits spend eight weekends in basic training, where they learn to fire and clean weapons, to handle explosives, and a range of other survival skills. After passing a final test, they are allowed to keep their state-issued weapons at home. “I don’t know many countries in the world where the state entrusts its citizens to have combat weapons at their homes, just in case,” said one veteran member. “If we are suddenly attacked, I don’t need to go to a certain point to get my gear. I can just step out of my front door, walk 20 feet into the bushes, and then I’m dangerous.”

Against a conventional army with its large battalions and rigid formations, the EDL’s small, local units are intended to be much more agile. “One of our original principles is that you fight in the area you are from,” says Major Rene Toomse, who oversees the EDL’s training programs. “The point is that during peacetime you have time to learn all the terrain: you know where you can hide, where you can produce good ambushes—it’s your turf. Imagine what kind of leverage that gives you against an invading enemy. They have no idea where to go, and you know every inch.”

The EDL hasn’t yet had to test its abilities in a real conflict, but it collaborates with the Estonian military and with other NATO forces in war games and joint exercises, and is a major reason why researchers at the Rand organization consider Estonia’s total defense capabilities to be among “the most developed” of the Baltic states.

That serves as reassurance in a country where many believe that should Ukraine fall, they will be next. After sitting in on the Klooga unit’s practice ambush, Major Toomse drove to a target range where a different unit was spending its Sunday learning to fire two-person antitank weapons called Carl-Gustavs. “If Russia thinks it can reoccupy Estonia or any Baltic country,” Toomse said, “it’s going to be a disaster for them.”
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[TopHatter]

27 Feb 22
RIO DE JANEIRO — Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro says his government will remain neutral regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Bolsonaro says he had a two-hour long conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Sunday to talk about the war and assured Russia’s leader that Brazil will keep a neutral position.

Brazil’s ultra conservative president visited Putin in Moscow earlier this month before the invasion and says he does not want to “bring the consequences of the conflict” to Brazil.

Bolsonaro says that Russia has no intention of carrying out any massacres and that in some regions of Ukraine “90% of the people want to get closer to Russia.”

The Brazilian president also criticized Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, saying people “entrusted the fate of the nation to a comedian.”
___

Shit that's aged like milk....

[Monash]

That question is legally speaking already answered. You can legally infer a criminal scheme based on actions alone since criminals tend to try and hide the evidence. So we know that A. The Russian's are engaging in mass deportations and kidnappings. B. Deliberate destruction of protected sites. C. The deliberate targeting of residential areas not being used for military purposes. D. An illegal war of aggression. E. Past history of such acts. F. Blocking ICRC access and humanitarian relief. and G. Not bringing any of the perpetrators up on charges.

To be clear my objection from the start was to categorical statements that the incident at Bucha were part of a deliberate formalized high level policy. Not that they or other acts weren't of themselves war crimes. That said:

(A) May be correct once access is gained to the civilians moved to Russia. It depends on the justification for the transfer, the treatment they have received and whether the intention was or is to detain them longer than is strictly necessary for their own well being. (B) & (C) You have to prove intent to destroy the targets concerned (recall incidents during the Iraq war where US munitions hit unintended targets. Deliberate multiple strikes on clearly marked civilian targets would qualify as a crime if the soldiers responsible were aware of that status. (D) Relates to the war in general not to specific incidents committed by specific individuals. (E) Evidence of past crimes (assuming they have been proven) is, as a rule not admissible as evidence in relation to a currently alleged crime. They are relevant to sentencing considerations only. (F) Depends on the reason given and the legitimacy of those reasons (G) May yet happen (I'd fall of my chair if it did but such processes take time).

The point of all the above is that I come from a background where my job is to prove allegations of criminality. Which means I don't make assumptions about who is responsible or even what particular offenses someone may be guilt of until I've crossed of all the evidential boxes and confirmed all the details. Again I don't doubt that Bucha was a war crime. The issue there is who do I charge? In this case who issued the orders or otherwise failed to act to prevent those crimes.

[zraver]

To be clear my objection from the start was to categorical statements that the incident at Bucha were part of a deliberate formalized high level policy. Not that they or other acts weren't of themselves war crimes. That said:

(A) May be correct once access is gained to the civilians moved to Russia. It depends on the justification for the transfer, the treatment they have received and whether the intention was or is to detain them longer than is strictly necessary for their own well being. (B) & (C) You have to prove intent to destroy the targets concerned (recall incidents during the Iraq war where US munitions hit unintended targets. Deliberate multiple strikes on clearly marked civilian targets would qualify as a crime if the soldiers responsible were aware of that status. (D) Relates to the war in general not to specific incidents committed by specific individuals. (E) Evidence of past crimes (assuming they have been proven) is, as a rule not admissible as evidence in relation to a currently alleged crime. They are relevant to sentencing considerations only. (F) Depends on the reason given and the legitimacy of those reasons (G) May yet happen (I'd fall of my chair if it did but such processes take time).

The point of all the above is that I come from a background where my job is to prove allegations of criminality. Which means I don't make assumptions about who is responsible or even what particular offenses someone may be guilt of until I've crossed of all the evidential boxes and confirmed all the details. Again I don't doubt that Bucha was a war crime. The issue there is who do I charge? In this case who issued the orders or otherwise failed to act to prevent those crimes.

Except war crimes have a different burden of proof. IJA General Yamashita went to the gallows for failure to maintain control of his troops and preventing them from committing war crimes. Since there is evidence of wide spread murder and torture including bodies left in the street for weeks that failure to maintain control standard is applicable. That standard goes from small unit leaders all the way to the top, each and every commander in that chain is both individually and severally responsible.

[Monash]

Except war crimes have a different burden of proof. IJA General Yamashita went to the gallows for failure to maintain control of his troops and preventing them from committing war crimes. Since there is evidence of wide spread murder and torture including bodies left in the street for weeks that failure to maintain control standard is applicable. That standard goes from small unit leaders all the way to the top, each and every commander in that chain is both individually and severally responsible.

Yes but again my original post related to attempts convict senior Russian officers officials remote from the scene on the basis that events in Bucha were official Russian policy. Those officers responsible for command and control of the units involved are a different matter. It was their job to maintain control of their troops regardless of whether of not it was 'policy' (orders from above). Their heads are on the chopping block for their own actions or inaction in failing to prevent the executions etc. How high up the chain that responsibility goes depends on who knew (or reasonably should have known) what and when. Proving the men in Moscow ordered it requires more.

[zraver]

Yes but again my original post related to attempts convict senior Russian officers officials remote from the scene on the basis that events in Bucha were official Russian policy. Those officers responsible for command and control of the units involved are a different matter. It was their job to maintain control of their troops regardless of whether of not it was 'policy' (orders from above). Their heads are on the chopping block for their own actions or inaction in failing to prevent the executions etc. How high up the chain that responsibility goes depends on who knew (or reasonably should have known) what and when. Proving the men in Moscow ordered it requires more.

My argument is based on Yamashita's trial. He ordered Manila be an open city. An order that was disobeyed by IJNLF troops. He went to the hangman anyway. My second argument stems from the Tokyo Trial more general where government officials including Tojo went to the gallows for conventional war crimes like rape, murder, executing prisoners etc even though they never left Japan. If part of Toji's sentence can be based on Yamashita's inability to control a colonel..

[Monash]

My argument is based on Yamashita's trial. He ordered Manila be an open city. An order that was disobeyed by IJNLF troops. He went to the hangman anyway. My second argument stems from the Tokyo Trial more general where government officials including Tojo went to the gallows for conventional war crimes like rape, murder, executing prisoners etc even though they never left Japan. If part of Toji's sentence can be based on Yamashita's inability to control a colonel..

Regarding Tojo et al they had manifest evidence that the atrocities committed by Japanese forces in the field were de facto policy (SOP) for the Japanese military i.e lots of similar episodes and pots of disparate locations under different commanders. Yamashita? Regarding regarding & command responsibility - its possible you could get senior Russian military figures on those grounds but not necessarily political ones. And even then as far as military commanders go a lot will depend on what the Russian decide to do about the Bucha incident given it is a comparatively recent event. (And yes, I would be totally surprised if they 'did ' anything'.) But in practical terms senior military officers could potentially cover their own precious arses by ordering military trials for selected junior scape goats if Putin or other senior figures thought it was worthwhile. Command responsibility covered.

End of the day? I don't think the Russia will take any action other than to deny the entire incident. I don't think any Russians will personally face prosecution other than in absentia and I don't think there's anything the West can do about it - other than hand over Russian government million in compensation to the victims. That will sting.