2022-2024 Russo-Ukrainian War

[Ironduke]

Sorry, your entire posts strikes me as false compromise, an argument to moderation, with a bit of the sky is falling mixed in.

Nations with fewer resources have endured relatively more powerful adversaries for decades and emerged victorious.

The current Russian regime is not a state that any good faith negotiations or compromises can be made. Any agreement that could be reached are as worthless as those made with Ribbentrop and Hitler. The Russian regime is a mendacious, perfidious, bad faith actor through and through.

Ukraine will simply need to endure and outlast Putin, exhaust the Russians, until such time conditions inside Russia change, with whatever help it can source from external partners, while the West keeps Russia outcast, keep their foreign reserves seized, keeps them sanctioned. No nation should be denied their agency, freedom, or right to exist to satisfy Russian imperial ambitions and ego. The Russians have no more rights to Ukraine than the Poles, Lithuanians, or Mongols. Short of a revolution or regime change in Russia, there should be no normalization or rapprochement.

Putin and his regime are an ephemeral phenomenon. I see no sense in making permanent cessions and appeasements to the ephemeral.

[Monash]

Sorry, your entire posts strikes me as false compromise, an argument to moderation, with a bit of the sky is falling mixed in.

Nations with fewer resources have endured relatively more powerful adversaries for decades and emerged victorious.

The current Russian regime is not a state that any good faith negotiations or compromises can be made. Any agreement that could be reached are as worthless as those made with Ribbentrop and Hitler. The Russian regime is a mendacious, perfidious, bad faith actor through and through.

Ukraine will simply need to endure and outlast Putin, exhaust the Russians, until such time conditions inside Russia change, with whatever help it can source from external partners, while the West keeps Russia outcast, keep their foreign reserves seized, keeps them sanctioned. No nation should be denied their agency, freedom, or right to exist to satisfy Russian imperial ambitions and ego. The Russians have no more rights to Ukraine than the Poles, Lithuanians, or Mongols. Short of a revolution or regime change in Russia, there should be no normalization or rapprochement.

Putin and his regime are an ephemeral phenomenon. I see no sense in making permanent cessions and appeasements to the ephemeral.

Mostly it was meant to be a statement to the effect that neither country can fight this war indefinitely without running out of equipment. Russia is using theirs up faster than it can possibly make it. Ukraine relies of external support to maintain their equipment levels. There is simply no way this war can last another 5 years without something somewhere 'breaking' on one side or the other. That 'break' or fail point could be Putin dying. Who the hell knows? It could be the 2024 election, the failure of Russia's next offensive? Whatever it is something has and is going to 'give'. Eventually.

[Officer of Engineers]

All that means is the Ukrainians will adopt small unit actions and avoid big unit actions. The Mujahadeen didn't have artillery and gunships and they outlasted a more powerful Soviet Army.

[Monash]

All that means is the Ukrainians will adopt small unit actions and avoid big unit actions. The Mujaheddin didn't have artillery and gunships and they outlasted a more powerful Soviet Army.

The Mujaheddin didn't have hundreds of lines of fixed defensive lines and major cities to defend. They conducted a guerilla war no front lines against an enemy who had already occupied the major population centers. And geography wise most of Ukraine does not lend itself to hiding in remote mountain caves. It does however lend itself to relatively easy travel by mechanize ground forces thanks to a reasonably extensive road network. Something Afghanistan also lacked.

[Officer of Engineers]

WWII Partisans would like to say something about that.

[Monash]

WWII Partisans would like to say something about that.

WW2 was only 'won' because external powers (the Allies) came to the rescue of partisans and drove out their oppressors. I say this not to underplay their contribution to the war effort but simply to point out that their job was to tie down enemy forces no defeat them by themselves.

This is the exact opposite of what we would want vis-a-vis Ukraine. The entire premise of Western support for the country was (and is) based on the idea that NATO could avoid a direct confrontation with Russian forces by supporting Ukraine's military. If Ukraine fall's (and it could) NATO is not going to supply/support an insurgency and it's certainly not rolling in to liberate them!

[Ironduke]

The Mujaheddin didn't have hundreds of lines of fixed defensive lines and major cities to defend. They conducted a guerilla war no front lines against an enemy who had already occupied the major population centers. And geography wise most of Ukraine does not lend itself to hiding in remote mountain caves. It does however lend itself to relatively easy travel by mechanize ground forces thanks to a reasonably extensive road network. Something Afghanistan also lacked.

Yet the Russians at this point aren't making significant advances despite having a relative advantage in personnel and materiel, and despite an almost complete lack of preparation of defensive lines on the part of the Ukrainians. All Russian advances are incremental, painfully slow, and come at a huge cost in men and materiel.

Their offensives since the initial invasion have seen the taking of a modestly sized city at the rate of one every nine months to a year with a very limited advance afterward, with no decisive breakthroughs, no collapse on the part of the Ukrainians, and no sweeping maneuvers and encirclements. For each modest advance, the Ukrainians have bled the Russians in the tens of thousands of men, and destroyed hundreds and thousands of vehicles. The Russians are not having an easy time advancing across ground that is "relatively easy travel" by "mechanized ground forces".

Logistically I don't think the Russians are capable of capitalizing on any local collapse of Ukrainian lines in a breakthrough, any attempt will just see the RA outrun its supply lines, run out of gas, with personnel and vehicles get eaten alive in the Ukrainian rear.

[Officer of Engineers]

WW2 was only 'won' because external powers (the Allies) came to the rescue of partisans and drove out their oppressors. I say this not to underplay their contribution to the war effort but simply to point out that their job was to tie down enemy forces no defeat them by themselves.

This is the exact opposite of what we would want vis-a-vis Ukraine. The entire premise of Western support for the country was (and is) based on the idea that NATO could avoid a direct confrontation with Russian forces by supporting Ukraine's military. If Ukraine fall's (and it could) NATO is not going to supply/support an insurgency and it's certainly not rolling in to liberate them!

The point being that the Ukrainians are not without options. They may not be able to push the Russians back but they can make that occupation as expensive as hell.

[Monash]

Sorry, your entire posts strikes me as false compromise, an argument to moderation, with a bit of the sky is falling mixed in.

Nations with fewer resources have endured relatively more powerful adversaries for decades and emerged victorious.

The current Russian regime is not a state that any good faith negotiations or compromises can be made. Any agreement that could be reached are as worthless as those made with Ribbentrop and Hitler. The Russian regime is a mendacious, perfidious, bad faith actor through and through.

Ukraine will simply need to endure and outlast Putin, exhaust the Russians, until such time conditions inside Russia change, with whatever help it can source from external partners, while the West keeps Russia outcast, keep their foreign reserves seized, keeps them sanctioned. No nation should be denied their agency, freedom, or right to exist to satisfy Russian imperial ambitions and ego. The Russians have no more rights to Ukraine than the Poles, Lithuanians, or Mongols. Short of a revolution or regime change in Russia, there should be no normalization or rapprochement.

Putin and his regime are an ephemeral phenomenon. I see no sense in making permanent cessions and appeasements to the ephemeral.

Sorry, I forget to address this bit. Yes his regime is ephemeral. The problem is that the dictator who will inevitably follow him will also be just as 'ephemeral'. And the one after that and so on and so on. The problem is that after 20 years of Putin there are no institutional structures left in Russia capable of delivering the change of perspective 'a waiting him out' policy entails. For the foreseeable future whoever ends up in Putin's chair will have the same 'what's in it for me' attitude that Putin has. They will also almost certainly be tainted by association with both Putin and hence the war itself since the new leader(ship) will almost certainly be members of the current inner circle and so almost as motivated as Putin is to producing a 'win' they can sell to the Russian public. (Maybe not quite as motivated as Putin is but still you get my point.)

So if that is reality even without Putin? What incentive is there for Russia to avoid instituting a frozen conflict even assuming the new regime decides it doesn't want to continue with a full scale war? Hence my points about there having to be trade offs that give Russia something in return for ending the war permanently. I don't like the idea but, IMO its better than the alternative. Outside of that that what other solutions do you see? Because I certainly see zero chance of a truly democratically elected government returning to Russia anytime soon. Which rules out 'popular' dissent' forcing any new Russian Government to the negotiation table.

[Ironduke]

Is that the reality without Putin? I can foresee scenarios in which those troops currently deployed in Ukraine may need to be withdrawn to stabilize the rule of whomever or whatever comes next. It could be internal rivals in Putin's current circle in a power struggle, whether bloody or relatively bloodless. A revolution and severe political instability is always in the cards for a state like Russia, with a concomitant collapse of its ability to sustain external wars. Did the Soviet government need to sell a win to the public in Afghanistan in 1989, or had the war there become just a fart in the wind in light of more pressing matters and challenges at the time?

I think it's a perfectly viable strategy at this moment in time for Ukraine to trade very small amounts of space while exacting horrendous losses in men and materiel against Russia, until such time Russia loses the political will to continue the war, whether that be through revolution, regime change, internal instability, a new dictator with different priorities or more important fish to fry, or any other number or combination of internal and external factors that diminish the ability of Russia to prosecute the war.

Putin is never going to make a good faith effort to negotiate an end to the war as long as he sees the potential for advance, no matter how small these advances are, or huge his losses are. He only has a double down plan, no back down plan. Like Hitler, he is all in. The EU and the US are never going to recognize any changes in the borders of Ukraine, which would thus legitimize and normalize the use of force in aggressive wars of conquest. There is no path where Putin will sign a treaty with anyone that concedes or consents to a Ukrainian state in NATO. Furthermore, there is no one to sign such a treaty with, as the EU, US, and NATO have no rights, purview, leave, ability etc. to sign any such treaty with Russia on behalf of or over the fate of Ukraine.

[Monash]

Is that the reality without Putin? I can foresee scenarios in which those troops currently deployed in Ukraine may need to be withdrawn to stabilize the rule of whomever or whatever comes next. It could be internal rivals in Putin's current circle in a power struggle, whether bloody or relatively bloodless. A revolution and severe political instability is always in the cards for a state like Russia, with a concomitant collapse of its ability to sustain external wars. Did the Soviet government need to sell a win to the public in Afghanistan in 1989, or had the war there become just a fart in the wind in light of more pressing matters and challenges at the time?

I think it's a perfectly viable strategy at this moment in time for Ukraine to trade very small amounts of space while exacting horrendous losses in men and materiel against Russia, until such time Russia loses the political will to continue the war, whether that be through revolution, regime change, internal instability, a new dictator with different priorities or more important fish to fry, or any other number or combination of internal and external factors that diminish the ability of Russia to prosecute the war.

Putin is never going to make a good faith effort to negotiate an end to the war as long as he sees the potential for advance, no matter how small these advances are, or huge his losses are. He only has a double down plan, no back down plan. Like Hitler, he is all in. The EU and the US are never going to recognize any changes in the borders of Ukraine, which would thus legitimize and normalize the use of force in aggressive wars of conquest. There is no path where Putin will sign a treaty with anyone that concedes or consents to a Ukrainian state in NATO. Furthermore, there is no one to sign such a treaty with, as the EU, US, and NATO have no rights, purview, leave, ability etc. to sign any such treaty with Russia on behalf of or over the fate of Ukraine.

To address the highlighted points. Unfortunately the FSB and other internal security organizations would likely still be intact and just as well funded/resourced under a new administration as they are under Putin. Active opposition to Putin inside Russia itself is minimal and IMO is hardly likely to suddenly boil over if/when he does die or is deposed. On the other hand any 'popular' military mutiny/revolt against continuation of the war would, if it happened definitely represent one of those breaks or fail points I mentioned earlier. Although again at the moment I wouldn't say such an event appears to be likely either. Putin's death? Might also potentially be one of those fail points I guess, although as I've stated before I'm not convinced his replacement would immediately try to sue for peace either for reasons previously given. In any case I don't think his death is likely in next few years. We can all hope but basing your entire geopolitical strategy on 'hoping the other guys dies' seems ... more like wistful thinking than a plan.

The incremental retreat/casualty tradeoff strategy? Already appears to be in motion regardless of whether Zelenskyy wants it to be or not. And barring a significant win by Biden and the Dems in 2024 this seems unlikely to change. Unfortunately it also doesn't bring the war to a decisive close either - unless one side or the other breaks.

Finally 'good faith' and Putin are not words I ever expect to see used in the same sentence. I do believe however that he would be entirely open to a peace deal as long as it's one that as I've said before he can sell as a win. For no other reason than that would be in his own best interests - and that's the only calculation that matters to Putin. Especially since he knows the clock is ticking for Russia as well as Ukraine. If Trump doesn't come through for him the next election Putin has some very serious thinking to do going forward given the next known/predictable fail point I've mentioned is Russia exhausting it equipment stockpiles 12 to 18 months after the election.

[Ironduke]

A regime change in Russia, whether due to Putin's death, incapacitation, a revolution, coup, etc. and so on, these are far more likely future scenarios than the collective West recognizing any change in Ukraine's borders, or negotiating with a Russia on a matter where it has no rights, ability, purview, remit, or incentive to do so.

The West will never recognize any change in borders, thus legitimizing and normalizing aggressive wars of conquest. There will, however, be some eventual changes in Russian government, Putin will die some day, and due to any number of factors, internal and external, the Russians may lose the political will to continue to prosecute the war, and/or the material, economic, and financial capability to do so. I don't think any one of these by themselves may end up being the inflection point, rather we may see a myriad of factors contribute.

There will never be a NATO-Russia treaty recognizing cession of Ukrainian territory to Russia. Nor an EU-Russia treaty. Nor a US-Russia treaty. Such a "grand bargain" will never happen. The recognition of any change in the Russia-Ukraine border would be catastrophic for the current world order. The mere act of even entering into any sort of negotiations in which an adversary's position is such confers a level of legitimacy and normalization of aggressive wars of conquest and border changes by force. It's inconceivable. And to re-iterate, NATO, the US, the EU, again, have no right, ability, purview, or remit to negotiate such a thing.

Yes, the Ukrainians are unlikely to dislodge the Russians from their current conquests at this moment in time. It turns out Surovikin was quite competent and had the right ideas as far as the Russians are concerned, with his defensive lines and defense in depth. Given however, the only peace options available to Ukraine are a peace that is worse than the current war, the best option for Ukraine, in my opinion, is to continue fighting until some myriad of factors emerge which see Russia lose the political will and capability to prosecute the war.

In the last year, the Russians have taken Avdiivka and a few kilometers of countryside around it. Do you really think this is the point where Ukraine should surrender? Is the war lost now because of Avdiivka? That Ukraine should come to the negotiating table and permanently and irrevocably cede 20% of its territory because it lost Avdiivka? As long as Ukraine stays in the fight, the future outcome of the war is full of possibilities which may prove favorable to Ukraine. Coming to the table and accepting a peace worse than the current war slams the door shut on those possibilities.

[Officer of Engineers]

The EU and the US are never going to recognize any changes in the borders of Ukraine, which would thus legitimize and normalize the use of force in aggressive wars of conquest.

Kosovo.

There is no path where Putin will sign a treaty with anyone that concedes or consents to a Ukrainian state in NATO. Furthermore, there is no one to sign such a treaty with, as the EU, US, and NATO have no rights, purview, leave, ability etc. to sign any such treaty with Russia on behalf of or over the fate of Ukraine.

We can keep Kiev out of NATO the same way we keep Russia out of NATO. The legal precedent has been set. The Finland/Sweden/Turkey/Hungary fiasco should tell you just how much of a monkey wrench any single NATO member can throw into the process.

However, the ONLY NATO member who matters is the US. If the US determines conquest is legit (Kosovo) or the UKR deserves NATO membership, nothing will stand in the way. There might be some wheels need to be greased or hammered but the decision would have been made.

There will never be a NATO-Russia treaty recognizing cession of Ukrainian territory to Russia. Nor an EU-Russia treaty. Nor a US-Russia treaty. Such a "grand bargain" will never happen. The recognition of any change in the Russia-Ukraine border would be catastrophic for the current world order. The mere act of even entering into any sort of negotiations in which an adversary's position is such confers a level of legitimacy and normalization of aggressive wars of conquest and border changes by force. It's inconceivable. And to re-iterate, NATO, the US, the EU, again, have no right, ability, purview, or remit to negotiate such a thing.

It's been done. US recognizing Soviet seizure of WWII territories. US recognizing communist China over Nationalist China. US recognizing North Vietnam's conquest of South Vietnam. US recognizing Azerbaijani conquest of Armenian territory. NATO recognizing the outcome of the Georgian War.

What's also being done is the US refusing to recognize Saddam's conquest of Kuwait.

We're not all that different from the Grand Bargain Powers.

[Monash]

A regime change in Russia, whether due to Putin's death, incapacitation, a revolution, coup, etc. and so on, these are far more likely future scenarios than the collective West recognizing any change in Ukraine's borders, or negotiating with a Russia on a matter where it has no rights, ability, purview, remit, or incentive to do so.

The West will never recognize any change in borders, thus legitimizing and normalizing aggressive wars of conquest. There will, however, be some eventual changes in Russian government, Putin will die some day, and due to any number of factors, internal and external, the Russians may lose the political will to continue to prosecute the war, and/or the material, economic, and financial capability to do so. I don't think any one of these by themselves may end up being the inflection point, rather we may see a myriad of factors contribute.

There will never be a NATO-Russia treaty recognizing cession of Ukrainian territory to Russia. Nor an EU-Russia treaty. Nor a US-Russia treaty. Such a "grand bargain" will never happen. The recognition of any change in the Russia-Ukraine border would be catastrophic for the current world order. The mere act of even entering into any sort of negotiations in which an adversary's position is such confers a level of legitimacy and normalization of aggressive wars of conquest and border changes by force. It's inconceivable. And to re-iterate, NATO, the US, the EU, again, have no right, ability, purview, or remit to negotiate such a thing.

Yes, the Ukrainians are unlikely to dislodge the Russians from their current conquests at this moment in time. It turns out Surovikin was quite competent and had the right ideas as far as the Russians are concerned, with his defensive lines and defense in depth. Given however, the only peace options available to Ukraine are a peace that is worse than the current war, the best option for Ukraine, in my opinion, is to continue fighting until some myriad of factors emerge which see Russia lose the political will and capability to prosecute the war.

In the last year, the Russians have taken Avdiivka and a few kilometers of countryside around it. Do you really think this is the point where Ukraine should surrender? Is the war lost now because of Avdiivka? That Ukraine should come to the negotiating table and permanently and irrevocably cede 20% of its territory because it lost Avdiivka? As long as Ukraine stays in the fight, the future outcome of the war is full of possibilities which may prove favorable to Ukraine. Coming to the table and accepting a peace worse than the current war slams the door shut on those possibilities.

Who mentioned anything about Ukraine surrendering? Remember also that Russia's (Putin's) starting objective when he launched the invasion was the complete conquest of Ukraine, not the rural/largely unpopulated 20% he's managed so far. And Ukraine gains tremendously from any peace deal as well, much more than Russia in fact due to the end of hostilities and it's inevitable integration into with the rich economies of the EU. The other problem is that even if everything goes Ukraine's way i.e. Biden wins this year and new long range weapons and equipment start flowing in the amounts needed to push the Russia's back - to the point where an impending Russian defeat becomes not just inevitable but obvious? Russia is a nuclear armed State, Putin will be desperate and Ukraine is NOT a member of NATO and hence under the protection of its nuclear deterrent.

[Ironduke]

US recognizing Soviet seizure of WWII territories.

WWII is pretty much the last instance prior to the creation of current international law, to which every country but Russia currently adheres to. Since then, international law has proscribed aggressive wars of conquest and deemed them illegal. If Russia gets to do it, everybody else gets to do it.

Kosovo.

There is precedent for recognition of new states that have emerged through secession, an independence war, and/or self-determination. Kosovo in this respect is no different than any of the other ex-Yugoslav republics, ex-Soviet Republics, etc. Annexation of territory by one sovereign state in an aggressive war of conquest is not the same thing as a subnational unit becoming an independent state.

US recognizing communist China over Nationalist China.

This was just a change in recognition of which was viewed as the legitimate government of China. There was no change in the recognition of the borders of China at this time, nor was China conquered or annexed by an external foreign power.

US recognizing North Vietnam's conquest of South Vietnam.

The international community never recognized either North or South Vietnam as legally constituting separate states, it was a matter of which was viewed as the legitimate government of the entire territory. Some countries recognized the government in Saigon as the legitimate Vietnamese government, others the one in Hanoi.

US recognizing Azerbaijani conquest of Armenian territory.

Nagorono-Karabakh was never recognized as Armenian territory under international law, not even by Armenia. Armenia never officially claimed this territory, nor did it recognize the independence of the NKR. It was legally viewed internationally as Azerbaijani territory. The US certainly did not recognize the NKR as part of Armenia either.

NATO recognizing the outcome of the Georgian War.

I don't think any NATO country recognizes Russia's occupation of Georgian territory as legal or legitimate.

There are actual examples you could cite since the creation of post-WWII international law on the matter. Golan Heights, Western Sahara, Sikkim, Goa, Western New Guinea.