2022-2024 Russo-Ukrainian War

[Ironduke]

The Kyiv Independent is reporting today that there are power outages in Moscow Oblast from strikes on electrical substations. Presumably Ukrainian drone strikes. The head of the Ukrainian Ministry of Strategic Industries has also recently claimed they are now producing several dozen domestic analogues of the Shahed drones per month. Meanwhile late last month Zelensky stated that there will be a "response" to Russian strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure, seemingly implying that Russian energy infrastructure will be retaliated against. I'm curious to see how this will play out over the winter. The War of the Electrical Substations.

Anyone have any takes on the Dnipro river crossings? My opinion, that it would be dangerous for Ukraine to cross too many men and materiel across the river, or try to push to far lest they get cut off and defeated in detail. Keeping close to the river though as they have, it seems this move could generate favorable opportunities to divert Russian resources to the left bank in Kherson, where the Ukrainians may be able to favorably attrit Russian forces with superior artillery positions on the right bank of the Dnipro. An opportunity that would not exist if they did not cross at least some forces to bait the Russians.

[Ironduke]

New Perun video drop:

[Monash]

Anyone have any takes on the Dnipro river crossings? My opinion, that it would be dangerous for Ukraine to cross too many men and materiel across the river, or try to push to far lest they get cut off and defeated in detail. Keeping close to the river though as they have, it seems this move could generate favorable opportunities to divert Russian resources to the left bank in Kherson, where the Ukrainians may be able to favorably attrit Russian forces with superior artillery positions on the right bank of the Dnipro. An opportunity that would not exist if they did not cross at least some forces to bait the Russians.

My personal take, based on the limited media reporting I've seen more or less matches yours i.e. the crossings are largely diversionary in nature with any advances claimed by the limited forces involved played up for PR purposes.

The central problem for Ukraine in pushing forces across the river remains the same one that forced Russia to withdraw from Khespn last year I.e. the inability of either side to sustain a large force on the opposite bank of the Dnipr River absent air superiority over it or sufficient air defences to prevent the enemy using PGMs to destroy/disrupt your LOCs crossing over it. Russia couldn't do it in 2022 and it would appear Ukraine cant do it now in 2023.

I've only seen claims that Ukraine had deployed about 3 bridades (totally or partially) onto the east bank and theres no sign of rapid advances by those units or of any more brigades joining them. Given these facts it would seem to me that the real intention of the crossings are to force Russia to redeploy men and material along the length of the river, a zone that until the recent crossings was only lightly defended compared to other sectors of gbe front. (IMO both sides have, until now basically been treating the river as a sort of giant moat ever since the Russians were forced to retreat back across it last year.)

If the Ukis can get the Russians to react and redeploy the equivalent of say 10 brigades in responce to probes by 3 of theirs? (Remembering theres a lot of river bank to cover.) It's a win for them.

[Ironduke]

If the Ukis can get the Russians to react and redeploy the equivalent of say 10 brigades in responce to probes by 3 of theirs? (Remembering theres a lot of river bank to cover.) It's a win for them.

This is my count from 5 weeks ago of Russian units stationed along the Dnipro (excluding Enerhodar):

• 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade
• 1445th Motorized Rifle Regiment
• 1822nd Battalion
• 126th Separate Guards Coastal Defense Brigade
• 227th Artillery Brigade
• 10th Special Purposes Brigade
• 439th Guards Rocket Artillery Brigade
• BARS "Kherson"

Compared to now. Italicized units appear to be recently deployed to the Dnipro in the last five weeks:

• 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade
• 1445th Motorized Rifle Regiment
• 1882nd Battalion
• 126th Separate Guards Coastal Defense Brigade
• 227th Artillery Brigade
• 10th Special Purposes Brigade
• 439th Guards Rocket Artillery Brigade
• BARS "Kherson"
• 24th Motor Rifle Regiment
• 810th Naval Infantry Brigade
• 127th Separate Intelligence Brigade
• 385th Motorized Rifle Regiment
• 177th Separate Regiment Marines
• 328th Airborne Assault Regiment
• 26th Motorized Rifle Regiment
• 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment
• 4th Squad BARS
• 33rd Squad BARS
• 144th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade
• 337th Airborne Assault Regiment

[tbm3fan]

That is a lot of units the Russians are throwing in. They are just missing the 499th Kitchen Sink Special Purpose High Times Regiment.

[Ironduke]

I think these BARS units must be like the Volkssturm of 1945. Older men for rear area duties.

[Albany Rifles]

I think these BARS units must be like the Volkssturm of 1945. Older men for rear area duties.

Yeah...my question was going to be how full are they on manpower authorizations, what weapons they have, what kind of shape are those weapon systems in and have they fixed their sustainment systemic issues yet?

[Ironduke]

My understanding on BARS units (apparently two more deployed to the Dnipro), is they are nominally battalion sized, poorly equipped, and there's supposedly an upper limit of age 40 for enlisted ranks. But I suspect in practice there's even older men in these units.

But besides these two BARS battalions, it appears Russia has deployed/redeployed a fair number of regiment and brigade sized units from the regular army, one from the VDV, and at least a couple naval infantry regiments as well. They're designated as "marines" but I don't think they are analogous to our Marines in professionalism, capability, or espirit de corps.

[Monash]

My understanding on BARS units (apparently two more deployed to the Dnipro), is they are nominally battalion sized, poorly equipped, and there's supposedly an upper limit of age 40 for enlisted ranks. But I suspect in practice there's even older men in these units.

But besides these two BARS battalions, it appears Russia has deployed/redeployed a fair number of regiment and brigade sized units from the regular army, one from the VDV, and at least a couple naval infantry regiments as well. They're designated as "marines" but I don't think they are analogous to our Marines in professionalism, capability, or espirit de corps.

I'd question how many of those units are at or near their mandated strengths as well. Particularly the marine units. Supposedly they along with Russian airborne units and their special forces have torn up pretty been badly in 2022 & early 2023 because they were constantly being thrown into combat to bolster previous poor performance of the rest of the army.

It may not matter as much though if they are under strength as it would in other sectors because as I said previously I cant see Ukraine developing their bridgehead on the east bank into a full fledged offensive. The 'win' for Ukraine comes from Russia having to redeploy those troop to that sector regardless on a 'just in case' basis.

[Albany Rifles]

The long reach of Ukraine's Intelligence Service


https://www.kyivpost.com/post/24856

Ukraine’s SBU Blows Up Freight Train in Rail Tunnel Deep Inside Russia


Kyiv Post sources claim that the Russians are using the railway to transport military supplies from China. At least four explosions struck the train, they added.



The entrance to the Severomuysky Tunnel.

The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) blew up a freight train in a tunnel on a vital rail link between Russia and China, sources have told Kyiv Post.

The operation, conducted overnight, struck in the Severomuysky Tunnel on the Baikal Amur Mainline deep inside Russia, north of Mongolia.

A source in Ukraine’s military leadership told Kyiv Post four explosions targeted the train as it passed through the tunnel.

They added: “Currently, the Russians use this route, including for military supplies. After the explosion, it was paralyzed.”




The source said Russian security services were investigating at the scene and workers were trying to make the tunnel operational again.

There is currently no information on the extent of the damage to the tunnel itself.

Kyiv Post contacted the SBU for a comment but did not receive a response.

Russian media also reported on this incident. According to their information, on Nov. 29 at 10:18 p.m., a freight train caught fire in the Severomuysky Tunnel.

The East Siberian Transport Prosecutor's Office reported that recovery and fire trains were in operation and there are no casualties.

The Russian Telegram channel Baza reported that fuel tank on the train caught but did not say what caused it.

“What caused the fire is still unknown. Police and FSB officers are working on the spot. Also, police officers and employees of the special services work out the places of train parking," Baza reports.

As fears grow that Kyiv’s counter-offensive has stalled there is concern that Russia may be preparing to launch a renewed offensive of its own – the signs are all there.

The attack is just the latest in a string of successes for the SBU on Russian and Russian-occupied territories since the start of the full-scale invasion.

In a documentary titled “Special Operations for Victory,” broadcast Nov. 24 on Ukrainian TV channel 1+1, the head of the SBU and other military officers released details of two attacks on the Kerch Bridge, two of the most significant to date.

So far, Ukraine has conducted two successful strikes on the Kerch Bridge that serves as a logistic lifeline between occupied Crimea and Russia’s mainland.

The first attack took place on Oct. 8, 2022, a day after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 70th birthday, which set the bridge on fire.

While most information for the attacks was gathered through open-source channels, a video posted by a woman on a yacht proved to be essential in determining the integral structure of the arch supporting the bridge, according to a counterintelligence officer operating under the callsign “Racoon.”

[Albany Rifles]

The Ukrainians hacked the TV networks in Crimea so President Zelensky appears on every channel.

https://t.me/supernova_plus/26124

[Ironduke]

The long reach of Ukraine's Intelligence Service


https://www.kyivpost.com/post/24856

A source in Ukraine’s military leadership told Kyiv Post four explosions targeted the train as it passed through the tunnel.

They added: “Currently, the Russians use this route, including for military supplies. After the explosion, it was paralyzed.”

This will pose some difficulties in rail transport for the Russians until they clear the tunnel and do whatever repairs they need to do. But there is a bypass line on the BAM, and there's also the Trans-Siberian Railway. I've seen some commentary on a couple reddits I read and elsewhere that the connection to the Russia Far East had been severed, not quite the case.

The amount of tonnage they can throughput will be reduced, and on the BAM Line trains east- and west-bound trains will have to take turns going very slowly on the bypass, which already has a very much reduced speed and requires extra locomotives to push/pull trains due to the grade.

[Albany Rifles]

This will pose some difficulties in rail transport for the Russians until they clear the tunnel and do whatever repairs they need to do. But there is a bypass line on the BAM, and there's also the Trans-Siberian Railway. I've seen some commentary on a couple reddits I read and elsewhere that the connection to the Russia Far East had been severed, not quite the case.

The amount of tonnage they can throughput will be reduced, and on the BAM Line trains east- and west-bound trains will have to take turns going very slowly on the bypass, which already has a very much reduced speed and requires extra locomotives to push/pull trains due to the grade.

Anything which strains the logistics trail is a good thing for Ukraine.

[Ironduke]

Well, I may have spoke to soon. The Kyiv Independent is now reporting they destroyed a 35m bridge on the bypass line in a second operation.

If true the BAM Line is completely severed now. Which means Russia will be entirely reliant on throughput they can achieve via the Trans-Siberian Railway for Europe-Far East rail traffic for the time being.

https://kyivindependent.com/media-sb...sias-far-east/

[Monash]

Well, I may have spoke to soon. The Kyiv Independent is now reporting they destroyed a 35m bridge on the bypass line in a second operation.

If true the BAM Line is completely severed now. Which means Russia will be entirely reliant on throughput they can achieve via the Trans-Siberian Railway for Europe-Far East rail traffic for the time being.

https://kyivindependent.com/media-sb...sias-far-east/

I can't be absolutely certain of course because I haven't see a photo of the bridge in question but I would suspect it wont take Russian engineers too long to replace the destroyed bridge with a temporary one. Their military railway units have probably been mostly stripped of soldiers for combat duty in Ukraine but their repair and maintenance equipment including pontoon railway bridges etc will still be stockpiled somewhere. A well planned and executed mission by the Ukrainians mission though.

From my perspective though the best bit is that there are thousands of miles of railway track, bridges and junction boxes etc the Ukrainians to 'Gomez Addams' regularly. I'm sought of surprised they haven't done something like this earlier but the team that carried out this is obviously still operating so here's hoping.