"...Before decentralization, top-level structures like army corps command were directly responsible for organizing and running counter-battery warfare. Brigade-level artillery command, in the meantime, was responsible for supporting the infantry on battlefields rather than hunting hostile artillery..."
Who can afford field armies these days with active manuever corps and divisions? If so, you'd have artillery staffs at division (DIVARTY) and Corps (Corps Arty H.Q.) controlling general support assets (F.A. GS rocket artillery batteries at DIVARTY) and corp-level F.A..tube and rocket battalions grouped in brigades under the Corps Arty Cdr...
...and linked into strategic, theatre, operational and tactical target acquisition resources...
...and well-exercised in the integration, coordination and employment of counter-battery, offensive E.W. and SEAD fires.
I assure a high likelihood that our own once-considerable skills there have atrophied dangerously. It is hard to identify, confirm, prioritize and allocate the correct mode of attack (direct engagement? Electronic suppression? Air strike?, etc.) and means/munitions employed.
And do it quickly and well in a continuous series of evolving targets. Maybe I'm wrong but the T.A. resources have never seemed better. If so, the onus is on resourcing, creating and developing staffs and organizations equal to some renewed realities.
Who can afford field armies these days with active manuever corps and divisions? If so, you'd have artillery staffs at division (DIVARTY) and Corps (Corps Arty H.Q.) controlling general support assets (F.A. GS rocket artillery batteries at DIVARTY) and corp-level F.A..tube and rocket battalions grouped in brigades under the Corps Arty Cdr...
...and linked into strategic, theatre, operational and tactical target acquisition resources...
...and well-exercised in the integration, coordination and employment of counter-battery, offensive E.W. and SEAD fires.
I assure a high likelihood that our own once-considerable skills there have atrophied dangerously. It is hard to identify, confirm, prioritize and allocate the correct mode of attack (direct engagement? Electronic suppression? Air strike?, etc.) and means/munitions employed.
And do it quickly and well in a continuous series of evolving targets. Maybe I'm wrong but the T.A. resources have never seemed better. If so, the onus is on resourcing, creating and developing staffs and organizations equal to some renewed realities.
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