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2022-2023 Russo-Ukrainian War

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  • Officer of Engineers
    replied
    Originally posted by Ironduke View Post
    Is it? I'm just a layman, but Wiki says maneuver warfare incorporates the elements of movement, initiative, and surprise, by enveloping, encircling, and disrupting enemy forces, while avoiding frontal assaults.

    What does active defense have to do with any of that?
    It's the modern version of the faint retreat. Lure lead elements of a Russian advance into a KZ while counter-attacking the Russian immediate rear to trap Russian lead elements in that KZ, denying a line of retreat for the Russian lead elements.

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  • Ironduke
    replied
    Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
    Attrition will turn this into a war of manoeuvre whether Moscow or Kiev likes it or not. Kiev is already adopting Active Defence which by definition is manoeuvre war. As the BUSINESS INSIDER article alluded to, Kiev currently lacks the men to hold the lines and thus must rely on Active Defence to plug the lines. Men will keep dying off until holding lines would be impossible and leakage might as well be open corridors for mobile troops.
    Is it? I'm just a layman, but Wiki says maneuver warfare incorporates the elements of movement, initiative, and surprise, by enveloping, encircling, and disrupting enemy forces, while avoiding frontal assaults.

    What does active defense have to do with any of that?

    Leave a comment:


  • Officer of Engineers
    replied
    Originally posted by Monash View Post
    Which is exactly what Zelensky fired Zaluzhny for insisting on, so his replacement isn't going to ask for or get it either.
    Which is something I, Zaluzhny, and Syrskyi don't understand. What is wrong with Total War when you're facing a man determined to destroy the Ukrainian State?

    Originally posted by Monash View Post
    As for 'too late'?
    ...

    As long as Ukriane keeps getting good intel support from NATO and doesn't make a drastic misstep? It can last until we see whose President in November.
    Russia is bleeding the Ukrainian Army dry.

    Originally posted by Ironduke View Post
    Well, if Russia continues at its rate since summer 2022 of capturing a town that formerly had around 50 or 70k inhabitants every 8 or 9 months or so, this war will drag out to about the year 2322. And Russia will lose about 30-60mil troops over this time. This is the pace and level of casualties they're operating at. They've so far been incapable of breaking out and engaging in a war of maneuver.
    Attrition will turn this into a war of manoeuvre whether Moscow or Kiev likes it or not. Kiev is already adopting Active Defence which by definition is manoeuvre war. As the BUSINESS INSIDER article alluded to, Kiev currently lacks the men to hold the lines and thus must rely on Active Defence to plug the lines. Men will keep dying off until holding lines would be impossible and leakage might as well be open corridors for mobile troops.
    Last edited by Officer of Engineers; Yesterday, 19:47.

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  • Ironduke
    replied
    Well, if Russia continues at its rate since summer 2022 of capturing a town that formerly had around 50 or 70k inhabitants every 8 or 9 months or so, this war will drag out to about the year 2322. And Russia will lose about 30-60mil troops over this time. This is the pace and level of casualties they're operating at. They've so far been incapable of breaking out and engaging in a war of maneuver.
    Last edited by Ironduke; Yesterday, 15:33.

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  • Monash
    replied
    Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
    Declare Martial Law. Assume a Total War footing. Conscript every able body man into the forces. This is a war of national survival. National Survival actions is needed.
    Which is exactly what Zelensky fired Zaluzhny for insisting on, so his replacement isn't going to ask for or get it either.

    As for 'too late'?

    I don't believe so. What little progress it's made this year including around Adviiika? Russia has managed only after a year long grind. It has a clear advantage in basic fires but the army that's trying to conquer Ukraine today is not the one that invaded. At least in terms of its equipment and it's ability to achieve rapid breakthroughs and effective combined armed offensives. It stocks of armored fighting vehicles and tanks etc have been gutted and its air force can't operate effectively over Ukrainian territory. Assuming Ukraine doesn't have any gaps in its lines and fortifies as heavily as it can? Russia won't be making another 'dash for Kiev' any time soon.

    As long as Ukriane keeps getting good intel support from NATO and doesn't make a drastic misstep? It can last until we see whose President in November.

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  • Officer of Engineers
    replied
    Originally posted by Monash View Post
    It's all coming down now to who wins in November this year.
    Too late.

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  • Officer of Engineers
    replied
    Originally posted by Monash View Post
    For now at least what choice does it have?
    Declare Martial Law. Assume a Total War footing. Conscript every able body man into the forces. This is a war of national survival. National Survival actions is needed.

    I understand Zaluzhny. You can't win this war half ass. Zelensky has the legislative and executive power to go Total War. Zelensky, for his own reasons legitimate or not, chosed NOT to do so.

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  • Monash
    replied
    Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
    For now at least what choice does it have? It's all coming down now to who wins in November this year.

    Leave a comment:


  • Officer of Engineers
    replied
    https://www.businessinsider.com/ukra...ny-wwii-2024-2

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  • Monash
    replied
    Originally posted by astralis View Post

    I have a feeling it is also because the Ukrainian state simply cannot raise, train, and equip 300,000 men. can't copy the Russians by throwing people onto a bus, give them 10 bullets and a week, and off to the frontlines. the Ukrainians did that in the fall of 2022 and that was a serious morale killer, even when everyone knew it was to buy the Western-trained brigades time.

    and Ukraine doesn't have the oil money that Russia can continue to rely on.

    regardless, though, Ukraine and Zelensky needs to do -something- about it. they're gonna bleed to death before they can achieve air parity.
    And there lies the problem for the officer replacing Valerii Zaluzhny as commander of the army. Apart from just remaining on the defensive he wont be able to suggest any viable option beyond what Zaluzhny recommended and was fired for to begin with i.e. raising more troops via conscription. Ukraine only has what? A third the population of Russia and a smaller industrial base (per head of population) to boot. Without extra troops its down to Biden winning the election this year and US sending modern long range strike systems in quantities sufficient enough that Ukraine can first match then exceed Russia's numerical advantage in fires with longer range and accuracy.

    Even then I doubt Ukraine retake all the land its lost to Putin but it sure as hell can make a continued Russian offensive nonviable and force Putin into talks where he is forced to cede some of it back and end this dam war.
    Last edited by Monash; 20 Feb 24,, 20:39.

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  • astralis
    replied
    Who's disagreeing? We all see the point. Zaluzhny wants the manpower when he could achieve air parity (F-16s). He could distract and attack at the same time if he had another 300,000 men.
    I have a feeling it is also because the Ukrainian state simply cannot raise, train, and equip 300,000 men. can't copy the Russians by throwing people onto a bus, give them 10 bullets and a week, and off to the frontlines. the Ukrainians did that in the fall of 2022 and that was a serious morale killer, even when everyone knew it was to buy the Western-trained brigades time.

    and Ukraine doesn't have the oil money that Russia can continue to rely on.

    regardless, though, Ukraine and Zelensky needs to do -something- about it. they're gonna bleed to death before they can achieve air parity.

    Leave a comment:


  • Ironduke
    replied
    The UA has completely withdrawn from Avdiivka.

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  • rj1
    replied
    Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
    No, the Ukrainians were not fighting like a Western military nor a Soviet military for that matter. They lacked the C3 to be a truly WW3 army. When only 2 companies out of 9 in a brigade can engage in combat, it's a statement that the entire bde cannot be used as effectively as it should.

    But the entire thrust is replacement manpower. Even Western Bdes will struggle if front line coys are reduced to 35% strength. You can't expect platoon size coys to do coy sized attacks be it Western or Soviet doctrine. In very fact, Soviet doctrine calls for 6 to 1 superiority before attacking, something neither side has achieved.
    Which on that point:

    Restoring Ukraine’s advantage

    In a prior article discussing the course of the war in 2022, we assessed that combined-arms training and precision-strike systems would not prove sufficient to escape attrition in the coming offensive. Assuming Ukraine and the West now accept the unavoidability of a long war, both need to settle on a long-term strategy to effectively defend against Russian offensive operations, reconstitute Ukrainian forces and maintain pressure on the Russian military with the goal of restoring a battlefield advantage to Ukrainian armed forces. The strategy should cast 2024 as a pivotal year, with an eye to restoring the ability to conduct a successful offensive in 2025.

    At this point, Russia has several material advantages. It is likely to retain an artillery-fire edge over the course of the year and beyond. Russia will also continue regenerating combat power, recruiting more than 10,000 troops per month. It will probably hold the strategic initiative along much of the 1,000 km front line and expand its strike campaign against Ukraine given increased production of drones and cruise missiles. Moreover, Moscow is now set to spend 6% of GDP on defence – a significant increase – and the real figure may be closer to 8%. Its apparent intent is to overwhelm Ukraine through defence-industrial mobilisation and sustained regeneration of combat forces.

    The most effective way for Ukraine to rebuild its advantage is to mount an effective defence in depth, which will reduce Ukraine’s losses and ammunition requirements. At present, Russia holds the defensive advantage, on account of dedicated engineering brigades, machinery and the capacity to fortify quickly, as well as extensive minefields and sophisticated minelaying systems, including those capable of distance mining. A better defence would also permit Ukraine to restructure its force deployments, rotate brigades and free up parts of the military for reconstitution.

    Ukraine will also have to replenish its force. Based on our field research, Ukraine’s average soldier appears to be in his 40s, which is ill-suited for certain combat tasks. Ukrainian leadership needs to review policies on the ages of those conscripted. The West can assist by scaling up training programmes, which need to be adjusted on the basis of lessons learned in the 2023 offensive and Ukrainian experience in this war. Within Ukraine, expanded facilities and training ranges will be needed to rotate units off and onto the front line. Further, units that have been on the front lines since the beginning of the war – particularly those at Bakhmut – need rest and recuperation.

    More broadly, Ukraine’s military requires recapitalisation. Ukraine and its Western backers need to increase industrial capacity and output of key systems in order to ensure that Ukraine will have the requisite fires advantage. For supporting countries, the challenge is to significantly increase production of artillery ammunition and air-defence interceptors. Our field research indicates that Ukraine will need around 75,000–90,000 artillery shells per month to sustain the war defensively, and more than double that – 200,000–250,000 – for a major offensive. At this stage, the Western coalition depends mostly on US stocks to sustain the lower range of this figure and does not have the ammunition to support a major offensive next year. Ukraine can reduce its requirements for artillery ammunition by significantly increasing production of strike drones, both first-person-view drones for use in close battle and long-range strike drones to target Russian critical infrastructure. To do this, Ukraine will have to resolve several financing, contracting and industrial-capacity issues. The West, for its part, will need to support Ukraine in procuring or developing munitions to use with drones, as such munitions from other sources are in short supply. Ukraine’s indigenous ability to maintain and repair Western armoured fighting vehicles and artillery is growing, and the West should work to advance the localisation of maintenance, parts replacement and production of strike systems.

    Naturally, defence and reconstitution by themselves are not enough, and Ukraine will have to be careful about being drawn into costly battles like Bakhmut, which tend to lead to a sunk-costs mentality. These may be politically symbolic, but they trade short-term gain for strategic costs that hamper reconstitution. At this stage of the war, the West is neither expecting nor desirous of fleeting or isolated battlefield victories for the continuation of its support. Instead, Ukraine should plan for and execute strike campaigns – for example, against the Russian Black Sea Fleet, Russian air bases in Crimea or key supporting infrastructure. Heading into 2024, it is clear that the optimal strategy is one that avoids a costly stalemate, or worse, a mounting Russian advantage that leads to Ukraine’s defeat. Both Ukraine and the Western countries involved retain good options, but success will require better alignment on strategy.
    This analysis was formed and written pre-Avdiivka of course, but the last bolded point pretty much describes it.

    So the rest of it, how are they reconstituting their armed forces if they think the average age of a soldier in the field is in the 40s? Based on their marketing material it seems they're trying to encourage more women to enlist.

    How are they getting arms and ammunition when all we're doing is eating up inventory? Defense contractor procurement at the moment is a complete shitshow based on personal knowledge. I get anything going to Ukraine is DX and would jump to the front of the line, but my criticism of Western defense structure probably ever since the Persian Gulf War is this belief we can do war half-ass and still succeed. I've read what you've stated before about NATO capacity outside of the U.S. and know you serve Canada, and it seems to me you think the same thing. But Ukraine is not a half-ass war, it's a full war, and we're not even fighting, we're just shipping shit, and that's even a challenge.

    If we and by we I mean all the countries supporting Ukraine are 2 years into this conflict and we still can't provide to Ukraine anything more than enough ammunition for purely defense, no offensives on offer...they've permanently lost Crimea and Donbass. To act like a miracle is going to occur at this point is irresponsible foolishness.

    So what's the end game?
    Last edited by rj1; 17 Feb 24,, 05:09.

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  • Officer of Engineers
    replied
    No, the Ukrainians were not fighting like a Western military nor a Soviet military for that matter. They lacked the C3 to be a truly WW3 army. When only 2 companies out of 9 in a brigade can engage in combat, it's a statement that the entire bde cannot be used as effectively as it should.

    But the entire thrust is replacement manpower. Even Western Bdes will struggle if front line coys are reduced to 35% strength. You can't expect platoon size coys to do coy sized attacks be it Western or Soviet doctrine. In very fact, Soviet doctrine calls for 6 to 1 superiority before attacking, something neither side has achieved.

    Leave a comment:


  • rj1
    replied
    Whole thing's a good read. But I find the end of this last paragraph interesting.

    https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis...ry-for-ukraine

    Making attrition work

    The most recent offensive raises the question of whether the West should emphasise a combined-arms, manoeuvre-based approach, or focus instead on helping Ukraine attain advantage via a destruction-based approach, especially given what is likely to be a prolonged attritional phase. The course of the war illustrates that manoeuvre will have to be earned, and that integration and simultaneity – basically, the key virtues of combined-arms operations – are not only difficult to achieve but also unlikely to produce breakthroughs under the conditions prevailing in Ukraine. Rather, the focus needs to be first and foremost on the attritional destruction of Russia’s forces by firepower in both the close and deep battles to pave the way for manoeuvre. Ukraine, in short, needs to embrace a destruction-centred approach for the next stage of the war, which may in time enable manoeuvre to be more successful.

    Attrition is a more dependable approach in part because the force quality required to execute combined-arms operations at scale is often difficult to maintain and reconstitute later in a conventional war. The Ukrainian armed forces have had to undergo cycles of reconstituting and rebuilding formations, often after losing more experienced soldiers and leaders to attrition. New units often consist of mobilised personnel, officers from other formations, and those who were promoted in grade, most without any professional military education. The emphasis therefore has to be on the fundamentals to build planning capacity within battalion and brigade staffs. This is required before higher levels of coordination are possible and instilling a major doctrinal evolution into a traditionally fires-centred military is feasible.

    Furthermore, Ukraine’s principal problem in the 2023 offensive was not an inability to conduct combined-arms manoeuvre. While it is true the new brigades trained by Western countries struggled to coordinate combat arms, this was ancillary rather than central to the offensive’s failure. Accordingly, it is incorrect to conclude that Ukrainian forces could not succeed because they could not fight like a Western military, or that fighting like a Western military doctrinally requires air superiority, without which success is impossible. In fact, Ukraine made progress by trying to gain better positions, fighting for relative fires advantage that reduced overall losses, and made Russia pay a high price to defend terrain. Fighting like a Western military is not necessarily a recipe for success in this war. As many Ukrainian soldiers have suggested, the operating environment is such that some Western tactics and techniques appear unsuitable or dated.

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