Bundeswehr Restructuring

[Albany Rifles]

As someone who has worked US Army and a little NATO acquisition for 30+ years these are some pretty short acquisition times. For a country not mobilized for war. with the supply constraints globally, this is a fairly impressive rapid movement. Especially when seen against the decades of slow movement.

[kato]

The Bundesrechnungshof, BRH - the German equivalent of the GAO - already reigned them in on some of these "shopping tour" acquisitions though ;-)

Apparently when looking at the actual financial numbers of projects earmarked to be paid from the 100 billion fund they found that somehow the government managed to actually squeeze 109 billion of acquisition planning in there. And BRH of course told them that that had to go.

One of those "overspending" components in that budget was the Navy in particular. Where they transferred three projects (K130, F126, U212CD) from the regular budget into it, announced in the press that those would be expanded with the money - but then only set up enough additional funding in the fund to finance one of those three. BRH effectively forced the MoD to decide now which one of those three it would be - they announced this week that it would be for two additional U212CD, i.e. not going for the options in the F126 contract (which i think would have expired soon anyway) or replacing the five only 15-year-old K130 corvettes with a new batch.

The other "overspending" project from the 100 billion fund cut down by BRH was a planned procurement of up to 1600 new 6x6 armoured vehicles for support functions. While the Bundeswehr portrayed that as a replacement for the Fuchs APC (many of which were overhauled and upgraded only 10 years ago), what they really wanted to replace with it was the up to 1000 MRAP and other armoured vehicles that were bought over the last 15 years mostly for Afghanistan. Without really all that much detail planning on what they wanted to use the new vehicles for, just a "We want a Fuchs replacement. Twice as many as we have now.".

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Acquisition times overall in Germany always look short to the "outside". However that's partly because BAAInBW will run their tenders and fully negotiate contracts before the parliament is asked to approve the money (which is when such acquisition goes "public"). Once the parliament approves the money they can then just sign the contract with the supplier, usually within 1-2 weeks.

Additionally the framework contracts that Rheinmetall CEO Papperger mentions are effectively standing future options from a single supplier, cutting out tendering processes for upgrade orders. The setup on these framework contracts tends to be such that the government can at any time during their run negotiate to expand them significantly - if they find money for it of course. For example Rheinmetall (RMMV)'s contract for the UTF logistics trucks (HX2 model) was simply expanded from 2500 to 3500 when money became available due to the pandemic - and last year they finished that up and then seamlessly switched production over to the WLS logistics trucks (HX2 model... with pallet loading system) for another 4000 trucks - which again can easily be expanded by a couple thousand more if needed.

[Albany Rifles]

Thanks for the lesson, Kato.

We had a really broken acquisition process which forced many reforms. A case in point was the F-35 program. It was poorly managed and many lost their jobs in the PM office. When the acquisition reforms were put into play the program turned around and became a much better project management.

it helps to have gate keepers in place to force us to do the right thing.

[kato]

Regarding potential Fuchs successors:

Germany today signed a statement of intent with Finland to join the "Common Armoured Vehicle System" programme.

https://www.patriagroup.com/newsroom...icle-programme

CAVS is a joint development and procurement programme of Finland, Sweden, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia since 2018 to have Patria develop a 6x6 wheeled APC that effectively combines the older XA-203 model with current technology from their XA-360. First deliveries of a basic APC variant occured in November 2021, the programme in my opinion is primarily about potential customers giving Patria technical packages to see whether they can implement it on the vehicle. So far Finland has ordered 160 vehicles, Lithuania 200 vehicles.

Despite the Fuchs replacement being shelved for now (in the sense of "would have to come from the general budget") it is apparently planned to procure 20 CAVS 6x6 APCs for testing.

For scale of that number, CAVS so far has orders for about 370 vehicles total, of which Finnland has ordered three and Sweden four for testing.

[kato]

Planned OrBat and ToE for the eight artillery battalions marked below:

"Divisional Artillery Group" (Battalion)
1./ - Staff / Support Battery
2./ - Artillery Reconnaissance Battery
3./ - Howitzer Battery (3 platoons with 3 ea 155mm SPH)
4./ - Howitzer Battery (3 platoons with 3 ea 155mm SPH)
5./ - Rocket Artillery Battery (4 platoons with 4 ea MLRS)
6./ - (cadred) Mixed Artillery Battery (3 platoons with 3 ea 155mm SPH + 1 platoon with 4 MLRS)
7./ - (cadred) Field Replacement Battery

"Brigade Artillery Group" (Battalion)
1./ - Staff / Support Battery
2./ - Observer Battery (4 platoons with 3 ea JFST + 1 ea JFCT)
3./ - Howitzer Battery (3 platoons with 3 ea 155mm SPH)
4./ - Howitzer Battery (3 platoons with 3 ea 155mm SPH)
5./ - (cadred) Howitzer Battery (3 platoons with 3 ea 155mm SPH)
6./ - (cadred) Field Replacement Battery

The Observer Battery in the Brigade Artillery Group holds one JFS team for each combat company in the brigade.
The Artillery Recce Battery in the Division Artillery Group as opposed to that is basically artillery radar and UAVs.

"Field Replacement" is the German term for a trained personnel reserve (i.e. personnel only, not equipment) to replace combat losses.

The target is to turn the cadred batteries into active batteries medium-term.

Currently Artillery Battalions are structured very differently internally, including 2x4 SPH in howitzer batteries and observers integrated as platoons into the howitzer batteries. Those rocket artillery batteries above will also be twice the size of what they're now.



Army Air Defense (to be reestablished, there isn't any right now) was provisionally planned to become part of these battalions, but has now been decided to become their own battalions (one per division). These battalions will formally be part of the division's artillery group, although operationally will be heavily mixed up with the Air Force ground air defense battalions (one per division) to form tactically mixed units that can be handed down to the brigades.

The exact equipment for both artillery and army air defense isn't decided or ordered yet. The artillery units for 10th Armored Division (the one marked to be ready 2025) will be initially equipped entirely with PzH2000 and MARS II MLRS, for 1st Armored Division (2027) they'll then have to buy new toys.

Including various upgrade programmes and new mortars for infantry units it is planned to invest about 4 billion Euro into indirect fire support units. This is not covered in the 100 billion fund, but would have to be paid from the regular budget.

Not decided upon yet is the layout or equipment for the Divisional Artillery Group of the Rapid Forces Division, i.e. the light forces. The intention is to procure "something airmobile" for this unit, with a possibility of just mortars or "other effector types" mentioned.

[João]

Hi Kato, I noticed the Poles are buy S.Korean Tanks and wondered what Germanies plans are. Do they still have an operational production line for the Leopard and its variants or are all tanks being upgraded similar to the British who I notice are in partnership with Rheinmetall?

[kato]

Hi Kato, I noticed the Poles are buy S.Korean Tanks and wondered what Germanies plans are. Do they still have an operational production line for the Leopard and its variants or are all tanks being upgraded similar to the British who I notice are in partnership with Rheinmetall?

The Bundeswehr is in the process of upgrading 205 of its 328 Leopard 2 to A7V variant, with the first battalion being equipped with them two months ago.

KMW/KNDS has an operational new production line for Leopard 2A7 variants. They're building a battalion of them for Hungary right now.

[João]

The Bundeswehr is in the process of upgrading 205 of its 328 Leopard 2 to A7V variant, with the first battalion being equipped with them two months ago.

KMW/KNDS has an operational new production line for Leopard 2A7 variants. They're building a battalion of them for Hungary right now.

Good to know that Germany has kept these skills. I'm sure the Hungarian order will be one of many

[kato]

Polaris Raumflugzeuge got a contract this week to actually build a scale demonstrator for the "rapid deployable reconnaissance system" based upon the paper study they did last year. Scale is not stated explicitly, but the demonstrator will roughly be about the size of a EADS Barracuda - somewhat smaller than e.g. the 1970s Lockheed D-21 drone which to some extent followed a similar approach. It is planned to be ready for a first flight campaign by the end of the year.

Polaris Raumflugzeuge is developing several demonstrators for the Bundeswehr under this contract.

One of them, ATHENA, is basically a copy of their ALEDA demonstrator that they developed inhouse starting before they got the contract; these aircraft are both scale models 3.5m in length. ATHENA is significantly heavier though as compared to ALEDA she is prepared for installation of a centerline rocket engine - in addition to her four turbojets - and is structurally strengthened for maneuvers at up to 6.6g. Due to her weight she also falls under a different UAV category and requires technical certifications like a real aircraft.

ALEDA had her first flight in October, ATHENA as the first purpose-built for the Bundeswehr as a customer had her first flight last week. For the flight campaigns the company has rented Peenemünde airport - as in the same base where V1/V2 rockets were developed 80 years ago - since it is the only one in Germany with the necessary safety precautions: a 2.5 km runway directly facing the open sea. They're using a MiG-23 shelter at the base to house their operations btw.

ATHENA will also be exhibited at the Berlin Security Conference (Nov 30th to Dec 1st), a high-level defence industry and military event (one of the largest in Europe). For scale, keynotes at this are held among others by the German chancellor and the NATO secretary general, there'll be discussion panels with various European ministers of defense, at least a dozen generals on the speaker lists etc. Gotta get that product to the decisionmakers after all.

It is planned to succeed ATHENA with another demonstrator for the Bundeswehr at larger scale dubbed NOVA as the final one for the RDRS development contract. NOVA is planned to have her first flight in second half of 2023, and in company plans upon finishing their Bundeswehr contract with it is planned to be followed with a full-scale spaceplane by 2025.

[kato]

Now with tactical symbols and in my opinion a bit too much color:

Comes from the internal newspaper "loyal" of the German Reservist Association. They tend to be "fairly informed".

The same TOE chart can be found in the Bundeswehr's brochure "Turning Point Ukraine War - Modernisation of the Land Forces" published mid last year. The brochure is apparently only being published and distributed internally, although its contents are not classified.

The only change in comparison to this chart from the reservist association is that in the brochure the internal layout of (Dutch) 11th Light Brigade (Paratroopers) within the Rapid Forces Division is blocked out with an overlay "subject to further decisions".

The integration of (Dutch) 13th Medium Brigade into 10th Armored Division shown in the chart is agreed upon and expanded upon in the above brochure in a separate article. Apparently it is part of a jointly agreed upon "Army Vision" that was signed in November 2022. Planning is for this integration to begin in 2023 and be completed in time for 10th Armored Division to be ready to be fielded to NATO readiness forces in 2025. The German-Dutch "Army Vision" also includes intentions of synchronizing and harmonizing logistics, training, procurement processes and technical requirements.

The ToE charts both here and in the brochure completely omit light infantry reserve forces (security units) to be attached. Planning in this regard follows that last activated during the Kosovo War, although now with dedicated reserve units instead of drawing personnel from active units. One platoon for each battalion, one company for each brigade and one battalion for each division.

[TopHatter]

German military in worse shape than before Russia's invasion -official

BERLIN (Reuters) - The German military is suffering from a greater shortage of weapons and equipment than before Russia's invasion of Ukraine a year ago, the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces said in her annual report on Tuesday.

"The Bundeswehr has too little of everything, and it has even less since (Russia's invasion on) Feb. 24, 2022," Eva Hoegl, who acts as an advocate defending the rights of the troops, told reporters in Berlin.

She denounced the government for being slow not only in spending the 100 billion euro special fund set up last year to bring the forces back up to scratch, but also in replenishing the military's stocks after rushing arms to Kyiv.

"Our troops welcome the support for Ukraine although it tears big holes (into their stocks) when howitzers, multiple rocket launchers or Leopard tanks are handed over to Kyiv," Hoegl said, demanding orders to be placed more swiftly.

"It must be clear that the moment (a howitzer) is handed over to Ukraine, the process of ordering a replacement must be launched," she said.

Hoegl also urged officials to speed up the modernisation of barracks that she described as being in a disgraceful state all over the country, criticising a lack of working toilets, clean showers and Wifi.

She put the investment needs for updating the infrastructure at 50 billion euros in total.
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kato Any insights on this?

[Monash]

Well if she gets what she wants there goes half of the special fund before the Bundeswehr gets so much as one extra bullet! Why do I see this whole special project actually achieving little in terms of real force multiplication?

[kato]

Eva Högl has been calling for more money for a while. My personal opinion on it is that it's not exactly part of her job description to call for what she does.

As for her 2022 report that the article refers to, other than the financial aspect she's mostly repeating stuff she already had in last report. The Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces mostly serves as the "public voice" for complaints of soldiers, for which the annual report presents notable examples. The report is about 100 pages of listing those with a complaint quote and an insight paragraph, for about everything you can think of (from various degrees of physical abuse of subordinates via stuff like "they paid me late twice last year" or "they've been dragging out my disciplinary hearing for a year now!" to such trivial stuff as bad wifi due to steel walls for students at the Bundeswehr University).


For some scale of the financial aspect, Högl has been calling for 300 billion Euro total, quite blatantly in the sense of "three times the 100 billion fund!". The 50 billion mentioned for infrastructure were what she mentioned in the same context. Part of these calls were when she was being publicly considered as bringing herself in position to replace MoD Christine Lambrecht back in January. She is now basically using the opportunity of the regular publishing of her report to repeat those calls to try to put the guy who got the job instead of her under pressure. Pistorius himself is trying to get the regular defense budget raised by 10 billion, i.e. to basically double the regular amount available for procurement.

As for the 100 billion fund, yes, very little or next to nothing of that has been paid out from the fund. Because the Bundeswehr does not pay until they actually have the equipment in their hands. For 2023 about 8.4 billion are planned to be spent on equipment to be delivered for projects paid from the 100 billion fund.


Yes, the equipment sent to Ukraine has so far not been replaced. There are contracts in process to do so, although in some cases they're being artificially complicated - for example Germany donated 14 PzH 2000 to Ukraine, but the minimum contract KMW is willing to sign is for 16. And since the Ministry of Defense wants (and can only have) it paid from outside the defense budget it's also tied to exact replacement numbers.

Since the vast majority of equipment donated by Germany comes from industry stocks and not the Bundeswehr it's not as big of a problem as may appear at first glance.

Deliveries from Bundeswehr stocks have been, including currently planned:

• 14 PzH 2000, 5 MARS II MLRS, 18500 rounds 155mm ammunition and undeclared amount of artillery rockets
• 18 Leopard 2A6, 2 BPz 3 recovery vehicles + undeclared amount of ammunition
• 1 Patriot battery + undeclared amount of ammunition
• 20 Marder IFV (in place of industry stock, will be replaced from that)
• 35 palletized load system 8x8 trucks from current production + 6 NBC Decon trucks + 280 older trucks, vans and pickups
• small amount of small arms of various kind (e.g. 500 pistols, 130 machine guns)
• medium amount ammunition stocks, mostly for small arms (roughly half as much as Germany donated to the US for the Iraq War 2003)
• large amount of winter uniform clothing (depending on specific item enough for between a division and the whole Ukrainian army)

[TopHatter]

Eva Högl has been calling for more money for a while. My personal opinion on it is that it's not exactly part of her job description to call for what she does.

I had a funny feeling this was a little out of her bailiwick...the louder the voices, the less responsibility they have for making something happen.

[kato]

The role of the Commissioner is actually pretty tightly defined by law.

• Officially, the commissioner "on her own" investigates exactly: cases of violations of constitutional rights of soldiers and violations of the principles of "Innere Führung" (i.e. the leadership concept in the Bundeswehr that defines the limits to legal commands and defines the soldier as a "citizen in uniform"). In addition she investigates on behalf of the Parliamentary Defense Committee on any issue that the Committee orders her to.
• For those investigations the commissioner has the right to demand access to any files, demand responses on questions asked from any Bundeswehr soldier and freely visit any Bundeswehr facility. She has the right to file for disciplinary or criminal investigations and to attend any such court cases, including even "simple" disciplinary hearings related to her area of responsibility.
• Every soldier in the Bundeswehr has a legal right to file complaints with the commissioner - explicitly directly, i.e. outside the reporting route that would pass it through his commanding officers. In addition soldiers may not be reprimanded or disciplined for such complaints.

Originally, the commissioner was created in order to curb excesses and provide oversight back when Wehrmacht soldiers were training Bundeswehr soldiers in the 50s and 60s. The commissioner reports to the Defense Committee both in person, when ordered and regularly through a public annual report of her work.

In 2022 the commissioner's office handled 3839 cases (think that's the lowest since 1959), of which 2343 were complaints by soldiers, 988 were "reportable events" (read: disciplinary cases) and the rest either came up at troop visits or was brought to their attention through other sources (letters from relatives of soldiers, press reports etc). About one in three complaints concerned the soldiers' careers, i.e. complaints about promotions, being posted somewhere, being pushed into a different training path etc.

Examples in the reports for "violations of constitutional rights" are always plenty. And in some cases really harder stuff, like a trainer handing a soldier a rifle with magazine in and telling them to point it at another soldier and pull the trigger - then when they refused to do so himself pulling a pistol, holding it to their head and pulling the trigger (on the empty pistol). Or in another case a NCO who announced that he'd punch a particular soldier in the balls for every day that they didn't sign up to extend their service (and then also doing so).

The infrastructure things in her report - that may go beyond it - are really often based around some sort of unequal treatment, lack of basic facilities or lack of infrastructure severely impacting training.

It should be noted that her annual report doesn't just contain "negative" complaints. There are also cases in it where e.g.

• investigations after a complaint have found that the Bundeswehr institution complained about was perfectly in their rights in what they did (e.g. a soldier that wanted to dissolve his 12-year service contract early and was denied that)
• cases of "exemplary" positive behaviour are portrayed that soldiers felt they should report (a soldier whose wife died and who was supported in sorting out his life by his comrades in his unit and his commanders)
• inquests where "alternatives" are shown (example: a complaint bureaucratical difficulties of organizing excursions for students of the Medical Adacemy - the commissioner's office basically asked other Bundeswehr schools and then pointed out just how the Navy NCO School does it differently)