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The Korean Dilemma
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The man in the high castle is worth a try too. Total horseshit as well but....hey who'd notice!!
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"...British forceful ethnic cleansing of eastern German provinces whose territory was being handed over to Poland. The Czechs did the same in the Sudetenland."
Colonel,
How in the hell were the Brits in a position to forcefully ethnically cleanse ANY eastern German province/state? That'd been the complete domain/responsibility of the Soviet Union. Further, if so, how would that be mistaken for an "uprising"?
"Die hard Japanese soldiers continued their fights well into the 21st Century, especially in Burma where they became warlords in command of the drug trade."
Their existence on remote Pacific islands would have been more akin to ship-wrecked pirates. Their existence as drug-lords in Burma is also new to me but would be dwarfed by Kuomintang drug warlords also living a life in remote exile. In any case, again, nothing remotely suggesting uprising on the home islands and nothing sufficiently worrisome to the world or within the meagre capacity of Burma to address.
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Originally posted by S2 View PostColonel, welcome back. It's good to again read your words.
"...There has not been one post war occupation that did not require further military action to subdue uprisings..."
Originally posted by S2 View PostCan't recall any civil disturbance issues in Japan nor W. Germany. Rumors of Nazis gathering in remote, forested beer halls -"Were-wolves" was never borne-out, thus complete B.S.
Die hard Japanese soldiers continued their fights well into the 21st Century, especially in Burma where they became warlords in command of the drug trade.
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DOR,
"...but post-war is a job for politicians and economists..."
Wouldn't that be nice but, sadly, politicians are even more narrowly short-sighted and self-centered. Want it done right then it'll require statesman-level determination, vision and prestige.
Think Woodrow Wilson or George Marshall.
Nothing of the sort readily available these days.
OoE,
Colonel, welcome back. It's good to again read your words.
"...There has not been one post war occupation that did not require further military action to subdue uprisings..."
Can't recall any civil disturbance issues in Japan nor W. Germany. Rumors of Nazis gathering in remote, forested beer halls -"Were-wolves" was never borne-out, thus complete B.S.
Oh! I haven't voted nor is it possible. I'm split equally between strategic ignorance and blowing the holy shit right out of tiny Kim. All in or all out until he begins slingin' nukes at every(any)body else.Last edited by S2; 11 Sep 17,, 06:07.
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Originally posted by citanon View PostIn the event of an armed conflict between NK and SK+US, what do you think are the chances of a Chinese armored incursion across the Yalu to secure nuclear sites closest to the Chinese border?
Originally posted by Oracle View PostAre you saying that the option of using military force rests with SKorea and that US should get involved only to secure the missile launch sites? No tomahawks flying?
Originally posted by Oracle View PostI was thinking different. By civil war, I thought TH meant what happened in Afghanistan post Soviet withdrawal, warlords killing and weakening each other to consolidate power.
Tiny Kim has been feeding Colonels and Majors to the dogs.
Originally posted by Oracle View PostWhat you say is true. From a strategic viewpoint, is that a good thing or a bad thing? Will China and Russian not support some among those and try to install a proxy. I think the SKorean army should get inside NKorea as fast as it can so as to neutralise any Chinese/Russian moves.
Originally posted by Oracle View PostAbsolutely.
Sir, why did US let Pak and India go nuclear?
Originally posted by DOR View PostGermany, 1918.
Iraq, 1991.
Iraq, 2011.
Originally posted by DOR View PostI'm the first to admit I'm no solider, but post-war is a job for politicians and economists.
Screwing up post-Kim Korea, by design or neglect, is a very bad idea.
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Originally posted by WABs_OOE View Post.
However, Gentlemen, I submit that the war's aftermath is a problem for Seoul to solve, not the rest of us. Seoul would have to occupy North Korea, not the US military. Seoul would have to pay for unification, not the US Treasury. Korean problems are for Koreans to solve.
Iraq, 1991.
Iraq, 2011.
I'm the first to admit I'm no solider, but post-war is a job for politicians and economists.
Screwing up post-Kim Korea, by design or neglect, is a very bad idea.
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Nice to see you Colonel.
Originally posted by WABs_OOE View PostThe point I was trying to make is that fanaticism ain't going to win them their war.
However, I submit that the war's aftermath ain't our problem. It's Seoul's problem. If war starts, Seoul is going to take the DMZ. That's a given. If Tiny Kim is to survive, then at least 50% of his army must survive the onslaught, enough for him to maintain order in the north. Frankly, I cannot see how that could happen. Seoul must hit hard, hit fast, and keep on hitting until the threat to Seoul is gone and that means not allowing the NKs time to regroup for round 2.
And if 80% of the North Korean Army is gone, then Tiny Tim is reduced a city state with his praetorian guard divisions. The families of those he fed to the dogs will be looking for blood as did Saddam's enemies. I also remind you that the Taliban's Omar's enemies picked over his bones.
I also see a ground incursion further north by the USMC to secure the missile launch sites. The strategic imperatives are obvious to those looking at the military options.
Originally posted by WABs_OOE View PostA military axiom. Hope for the best. Prepare for the worst.
There will be civil war regardless of Chinese or Russian involvement. Tiny Kim fed people to the dogs. Their families will be out for blood.
What you say is true. From a strategic viewpoint, is that a good thing or a bad thing? Will China and Russian not support some among those and try to install a proxy. I think the SKorean army should get inside NKorea as fast as it can so as to neutralise any Chinese/Russian moves.
Originally posted by WABs_OOE View PostHowever, Gentlemen, I submit that the war's aftermath is a problem for Seoul to solve, not the rest of us. Seoul would have to occupy North Korea, not the US military. Seoul would have to pay for unification, not the US Treasury. Korean problems are for Koreans to solve.
Sir, why did US let Pak and India go nuclear?
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Sir,
In the event of an armed conflict between NK and SK+US, what do you think are the chances of a Chinese armored incursion across the Yalu to secure nuclear sites closest to the Chinese border?
This seems to me a limited and logical step to preclude American bombing of those particular sites and the potential release of radiation into northern China that could result.
Further it would seem to be a well defined mission of limited extent that could be fought in line with PLA's limited war under modern conditions doctrine we were discussing so much on CDF many years ago.
On the other hand, this would still require a large commitment of forces across a broad front and deconfliction with US forces.
Last edited by citanon; 10 Sep 17,, 06:56.
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Originally posted by TopHatter View PostYes sir we have, but we've also seen how it can work in Iraq and Afghanistan. And we have no Douglas MacArthur today, nor a Hirohito to command his people to lay down their arms and surrender.
However, I submit that the war's aftermath ain't our problem. It's Seoul's problem. If war starts, Seoul is going to take the DMZ. That's a given. If Tiny Kim is to survive, then at least 50% of his army must survive the onslaught, enough for him to maintain order in the north. Frankly, I cannot see how that could happen. Seoul must hit hard, hit fast, and keep on hitting until the threat to Seoul is gone and that means not allowing the NKs time to regroup for round 2.
And if 80% of the North Korean Army is gone, then Tiny Tim is reduced a city state with his praetorian guard divisions. The families of those he fed to the dogs will be looking for blood as did Saddam's enemies. I also remind you that the Taliban's Omar's enemies picked over his bones.
I also see a ground incursion further north by the USMC to secure the missile launch sites. The strategic imperatives are obvious to those looking at the military options.
Originally posted by Oracle View PostTH, NK is extremeley improvised. The moment the first bomb falls, NKs would rush to the border to cross-over for life and food. It's not an islamic state nor are guns available for all.
Originally posted by Oracle View PostI saw that video in Youtube, and it is completely opposite of what the Russian article presents. NKs are not mindless zombies. There will be a civil war only if the Chinese and the Russians decide to join the party. How US manages that would be interesting to see.
However, Gentlemen, I submit that the war's aftermath is a problem for Seoul to solve, not the rest of us. Seoul would have to occupy North Korea, not the US military. Seoul would have to pay for unification, not the US Treasury. Korean problems are for Koreans to solve.
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Originally posted by TopHatter View PostI sure hope so...but I don't think that will be the case.
In the polls, the second option is limited preemptive military strike. Does it mean drop a grenade? ;-)))
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Originally posted by citanon View PostWe have better than that. We have Chinese and Korean soap operas infiltrating every corner of NK society via USB sticks:
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/north-k...to-daytime-tv/
Very few in NK are stupid enough to live up to their hypocritical posing.
We went through this in China. The very same people who were waving Mao's little red book were the ones powering forward Deng's economic expansion, and Jiang and Hu's headlong rush into crony capitalism.
The people crying down with American Imperialism in the 60s were the same ones rushing to go to America in the 80s to today. First to study, then to work, now to buy houses in California and NYC.
In a society like that people adopt dual personalities. EVERYONE will cry for the Great Leader on instinct and conditioning. The feelings will even be genuine. Then the vast majority will breath a great sigh of relief and will be out for themselves.
If North Koreans were actually stupid, we wouldn't be having the present problems with nukes and missiles. They are not stupid.
Never underestimate the power, pervasiveness and extent of human hypocrisy.
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Originally posted by Oracle View PostTH, NK is extremeley improvised. The moment the first bomb falls, NKs would rush to the border to cross-over for life and food. It's not an islamic state nor are guns available for all.
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DE, I edited post # 115.
Originally posted by TopHatter View PostYes sir we have, but we've also seen how it can work in Iraq and Afghanistan. And we have no Douglas MacArthur today, nor a Hirohito to command his people to lay down their arms and surrender.
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It's just horrible to imagine what they would do in a war. Every North Korean will be a suicide bomber with a bomb belt. There is not a person there who wouldn't be ready to die for the system that has enslaved them. They have nothing apart from this, it's the only meaning of their existence.
Why Kim Jong Un wouldn’t be irrational to use a nuclear bomb first | WAPO | Sept 8 2017
Kim’s nuclear arsenal exists to stop his enemies’ quest for regime change. If North Korea and the United States wind up shooting at each other, it might make sense for Kim to use nuclear weapons first in a way that increases his chances of survival. The basic idea is to use one set of nuclear devices to stave off the conventional invasion, and hold in reserve longer range, more powerful devices that threaten the enemy’s cities to deter nuclear annihilation. It’s a doctrine called “asymmetric escalation,” employed by states that are conventionally weak. France articulated it during the Cold War to deter the more powerful Soviet Union, and Pakistan does the same today against a more powerful India.
The strategy turns on Kim’s main calculation that the United States will say it’s not worth losing a major American city to get rid of him. This would allow him to avoid the fate of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Libya’s Moammar Gaddafi, who did not have nuclear weapons. Deterrence worked uneasily during the Cold War — albeit with close calls and some hair-raising moments — but it worked. Many of the same principles about mutual destruction still obtain today between major powers.
Yet the equation for North Korea, which cannot ensure mutual destruction, is slightly different. Faced with the prospect of a U.S.-led invasion, Pyongyang’s conventional inferiority requires it to degrade the United States’ ability to sustain the attack against it. This means it essentially has no option but to use nuclear weapons first against targets such as Andersen Air Force Base in Guam, which stations American bombers, and a variety of allied bases in Japan and South Korea. North Korea has to use nuclear weapons there because it does not have enough conventional warheads to damage the bases meaningfully; a conventional response would not slow or stop a U.S. onslaught. It is for these bases that North Korea has tested the medium-range missiles, reportedly developed a compact nuclear fission warhead and honed guidance for the missiles that would carry it.
Wouldn’t such an attack mean the retaliatory annihilation of North Korea? Not necessarily. This is why the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and the H-bomb are so important. Kim’s survival theory is that North Korea could threaten to destroy an American city with a thermonuclear-tipped ICBM if the United States continued an invasion or retaliated with nuclear weapons. Anytime its cities can be held at risk, the United States’ deterrence equation changes, as it did during the Cold War. Are we willing to risk losing millions of civilians in our homeland? Possibly not. And it’s unlikely that we could reliably destroy all of Kim’s ICBMs on the ground or intercept the warheads in the air, particularly as he builds more. So the prospect of losing San Francisco thanks to our nuclear retaliation may cause us to pause conventional operations and elicit a cease-fire, thereby preserving Kim’s regime and rule. Kim may surmise that if he doesn’t use nuclear weapons first, he is certain to lose; if he does, he may have a fighting chance of surviving.
This scenario to stave off an invasion with a limited nuclear attack on a U.S. military target is not irrational, although it is clearly risky and terrifyingly tragic. One wrinkle is that North Korea’s arsenal is currently small and vulnerable, and U.S. military strategy, reiterated by Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, is to try to find and destroy all of Kim’s nuclear systems in the event of a war. That gives Kim an incentive to go first, go early and go massively if he is not confident about surviving a U.S. attempt at disarming him. If Kim thinks we are coming after him or his forces, he cannot afford to be wrong, and he cannot afford to launch second.
States with small arsenals that are put under counterforce pressure have itchy trigger fingers. It is what is known as the use-it-or-lose-it dilemma. Prior to World War I, European powers believed they all had to mobilize military forces first or risk massive conventional defeat. The calculation for North Korea is the same today, except with nuclear weapons.This current risk is amplified by our saber-rattling. How do we assure Kim that the B-1B sorties from Guam that are meant as “shows of strength” are not a prelude to a counterforce surprise attack? We are in a particularly dangerous phase right now, and not because Kim is unpredictable. The more rational he is, the itchier his trigger finger could be.At the broader political level, Kim has another aim with his nuclear weapons: to break our alliances. The Soviet Union’s acquisition of ICBM technology caused panic among our allies. France developed its own nuclear weapons, because Charles de Gaulle was convinced we would not trade Pittsburgh for Paris. Today, the concern among our allies is that with our homeland at risk, we might not trade San Francisco for Seoul, or Toledo for Tokyo. These anxieties are amplified when President Trump accuses South Korea and China of “appeasement” after North Korea’s thermonuclear test. Pyongyang probably read that tweet with glee, thinking that its political strategy is already working. With a nuclear security umbrella like the one we maintain in East Asia, it’s always harder to reassure allies than it is to deter the adversary. Right now, we are being outplayed by Kim on both counts.
Dispensing with the notion that Kim is crazy or irrational is important for two reasons. First, it clarifies the military and political strategies he might envision with nuclear weapons. Second, it suggests that he responds to both domestic and international incentives. It means deterrence — which was always coupled with reassurance and diplomacy — can work with North Korea, just as it did with the Soviet Union and China. But deterrence works both ways: We can no longer threaten to attack North Korea without risking a nuclear exchange.
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Originally posted by TopHatter View PostYes sir we have, but we've also seen how it can work in Iraq and Afghanistan. And we have no Douglas MacArthur today, nor a Hirohito to command his people to lay down their arms and surrender.
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/north-k...to-daytime-tv/
Very few in NK are stupid enough to live up to their hypocritical posing.
We went through this in China. The very same people who were waving Mao's little red book were the ones powering forward Deng's economic expansion, and Jiang and Hu's headlong rush into crony capitalism.
The people crying down with American Imperialism in the 60s were the same ones rushing to go to America in the 80s to today. First to study, then to work, now to buy houses in California and NYC.
In a society like that people adopt dual personalities. EVERYONE will cry for the Great Leader on instinct and conditioning. The feelings will even be genuine. Then the vast majority will breath a great sigh of relief and will be out for themselves.
If North Koreans were actually stupid, we wouldn't be having the present problems with nukes and missiles. They are not stupid.
Never underestimate the power, pervasiveness and extent of human hypocrisy.Last edited by citanon; 10 Sep 17,, 01:03.
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