Border face-off: China and India each deploy 3,000 troops

[Double Edge]

Talking about the environmental conditions.

I really understand how weather impacts flying. The OH-58A had an issue with losing tail rotor effectiveness in a tail wind. I found out, painfully, in FEB 86 when the 58 I was in was doing pop ups from behind trees to find the approaching OPFOR. One moment I was looking through binos, the next I was looking at the ground through side window with a broken ankle.

That bolded bit could explain things.

Which is it was the tail rotor that hit a tree.

Taken in isolation that sentence makes no sense whatsoever.

But if the winds caused a loss of control of the aircraft then it does.

Is there no counter measure you can apply in such a case ? Requires you to be of sufficient altitude, right ? otherwise no.

Which begs the question why were they flying so low. So low as to be snapped by a smartphone. Should have been a dot in the sky.

Maybe they had already lost control by that point and were desperately trying to control the craft.

They were flying higher, lost control and then it was do whatever to make a controlled landing. Given the terrain that proved to be an impossible task.

Bodies burnt beyond recognition. This bit really had people upset

Just to be clear this was hills altitude. No where near any mountains. This happened in the southern most state of India.

[tbm3fan]

Talking about the environmental conditions.

I really understand how weather impacts flying. The OH-58A had an issue with losing tail rotor effectiveness in a tail wind. I found out, painfully, in FEB 86 when the 58 I was in was doing pop ups from behind trees to find the approaching OPFOR. One moment I was looking through binos, the next I was looking at the ground through side window with a broken ankle.

You would know this. Do military choppers have recording equipment on them like commercial aircraft and I am assuming military aircraft?

[tbm3fan]

This would be a surprise if it were true. The helicopter was top of the range and Mi-17's are used by 60 militaries around the world. We have over 200 of them. There have been accidents over the years. But not mechanical. Mostly pilot error or bad weather conditions.

These are military grade aircraft and very capable of handling those weather conditions. Ground sensing radar, Obstacle avoidance instruments. The works.

There was no mechanical fault with the Taiwanese Generals helicopter and i expect this to hold true in the case of the Indian Chief of Defense

Maintenance issues is the last thing you expect for aircraft flying top staff

Another thing i learnt is helis are safer than planes. If the engine loses power, descent is still possible in a somewhat controlled manner.

The rotors will spin to slow the descent. There will be a bumpy landing but possibly survivable.


This deals with lack of familiarity of the pilot with the airports layout.

I'm expecting pilot error but not for this reason. An error in judgement. Went ahead and hit a tree because the fog was so dense.

So how could that happen ? the helicopter was on the decent phase of the trip. Not exactly near but past the trip's halfway point. Still, not a reason to be flying low.

This happened at mid day. Foggy conditions so not clear but otherwise nothing remarkable. A routine flight to a training college. A trip made many times before.

Eye witness reports said they saw the heli hover in the air then disappear into the fog and next they heard a crash.

Why it was hovering is unclear. Something was spotted and they were adjusting maybe.

People want an escort for these trips. One goes ahead and is then followed.

That is harder to do in practice but with people as important. We can't lose them.

I never said it was a mechanical error nor a specific pilot error. I simply gave examples of such errors and could go on listing more of them if you want but felt that I had already got my point across without going overboard. Do I need to go overboard?

Granted these pilots no doubt had thousands of hours in the type and should be well trained in IFR flying and well aware of what losing situational awareness is. By the way do you understand how one can lose situational awareness in the fog? You have no horizon, you bank right, the hairs in your vestibular canals report to your brain that you are still flying straight, so you bank more to the right. On and on into a "death" spiral without you knowing. Kobe's pilot probably did that. JFK, Jr. no doubt did that. Your average civilian pilot should never fly in bad weather but I would expect a trained military pilot to do better, much better.

[Albany Rifles]

Kobi's chopper wasn't half as good as the ones these two generals had

Talking about the environmental conditions.

I really understand how weather impacts flying. The OH-58A had an issue with losing tail rotor effectiveness in a tail wind. I found out, painfully, in FEB 86 when the 58 I was in was doing pop ups from behind trees to find the approaching OPFOR. One moment I was looking through binos, the next I was looking at the ground through side window with a broken ankle.

[Double Edge]

You would be surely surprised to hear that it is not uncommon at all. Watching a Youtube channel that documents flight crashes over the last 60 years you will find few due to a purely mechanical issue. Most mechanical issues were due to a maintenance personnel mistakes during a repair. Leaving out a seal, not following the repair instructions in the manual, and other stupid stuff. Those numbers pale in comparison to pilot error. Not qualified to fly IFR, ignoring cockpit warnings because they thought they knew better, losing situational awareness, careless mistakes like bumping the stick and knocking off the autopilot, and on and on.

One I saw last night which I recall back then but have now heard the NSTB report. Mechanic error.

This would be a surprise if it were true. The helicopter was top of the range and Mi-17's are used by 60 militaries around the world. We have over 200 of them. There have been accidents over the years. But not mechanical. Mostly pilot error or bad weather conditions.

These are military grade aircraft and very capable of handling those weather conditions. Ground sensing radar, Obstacle avoidance instruments. The works.

There was no mechanical fault with the Taiwanese Generals helicopter and i expect this to hold true in the case of the Indian Chief of Defense

Maintenance issues is the last thing you expect for aircraft flying top staff

Another thing i learnt is helis are safer than planes. If the engine loses power, descent is still possible in a somewhat controlled manner.

The rotors will spin to slow the descent. There will be a bumpy landing but possibly survivable.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Easter...nes_Flight_855

Pilot error here. Heard the cockpit recordings and the Tower Control. Tower gives clearance for runway 22 several times. Meanwhile the pilot repeats as he lines up on runway 26 which is marked as such. There was non-flight related talk in the cabin during this.His mistake killed 49 people and left one survivor. There were some other issues with staffing in the control tower that didn't help. However, the pilot should have made it his duty to be aware of the airport layout before getting into the plane. Taking off is serious and the Tower needs to pay attention to watching the pilot and the pilot needs to pay attention to watching the Control Tower so no mistakes either way. Today the airport has the main runway, 22, separate from runway, now 27, so not taxi mistakes.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comair_Flight_5191

This deals with lack of familiarity of the pilot with the airports layout.

I'm expecting pilot error but not for this reason. An error in judgement. Went ahead and hit a tree because the fog was so dense.

So how could that happen ? the helicopter was on the decent phase of the trip. Not exactly near but past the trip's halfway point. Still, not a reason to be flying low.

This happened at mid day. Foggy conditions so not clear but otherwise nothing remarkable. A routine flight to a training college. A trip made many times before.

Eye witness reports said they saw the heli hover in the air then disappear into the fog and next they heard a crash.

Why it was hovering is unclear. Something was spotted and they were adjusting maybe.

People want an escort for these trips. One goes ahead and is then followed.

That is harder to do in practice but with people as important. We can't lose them.

[Double Edge]

Sounds very much like the air crash that killed Kobi Bryant and his daughter

Kobi's chopper wasn't half as good as the ones these two generals had

[tbm3fan]

This is the question every one asks.

How can this happen with highly skilled pilots using sophisticated equipment that they crash into mountains or trees !!!

You would be surely surprised to hear that it is not uncommon at all. Watching a Youtube channel that documents flight crashes over the last 60 years you will find few due to a purely mechanical issue. Most mechanical issues were due to a maintenance personnel mistakes during a repair. Leaving out a seal, not following the repair instructions in the manual, and other stupid stuff. Those numbers pale in comparison to pilot error. Not qualified to fly IFR, ignoring cockpit warnings because they thought they knew better, losing situational awareness, careless mistakes like bumping the stick and knocking off the autopilot, and on and on.

One I saw last night which I recall back then but have now heard the NSTB report. Mechanic error.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Easter...nes_Flight_855

Pilot error here. Heard the cockpit recordings and the Tower Control. Tower gives clearance for runway 22 several times. Meanwhile the pilot repeats as he lines up on runway 26 which is marked as such. There was non-flight related talk in the cabin during this.His mistake killed 49 people and left one survivor. There were some other issues with staffing in the control tower that didn't help. However, the pilot should have made it his duty to be aware of the airport layout before getting into the plane. Taking off is serious and the Tower needs to pay attention to watching the pilot and the pilot needs to pay attention to watching the Control Tower so no mistakes either way. Today the airport has the main runway, 22, separate from runway, now 27, so not taxi mistakes.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comair_Flight_5191

[Albany Rifles]

Sounds very much like the air crash that killed Kobi Bryant and his daughter

[Double Edge]

Taiwan's chief of staff was also killed in a helicopter crash just under two years ago. Very similar conditions

Cause of Taiwan Black Hawk crash revealed | Taiwan News | Feb 14 2020

The helicopter’s flight recorder was sent to the U.S. on Jan. 8 for investigation into the Jan. 2 incident. The Taiwan Transportation Safety Board (TTSB) had ruled out mechanical malfunction as the cause based on a preliminary reading of the data retrieved from the black box.

According to the report, rapidly changing weather conditions along with inadequate “situation awareness” contributed to the fatal crash. Defective cockpit resource management (CRM) could also have been involved, which is when the pilot and co-pilot fail to follow due procedures that compromise their response in an emergency, wrote UDN.

The chopper crashed into a hilltop under cloudy conditions in the mountains of northern Taiwan.

Same case with the Indian CDS in the Nilgiris hills. Fast changing weather, low cloud cover, hilly terrain and tall trees.

I expect the report on the ensuing black box investigation to be along similar lines.

However, the advanced technology fitted on the UH-60M Black Hawk, including military GPS and inertial navigation system, should have been able to sound an alarm about any imminent terrain impact, the reported cited Ministry of National Defense officials as saying.

This is the question every one asks.

How can this happen with highly skilled pilots using sophisticated equipment that they crash into mountains or trees !!!

[Double Edge]

Good tribute to the late CDS by Gen Shankar

A mighty general, best of the soldiers, and a dear friend: An ode to CDS Bipin Rawat | FIrstpost | Dec 09 2021

In this untimely demise of General Bipin Rawat, I lost a long-time friend, the Armed Forces lost a great leader, and the nation lost one of its best soldiers it ever had. Many might disagree but I will qualify.

Till 2015, India was a soft nation. Any two bit terrorist could do anything and get away. When India carried out cross-border surgical strikes on terrorist camps in Myanmar, General Rawat masterminded them as General Officer Commanding 3 Corps in Dimapur. In 2016, as the Vice Chief of Army Staff, he was instrumental in the decision making, planning and execution of cross-LoC (Line of Control) strikes against terrorist launch pads in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). He prepared the Indian Army for any follow-up escalation.

His finest action was to stop the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in its tracks at Doklam when he was the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) in 2017. For the first time after 1967, China was thwarted physically by India. After the Doklam incident, India developed the belief that it can stand up to China. The PLA invincibility bubble was pricked. In 2019, General Rawat had fully prepared the Indian Army to enable the Indian Air Force (IAF) to carry out strikes on Jabba Top (nee Balakot).

Last year when the PLA aggression manifested along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh, he was at the helm of affairs, as CDS. His decision would have led to India occupying the Kailash Range. It forced the PLA to retreat eight km from Finger 4 on the Pangong Lake, after destroying its own bunkers. This has not happened after the Sumdorong Chu incident in 1986-87. The Chinese are still sitting there.

General Rawat was not flamboyant like Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, who decisively defeated Pakistan. He was not brilliant strategically like General Krishnaswamy Sundarji, who outflanked China. However, connect all the operational dots I have outlined, something far greater comes out. He has incrementally reinforced belief in the Indian Armed Forces to defend the nation. India’s operational thought process has transformed irreversibly. He leaves a hard and strategically confident India to take its rightful place in world affairs. We need to thank General Rawat, one of India’s best soldiers, for this.

All of these things we have so exhaustively discussed and argued about. So it was Gen Rawat who conceived of them.

General Rawat had a balanced professional career. He commanded 5/11 Gorkhas in Kibithu (Walong Sector). He commanded an RR Sector in the Valley and a UN brigade as part of MONUSCO. He commanded 19 Infantry Division along the LoC and 3 Corps in Dimapur. He had great operational insight and experience in conventional and sub conventional operations. He put this to good effect as a COAS and CDS. His exposure in the US Army Command and General Staff College widened and rounded his thinking.

He applied all this knowledge to good effect when appointed as India’s first Chief of Defence Staff. He started initiating reforms in India’s Higher Défence Organisation and has laid the groundwork for enhanced jointness and roll out of joint theatre commands.

This is the bit that really bites. As India's first ever CDS he was at the core of some very important reorgs, tough reorgs that others oppose but he was bold enough to push through.

Hopefully he has done enough work two years into his three year term for the momentum to carry things forward.

So sad his wife had to pass on with him as well.

Gen. Shankar mentions the backstory behind those key events of the last five years.

[Officer of Engineers]

All good. Imagine a wolf pack of say eight subs. Think they will get some shots in ?

Wolfpacts are sucide pacts. There's a reason why we don't use them after WWII and even the Kreigsmarine were forced to abandon the tactic at the end of the War. Wolfpacts need co-ordination in order NOT to get into each other's way and that means radio chatter up the ying-yang. That radio chatter is a torpedo homing beacon. Without radio chatter, wolfpact subs were known to crash into each other trying to line up on target.

Sutton mentions China is the biggest operator of AIP subs. If the number to spare is too high currently they will not bother. Raincheck until they can build more.

Do you at least accept these subs can pose a threat to a carrier ?

Not without a drastic increase in submarine design and build technology. Again, the YUAN is a noisy KILO. The Chinese fucked up a fantastic design by adding a hump that raise the noise level up the ying-yang.

What they want is for the threat to be large enough that the carrier does not enter the designated space and stays out of it. Step 1.

What they need is ASW and they suck.

What will it take to spook the USN ? your present advantage where you can find them goes away. So they need to make some tech break throughs to achieve that.

There's serious advantages to getting successful at no go zones.

No need to take Taiwan. Strategically, Taiwan becomes irrelevant after this point.

So there is a parallel effort going on here. They get Taiwan, good for them. Otherwise its still not the end of the world.

Turn the first island chain from a barrier that keeps the PLAN penned in into a barrier that keeps the USN out

I've been hearing this garbage for 20 years. Nothing yet.

Setup walls elsewhere to keep allies from responding in effect containing them to their own backyards. This is the bit that concerns me.

They can replicate the SCS charade elsewhere with predictable results now they have a working model.

Feasibility ? dunno. If not today then maybe some day ?

I think in terms of contours.

It would be a good place for China to be and bad for the rest of us.

They get to do to the rest of us what USN has been doing to them since the end of WW2.

Good science fiction writing there.

We need some rules for grey zone. How's this for starters...

First one to fire a shot loses.

You get to find the enemy and blind the enemy. You don't get to kill the enemy because you will never receive your kill order.

You will not receive your kill order because your side does not want to start a war.

The key point here is there is no conflict with grey zone. Just coercion and counter coercion.

Get this right and you deter them. We are not doing that right now and funnily enough neither are they deterring us either.

You are exactly the kind of guy that needs to listen to Dahm because you think in the binary of war and peace.

I've must have missed it when the Cold War turned hot. Funny, I don't remember exchanging fire with 16th Guards? We do EXACTLY what we did in the Cold War. Use Chinese reactions as a training tool. Fly as close to their AD radars as possible and guage their response. See if we can get closer each time. If they have a war game, we have a surprise drill. See how fast we can react to a sudden military action. Tail as close to their subs as much as possible and dance with their ASW.

Guess what? We're the ones surprising the Chinese, not them. They're the ones bellyaching.

Instead we have to think of the space in between and how to get good at doing deterrence in that space.

The man is doing his job, He's intel. Study the enemy, identify shortfalls in current SOP's, make recommendations to beat them at their own game. Hope higher ups listen.

Bear with me as i get through some articles from Journal of indo Pacific Affairs

All bullshit!. We define and control the battlespace. Not the Chinese. At the very least, the Soviets were able to force a battle of their choosing on us. There is zero ways for the Chinese to force a battle of their choosing on us. Every move they try to make, we pre-empt them. They have a wargame at sea. Our ships are in place watching them before their fleet arrives. I'm not impressed with Dahm.

Bottom line: Out maneuver helps to win the war should it come but does not offer much to deter in peacetime.

Si pacem, para bellum. Our objective is not to deter them. Our objective is to let them know we will destroy them.

They can bellyache all they want but our lines in the sand have not been crossed. We've crossed theirs with impunity. The SCS is our waters, not theirs.

[Double Edge]

Could not believe the title when i saw it !!! How we lost a 4 star general in a peace time crash..

Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat, wife and 11 others die in chopper crash in Tamil Nadu | TOI | Dec 08 2021

RIP

[Double Edge]

Oracle was saying if PLA show up again we need to shoot 50 of them. Better response is what we did Sept end this year.

Detain 200 of them when they tried at Tawang. You do that you show them you got eyes on the area good enough to detain them.



Earlier you said if they come in, let them come in more. Then finish them off.

Now i know why you said it. Viets did that in '79

That was a war man. Should it come to that then of course we would do the same and use the defenders advantage.

But you can see why we cannot do it with grey zone.

[Double Edge]

Applying this concept of information superiority to events that transpired over the previous year at the Indo Tibet border..

China managed to make incursions in Apr 2020 because India lacked eyes on the ground. India lacked in information superiority. In the conventional vernacular they call this an 'intel failure'. Vague term.

As a result India had to scramble troops to the border to match Chinese numbers in the area.

Towards the end of Aug 2020, Indian troops beat the Chinese to the tops of the Kailash range.

India now had eyes on their Moldo garrison, all its approaches and a view of occupation of fingers 5 onwards from across the lake.

India gained information superiority over the PLA in this region. What was the result ?

By Feb '21 China agreed to withdraw from the fingers area. Why ?

Because if we could see them then we could kill them. Their position was untenable.

So if one lacks in information superiority then they have to resort to maneuver warfare. Not always a panacea.

When performed well it can result in the take over of the Kailash range

When done wrong it can lead to Galwan. Recall how both sides took extreme care not to open fire ? We know now why that was.

Achieving information superiority over the Chinese in areas of concern will deter them from grey zone operations in those areas. Indeed as shown it can even reverse their former transgressions

You already know this but when applying the information superiority paradigm we can see why things went wrong and what to aim for to fix it.


Another example of Indian information superiority is the narrow approach in the Chumbi valley the Chinese have to take to reach the Chicken's neck.

India controls the heights there. We can see them coming from far off.


In 2017 we acted to stop them at Doklam for the very reason to prevent them getting information superiority on the Siliguri Corridor.

Going to the extent of picking a fight with them over in Bhutan.


To date nobody has used this term 'information superiority' but its explaining the actions of both sides pretty well.

Yeah this is something that can only come from an intel guy


To say maneuver warfare can fix anything is to be reactive. Once they get the drop on you then you have to scramble to do something.

But preserving and enhancing information superiority over them prevents them from pulling any stunts to begin with.

And that, OOE is the point Dahm is making.

New speak for you for something you intuitively understand in a different form.

An entirely different language for me and i think we better get the hang of it.

Conversation in this thread has been confined to the military domain. One dimensional

We never got into the information domain.

[Double Edge]

Here's one article from the Journal that references Dahm's work. Scenarios help understand how this Information superiority business is supposed to work,

Six colonels wrote this. Lead is Army, rest are AF.

A US Response to China’s Aggression in the South China Sea and Overall Aim of Information Dominance | Journal of Indo Pacific Affiars | Jun 03 2021

They propose

a more focused, asymmetric strategy that
1) thwarts China’s information dominance by stopping the use of military controlled assets in the SCS with actions that will “press on” amid China’s threats and use of C4ISR and
2) combines cyber and precision strikes on China’s key economic and informational capabilities.

An example of China's use of this idea

China is actually employing the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia, an armed fishing militia, and the well-trained Chinese Coast Guard to provide them a unique capability to operate in disputed areas while not crossing the line of offensive conflict. This tactic allows China an early information dominance in the SCS.

The Dahm reference

Information: One of Beijing’s goals for its island outposts in the SCS is to build an integrated system-of-systems to facilitate information superiority through command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and nonmilitary information networks. A review of open-source material and commercial satellite imagery by a senior researcher at the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, found significant communication potential for China through undersea fiber-optic-cable, multi-band satellite communications and high-frequency broadband arrays. These combine to develop an integrated system of Chinese information superiority, allowing Beijing de facto control.

But

information operations are ill-defined in military publications in relation to China’s focus on information dominance.

We don't even have a proper vocabulary

IW presents the Chinese with a potentially potent, if circumscribed, asymmetric weapon.

Defined carefully, it could give the PLA a longer-range power projection capability against U.S. forces that its conventional forces cannot currently hope to match.

In particular, I would argue that these weapons give the PLA a possible way to attack the Achilles’ Heel of the advanced, informatized U.S. military: its information systems, especially those related to command and control and transportation.

By attacking these targets, the Chinese could possibly degrade or delay U.S. force mobilization in a time dependent scenario, such as Taiwan, and do so with a measure of plausible deniability.

The two references for the above comes for couple of publications going back to the 90s (!)

30. Joint Chiefs of Staff ( JCS) Pub 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (IO), 9 October 1998, I9; and Joint Chiefs of Staff ( JCS) Pub 3-13.1, Joint Command and Control Warfare (C2W) Operations, 7 February 1996, I3.

31. James Mulvenon, “The PLA and Information Warfare,” in The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age, ed. James Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 176–77

The problem

Consequently, one of NORAD four strategic principles is information dominance as a defensive measure for the United States.This is somewhat problematic because neither USNORTHCOM nor USINDOPACOM are directly confronting China’s focus on information operations, especially as an element of asymmetric warfare, and the use of military owned assets in the SCS.

So what to do to deter China ?

Information Power: To deter future Chinese aggression and expansion, the United States through continued partnership with the Philippines and regional allies, must go beyond information sharing and adopt a more aggressive strategy that negates China’s aim of information dominance.

Simultaneously, the United States will increase the frequency and scope of ISR gathering in the region. Increasing our involvement could signify to China a shift from the historically passive stance we have taken to one that is assertive and aligns with our current NSS. This increased involvement and showcase of strength would bring forth a newfound commitment to a collective response that upholds regional order respectful of sovereignty and independence.

Furthermore, these actions would influence China to freeze the militarization of its island bases—especially in the Spratly Islands—and rethink its refusal to abide by international law regarding its expansionism in the SCS.

A more active US engagement in the region than before.

The United States would continue to rely on satellite imagery to provide precise information on China’s military expansion in the Spratly Islands. We would engage in strong collaboration with the Philippines and our coalition partners; additional ISR assets would be reallocated to the area and surveillance patrols increased throughout the Indo-Pacific region. The increased ISR could also be leveraged by the Foreign Malign Influence Response Center that is being established within the Office of the Director for National Intelligence, as mandated by recent legislation.

More eyes on the region

Military: the United States needs a more forward presence near the SCS or it should move assets into the region that can better respond to China’s presence. One way to indicate a powerful presence is

The creation of a new fleet based out of Singapore, as suggested by former Secretary of the Navy Kenneth Braithwaite, would enable the US Navy to focus its efforts in the region and help boost the confidence of our ASEAN partners that the United States is there to stay. Establishing this new fleet within the South China Sea and near the Strait of Malacca would give the United States a more rapid response capability to Chinese provocations and enable a more proximate hub for freedom of navigation operations. A ubiquitous United States in Southeast Asia will also serve as a deterrent to an increasingly belligerent China and its gray-zone operations that have allowed Beijing to expand China’s sphere of influence in the region relatively unopposed.

Greater US military presence in Southeast Asia will not only inspire confidence from our partners in the region but show China that its implementation of a Monroe-esque Doctrine in Asia will not go unchallenged

Build presence

For the coercion aspects of this course of action, the United States will send an aircraft carrier battle group supported by air assets and missile defense that are joined by partner naval and air forces to the SCS to cooperatively monitor the Chinese naval threat and other emergent threats to freedom of navigation.

USINDOPACOM will increase its commitment to building alliances that create a broader coalition/alliance in the region to improve the joint interoperability of participating nations. Additionally, it will work with the State Department to assist the governments of the Philippines and Vietnam in building joint information campaigns that support military operations and in building joint military medical response teams that can aid in the COVID–19 pandemic.

Not just info sharing with Philliines & Vietnam but the colonels want 'a more aggressive strategy that negates China’s aim of information dominance'.

All those naval exercises should help here.

To work toward a regional balance of power in the SCS, air and space power need to be projected in a total force concept.

The aim would be to target Chinese military forces, primarily naval.

Joint ISR would be used to observe, collect intelligence, and degrade Chinese capabilities and set conditions for strategic strikes, if needed.

United States assets for this task would include P-8A’s, P-3C’s, EP3E’s, and RC-135V/W’s. These aircraft would collect a wide variety of information, “from full-motion video via electro-optical and infrared cameras on the P8As and P-3Cs to a host of signals and electronic intelligence via the sensor suites on the EP-3Es and RC-135s.” Additionally, both satellite and drone tracking would be a key element to intelligence and surveillance gathering.

Combining all these capabilities would allow for joint planning efforts to meet potential Chinese threats, as well as surveillance of terrorist groups.

Cyber forces could attack Chinese satellites to dominate and protect the space domain. Control of the space domain is imperative, as our satellites must be operational due to our reliance on GPS and other technologies of our weapon systems.

Simultaneously, cyber actions would be deployed to disrupt China’s military operations, impairing computer systems responsible for “data communications and computation for command and control,…ISR, targeting, navigation, weapon guidance, battle assessment and logistics management, among other key functions.”

Strategic targets would include Chinese information and collection assets largely controlled by Chinese air and naval forces, air and surface radar, inter island communications, high-frequency communications, electronic warfare and signals intelligence, unmanned systems, and sub-reef counter stealth radar, undersea fiber-optic cable, and satellite communications.

If required, military information support operations could be enhanced in the region through information warfare, via the coalition/alliances, particularly to support pro-messaging to civilian populations and degrade the informal info networks of Chinese civilian boats and fishermen.

Looks like active cyber operations all below the threshold of war.