Border face-off: China and India each deploy 3,000 troops

[Double Edge]

What's been missing from the conversation is any idea of numbers the PLA have massed on our borders.

Heard Sushant Singh say they are 40k PLA facing Ladakh alone. 400 have disengaged.

I don't know if that number is realistic or not. It's an awful lot of people to have engaged in just one area.

Numbers on either side : India 30k, China 40k and that is for Ladakh only.

With over 30,000 troops in Ladakh, Indian Army to place emergency orders for extreme cold weather tents | DNA | Jul 06 2020

Disengagement process: Troops step back 2 km in Hot Springs, Gogra next | IE | Jul 09 2020

A second officer said that following the completion of the initial step of disengagement at various standoff sites, another meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation & Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (WMCC) is likely to be held this week.

It will be followed by another round of talks at the level of the Corps Commander to finalise the next step of disengagement.

The second officer also struck a note of caution about the disengagement process so far, stating that China had massed more than two divisions all along the LAC in the Ladakh sector. Moreover, it has the capacity to bring in more troops and equipment to the border within three to four days.

These soldiers and equipment, the officer said, continue to remain deployed at the LAC. “Some 40,000 of them have come from 2,000 km away, and 400 have moved back by 2 km,” he said. This demands a matching level of alertness and preparedness from the Indian side “as intentions can change quickly and we have to go by the capability they have,” the officer said.

[Double Edge]

Deter what? It was a kung fu fight. The BIGGEST THING about "deterrence is not warfighting" is to keep things in perspective. Is 100 Chinese nukes enough to deter American 10,000? Maybe. And that's good enough for the Chinese. This was a kung fu fight with neither side bringing even light arms into it, meaning deterrence has worked. Neither side is resorting to a force of arms.

That's good to hear but there's still a lot of people facing each other right now.

[Officer of Engineers]

That's good to hear but there's still a lot of people facing each other right now.

Are they under threat of fire? No? Tell them to go nuts with kung fu.

[Oracle]

Deterrence holds. Mischief too. This will continue till either country is weakened to the point it gives up.

India facing more cyber attacks from China and Pakistan since nationwide lockdown

[Oracle]

India's shopping for lightweight mountain-friendly tanks post China tussles

[Double Edge]

Been trying to find more info about these 73 roads but no one has any maps of them. This article from over a year ago.

India’s military brass wants swifter build-up of border infrastructure with China | TOI | Apr 14 2019

There have also been huge delays in the construction of the 73 “strategic” all-weather roads, with a total length of 4,643-km, which were first identified for construction along the LAC almost two decades ago. Of the 61 roads entrusted to BRO, with more east-west lateral links as well as better access routes to strategic peaks and valleys, just about 35 have been fully completed till now.

So we're about half way done when it comes to border roads

there has been little progress on the 14 “strategic” railway lines, which were approved by the defence ministry in 2010, with the Army even identifying three of them as topmost priority later.

No progress on these rail links to date

The Army, for instance, is now looking forward to completion of two critical projects, the Rohtang tunnel in Himachal Pradesh by the end of this year and the Se La tunnel in Arunachal Pradesh by 2022-2023.

But the work on over a dozen other proposed tunnels in J&K, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, along the borders with Pakistan and China, has not progressed beyond the initial stages. The tunnels are crucial for providing storage of war-fighting assets as well as NBC (nuclear, chemical, biological) protection without the threat of detection by enemy satellites and spy drones.

Mixed progress with tunnels.

The rest is from Raje's report on the Tibet exercises back in Feb

India’s border infrastructure problems are further magnified by the multiplicity of agencies involved in securing the border. For example, the Indian Army, Indo-Tibet Border Police, Border Security Force and the Assam Rifles are all responsible for managing the border on the Indian side. This has meant that both the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) have responsibility for the Sino-Indian border and the lack of coordination between different ministries and agencies has resulted in difficulties. For its part, China’s border management is managed by a single unified commander who is responsible for the TAR forces. India will therefore have to rectify its border systems and work towards a unified command structure to strengthen its defenses.

China’s border infrastructure is significantly more developed than India’s, but it is important to note that India faces tougher geological conditions in improving its infrastructure. The Himalayas is a young fold mountain range and is still rising and therefore, the construction takes place on fissured rocks mixed with clay. Also given the North-South flow of rivers on the Indian side, developing lateral connectivity is also challenging. While the terrain certainly is a problem, there are challenging tasks for China as well on specific sectors which it has managed to overcome. On the Indian side, the problem is primarily related to scaling.

For instance, the bridge-road construction ratio is tilted in favour of roads at 5 km of road against 9 m of bridge construction per day. More importantly, there is a shortage of not only qualified and skilled personnel but also heavy equipment for drilling through the mountainous terrain. Local political interference by non-qualified contractors has also been an issue. While BRO fared reasonably well in the initial decades after India’s independence, significant delays over the past many years in the completion of projects should be an imperative for a debate on the effectiveness of the BRO. Successive central administrations, including the current Modi government, have emphasised the need to expedite the development of infrastructure along the Sino-Indian border, but the delays—and the excuses for such— delays continue irrespective of the government in power.

Her last paper on border infrastructure was in 2013

[Officer of Engineers]

Deterrence holds. Mischief too. This will continue till either country is weakened to the point it gives up.

By using kung fu? It's a pissing contest. You know the thing about pissing contests? There's always more piss.

[Double Edge]

An old article from 2007 on Chinese agenda towards India. Luck that archive had it as the website where this article appeared in is long gone

I find it amazing that as late as 2007, some suspect India still has eyes on Tibet. If this is the calibre of people advising Beijing back then its fair to say there are zero chances of peace with China in the near future. We are on an increasingly adversarial path. The time for firing shots comes after we've successfully decoupled from them. Which is to say not now but in the near future. There is no peaceful solution to the border, it will be settled by force.

When can we dump the one China policy as its giving them the basis to make claims on India.

Late Sushma's point was valid, one India in exchange for one China.

''India-China Competition Revealed in Ongoing Border Disputes'' | PINR | Oct 09 2007

''India-China Competition Revealed in Ongoing Border Disputes''

Yet another "useful and positive" round of Sino-Indian boundary negotiations was held on September 24-26 against the backdrop of a general consensus in both capitals that no breakthrough to the territorial dispute could be achieved for a long period of time. Talks for a settlement have now gone on for more than a quarter of a century (since 1981, to be precise) -- with a "big push" given to them by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988, the second one by Atal Bihari Vajpayee's sojourn in Beijing in 2003 and a third one by Manmohan Singh's talks with Premier Wen Jiabao in 2005 and President Hu Jintao in 2006 -- yet all were in vain.

As a result, the 4,056-kilometer (2,520 miles) frontier between India and China, one of the longest inter-state borders in the world, remains the only one of China's land borders not defined, let alone demarcated, on maps or delineated on the ground. While Indians doubt China's sincerity in border negotiations, Chinese question India's leaders' will and capacity to settle the dispute in a "give-and-take" spirit.

Up until 2005, there was a great deal of optimism about a possible breakthrough. Evidence of this came during Prime Minister Vajpayee's China visit in June 2003 when New Delhi's readiness to address Chinese concerns on Tibet was matched by Beijing's willingness to resolve the Sikkim issue by recognizing the trade route through the Nathu La Pass on the China-Sikkim frontier with India and later showing Sikkim as part of India in its maps.

For its part, New Delhi reiterated its stance on the Tibetan Autonomous Region as part of China. This visit also paved the way for border talks to be held through special representatives of the leaders to find an early "political solution" to the boundary question, rather than going only by the legal and historical claims of the two sides. India indicated its willingness to settle for the territorial status quo by giving up claims to the Aksai Chin in Ladakh and hoped China would give up its claims to Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern sector and recognize the McMahon Line just as Beijing had accepted Tibet's British-drawn boundaries with Afghanistan and Myanmar (formerly known as Burma).

In order to give a new thrust to the ongoing border negotiations, an "Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the Boundary Question" was signed during Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao's visit to India in April 2005. The joint statement issued at the end of the visit talked of a "Strategic and Cooperative Partnership" between India and China.

No Movement

Since then, however, Beijing has upped the ante by demanding major territorial concessions in populated areas of Arunachal Pradesh on terms that many in New Delhi see as "humiliating and non-negotiable." Tawang, in particular, has emerged as a sticking point since the Chinese claim it to be central to Tibetan Buddhism given that the sixth Dalai Lama was born there.

Ties between China and India were strained even further in May 2007 when the Chinese government refused a visa to an Indian official from disputed Arunachal Pradesh to visit China, and the Indian government's invitation soon thereafter to Taiwan's opposition Kuomintang (K.M.T.) party presidential candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, to visit India in June 2007 to hold talks with senior Indian officials. China voiced its opposition to Ma's visit and called on India to abide by the "One China policy."

Thereafter came media reports of the People's Liberation Army (P.L.A.) encroachments across the Line of Actual Control (L.A.C.) and Chinese small arms supplies to insurgents in India's volatile northeast via Bangladesh and Myanmar. Then, in August 2007, Beijing demanded the removal of two old Indian Army bunkers near the tri-junction of Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet, claiming that these were located on their territory. This move raised questions about China's declared policy of treating Sikkim as part of Indian territory. Not surprisingly, China's increasing assertiveness over the disputed borders has led to a rapid meltdown in the Sino-Indian border talks and a "mini-Cold War" has quietly taken hold at the diplomatic level during the past two years, despite public protestations of amity.

Some observers argue that Hu Jintao's desire to control the choice of the next Dalai Lama has led to pressuring India to concede access to the Tawang Monastery, which is crucial to this choice. The deterioration in Sino-Indian relations under Hu, however, should not have come as a surprise given his reputation as a hardliner over Tibet. (After all, Deng Xiaoping had groomed him for the Chinese Communist Party leadership because of his prominent role in the successful suppression of the Tibetan revolt in 1988.) In this context, the rapid pace development of road, rail and military infrastructure in Tibet close to its borders with India and Nepal is seen as preempting any possible destabilization of Tibet post-Dalai Lama.

Others, however, do not see any sinister designs in western China's development. Instead, they attribute the recent downturn in Sino-Indian relations more to domestic power struggles within the Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.) than to the Dalai Lama succession issue or to Chinese concerns about India's growing tilt toward the United States.

While there may be an element of truth in all these arguments, there are other more fundamental reasons behind the recent chill in Sino-Indian relations. Apparently, the strategic consequences of India's economic resurgence coupled with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's offer in March 2005 to "help make India a major world power in the 21st century" have greatly bothered the Chinese. This offer, and the long-term India-U.S. defense cooperation framework and the July 2005 U.S.-India nuclear energy deal that followed soon after, have been compared by Chinese strategic analysts to "the strategic tilt" toward China executed by former U.S. President Richard Nixon in 1971 to contain the common Soviet threat. Claiming that these developments have "destabilizing" and "negative implications" for their country's future, China's India-watchers have started warning their government that Beijing "should not take India lightly any longer."

Chinese leaders were led to believe that China's growing economic and military might would eventually enable Beijing to re-establish the Sino-centric hierarchy of Asia's past as the U.S. saps its energies in fighting small wars in the Islamic world, Japan shrinks economically and demographically while India remains subdued by virtue of Beijing's "special relationships" with its South Asian neighbors. However, a number of "negative developments," from Beijing's perspective, since early 2005 -- the Indian and Japanese bids for permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council, the formation of the East Asia Summit that includes India, Australia and New Zealand, the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, India's ability to sustain a high economic growth rate of eight to nine percent and the strategic implications of India's "Look East" policy -- have apparently upset Chinese calculations.

Therefore, after a hiatus of a few years, Chinese media commentaries have resumed their criticism of Washington's "hegemonic ideas" and for drawing "India in as a tool for its global strategic pattern." Some Chinese analysts express serious reservations about U.S. efforts to draw "India in as a tool for its global strategic pattern," arguing that "India's DNA doesn't allow itself to become an ally subordinate to the U.S., like Japan or Britain." Nonetheless, most see India as a "future strategic competitor" that would be an active member of an anti-China grouping due to the structural power shifts in the international system and advocate putting together a comprehensive "contain India" strategy based on both economic tools (aid, trade, infrastructural development) and enhanced military cooperation with "pro-China" countries.

India-wary China

An internal study on India undertaken in mid-2005 (with inputs from China's South Asia watchers such as Cheng Ruisheng, Ma Jiali, Sun Shihai, Rong Ying, Shen Dingli, among others) at the behest of the Chinese leadership's "Foreign Affairs Cell" recommended that Beijing take all measures to maintain its current strategic leverage (in terms of territory, membership of the exclusive Permanent Five and Nuclear Five clubs); diplomatic advantages (special relationships, membership of regional and international organizations); and economic lead over India. Although the evidence is inconclusive, the most plausible deduction is that this internal re-assessment of India lies behind the recent hardening of China's stance on the territorial dispute and a whole range of other issues in China-India relations.

The Chinese are concerned that the U.S.-India nuclear deal and related agreements would bring about a major shift in the power balance in South Asia that is currently tilted in China's favor. The recent strengthening of China's strategic presence in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar and overtures to the Maldives should, therefore, be seen against this backdrop. Despite protestations to the contrary from India and the United States that New Delhi is unwilling and unlikely to play the role of a closely aligned U.S. surrogate such as Japan or Britain, China's Asia strategy is based upon the premise that maritime powers such as the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India would eventually form an informal quadrilateral alliance to countervail continental China.

As a commentary in Huanqiu Shibao noted: "The fact is that Japan, Australia, and India are respectively located at China's northeast, southeast, and southwest, and all are Asian powers, while U.S. power in the Pacific is still unchallengeable. Hence, should the "alliance of values" concentrating military and ideological flavors in one body take shape, it will have a very great impact on China's security environment."

From Beijing's perspective, the responsibility for this "negative development" lies solely at New Delhi's door. In their writings, Chinese analysts seem upset over their southern neighbor's all-consuming passion to become "a big power," and see the nuclear deal as its key to unlocking the door leading to the big league in world politics.

As a Renmin Ribao commentary noted in August:

The U.S.-Indian nuclear agreement has strong symbolic significance for India in achieving its dream of a powerful nation…In recent years, it introduced and implemented a 'Look-East' policy and joined most regional organizations in the East Asian region…In fact, the purpose of the United States to sign a civilian nuclear energy cooperation agreement with India is to enclose India into its global partners' camp, so as to balance the forces of Asia [read, China]. This fits in exactly with India's wishes.

Once the nuclear deal crosses all the "big four hurdles" (opposition from pro-Chinese Communist parties in India; negotiations on I.A.E.A. safeguards; approval by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (N.S.G.); and its passage by the U.S. Congress), Beijing believes that it would end the nuclear symmetry between New Delhi and Islamabad (or, de-hyphenate the sub-continental rivals) and put India on par with nuclear China (re-hyphenate China with India).

This, from Beijing's perspective, is quite disconcerting because a major objective of China's South Asia policy has been to perpetuate parity between India and Pakistan. Add to this India's military exercises with the U.S., Japan and Australia, support for the concept of "concert of democracies," and attempts to establish strategic ties with countries that fall within China's sphere of influence (Mongolia, South Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Myanmar) -- all of these reinforce Beijing's fears about its containment. However, despite its strong disapproval of a pact that would narrow the power gap between India and China, Beijing would not want to take a stance that pushes India further into Washington's camp. Most likely, Beijing would use its N.S.G. membership to further its own and its allies' interests by:

• Using the "double standards" argument to question Washington's commitment to non-proliferation goals in light of its decision to back India's nuclear industry while opposing the right to nuclear energy for Iran and Pakistan;
  
• Insisting that any changes to the N.S.G. guidelines to accommodate the deal must not be "country [i.e., India]-specific" but "universal criteria-based" so that "all countries [read, Pakistan] can benefit from the peaceful use of atomic energy under the I.A.E.A. safeguards." This formulation, outlined by Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, would pave the way for the Chinese construction of the Chashma III and IV nuclear reactors in Pakistan;
  
• Using the deal to extract major concessions from Washington, including an end to the arms embargo and the lifting of bans on high-tech dual-use technology exports to China;
  
• Seeking new assurances that U.S.-India ties are not related to any "contain China" strategy.

The fact of the matter is that China and India are locked in a classic security dilemma: one country sees its own actions as self-defensive, but the same actions appear aggressive to the other. India feels the need to take counter-balancing measures and launch certain initiatives to stay independent of China -- such as the "Look East" policy -- which are perceived as challenging and threatening in China. Like China, India is actively seeking to reintegrate its periphery with the framework of regional economic cooperation. Like China, India seeks greater international status and influence commensurate with its growing economic power.

However, like any other established status quo great power, China wants to ensure that its position remains strong vis-à-vis challenger India for strategic, economic and geopolitical reasons. Through closer strategic ties with India's neighboring countries, China is warning India not to take any counter-measures to balance Beijing's growing might.

Tibet is the Key

Tibet remains the key to China's policymaking on the India-China boundary dispute. The Chinese still suspect that India prefers an independent Tibet and covertly supports Tibetan separatists. Unless and until Tibet is totally pacified and completely Sinicized as Inner Mongolia has been, Beijing would not want to give up the "bargaining chip" that an unsettled boundary vis-à-vis India provides it with. An unsettled border provides China the strategic leverage to keep India uncertain about its intentions, and nervous about its capabilities, while exposing India's vulnerabilities and weaknesses, and ensuring New Delhi's "good behavior" on issues of vital concern to China.

Several recent commentaries in Chinese language sources confirm a shift toward a tougher Chinese stance on the territorial dispute with India. Articles on "Future Directions of the Sino-Indian Border Dispute" published in Guogji Zhanlue in November 2006, Liu Silu's "Beijing Should Not Lose Patience in Chinese-Indian Border Talks" in Wen Wei Po on June 1, 2007, and Professor Wang Yiwei's interview "Helping U.S. May Derail Border Talks" with the Asian Age on July 25, 2007 are broadly representative of the official thinking in China's national security establishment on this subject. The key arguments and major themes presented in these and other writings are summarized below.

First, since India controls 90,000 square kilometers of the richest part of Tibet and the Himalayan region, equivalent to two and a half Taiwans and as large as Jiangsu Province, "the Chinese government will not easily give up its territory." Wen Wei Po commentator Liu Silu contends that as "it is equally difficult to get India to spit out the fatty meat it is chewing…Beijing had better be patient at the negotiation table [because] time is on China's side." Apparently, many Chinese strategic thinkers believe that China's comprehensive national power vis-à-vis India is likely to increase over time, and that would enable Beijing to drive a better bargain on the boundary question in the future.

Second, as Professor Wang Yiwei puts it, "China showed 'greatness' once, after the 1962 Indo-China war, when it gave up the land it controlled [in Arunachal Pradesh] and it could not be expected to show magnanimity again…India 'lost an opportunity' to settle the boundary question when Deng Xiaoping and Mao Zedong were alive. President Hu Jintao is not Deng or Mao. He is strong but cannot be compared with them." In other words, the ball is in India's court. If New Delhi wants a settlement, it must hand over a large chunk of territory in Arunachal Pradesh to China.

Third, the Sino-Indian border issue is linked with sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the respective status of the two countries in the global hierarchy. Hence, a Guogji Zhanlue commentary advises that Beijing "should not adopt any hasty step or make big compromises on principles" because this issue, "if approached in a hurry, could impact the respective rise of the two nuclear powers." One Chinese concern is that a border settlement, without major Indian territorial concessions, could potentially augment India's power position and thus impact negatively China's rise. An unsettled boundary suits Chinese interests for the present because China's claims in the western sector are complicated by the Indo-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir, Pakistan's interests in the Sino-Indian territorial dispute, and Beijing's interest in keeping India under strategic pressure on two fronts.

Fourth, a "fair and reasonable settlement" implies that "India will need to give up something to get something." Ideally speaking, Wen Wei Po argues that China should "recover the entire area. But it is negotiable for the disputed territory to be split equally between China and India, as was the case of Heixiazi [Bolshoy Ussuriysky] Island in the northeast [on the Russian border]. A third option would be for Beijing to recover at least the 2,000 square kilometers covering Tawang and Takpa Shiri. It is believed that this is Beijing's last resort and it will not accept any deal worse than this." Having wrested substantial territorial concessions from Russia, Vietnam, and Tajikistan in their land border disputes with China, Beijing is now expecting the same from India.

Fifth, China should economically harmonize/integrate Tibet, Nepal and the border regions with India into China's economic sphere through increased economic links and infrastructure projects, such as the Qinghai-Tibet railway, before proceeding for a boundary settlement with India. Underlying this is the belief that economic interdependence would soften India's position, leading to a settlement on China's terms.

Last, if negotiations, coercive diplomacy and economic harmonization (a carrot and stick policy) fail to produce the desired outcome, the use of force at an appropriate time in the future to recover "China's Southern Tibet" (a new Chinese term for Arunachal Pradesh) is not ruled out. Many Chinese analysts believe that the military balance has shifted in their favor with the completion of the 1,118-kilometer (695 miles) Qinghai-Tibet railway and other military infrastructure projects in Tibet and that negates the need for any territorial concession to India in the eastern sector.

These views and arguments clearly (a) advocate a "constraining India" strategy; (b) foretell a long and torturous course of future border negotiations; and (c) indicate an uncertain and unpredictable future for India's relations with China.

Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi's statement to his Indian counterpart Pranab Mukherjee made in June 2007 that the "mere presence of populated areas in Arunachal Pradesh would not affect Chinese claims on the boundary" should then be seen against this background. However, in Indian policy circles, this statement is seen as repudiating Article VII of the "Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles" signed during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's India visit in April 2005, which states: "In reaching a border settlement, the two sides shall safeguard populations in border areas."

The inclusion of the phrase "settled population in the border areas" was then interpreted as a diplomatic concession that India had extracted from China as it protected India's interests against Chinese claims to Tawang and other areas in Arunachal Pradesh. India reportedly conveyed to China in June 2007 that it could not be pushed beyond a point on the boundary dispute. Describing the Chinese move as "a serious retrograde step," Mukherjee publicly rebuffed Beijing, saying that New Delhi would not part with populated portions of the state of Arunachal Pradesh: "Any elected government of India is not permitted by the constitution to part with any part of our land that sends representatives to the Indian Parliament."

Sending a clear signal against any Chinese designs over Arunachal Pradesh, he added: "The days of Hitler are over. After the Second World War, no country captures land of another country in the present global context. That is why there is a civilized mechanism of discussions and dialogue to sort out border disputes. We sit around the table and discuss disputes to resolve them."

The Indian government has also responded by unveiling plans for economic development and major infrastructure projects (the building of 72 roads, three airstrips and numerous bridges) in the border areas along the undefined L.A.C. that would enable the Indian military to "swiftly move forces into the region and sustain them logistically in the event of any untoward trouble or emergency." Indian Defense Minister A. K. Antony told the Combined Commanders' Conference in July 2007 that "China has been building a lot of infrastructure -- railways, airports and roads [along the Indian border]. We are also doing the same thing."

Reacting to recent reports of some military skirmishes, Antony acknowledged that "there may have been an odd instance," but he ruled out "chances of any confrontation." Indian Chief of Army Staff General J. J. Singh has done the same, assuring the country that "a 1962-like situation will not be repeated. We are fully prepared to defend our borders." In response to the establishment of four new airbases in Tibet and three in southern China, the Indian Air Force is reportedly beefing up its presence by deploying two squadrons of Sukhoi-30MKIs near the Chinese border.

Although the probability of an all-out conflict is extremely low, the prospect that some of India's road building projects in disputed areas could lead to tensions, clashes and skirmishes with Chinese border patrols cannot be completely ruled out. Should a conflict break out, the P.L.A.'s contingency plans emphasize a "short and swift localized" conflict (confined to the Tawang region, along the lines of the 1999 Kargil conflict) with the following objectives in mind: capture the Tawang tract; give India's military a bloody nose; and deliver a knockout punch that punctures India's ambitions to be China's equal or peer competitor once and for all.

The ultra-modern civilian and military infrastructure in Tibet is expected to enable Beijing to exercise the military option to achieve the above-mentioned objectives should that become necessary at some stage in the future.

Present Imperfect, Future Tense

In short, there is little or no sign of an early resolution to the conflicting claims, despite continuing negotiations and the recent upswing in diplomatic, political, commercial and even military ties between the world's two most populous countries. The border disputes have simmered in the background for more than 50 years, threatening to disrupt relations between Asia's two giants.

With China insisting on the return of Tawang on religious, cultural, and historical grounds, Indians have a more powerful case for the return of the sacred Mount Kailash-Mansarovar in Tibet, since it is a sacred religious place associated with the Hindu religion. Additionally, there is the contentious issue of the Shaksgam Valley that Pakistan handed over to China in 1963, which China's Foreign Ministry spokespersons now claim is a non-issue.

Negotiating these issues will not be easy and will test diplomatic skills on both sides. It is worth noting that historically China has negotiated border disputes with neighbors in their moment of national weakness (Pakistan, Myanmar in the 1960s, and the Central Asian republics in the 1990s) or only after the overall balance of power had shifted decisively in China's favor and/or after they had ceased to be a major threat (land border settlements with Russia and Vietnam in the 1990s). It has not, however, negotiated with those who are perceived as present rivals and future threats (India, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines and Taiwan).

In the meantime, both sides will have to learn to live without an early resolution to the dispute. Even if the territorial dispute were somehow resolved, India and China would still compete over energy resources, markets and for geostrategic reasons. A new potentially divisive issue for the future appears to be the ecological impact on the Indian subcontinent of Chinese plans to divert the rivers of Tibet for irrigation purposes in China. With China controlling the Tibetan plateau -- the source of Asia's major rivers -- there looms a potential conflict over depleting water reserves. Water is increasingly becoming a divisive issue in India's bilateral relations with China.

Simmering tensions over territory, Tibet, energy resources and rival alliance relationships ensure that Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's assertion that "there is enough [geopolitical] space for the two countries to develop together" will remain more a "hope" than a conviction. The relationship between the two rising Asian giants with overlapping spheres of influence and disputed frontiers will be characterized more by competition and rivalry than cooperation. Indeed, the possibility of confrontation cannot be ruled out completely.

Report Drafted By:
Dr. Mohan Malik

The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an analysis-based publication that seeks to, as objectively as possible, provide insight into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around the globe. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written permission of [email protected]. All comments should be directed to [email protected].

[Oracle]

By using kung fu? It's a pissing contest. You know the thing about pissing contests? There's always more piss.

I am thinking about it another way. One country's economy will take a beating, then it will slow down to a point when reserves would come into play. Followed by a massive recession world wide, civil riots, uprising. Which one, India or China, depends on the course the country takes.

[Oracle]

I heard something, which is rumour for now, that GoI is thinking of building an underwater tunnel in the Brahmaputra. Anyone heard anything?

[Oracle]

India rejects two Chinese companies’ bids on development of Delhi-Mumbai expressway

Retaliation.

[Double Edge]

China has captured 60 sq km of Indian land!

What are military satellites for? Why the hell was the mountain strike corps not raised? Why is India always bending backwards to the communists? Whenever Chinese media talks about 1962, why doesn't any single F govt. spokesperson remind the Chinese of 1967? Such pathetic management. I thought a******* in the GoI would understand what happened to Tibet, so that another Ladakh doesn't happen. Why do we always talk with the Chinese? Why not evict them forcefully from our land? The Indian government doesn't have any shame. First they were sleeping, now they are talking. Why spend billions of dollars on defence, if the objective is to talk. Why? These F politicians have ruined India. British went away, leaving these 3rd rated people as politicians.

Rajnath Singh is the most incompetent minister in Modi's cabinet. I said it before, now it's proven. The Army chief should take over for a period of 20 years. We need martial law for 20 years. Yes, I'm saying this.

This is something we need to discuss. PLA moved in a divsions worth and we only found out after the fact (!)

Lessons from the Ladakh crisis | ORF | Jun 23 2020

From the author of that Belfer study

In addition to our own satellites, after signing COMCASA we now have access to what American birds can see yet we still missed it.

Once this episode concludes, the magnitude of this crisis compels an official review as to how Chinese forces were able to find such advantages against India’s conventional force superiority.

A component of this superiority, as discussed in the force estimate, was the need for Chinese troops to be mobilised from areas further within its interior to prepare for such a border offensive.

Compared to permanently stationing these forces close to the border areas — as India has selected — this longer Chinese geographic mobilisation trail would generate more signals and activities that Indian ISR would detect. This would enable New Delhi to counter-mobilise its forces toward border areas, and even rotate additional interior forces into the theater, further denying the incoming Chinese forces the potential of gaining the conventional edge and coercive leverage. Even if there were gaps in India’s close ISR attention on its border areas, it was likely that such significant Chinese military movements would be observed by the US, which would then alert and update India. This US ISR-sharing, after all, occurred during the Doklam crisis.

Instead, it has become apparent that there have been grave failures somewhere (but more likely in multiple places) in the Indian intelligence chain, as it runs through from source to consumer. China achieved its current position in Ladakh through staging a military exercise as a feint, sending forces to occupy the areas it now holds. Such heightened Chinese military activity close to border areas should have alerted Indian decisionmakers, who would order a stepping-up of Indian LAC patrols and general military readiness in these areas.


Multiple Indian intelligence agencies reportedly provided warnings on concerning Chinese military activities as far back as February 2020. However, “when asked if there were any delays in acting on the intelligence alerts, officials said initial reports were not specific and the intent of Chinese deployment was not clear.”

The more precise location of the likely Chinese incursion was only identified in April 2020.

This means China was able to largely erase its mobilisation disadvantages compared to India, to the extent that the issuance of the precise intelligence warning gave so little time for Indian forces that they had to respond “by quickly rushing in troops from Leh.”

Information regarding US intelligence-sharing on these Chinese movements is currently not publicly available. Even if New Delhi was in receipt of US intelligence reporting on these actions, it is still clear that India’s overall intelligence system — including the decisionmaker consumers — did not function effectively in the crucial period of early warning and counter-mobilisation.

An intelligence failure of this magnitude requires a thorough official review of its structural causes and recommending reforms, similar to the Kargil Review Committee.

If the government will not commission a public inquiry of its own accord, then it should be initiated by the Lok Sabha Standing Committee on Defence.

The National Security Advisor (NSA), Ajit Doval, should be required to give evidence in this inquiry. This officeholder is charged with intelligence oversight and directly briefing the Prime Minister. Moreover, Doval’s long background in intelligence means he will have an additional level of insight regarding the core flaws in the system. Former NSAs, Deputy NSAs, and additional former senior intelligence officials should also be invited to participate and fully briefed accordingly by the government.

Modi must take the initiative to establish such an inquiry and act on its findings. This will ensure India’s intelligence systems and military forces are suitably robust and well-organised for this new era; a period which could last decades after Modi leaves office.

Another in the same theme

Déjà vu – Failures in Intelligence & Accountability? | ORF | Jun 19 2020

Although India claimed military and political success after Kargil, serious deficiencies in its defence and intelligence capabilities were exposed. The Kargil Review Committee (KRC), established by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s government, believed that India’s intelligence apparatus had failed. However, despite adopting selective recommendations from KRC — like the creation of the National Technical Research Organisation and the Defence Intelligence Agency to help process disparate intelligence collection and analysis — India continues to suffer from poor strategic assessment. The inability to correctly monitor and analyse the redirection of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) elements taking part in an exercise on the Tibetan plateau to positions close to LoAC is one example of this.

In a country like India where society is deferential to the military, the lack of political review or accountability on performance during conflict or peacetime has resulted in a culture of mediocrity to take hold within the military leadership.

Is it time to revisit the absence of accountability for chain of command failures? Pinning accountability, however, means admitting failure. The aftermath of the Kargil conflict saw little accountability fixed on individuals in the army who had ignored may indicators of a Pakistani intrusion. PLA’s incursions in the Galwan River and Pangong Lake areas look eerily similar, and failure to deploy troops in time by the Udhampur-based Northern Command or by Army HQ suggests command failure, or poor military strategic assessment.

The counsel and information offered by the military is key for the political leadership to decide on a course of action. To this end, the post of chief of defence staff (CDS) was created on KRC’s — and subsequently the Naresh Chandra Task Force’s and Shekatkar Committee’s — recommendations, to provide a single-point of advice to GoI on military affairs, and to synergise India’s three armed services. However, CDS Gen Bipin Rawat, otherwise known for his frequent moments of public frankness, has lately been curiously ‘missing from action’ in the current crisis. And the assessment put out in public by the Army Chief Gen Naravane after the initial clashes not too long ago reflected a lack of appreciation of the impact of the incursions or of China’s strategy of manipulating risk to achieve its territorial objectives.

When the dust settles down, it will be important to determine the nature of the shortcomings that led to the failure to anticipate or learn from previous incidents since the Chinese threat was especially evident. There are no easy formulae for the assessment of Indian military effectiveness vis-à-vis PLA. But investing in more technologically advanced military and intelligence infrastructure to detect and deter future Chinese attempts in changing the status quo may be a first step.

[Double Edge]

Hardliners vs others on how to handle China's India problem

The standoff and China’s India policy dilemma | Hindu | Jul 15 2020

The hardliner view, remember the names

On one side of the debate are China’s top India watchers such as Lin Minwang and Zhang Jiadong, from Fudan University, and Li Hongmei from the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS) among others, who believe that the present conflict is not an “accident” but an “inevitable result” of what they perceive as “India’s long-standing speculative strategy on the China-India border”. From Doklam to Kashmir to India’s “unending infrastructure arms race” at the LAC, they say, Beijing was “fed up” and “had to teach India a lesson”.

Their key argument is that China-India relations hold no great prospect in the current international situation. There is no possibility of a negotiated settlement of the border dispute any time soon. India is already a “quasi-ally” of the U.S. with no scope for reversal. With opportunities for cooperation at the global level diminishing, regional competition intensifying and the earlier system of effective management of bilateral differences crumbling beyond control, periodic violent conflicts, they predict, are the “new normal” in China-India ties.

China, they argue, should reconsider its prevalent strategic thinking that India is not its main strategic challenge and, therefore, peace needs to be maintained in its direction as much as possible. Only by daring to fight, by showing strong determination, the will and the ability on the western frontier can China effectively deter its adversaries on the eastern coast.

This is also, what they called, the right way to resolve China’s primary contradiction, that is the China-U.S. problem, by first breaking “its arms and legs”.

To deal with a resurgent India, Chinese hardliners suggest
- a policy of “three nos”: “no weakness, no concession and no defensive defence”. In other words, China should take all opportunities to crack down on India, take the initiative to hit it hard whenever possible. This, it is argued, will not damage China-India relations; on the contrary, it will make it more stable. Didn’t the 1962 China-India war help China to maintain peace and stability on the western front for a long time and directly eliminate American and Soviet ambitions to use India to contain China?

In this backdrop there is renewed interest among certain sections of the Chinese strategic community to: keep India under control by destabilising the entire border region, creating tension across the board, from the McMahon Line in the east to the Aksai Chin area in the west; take the initiative to attack and seize territories under India’s control from Kashmir to Arunachal Pradesh, and weaken India internally, by supporting the cause of Maoists, Naga separatists and Kashmiris.

The others, seems to be the one with the working brains

However, on the other side of the debate are Chinese political thinkers and professors such as Zheng Yongnian and Yu Longyu among others, who in their analysis of the Galwan Valley incident, have been somewhat critical about China’s policies towards India, which they say remain mostly tactical, of a “reactive nature” and are characterised by a “tit-for-tat” approach without any clear strategic intent. This, according to them, stokes extreme nationalism in India and unites the otherwise divided nation against China, which not only harms China’s interests but might eventually draw China into an untimely military conflict.

They criticise those vying to “teaching India a lesson” as being “short-sighted” and not “psychologically prepared for the rise of India”. China, they argue, lacks understanding of the fact that India, as a rising power, is very important to China and will be increasingly crucial in the future, with China-India relations evolving as the most important pair of relations after China-U.S. links.

If China-India ties are damaged beyond repair, they warn, India alone or in association with other countries will cause “endless trouble for China”. For instance, an openly hostile India will use every possible means to prevent China from reaching the Indian Ocean. On the other hand, the decoupling of China-India relations will further strengthen the “anti-China alliance” between the U.S., Japan, Australia, Vietnam, Indonesia and other countries, who will actively take the initiative to reshape global industrial chains, use the Indo-Pacific Strategy to check and balance China’s military and economic power, and expand international organisations such as the G-7 to weaken China’s influence in international affairs.

On a similar note, various commentaries in the Chinese press highlight that downgrading China-India relations to the level of India-Pakistan relations or a ‘Kashmirisation’ of the China-India border is easier said than done as this will require a complete reversal of China’s present LAC policy of being “reasonable, profitable and economical”.

Strategically too, they say, it is “unwise” for China to take the initiative to get into a comprehensive military conflict with India — “a big country with comparable military strength”— at this point in time. The general view among these military analysts is that if China has an advantage in terms of psychology, equipment, and logistics mobilisation, India too has advantage on various fronts such as deployment, supply line, practical war experience, topography, and climate among others. If India’s disadvantage remains in the fact that its capital lies well within the bombing range of China, China’s key disadvantage is its particularly long supply lines. Therefore, if the conflict ends in a short period of time, it will benefit China. But if it is prolonged, China will be disadvantaged.

If a war starts, they argue, India will make all efforts to prolong it as long as possible, and the U.S. is likely to help India to attain this objective. Even if the two sides ended in a tie, in India it will be counted a victory and the national morale will rise sharply; on the contrary, in China, the morale will decline if it cannot beat India decisively. Therefore, in its effort to “teach India a lesson”, they fear, China might lose more than it would gain.

China better believe the bolded bit. If the Paks could be as annoying at a tenth the Indian economy just imagine what India would be to China at a fifth.

A longer war benefits India and a shorter one benefits China ? i'd have thought the opposite was true, hmmm

They also think of India as of comparable military strength. Interesting.

The overall consensus within this group is that it is still not the time to ‘resolve’ the India problem. Instead, China, for now, should strive to make India retreat without a military conflict, maintain basic peace and stability at the borders, and, at the minimum, not deliberately push it towards the U.S. Meanwhile, China simultaneously carries out its strategy of weakening India internally by leveraging its social and political differences, completing its strategic encirclement, improving troop deployment in the Tibet region to secure the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and stationing Chinese troops in the Gwadar Port (Arabian Sea), so as to secure China’s Indian Ocean sea routes, among other interests.

In the words of another Chinese strategist, Yin Guoming, rather than winning a war, China should aim at attaining a comprehensive and overwhelming advantage in geopolitics vis-à-vis India, which cannot be altered by war.

Sounds like their plan to defeat the US in Asia. One fine day it will just be.....

[Double Edge]

India's shopping for lightweight mountain-friendly tanks post China tussles

You'd think we'd have built one of our own by now instead of shopping for one in the open market.

What with all the work on the Arjun. How hard would it have been to develop a lighter version for the mountains.

I really wonder why this option was not considered.

[Double Edge]

Gentlemen, at this point, I would caution you to sit back and wait for the intel to come to you. Too much speculation and not enough data. Your army is ready to receive the enemy but no one is ready for war. There is not enough prep work on either side to initiate war. What's more. No one wants war. Else both sides would be rushing men and material to the front.

I realize that it is extremely hard to wait and do nothing but that is exactly what needs to be done right now.

Right now, just keep asking questions. Don't expect answers because the Chinese won't say squat.

We got precious little to date

First intel on PLA came mid-April, long before Pangong clash | IE | July 15 2020

These reports have strengthened the view at the highest levels of the intelligence set-up that significant details, though available, were glossed over as the crisis brewed in Ladakh, leaving the government in a blind spot.

There is one side that says intel failure and here is the other, breach of trust

A senior Army officer said “there was no report of any massive PLA troop movement and deployment with us in April. The first report about movement of some Chinese military vehicles was received only in May, which pertained to infrastructure construction activities”.

The officer said that “Chinese troops, which were part of an ongoing training exercise, were later diverted to the standoff sites on the LAC. These exercises are routine every summer and there has been a long understanding that the two armies move back to their bases after the exercise. It is an established norm, followed scrupulously for years.”

“This year again, we were aware of these exercises by the PLA in the exercise area but there was breach of trust and faith by the Chinese, as they diverted these troops to the standoff sites. The distance from the exercise area to these sites is some 200 km, and it does not take much time to do this. It was a breach of trust,” the officer said.

So not holding my breath for that review. The military does not think there was an intel lapse

I was lead to thinking this was well planned move by the PLA but increasingly it looks like a rash decision without adequate thought about the consequences. Do these people even realise the damage they've done to relations ? assuming things don't get worse.

Saying those relations do not amount to much is ridiculous. That is not an acceptable answer here.

And at the end of the day we are still left wondering what China will have to show for their effort ; )

India should make them pay for this misstep. Diplomatically, economically, reputationally.