Border face-off: China and India each deploy 3,000 troops

[Double Edge]

Nitin's update on the state of roads in Arunachal

The black and orange side roads have come up since 2008. Prior to that they were not blacktopped so got muddy in the rain.

The Dalai Lama entered India in 1959 and took the Tawang - Bhalokpung route to arrive in Tezpur.

Nitin thinks that route should be called the Dalai Lama Highway : )



It's as a result of these roads China makes its latest claim to an area in Bhutan near the Sakteng sanctuary

The joke is the area isn't even contiguous with the present Chinese border but is rather further south and borders Arunachal.



So India is propsing to build a road through this area China claims that will link Gauhati with Tawang by going through Bhutan via Trashigang

India wants to build a road through Bhutan's 'Yeti Territory' to counter China's expansionist moves | DH | Jul 08 2020

Thing is we've wanted to do this for the last ten years but have not got the green light from Bhutan as yet, going by the ten yr old HT article below

Road through yeti territory excites locals | HT | Nov 29 2010

[Double Edge]

Long series of tweets featuring newspaper clippings building up to the '62 war.

Galwan, Pangong, Ladakh, its as if the Chinese have choreographed these to scare us.

[Double Edge]

And India is the worlds' largest democracy? Fook India.

An online petition addressed to Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been launched for the renaming of Panchsheel Marg outside the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi’s Chanakyapuri “as the Dalai Lama Marg.”

The petition has been initiated by a senior bureaucrat, O.P. Mishra in his personal capacity as a citizen, as per information on Facebook; he is currently posted in the Union Territory of Lakshadweep as Secretary.

The Chinese Embassy has three roads around it, Shanti Path, Panchsheel Marg and Nayaya Marg. Mishra’s petition says that “Panchsheel” was the treaty between India and China in 1954. The then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru advocated this treaty.

“We named one of the most important roads in Chanakyapuri to mark the importance of the treaty as Panchsheel Marg.

Panchsheel means the five principles which formed the basis of Indo-Sino relationship—mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence.

Sadly, this treaty survived only on paper.”

There are some who feel that it would be better to rename Shanti Path as Dalai Lama Marg.

That way, the Chinese embassy’s address will be “50-D, Dalai Lama Path, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi 110021”.

Whenever the Chinese will have to give directions, they will have to say “We are on the Dalai Lama Path”!

High time this was done

https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/n...a-path-chinese

[Officer of Engineers]

Vis-a-vi 1979-1989 Sino-VN Combat.

There are things that needed to be understood that are not explained by those articles and frankly, ignorant of a whole sleuth of things. Sino-VN was an existential crisis for both countries. While VN performed militarily extremely well, it should be noted that they failed to stop the PLA and frankly, had Deng decided (and he clearly had the balls to do it), he could have taken Hanoi. China, however, woke up that they were in no shape to stop the Soviets. What's more, they were surrounded. India, Vietnam, and the USSR. Whatever illusion they were spouting about the Paper Polar Bell was dispelled when the 40th Army crossed into Afghanistan ... in winter ... over mountains ... with armour. (a military feat that has yet to be duplicated even today by the US).

There was only one strategic objective in the 1979 War and that was to force VN to withdraw from Cambodia. The hope was that Chinese military pressure on the border would relieve Vietnamese military pressure in Cambodia. That did not occurred. The Chinese did not get what they wanted. However, they got what they needed. They destroyed the military threat in the South. VN was in no position to march north had the Soviet Armies marched south. The 1985 2nd Sino-VN War was a much reduced action but showed just how far the Chinese had advanced and how far VN had fallened. The battle was a for a few hills. The Chinese committed a division and held the hills for 2 months before VN could respond and they responded with a single regt. That regt was destroyed in artillery barrage.

The economic toll on VN cannot be understated. They were relying on Soviet aide more and more. The Soviets were unwilling to pay VN to properly face the Chinese while the Chinese were getting good with their funds (cut 2 million men from the Army and use those funds for training and equipment). By 1989, VN was broke. They had no choice but to leave Cambodia and sue for peace with China.

Trying to play the enemy's chess game while you're newbie while they're the chess master is a setup for failure.

[Double Edge]

Vis-a-vi 1979-1989 Sino-VN Combat.

There are things that needed to be understood that are not explained by those articles and frankly, ignorant of a whole sleuth of things. Sino-VN was an existential crisis for both countries. While VN performed militarily extremely well, it should be noted that they failed to stop the PLA and frankly, had Deng decided (and he clearly had the balls to do it), he could have taken Hanoi. China, however, woke up that they were in no shape to stop the Soviets. What's more, they were surrounded. India, Vietnam, and the USSR. Whatever illusion they were spouting about the Paper Polar Bell was dispelled when the 40th Army crossed into Afghanistan ... in winter ... over mountains ... with armour. (a military feat that has yet to be duplicated even today by the US).

There was only one strategic objective in the 1979 War and that was to force VN to withdraw from Cambodia. The hope was that Chinese military pressure on the border would relieve Vietnamese military pressure in Cambodia. That did not occurred. The Chinese did not get what they wanted. However, they got what they needed. They destroyed the military threat in the South. VN was in no position to march north had the Soviet Armies marched south. The 1985 2nd Sino-VN War was a much reduced action but showed just how far the Chinese had advanced and how far VN had fallened. The battle was a for a few hills. The Chinese committed a division and held the hills for 2 months before VN could respond and they responded with a single regt. That regt was destroyed in artillery barrage.

The economic toll on VN cannot be understated. They were relying on Soviet aide more and more. The Soviets were unwilling to pay VN to properly face the Chinese while the Chinese were getting good with their funds (cut 2 million men from the Army and use those funds for training and equipment). By 1989, VN was broke. They had no choice but to leave Cambodia and sue for peace with China.

Trying to play the enemy's chess game while you're newbie while they're the chess master is a setup for failure.

Thanks, Will reply after i taught myself some contemporary Vietnamese history : )

[Double Edge]

A reaction to a recent interview given by Shukla to Karan Thapar with The Wire

Interviewer is Shiv Kunal Verma and the interviewee is Gen VK Singh

General VK Singh, former Chief of the Army Staff who is now presently the Minister of State for Road Transport & Highways talks to Shiv Kunal Verma, the author of 1962: The War That Wasn't with reference to the interview conducted by journalist Karan Thapar (son of General Pran Thapar, who was the Army Chief in '62) and Ajai Shukla, a former Army officer turned journalist with close political connections.


SKV: Have you seen the interview? It's sweeping through Social Media and along with comments from another former Army officer, Pravin Sawhney, it's painting a grim picture.

VKS: I've seen the transcripts and am aware of what these two and some others are saying. Frankly, I am absolutely shocked at the devious manner in which information is being put out by them. Neither Shukla nor Sawhney have a clue about the ground situation. They left the army decades ago… Sawhney from the Raj Bhavan in Punjab and Shukla from Nagrota to build on his family connections with the Gandhis. They are using the credibility their rank gives them to not only peddle lies, they are playing a very dangerous game where they want to create a fear syndrome in a bid to promote themselves.

---

SKV: By using and interpreting satellite images, the arguments being put forward are that we have lost a considerable amount of territory.

VKS: As I said its being very cleverly done. If you remember one of the first images put out by Shukla showed the Chinese sitting literally on the Galwan-Shyok junction, controlling the heights on the northern side of the Galwan Valley. Having got everyone's attention, including a former Northern Army Commander long since retired, that annotated image quietly disappeared and new ones appeared showing the area of conflict around PP 14. This was a quantum shift backwards by nearly 8 to 10 km. By using satellite images and projecting their make belief fantasies based on their perception of the LAC, what they are trying to do is obvious to any trained eye.

---

SKV: I think you need to elaborate on this. Most people had no idea where the Galwan Valley was...

VKS: That there is a real threat from the Chinese build up there can be no doubt. They have been doing this for years, probing, looking for perceived weaknesses. That Communist China's core ideology is expansionist there is no doubt. We are dealing with a powerful adversary here and frankly the Chinese are playing a game of chess. We have certain short comings but we are not push overs by any stretch of imagination. Even in 1962 as you correctly point out in your book, we lost not to the Chinese but to ourselves.

As for the Galwan Valley the Chinese have since 1962 controlled the major part of the Valley. The area under us, where we perceive the LAC to be, gives us control of the final few kilometres. There is a major camp where PLA troops have concentrated some 10 km behind the LAC on their side and they have made another camp ahead of that. We are not fools... disengagement is to calm things down and we know where our immediate strategic and tactical goals are. No reason for us to compromise on that. Shukla says no one has the guts to put his name on the new alignment... well, he can take it from me PP 14 is under our control and the Chinese do not have any direct observation of the Shyok Valley or the road. If that doesn't satisfy him and his handlers, I do not know what will.

---

SKV: What about the other sectors? Pangong Tso, Hot Springs, the Depsang Valley... DBO… all throw backs to 1962

VKS: As you and I both know, the Chinese have been playing this game relentlessly. Doklam as you pointed out in the Sunday Guardian yesterday was also a classic case of the Army stepping in and blocking the Chinese as they tried to push the road further towards the tri-junction. The Eastern Army Commander at that time acted decisively and that was the end of that. This same lot created a huge hue and cry saying the Chinese had since done this and that and in the long run this and that had happened. It's laughable, but if the Chinese have built a few structures there, good for us. It gives us clear targets for we are sitting on the heights.

The Chinese have pushed into what at best can be called the grey areas between their perception of the LAC and ours. We have already called their bluff and now negotiations will carry on to push them back. The Sumdrong or as the Chinese call it, the Sangduoluo, talks went on for seven years, but we stood our ground and got what we wanted. Give it time... I also do not want to get into specifics. This is not a cricket match where a ball by ball commentary has to be given.

---

SKV: Shukla in particular was involved in the Siachen sell out earlier. We were all quite appalled he along with the others were not arrested for what clearly amounted to treason. You had put in a formal complaint to the MHA at the time.

VKS: Not just MHA, but to the Press Council and to the Delhi Police as well. Mr Sushilkumar Shinde was then the Home Minister... how could he act against some of their own? Shekhar Gupta was also one of the characters who had a price tag attached to his pen... 'journalism of courage' I think he called it. He was sitting on the Press Council, maybe even heading it. Look what these people did to the TSD (Technical Support Division) among other things...

Look treason is treason... I think these cases should be looked at even now. Quite frankly the Siachen sell-out by itself is something that needs to be enquired into. From what I remember once they were exposed the facts were quite cut and dry. You give them a free rope this rubbish will carry on ad nauseam. It’s pretty obvious some one sitting somewhere is coordinating this entire exercise.

---

SKV: Why not give a regular update officially. I suggested that yesterday in my article in the Sunday Guardian.

VKS: Well, as a one-time thing since these chaps are hell bent on spreading panic, maybe. Briefings have a time and place and not because some ignoramuses are clamouring for it on behalf of their handlers. But I don't see the Chinese telling us through any self-styled experts what their game plan is. The people in question here are all intelligent characters and they are doing what they are doing with their eyes wide open.

The language and terms being used by Ajai Shukla is mirroring Chinese perceptions.

The trouble is these guys are also hiding under the freedom accorded to the press under our constitution. As far as I am concerned, they are traitors... and I don't use that word off the cuff or lightly! We can all see the frustration building up among certain political circles. These are tough times but the self-styled leaders of the opposition and the Chinese together need to create as many cracks to make the government of the day look vulnerable... in the case of the former they must remember the saying... don't cut the nose to spite the face!

TSD was a secretive military intelligence unit, set up in 2010 under former army chief General VK Singh, and disbanded after he retired in 2012.

[hboGYT]

Vis-a-vi 1979-1989 Sino-VN Combat.

There are things that needed to be understood that are not explained by those articles and frankly, ignorant of a whole sleuth of things. Sino-VN was an existential crisis for both countries. While VN performed militarily extremely well, it should be noted that they failed to stop the PLA and frankly, had Deng decided (and he clearly had the balls to do it), he could have taken Hanoi. China, however, woke up that they were in no shape to stop the Soviets. What's more, they were surrounded. India, Vietnam, and the USSR. Whatever illusion they were spouting about the Paper Polar Bell was dispelled when the 40th Army crossed into Afghanistan ... in winter ... over mountains ... with armour. (a military feat that has yet to be duplicated even today by the US).

There was only one strategic objective in the 1979 War and that was to force VN to withdraw from Cambodia. The hope was that Chinese military pressure on the border would relieve Vietnamese military pressure in Cambodia. That did not occurred. The Chinese did not get what they wanted. However, they got what they needed. They destroyed the military threat in the South. VN was in no position to march north had the Soviet Armies marched south. The 1985 2nd Sino-VN War was a much reduced action but showed just how far the Chinese had advanced and how far VN had fallened. The battle was a for a few hills. The Chinese committed a division and held the hills for 2 months before VN could respond and they responded with a single regt. That regt was destroyed in artillery barrage.

The economic toll on VN cannot be understated. They were relying on Soviet aide more and more. The Soviets were unwilling to pay VN to properly face the Chinese while the Chinese were getting good with their funds (cut 2 million men from the Army and use those funds for training and equipment). By 1989, VN was broke. They had no choice but to leave Cambodia and sue for peace with China.

Trying to play the enemy's chess game while you're newbie while they're the chess master is a setup for failure.

In passing, how's PLA's office corp now? Last time it was mentioned, it was said that they needed 20 years to catch up to the West. Are they now at the Soviet levels at least?

[Officer of Engineers]

In passing, how's PLA's office corp now? Last time it was mentioned, it was said that they needed 20 years to catch up to the West. Are they now at the Soviet levels at least?

Book smart but not street smart. The Russians called them Iron Disciplined in that they would never waivered from their plans no matter the hardship. Also can't stop, never mind revising, once that plan goes to shit. The Chinese could never do a Georgia with half their reccee officers on leave as the Russians had.

[Double Edge]

The parity in numbers doesn't really mean anything. The Japanese were outnumbered everywhere they operated in the weeks after Pearl Harbor. The US had inferior numbers relative to the Iraqis just before Desert Storm. The point is that until sustained contact and a decision clinched by the combat arms, all you have is PR claims by the press people on both sides. Maybe the Chinese end up in Kashmir. Maybe the Indians end up in Tibet.

Here's a rundown from the Belfer Center

The Strategic Postures of China and India: A Visual Guide | Belfer Center | Mar 2020

They have annotated google maps showing airbases and nuclear bases of both countries.

India is building nuclear submarines and ICBMs. That’s a $14 billion mistake | The Bulletin | Feb 26 2020

Our analysis suggests that India’s defense position is more secure than is sometimes argued.

India’s nuclear and conventional position with respect to both China and Pakistan is in fact robust. India has key under-appreciated conventional advantages on the ground and in the air that assure it against Chinese threats and attacks. Moreover, its nuclear-armed missiles already have sufficient range to credibly hold major Chinese cities at risk.

As a result, India has an opportunity to pursue greater nuclear transparency and restraint with both of its nuclear-armed neighbors. Instead of investing in new nuclear weapons platforms that do little to strengthen deterrence against China, New Delhi should improve the survivability of existing forces and fill the gap in global arms control leadership with an initiative on restraint and transparency.

Despite the apparent numerical parity of ground forces on both sides of the border, Indian forces are all permanently close to China’s border, shortening their mobilization time and limiting the prospects of a successful Chinese cross-border advance. Even in a war with India, a significant proportion of Chinese ground forces will be unavailable, reserved either for Russian taskings or for countering insurrection in Xinjiang and Tibet. The majority of forces are located further from the Indian border, posing a striking contrast with the majority forward-deployed Indian forces with a single China defense mission.

India also has more and better aircraft along the border, more experienced air crews, as well as a resilient basing position, with “a large number of airfields in the east and west, so even if some airfields are down, operations can continue from other locations.”

Because of this, Chinese strategic planners intend for early long-range missile strikes against Indian air bases instead of a regional aircraft offensive. However, India benefits from the greater number and redundancy of regional air bases, and the daunting number of Chinese missiles required to truly incapacitate relevant Indian air forces.

This makes me wonder about the former NSA's recent assessment that somehow our present posture fails to deter China any longer.

Why not ask the reverse question. How well is Chinese deterrence working against India ??

Doklam would have come as a surprise if not a shock for them.

And their present actions post Doklam aren't helping matters at all. In fact its only pushing India to ante up further.

What does that say for Chinese deterrence now.


However the authors think India is wasting money on nuclear subs & ICBMS. Why ?

A desire to hold more coastal cities at risk with more warheads misunderstands what deters China.

Chinese nuclear expert Wu Riqiang noted in January 2018 that “the fact that India’s nuclear weapons can reach Chengdu has the same (deterrence) effect (on China) as being able to reach Beijing.”

India’s posture is sufficient to deter Chinese attack or blackmail without building the Agni-V and Arihant systems, which would serve the same purpose as the Agni-III, but at a higher price.

Their prescription in a nutshell is build more Agni-3's and make them survivable instead of spending on Agni-5 & more nuke subs which they think GOI is doing for prestige reasons alone. An example where political image considerations over rule military recommendations

Way i've understood it is nuclear subs is just us completing the sea based leg of the triad. I also do not see the harm in having missiles with a longer range such as the Agni-5 as it gives us options in the future.

The other objective driving India’s acquisition of an at-sea deterrent is its survivability. But building a nuclear-armed submarine is not the only way to improve survivability. A better way to ensure that India could retaliate against a Chinese first strike is by making its existing missile forces more redundant and mobile.

Greater force redundancy can be generated by increasing the number of deployed Agni-III missiles from around 10 to 30. Similarly, deployed Agni-II missiles could move from around 16 toward 20. These latter missiles could also be regularly rotated through India’s northwest, center, and northeast, to further improve redundancy and survivability against China. This would improve general redundancy while still fielding a force of sufficient but low numbers.

Another approach would be for Indian protocols to specify that the missiles be dispersed to interior Indian locations and held in protective reserve in peacetime, holding this position even after a Chinese nuclear attack on India’s missile bases in its northeast. This arrangement would give India the ability to respond at a time and place of its choosing and would leave Chinese strategic planners considering a strike with no assurance as to whether all Indian nuclear missiles able to reach China had been eliminated. Chinese policymakers would also have to factor in a nuclear attack that included targets deep within India’s interior, negating a limited nuclear war scenario that may be available if only targeting bases in India’s northeast.

Besides increasing the quantity, India could also augment the mobility of its existing missile forces. Both the Agni-II and Agni-III are road- and rail- mobile, though they reportedly have limited off-road capabilities. Nor are they regularly moved around the country because India “considers substantial dispersal unnecessary, and that it is adequate to move missiles out of their regular garrisons to nearby alternate locations which may also be useful for mating warheads and missiles.” This limits their survivability. Improving the land mobility of these forces would thus enhance their survivability, averting the need for a nuclear-armed submarine fleet for survivability reasons. As such, India could bolster its survivable second-strike force at a significantly lower cost to that which is currently planned, and channel the savings into conventional defenses.

Generating dispersal capabilities includes further improving the road and rail network linking these bases and the off-road capabilities of its transporter-erector-launcher fleet. This refocusing of the Indian nuclear posture emphasizing dispersal will ensure that Pakistan and China face greater uncertainty if considering a nuclear attack against India. The Indian Air Force’s existing nuclear missions and number of gravity bombs can remain until this new posture comes to full technical fruition.

These recommended force posture changes for enhanced geographic rotation and dispersal will continue to assure Indian deterrence against China. In contrast, India’s current approach of developing new delivery platforms and significantly expanding the force’s size brings fewer deterrence benefits and greater risks. These new systems contribute little toward fulfilling India’s historical adherence to a minimalist nuclear doctrine, which rejects the presumption that India should build toward numerical parity. Indeed, Indian officials have long rejected the notion of New Delhi pursuing such an arms race.

Instead of bolstering deterrence against China, these new systems may be intended more to project a global power image. A better global investment for India would be in nuclear transparency and stability.

The piece de resistance is they advocate that India become an advocate for arms control & nuclear transparency.

The decay and collapse of diplomatic arms control restraints are unshackling nuclear weapons capabilities the world over. This presents an opportunity for India to lead a global resistance to this trajectory, bolstered by its strategic sufficiency against Pakistan and China.

The Indian government might begin with unilateral restraints in range and deployment numbers, starting with a pledge not to deploy missiles with a longer range than that of the Agni-III, or about 5,000 kilometers. A voluntarily restrained Indian nuclear force would place India in a strong position to lead global calls for reviving and strengthening arms control talks, including among itself, Pakistan, and China.

Taking upon itself a voluntary leadership role on nuclear restraint would confer additional benefits.

First, it would allow India to reassert the credible minimum deterrence nature of its nuclear force, which is increasingly under domestic and international question.

Second, it would place the global spotlight upon China and Pakistan. Despite its larger nuclear arsenal, China claims that its less-caveated no-first-use policy demonstrates that its nuclear practice is closer to nuclear minimalism than that of India. Pakistan, for its part, portrays an ever-worsening Indian nuclear and conventional threat to justify its own nuclear force expansions and doctrinal revisions, which its officials still insist is consistent with a “credible minimum deterrence” posturing concept.

Third, it would free budgetary room for Indian conventional military modernization to maintain its qualitative and quantitative edge against China, and to invest in the connectivity and off-road dispersal capabilities to strengthen Indian nuclear deterrence.

Finally, as India seeks to join both the UN Security Council and the Nuclear Suppliers Group as a permanent member, such an initiative would also support its foreign policy goals of strengthening global nonproliferation efforts outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, signaling its nuclear restraint, and highlighting its status as a responsible rising power.

While this would be a landmark in nuclear transparency, especially in South Asia, such recommendations for India are not new. Following the 1998 nuclear tests, retired Indian military officials called for numerical force size ceilings to be formally adopted. Two decades later, it is time to take their advice seriously.

[Double Edge]

I find think tankers quite enamoured with the idea.

You mean Indian think tankers. I have not noticed anyone other than Indian think tanks, including India's MOD, are talking about Indians in command of Australian, American, nor Japanese assets or vice versa.

Now that i think about it, it was American think tankers like Jeff Smith that promote the idea. He's written a few articles on the subject and his latest is below

https://www.heritage.org/global-poli...n-indo-pacific

See the report

[Double Edge]

Seems we are opening up more with Manila

India is interested in navigation in the South China Sea region: Philippines | ET | Jul 07 2020

Last year navies from India, USA, Philippines and Japan conducted joint sail in the South China Sea region to demonstrate presence of like-minded parties in the SCS region.

Modi’s recent conversation with Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte is significant as it opens up the possibility of wider Indo-Pacific partnership between Delhi and Manila in the backdrop of China’s tough posturing along the LAC and South China Sea region.

On that occasion both leaders had shared satisfaction in its bilateral relationship, including defense cooperation, with Modi noting how India sees the Philippines as a “vital partner” in the Indo-Pacific region. The Philippines also expressed similar sentiments, ET has learnt. The Philippine President in fact wanted India to play a bigger role in the Indo-Pacific region.

The mainstay of bilateral defence cooperation continues to be capacity building and training, exchange visits of delegations and naval and coast guard ship visits. India has also extended Line of Credit to the Philippines in the defence sector.

'joint sail' is not FONOPS.

[Oracle]

Here's a rundown from the Belfer Center

The Strategic Postures of China and India: A Visual Guide | Belfer Center | Mar 2020

They have annotated google maps showing airbases and nuclear bases of both countries.

India is building nuclear submarines and ICBMs. That’s a $14 billion mistake | The Bulletin | Feb 26 2020

This makes me wonder about the former NSA's recent assessment that somehow our present posture fails to deter China any longer.

Why not ask the reverse question. How well is Chinese deterrence working against India ??

Doklam would have come as a surprise if not a shock for them.

And their present actions post Doklam aren't helping matters at all. In fact its only pushing India to ante up further.

What does that say for Chinese deterrence now.


However the authors think India is wasting money on nuclear subs & ICBMS. Why ?



Their prescription in a nutshell is build more Agni-3's and make them survivable instead of spending on Agni-5 & more nuke subs which they think GOI is doing for prestige reasons alone. An example where political image considerations over rule military recommendations

Way i've understood it is nuclear subs is just us completing the sea based leg of the triad. I also do not see the harm in having missiles with a longer range such as the Agni-5 as it gives us options in the future.




The piece de resistance is they advocate that India become an advocate for arms control & nuclear transparency.

Already posted last page.

[Officer of Engineers]

Now that i think about it, it was American think tankers like Jeff Smith that promote the idea. He's written a few articles on the subject and his latest is below

https://www.heritage.org/global-poli...n-indo-pacific

See the report

It reads like adding the Indian Navy as another USN task force. Don't think that's what Dehli had in mind.

[Double Edge]

Already posted last page.

Oh yes at #1289

Forgot to go through it. Some one mentioned the Belfer Center study in Nitin's channel.

I quoted from their article in the bulletin where they use that study to advocate a more transparent role for India whose nuclear doctrine at this point in time seems to be under pressure.

It's a straight-forward report, the conclusion of which I derived is, conventionally India is in a better position than China and reasons mentioned there-in.

I don't know about better but certainly not as bad as its made out to be.

The difference at the border isn't as much as GDP figures are.

So is deterrence working or not ? we will only know when the year is over because at this point its not clear.

A disengagement without troops reduction means nothing. It's only the deferment of a potential clash.

[Officer of Engineers]

So is deterrence working or not ? we will only know when the year is over because at this point its not clear.

Deter what? It was a kung fu fight. The BIGGEST THING about "deterrence is not warfighting" is to keep things in perspective. Is 100 Chinese nukes enough to deter American 10,000? Maybe. And that's good enough for the Chinese. This was a kung fu fight with neither side bringing even light arms into it, meaning deterrence has worked. Neither side is resorting to a force of arms.