Border face-off: China and India each deploy 3,000 troops

[Double Edge]

^ That can be thought through.

I was thinking what about terrorist outfits in the NE, are they going to get active again?

You'd need an event that sufficiently got people riled up to sustain it. Given the number of those we've had over the decades i wonder what more is required.

At the same time we'd have to keep inter religious conflict down because people see a war with Pakistan as communal fight with tanks.

One way to get over this is by stoking nationalism but then you end up creating a bigger monster than the one you are dealing with.

One advantage people tout about the CCP is they can control nationalism. That is to say if the CCP were toppled and they end up with a different form of govt then Chinese nationalism could get worse that it already is.

Looking at China's behaviour over the last fifty years its an open question how well the CCP has managed to control nationalism.

[Oracle]

[Double Edge]

[ATTACH]48802[/ATTACH]

https://www.macrotrends.net/countrie...defense-budget

Guess who the finance minister was in 1962 ? Morarji desai

Who kept on refusing all defense proposals before 1962 because he thought defense expenditure would be an insult to the memory of Mahatma Gandhi (!)

Any proposal for arms equipment, restructuring, increase of man power all got canned under Morarji Desai

Nehru could have intervened but he was not that kind of PM, besides Morarji was a heavy weight of his own as well.

After 1962 he approved all defense spending

General Kaul was a military administrator not a field man. Appointing Kaul as corps commander was a colossal error of judgement.

https://youtu.be/7g-15T3dtFo

[Officer of Engineers]

Same dilemma confronts China today as it did back then. Whether they want two hostile fronts ?

You mean like 1979?

We could have teamed with the Soviets back then and put pressure on them.

The Chinese (and we) counted you as part of the Soviet team and acted accordingly, hence our joint alliance with Pakistan.

We don't have to get into an arms race with them. Just enough to give them doubt whether they could win against us.

That's just it. You're playing their game. They build roads. You build roads. They build air fields. You build air fields. You're trying to keep up with the Zhongs instead of out-thinking them like they're trying (but failing) with the USN. The Chinese may have failed miserably with the fake islands but at the very least, they're trying to out-think the Jones instead of trying to keep up with them.

If India does not stand up to them then who else will.

If India does not believe in its capabilities then who else will.

You're joking. ANZUS, Japan, Taiwan, NATO.

I was thinking along the lines of conventional deterrence.

Keeping up with the Zhongs. They spend more, you have to spend more.

You're joking.

Partially, the point is to get them to join you for mutual survival whether militarily, economically, socially, or politically.

Edit: Come to think of it, there is zero way for India to keep up with the Zhongs. They have an extremely cheap answer to anything India would do - Pakistan. If the JF-17 is any example, the Chinese gave Pakistan an entire production line at zero cost to Pakistan.

[Double Edge]

India must remain careful

Agree broadly with this editorial.

What were China's objectives. Why did they deploy in the numbers that they did and where they did.

Their focus seems to be on Pangong Tzo, possibly Demchok and DBO.

Is it because of our deployment in Galwan. Do they want to block our access to Siachen & DBO ?

Due to our quick deployment, we call it mirror deployment the Chinese felt some what deterred. Were they expecting a quick operation where they could have cut us off in some places with minor skirmishes.

We will have to be vigilant in the future. If they spent so much to mobilise and got nothing then their objective was not realised.

Despite the disengagement which will be temporary, they could return in weeks, months or the next year with a larger force and greater surprise and cut us off some where.

The pandemic gives them cover as most countries are still reeling under its impact.

They got a dry run of our capabilities as well as their preparedness.

They might have been taken aback with the Galwan incident and realised that the conflict would become much broader. That means preparing their side for body bags since they would not release numbers this time.

We should keep a close watch using everything at our disposal, UAV's helicopters & satellites.

We also need to work out plans to capture their own territory so there is a quid quo pro riposte.

Jaydev's take

[Double Edge]

You mean like 1979?

No, I mean China would have had two fronts Soviets & India just like they will have now with India & US.

In the 50s & 60s, why would the west oppose India creating a second front on China ? they would not.

The Russians have to split their forces to their eastern front anyway. The split was bad enough by the dawn of the 60s already.

I'm not sure how things would transpire in the 70s though with Nixon's opening to China.

We did not have much trouble with them during that period anyway.

The Chinese (and we) counted you as part of the Soviet team and acted accordingly, hence our joint alliance with Pakistan.

Did not work out too well for the Paks did it. This alliance did not come to their help in the '65 war. At most it helped them with arms. So they would not lose badly.

That's just it. You're playing their game. They build roads. You build roads. They build air fields. You build air fields. You're trying to keep up with the Zhongs instead of out-thinking them like they're trying (but failing) with the USN. The Chinese may have failed miserably with the fake islands but at the very least, they're trying to out-think the Jones instead of trying to keep up with them.

Not entirely. They still need a 1:8 (if not more) ratio to win anything with us. This is mountain warfare. Element of surprise should they achieve it will lower that ratio but not by much provided we can bring a force to bear.

So I don't see any other option available to building up border infrastructure. Building roads means only the paramilitary polices the border and should tensions rise the army is just a ride away. We don't keep our forces permanently deployed on the border. Roads mean we can block whatever they bring there and we prevent this constant nibbling. We want to put a stop to this nibbling.

To do as you say, let them in and then suffocate them relies on us wanting to do that which is start a war with them. Otherwise they keep whatever they can intrude into. Standoffs prevent wars. There is no win, both sides withdraw eventually. That has been the pattern since Sumdurong Chu in '86.

Also the settlement with Russia came after the Soviets collapsed. Change of regime, different priorities in Russia means easier border settlement with China and on China's terms. We will not get such a windfall any time soon in the future. Assuming CCP survives the next few decades.

You're joking. ANZUS, Japan, Taiwan, NATO.

I mean India is on its own when it comes to these border tensions. Now NATO is certainly helpful if larger hostilities break out but won't come into play otherwise.

Keeping up with the Zhongs. They spend more, you have to spend more.

Only if we want to take and hold. We just want our borders settled, we're not looking at increasing our land area.

Whatever offensive capabilities we develop would be to deter them intruding into our space not occupy their land.

[Officer of Engineers]

No, I mean China would have had two fronts Soviets & India just like they will have now with India & US.

You've missed the reference. 1979. The 1st Sino-Vietnam War. A punitive expeidition involving over 270,000 men from both sides and these were China's 2nd rate troops (and they acted like it) while their best Armies went north to face a possible Soviet retallitory own punitive expedition. This kinda make peanuts of the current spat.

The Russians have to split their forces to their eastern front anyway. The split was bad enough by the dawn of the 60s already.

I'm not sure how things would transpire in the 70s though with Nixon's opening to China.

Mushroom clouds all over Northern China. A Soviet armoured thrust to Lop Nor, bringing NW China under Soviet occupation. Brezhnev discussed the plans with Nixon, wanting the US to stay out. Nixon said no and hence, Moscow stood down. Brezhnev felt betrayed by Nixon against their common foe who was killing Americans in Vietnam.

We did not have much trouble with them during that period anyway.

Pakistan was keeping you busy.

Did not work out too well for the Paks did it. This alliance did not come to their help in the '65 war. At most it helped them with arms. So they would not lose badly.

In all of history, since when did any power worried about supporting vassal wars they were never informed of?

Not entirely. They still need a 1:8 (if not more) ratio to win anything with us. This is mountain warfare. Element of surprise should they achieve it will lower that ratio but not by much provided we can bring a force to bear.

Who said they wanted to win? You're both using kung fu for crying outloud. Start worrying when firepower starts showing up and not one second before.

So I don't see any other option available to building up border infrastructure. Building roads means only the paramilitary polices the border and should tensions rise the army is just a ride away. We don't keep our forces permanently deployed on the border. Roads mean we can block whatever they bring there and we prevent this constant nibbling. We want to put a stop to this nibbling.

Unless you're going to put up a Starbucks somewhere, it still is trying to keep up with the Zhongs and they have money to spare. They in fact could put a Starbucks just to support their troops. I don't know what the answer is but I do know it's a lost cause following the Chinese lead.

Here's a case in point: the Chinese could never hope to defeat a USN Carrier Task Group. So, they came up with Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile. To those well versed in the matter, it's horse puckey but to the layman? The Chinese can now sink a USN carrier and that gives a leg up for the Chinese when it comes to negotiations in the SCS. Note I said negotiations, not military confrontation because that will reveal just what kind of horse puckey the Chinese have been touting about the AShBM.

To do as you say, let them in and then suffocate them relies on us wanting to do that which is start a war with them. Otherwise they keep whatever they can intrude into. Standoffs prevent wars. There is no win, both sides withdraw eventually. That has been the pattern since Sumdurong Chu in '86.

They have money to spare. You don't. And to be frank, my idea would at least reduce Chinese penetration. If I see it, so do Indian and Chinese officers and I doubt any Chinese officer is sane enough to extend his neck that far into a guallotine. But the point remains that the challenge is to out-think the Chinese, not match their spending (don't think roads are any cheaper on either side of the LAC).

I mean India is on its own when it comes to these border tensions. Now NATO is certainly helpful if larger hostilities break out but won't come into play otherwise.

NATO is doing FONOPs right now and Canadian subs are scaring the shit out of the Chinese Navy, surfacing undetected besides Chinese Naval vessels to challenge them. But you're right that India is on her own with regards to her borders but that does not mean others need India to stand up for them.

Only if we want to take and hold. We just want our borders settled, we're not looking at increasing our land area.

Whatever offensive capabilities we develop would be to deter them intruding into our space not occupy their land.

That's keeping up with them. To take land, you need to outspend them.

[Double Edge]

You've missed the reference. 1979. The 1st Sino-Vietnam War. A punitive expeidition involving over 270,000 men from both sides and these were China's 2nd rate troops (and they acted like it) while their best Armies went north to face a possible Soviet retallitory own punitive expedition. This kinda make peanuts of the current spat.

Ah, now i get it. Yes, this is pretty much what i had in mind.

https://www.globalsecurity.org/milit...rc-vietnam.htm

Chinese might have suffered a military failure but scored a diplomatic win. Though the Russians massed on the Chinese border they did not intervene and thereby China exposed the limitations of Soviet-Viet military pact

Well, China still had to dedicate their A troops to the northern border. So why isn't that worth something here ?

The aftermath however give pause. That's a hell of a lot of men.

After the war both China and Vietnam reorganized their border defenses. In 1986 China deployed twenty-five to twenty-eight divisions and Vietnam thirty-two divisions along their common border.

The Vietnamese responded to the Chinese campaign by turning the districts along the China border into "iron fortresses" manned by well-equipped and well-trained paramilitary troops. In all, an estimated 600,000 troops were assigned to counter Chinese operations and to stand ready for another Chinese invasion. The precise dimensions of the frontier operations were difficult to determine, but its monetary cost to Vietnam was considerable.

By 1987 China had stationed nine armies (approximately 400,000 troops) in the Sino-Vietnamese border region, including one along the coast. It had also increased its landing craft fleet and was periodically staging amphibious landing exercises off Hainan Island, across from Vietnam, thereby demonstrating that a future attack might come from the sea.

Low-level conflict continued along the Sino-Vietnamese border as each side conducted artillery shelling and probed to gain high spots in the mountainous border terrain. Border incidents increased in intensity during the rainy season, when Beijing attempted to ease Vietnamese pressure against Cambodian resistance fighters.

Since the early 1980s, China pursued what some observers described as a semi-secret campaign against Vietnam that was more than a series of border incidents and less than a limited small-scale war. The Vietnamese called it a "multifaceted war of sabotage." Hanoi officials have described the assaults as comprising steady harassment by artillery fire, intrusions on land by infantry patrols, naval intrusions, and mine planting both at sea and in the riverways. Chinese clandestine activity (the "sabotage" aspect) for the most part was directed against the ethnic minorities of the border region. According to the Hanoi press, teams of Chinese agents systematically sabotaged mountain agricultural production centers as well as lowland port, transportation, and communication facilities. Psychological warfare operations were an integral part of the campaign, as was what the Vietnamese called "economic warfare"--encouragement of Vietnamese villagers along the border to engage in smuggling, currency speculation, and hoarding of goods in short supply.

Your point is India should not replicate Vietnam ? because i'm hearing arguments that Vietnam did it so why can't we.

Oracle, you still want a hot border with China : )

Mushroom clouds all over Northern China. A Soviet armoured thrust to Lop Nor, bringing NW China under Soviet occupation. Brezhnev discussed the plans with Nixon, wanting the US to stay out. Nixon said no and hence, Moscow stood down. Brezhnev felt betrayed by Nixon against their common foe who was killing Americans in Vietnam.

This is the point we would be let down by the Russians. Kinda like the Paks in '65. There would be no Bangladesh campaign possible.

Yet it still happened. The Soviets kept China busy, we ensured the passes were blocked in winter for double safety.

Indian don't think Russia let them down in '71 and i doubt Vietnamese think they did in '79 either. Relations between Vietnam & Russia increased after the 1979 war.

Who said they wanted to win? You're both using kung fu for crying outloud. Start worrying when firepower starts showing up and not one second before.

Getting into a fight without a win looks bad for them ?

Unless you're going to put up a Starbucks somewhere, it still is trying to keep up with the Zhongs and they have money to spare. They in fact could put a Starbucks just to support their troops. I don't know what the answer is but I do know it's a lost cause following the Chinese lead.

Here's a case in point: the Chinese could never hope to defeat a USN Carrier Task Group. So, they came up with Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile. To those well versed in the matter, it's horse puckey but to the layman? The Chinese can now sink a USN carrier and that gives a leg up for the Chinese when it comes to negotiations in the SCS. Note I said negotiations, not military confrontation because that will reveal just what kind of horse puckey the Chinese have been touting about the AShBM.

They have money to spare. You don't. And to be frank, my idea would at least reduce Chinese penetration. If I see it, so do Indian and Chinese officers and I doubt any Chinese officer is sane enough to extend his neck that far into a guallotine. But the point remains that the challenge is to out-think the Chinese, not match their spending (don't think roads are any cheaper on either side of the LAC).

This is the point where i wonder whether the govt is just looking out for its rear instead of letting the military influence their thinking.

Yet just see Vietnam in the 80s, those guys know what you mean and still ended up dedicating as many divisions. Why didn't they do as you said ?

It worked initially but five years later you end up with the massive buildup at the border by both sides.

However both did resolve their border differences eventually. Maybe there is a lesson in how Vietnam & China went about it.

NATO is doing FONOPs right now and Canadian subs are scaring the shit out of the Chinese Navy, surfacing undetected besides Chinese Naval vessels to challenge them. But you're right that India is on her own with regards to her borders but that does not mean others need India to stand up for them.

Oh come on, the US is trying its best to court us for just that. More the merrier is their philosophy : )

That's keeping up with them. To take land, you need to outspend them.

The alternative is letting them nibble here and there. This is where the political comes up. Opposition starts screaming govt is doing nothing. Yet and the part i don't get much clarity on is govts of the day let them do just that.

Don't need twenty divisions on the border. Don't need to fight them. Just keep quiet.

Stobdan mentions in Ladakh over the years the herders aren't allowed into tracts with their cattle and with time more tracts become inaccessible.

[Oracle]

China took incredibly aggressive actions, India did best to respond: Mike Pompeo on LAC face-off

Army asks soldiers, officers to delete Facebook and Instagram accounts, uninstall 89 apps

US commends India for responding to China's 'incredibly aggressive actions', sanctions Beijing on Tibet travel restrictions

[Oracle]

Keeping up with the Zhongs. They spend more, you have to spend more.

I'm afraid that is what is going to happen. The incumbent Government has to answer to the screaming opposition, and to the people of how they plan to tackle the Chinese threat. American weapons are costly, but to maintain a posture of deterrence, we have to spend.

Partially, the point is to get them to join you for mutual survival whether militarily, economically, socially, or politically.

The reason for PA to exist is its enmity with a Hindu India, it is ideological, this is not going away. India tried many many times, but always got stabbed in the back. I see no solution to the Pakistan problem unless the PA is defanged and de-armed, and for that we all know what has to be done.

Edit: Come to think of it, there is zero way for India to keep up with the Zhongs. They have an extremely cheap answer to anything India would do - Pakistan. If the JF-17 is any example, the Chinese gave Pakistan an entire production line at zero cost to Pakistan.

Then we have more compelling reasons to control those heights on our eastern sector.

[Oracle]

You'd need an event that sufficiently got people riled up to sustain it. Given the number of those we've had over the decades i wonder what more is required.

Not needed.

You think too much. PA will give us the chance. Another 26/11, we say this is it, and march right into Pakistan. But for that, battle-plans are not enough, we need to have the arsenal to force PA into submission within the first 2 days.

At the same time we'd have to keep inter religious conflict down because people see a war with Pakistan as communal fight with tanks.

Again, you think too much. OIC/OPEC? Do these countries even matter? We'd show it to be a Nat'Sec issue and ask our Army to roll those tanks into Pakistan. Think like the Americans.

One way to get over this is by stoking nationalism but then you end up creating a bigger monster than the one you are dealing with.

One advantage people tout about the CCP is they can control nationalism. That is to say if the CCP were toppled and they end up with a different form of govt then Chinese nationalism could get worse that it already is.

Looking at China's behaviour over the last fifty years its an open question how well the CCP has managed to control nationalism.

Stoking nationalism won't work in regressive regimes like Pakistan/China. They are very tightly controlled states.

[Oracle]

Oracle, you still want a hot border with China : )

Only if we have battle plans whose military objectives state the break-up terroristan and staring down the dragon. Hell yeah. And I am more than sure we do have those plans.

[Oracle]

Trying to be GRU huh!

[Oracle]

This came out in March 2020. I just saw it now. It details conventional & nuclear forces of India & China, facing each other. Mind you, this report has been done after the Doklam crisis, keeping in mind the Doklam crisis.



It's a straight-forward report, the conclusion of which I derived is, conventionally India is in a better position than China and reasons mentioned there-in.

Please click on the above image to go the main site.

[Oracle]

India is building nuclear submarines and ICBMs. That’s a $14 billion mistake.

Despite struggling to modernize outdated conventional forces with the current defense budget, India is investing in two new nuclear platforms. The first is the Arihant-class submarine fleet, the second the mobile Agni-V intercontinental ballistic missile. Together, their combined price tag will top $14 billion. Is this money well spent?

Pessimism about its strategic balance with China is driving India’s nuclear arms procurement. An altercation between troops of both countries in summer 2017, which came to be known colloquially as the Doklam crisis, stimulated introspection among Indian officials and experts about the future of the relationship with China. Politically, the Indian strategic community has largely concluded that the peaceful resolution of border disputes has become less likely, forecasting more rivalry than cooperation.

Indian discussions on the strength of their military position against China in the disputed frontier areas have converged on the view that China holds the conventional and nuclear edge over India in this domain. For example, Jagannath P. Panda, a leading expert on Indian security, observed in a June 2018 conversation that “India’s ground force posture and strength is not really comparable to that of China in their border regions. China has better military infrastructure, capabilities, and logistics.” A former army commander tasked with defense against China wrote during the 2017 standoff that he expected the episode to end in a barrage of Chinese missile strikes to expel Indian forces from the area and settle the dispute on Chinese terms. Even India’s optimists, a minority, anticipate that China will succeed in staying ahead of India’s strategic capabilities.

Despite the hand wringing, India’s nuclear and conventional position with respect to both China and Pakistan is in fact robust. India has key under-appreciated conventional advantages on the ground and in the air that assure it against Chinese threats and attacks. Moreover, its nuclear-armed missiles already have sufficient range to credibly hold major Chinese cities at risk.

As a result, India has an opportunity to pursue greater nuclear transparency and restraint with both of its nuclear-armed neighbors. Instead of investing in new nuclear weapons platforms that do little to strengthen deterrence against China, New Delhi should improve the survivability of existing forces and fill the gap in global arms control leadership with an initiative on restraint and transparency.

Confidence toward Pakistan. India is rightly confident in its conventional posture toward Pakistan. With recent exercises successfully leveraging air and land power to destroy major Pakistani conventional offensive forces, Indian military officials are now exploring options for standoff strikes against high-value targets deeper into Pakistan.

In the nuclear domain, India’s professed goal has always been to field a credible second-strike capability. This assured retaliation doctrine depends on the creation of sufficient doubt in the adversary’s calculus that a disarming first strike would succeed by ensuring that Indian nuclear forces are survivable. Survivability relies upon adequate force dispersal.

According to the most recent Nuclear Notebook, India has four types of land-based nuclear-capable missiles. In a forthcoming report, we assess that these missiles are spread throughout the country and provide their likely locations. While their ranges vary substantially, all are capable of reaching Pakistan given their current basing. The four types include approximately 10 Agni-III missiles, which have a range of up to 5,000 kilometers, stationed in Assam in northeast India; around 16 Agni-II missiles, eight of which are stationed in India’s northeast and another eight stationed in central India, each with a range of around 2,000 kilometers; about 20 short-range Agni-I missiles; and 24 short-range Prithvi-II missiles stationed close to the Pakistan border.

Beyond this, India also has an estimated two squadrons of Jaguar IS and one squadron of Mirage 2000H fighters, totaling around 51 aircraft, that are tasked with nuclear missions.

Measured by its continuing ability to reach any part of Pakistan from a variety of vectors and existing delivery platforms, India maintains a survivable and credible second-strike posture.

Nervousness toward China. In contrast, Indian strategic planners are comparatively insecure in their assessment of the force balance against China. This nervousness, however, is unfounded.

Despite the apparent numerical parity of ground forces on both sides of the border, Indian forces are all permanently close to China’s border, shortening their mobilization time and limiting the prospects of a successful Chinese cross-border advance. Even in a war with India, a significant proportion of Chinese ground forces will be unavailable, reserved either for Russian taskings or for countering insurrection in Xinjiang and Tibet. The majority of forces are located further from the Indian border, posing a striking contrast with the majority forward-deployed Indian forces with a single China defense mission.

India also has more and better aircraft along the border, more experienced air crews, as well as a resilient basing position, with “a large number of airfields in the east and west, so even if some airfields are down, operations can continue from other locations.” Because of this, Chinese strategic planners intend for early long-range missile strikes against Indian air bases instead of a regional aircraft offensive. However, India benefits from the greater number and redundancy of regional air bases, and the daunting number of Chinese missiles required to truly incapacitate relevant Indian air forces.

Unsurprisingly, the bulk of India’s nuclear-armed missile forces are located closer to Pakistan than China. This means that the short-range Agni-I and Prithvi-II missiles are not useful in deterring Beijing. However, the 10 Agni-III launchers can reach the entire Chinese mainland, while eight Agni-II launchers could reach central Chinese targets.

As for India’s nuclear-capable aircraft, these could reach Tibetan airspace equipped with nuclear gravity bombs. However, it is nearly certain they would be identified and intercepted by air defenses before proceeding deeper into China from Tibet.

To bolster its position against China, India is pursuing two new nuclear platforms: the Arihant-class nuclear submarine fleet, armed with 3,500 kilometer range K-4 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and the Agni-V intercontinental ballistic missile. A principal purpose of these systems is to bring more Chinese east coast metropolises into targeting range.

However, as noted above, India’s existing forces already have the necessary range. The 10 Agni-III intermediate-range ballistic missiles stationed in Assam can credibly threaten Beijing, Shanghai, and other high-value Chinese east coast targets. Additionally, the eight Agni-II medium-range ballistic missiles stationed in India’s northeast can hold central and western Chinese cities such as Chengdu and Chongqing at risk.

A desire to hold more coastal cities at risk with more warheads misunderstands what deters China. Chinese nuclear expert Wu Riqiang noted in January 2018 that “the fact that India’s nuclear weapons can reach Chengdu has the same (deterrence) effect (on China) as being able to reach Beijing.” India’s posture is sufficient to deter Chinese attack or blackmail without building the Agni-V and Arihant systems, which would serve the same purpose as the Agni-III, but at a higher price.

Survivability by mobility. The other objective driving India’s acquisition of an at-sea deterrent is its survivability. But building a nuclear-armed submarine is not the only way to improve survivability. A better way to ensure that India could retaliate against a Chinese first strike is by making its existing missile forces more redundant and mobile.

Greater force redundancy can be generated by increasing the number of deployed Agni-III missiles from around 10 to 30. Similarly, deployed Agni-II missiles could move from around 16 toward 20. These latter missiles could also be regularly rotated through India’s northwest, center, and northeast, to further improve redundancy and survivability against China. This would improve general redundancy while still fielding a force of sufficient but low numbers.

Another approach would be for Indian protocols to specify that the missiles be dispersed to interior Indian locations and held in protective reserve in peacetime, holding this position even after a Chinese nuclear attack on India’s missile bases in its northeast. This arrangement would give India the ability to respond at a time and place of its choosing and would leave Chinese strategic planners considering a strike with no assurance as to whether all Indian nuclear missiles able to reach China had been eliminated. Chinese policymakers would also have to factor in a nuclear attack that included targets deep within India’s interior, negating a limited nuclear war scenario that may be available if only targeting bases in India’s northeast.

Besides increasing the quantity, India could also augment the mobility of its existing missile forces. Both the Agni-II and Agni-III are road- and rail- mobile, though they reportedly have limited off-road capabilities. Nor are they regularly moved around the country because India “considers substantial dispersal unnecessary, and that it is adequate to move missiles out of their regular garrisons to nearby alternate locations which may also be useful for mating warheads and missiles.” This limits their survivability. Improving the land mobility of these forces would thus enhance their survivability, averting the need for a nuclear-armed submarine fleet for survivability reasons. As such, India could bolster its survivable second-strike force at a significantly lower cost to that which is currently planned, and channel the savings into conventional defenses.

Generating dispersal capabilities includes further improving the road and rail network linking these bases and the off-road capabilities of its transporter-erector-launcher fleet. This refocusing of the Indian nuclear posture emphasizing dispersal will ensure that Pakistan and China face greater uncertainty if considering a nuclear attack against India. The Indian Air Force’s existing nuclear missions and number of gravity bombs can remain until this new posture comes to full technical fruition.

These recommended force posture changes for enhanced geographic rotation and dispersal will continue to assure Indian deterrence against China. In contrast, India’s current approach of developing new delivery platforms and significantly expanding the force’s size brings fewer deterrence benefits and greater risks. These new systems contribute little toward fulfilling India’s historical adherence to a minimalist nuclear doctrine, which rejects the presumption that India should build toward numerical parity. Indeed, Indian officials have long rejected the notion of New Delhi pursuing such an arms race.

Instead of bolstering deterrence against China, these new systems may be intended more to project a global power image. A better global investment for India would be in nuclear transparency and stability.

India’s global opportunity. The decay and collapse of diplomatic arms control restraints are unshackling nuclear weapons capabilities the world over. This presents an opportunity for India to lead a global resistance to this trajectory, bolstered by its strategic sufficiency against Pakistan and China.

The Indian government might begin with unilateral restraints in range and deployment numbers, starting with a pledge not to deploy missiles with a longer range than that of the Agni-III, or about 5,000 kilometers. A voluntarily restrained Indian nuclear force would place India in a strong position to lead global calls for reviving and strengthening arms control talks, including among itself, Pakistan, and China.

Taking upon itself a voluntary leadership role on nuclear restraint would confer additional benefits. First, it would allow India to reassert the credible minimum deterrence nature of its nuclear force, which is increasingly under domestic and international question.

Second, it would place the global spotlight upon China and Pakistan. Despite its larger nuclear arsenal, China claims that its less-caveated no-first-use policy demonstrates that its nuclear practice is closer to nuclear minimalism than that of India. Pakistan, for its part, portrays an ever-worsening Indian nuclear and conventional threat to justify its own nuclear force expansions and doctrinal revisions, which its officials still insist is consistent with a “credible minimum deterrence” posturing concept.

Third, it would free budgetary room for Indian conventional military modernization to maintain its qualitative and quantitative edge against China, and to invest in the connectivity and off-road dispersal capabilities to strengthen Indian nuclear deterrence.

Finally, as India seeks to join both the UN Security Council and the Nuclear Suppliers Group as a permanent member, such an initiative would also support its foreign policy goals of strengthening global nonproliferation efforts outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, signaling its nuclear restraint, and highlighting its status as a responsible rising power.

While this would be a landmark in nuclear transparency, especially in South Asia, such recommendations for India are not new. Following the 1998 nuclear tests, retired Indian military officials called for numerical force size ceilings to be formally adopted. Two decades later, it is time to take their advice seriously.

This is the article, prequel, to the above post.