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Border face-off: China and India each deploy 3,000 troops

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  • China agrees to share Brahmaputra river data with India
    Politicians are elected to serve...far too many don't see it that way - Albany Rifles! || Loyalty to country always. Loyalty to government, when it deserves it - Mark Twain! || I am a far left millennial!


    • We pay for it as well. Salaries for people who gather the data

      This from 2014

      India to pay China Rs 82 lakh annually for Brahmaputra flood data | Rediff | Jul 01 2014


      • China, Maldives: Beijing's Boats Send a Message to India, Feb 15

        China’s naval presence deterred Indian intervention in Maldives crisis: sources

        No confrontation or warning shots at Chinese warships near Maldives: Indian Navy, Mar 28

        Maldives lifts state of emergency, defusing China-India tensions, Mar 23

        What is really the case?
        Politicians are elected to serve...far too many don't see it that way - Albany Rifles! || Loyalty to country always. Loyalty to government, when it deserves it - Mark Twain! || I am a far left millennial!


        • Newspapers trying to make a story. The Indian Navy said there's no conforntation AND all the stories are all about "ifs" and "probablies." Not one indication of any military action. Whoopee Doo, Chinese ships are in the area - like a 1000 miles away area. So friggin what?


          • Originally posted by Oracle View Post
            Stratfor's sister podcast gpf disagrees

            The issue about the Maldives is if India actually does take up the cause.

            And you have seen little blips from India, you had them announce that there’s special forces who are just on alert. You have had one or two not huge-level Indian politicians but some people come out and say no, India really should move forward with this. You even reportedly had a conversation between U.S. President Donald Trump and India’s leader Narendra Modi on the phone and that apparently factored in.

            Now China got wind of this and it got to the level of China’s foreign ministry saying well China does not support anybody intervening in the Maldives. We have to figure out a way to fix this problem. And the reason I think that some are pushing India to do this is because China actually has a pretty good relationship with the current President, the guy who did all those arrests in the first place. Now that all sounds kind of important right? Why we didn’t write about it is because nobody has intervened.

            Everybody talks about the Maldives as one of these potential bases for China in their One Belt, One Road project. I’m much more concerned with how China is gonna get outside of the South China Sea right now. You can’t be thinking about China building bases in the Indian Ocean when it can’t even get past a potential U.S. blockade, if the U.S. wanted to hypothetically in the South China Sea.


            So China and the United States have diverging interests. There is no Soviet Union that still exists that brings them together with a common foe. And so China is not completely comfortable with the idea that their economy and the imports and exports that are part of that economy happen at the grace of the United States. And China is slowly, and I emphasize slowly, trying to build a naval force and military force that would allow to project outwards.

            Now people look at this and say well oh my god, they’re going to try and create bases all over the place and challenge the United States. Well that’s really putting the cart in front of the horse. Like show me the Chinese building an actual modern aircraft carrier and graduating more than one or two classes of fighter pilots that know how to actually fly planes on and off carriers. And show me that they actually have the ability to carry out amphibious landings, ok then I’ll start paying attention.

            But you know right now the idea that China is going to create bases and just because it leases an island in the Maldives that’s somehow going to massively increase Chinese power? That’s what the Chinese want people to think, that’s not actually what China is doing right now. If you want to see what’s really important for China right now, watch them with the Philippines, watch the type of naval maneuvers that they’re trying to develop and the technologies they’re trying to develop in their own near abroad.

            You know 20, 30 years from now, if they’re still doing this type of stuff and they’ve mastered some of that you know weaponry, then maybe you can talk about a Chinese base in the Maldives, we obviously have our own internal views about how China is probably not even going to get there in the first place. But that’s why a lot of that is overwrought.

            CA: What about India in all of this? I mean we don’t need to make the call right now that it’s going to intervene or not intervene. But Indian foreign policy, even in its near abroad, is it being more adventurous than it has been lately? What’s the deal there?

            JLS: Look India in its, you know it’s called the subcontinent for a reason, right? And it’s basically isolated from a lot of the rest of the world. Look these areas that are around India, India is a behemoth, India is a dominant player here. It does not have to intervene in the Maldives to be the most important country in the Indian subcontinent in the Indian Ocean.

            You are right though that in the last couple of years, we have seen India become more focused, more strategic than what it’s doing on the foreign and in its foreign policy realm. And a lot of that has to do with you have a very, very strong government there, which is not normal for India. India is so fractured and is usually so disjointed that it can’t really think in terms of projecting power in those ways. This government is much stronger and it is trying to project Indian power to keep itself stronger and to protect its interests.

            You know, is this a litmus test for that? No, I don’t think so. The Maldives is a relatively small island. I think neither India nor China want to be involved here on any level. The last thing either one of them want to do is be seen as intervening in the affairs of a country that both many decades down the road see as potentially strategically important.

            But if you’re talking about today, no I don’t think it pays for India to be involved there. China is certainly not in a position to be involved there. It’s just trying to build a long-term relationship. And unless something happens unexpected from our point of view, this is probably not that big of a deal.
            Last edited by Double Edge; 31 Mar 18,, 22:44.


            • Looking forward to a fun summer ahead

              India bracing for a 'hot' summer on China front after Doklam crisis | TOI | Apr 02 2018

              HAYULIANG/KIBITHU: Indian security forces are bracing for a “hot” summer in the Himalayas along the Line of Actual Control with China this year. But unlike the Line of Control with Pakistan, where cross-border firing duels is the norm, it will be a battle of nerves in the shape of troop face-offs and transgressions without actual shots being fired on the China front.

              The assessment by the Indian defence establishment is that at least half of the 23 “disputed and sensitive areas” identified on the 4,057-km LAC, stretching from eastern Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh, are “likely to witness renewed muscle-flexing” by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with winter ebbing away now.

              The two countries continue to maintain high operational alertness on their borders, with additional units deployed in forward areas, despite troop disengagement from the 73-day face-off at Doklam near the Sikkim-Bhutan-Tibet tri-junction last year.

              With Chinese troops having now permanently occupied the Bhutanese territory of north Doklam by constructing bunkers, hutments, roads and helipads to sustain their troops in the area, the number of PLA “transgressions” across the LAC into what India perceives to be its territory has also shown a significant jump. If 273 transgressions (military euphemism for incursions) were recorded in 2016, the number touched 426 last year.

              “We are keeping a close watch on the Chinese activity. We are also conducting regular and special long-range patrols (LRPs) to the 18 mountain passes in the region to physically dominate the LAC,” said a senior officer of 2 Infantry Mountain Division, responsible for “maintaining the sanctity” of the 386-km stretch of the LAC in the rugged terrain of Dibang, Dau-Delai and Lohit Valleys in Arunachal Pradesh.

              Indian troops, of course, also conduct “aggressive patrolling’’ in all the three sectors of the LAC -- western (Ladakh), middle (Uttarakhand, Himachal) and eastern (Sikkim, Arunachal) – to strengthen claims to disputed territories. “In fact, we patrol much more than the PLA,” said an officer.

              The rival troops often leave behind “tell-tale signs” in the shape of cigarette packets and cans or painted rocks to declare it their territory. “If the rival troops come face-to-face, there are laid down steps like banner drills to defuse the situation. Issues on the LAC are resolved through established mechanisms like border personnel meetings, flag meetings and hotline calls,” said another officer.

              But the confrontations can get quite prolonged like they did during the Depsang and Chumar face-offs in eastern Ladakh in 2013-2014. The disputed areas in Ladakh range from Trig Heights, Demchok and Dumchele to Chumar, Spanggur Gap and Pangong Tso.

              In Arunachal, the flashpoints are Namkha Chu, Sumdorong Chu, Asaphila, Dichu, Yangtse and Dibang Valley. In the Dibang Valley, the hotspots are the so-called “Fish Tail-I and II” areas, which take their name from the shape the LAC takes in the region. In the middle sector, in turn, the disputed areas include Barahoti, Kaurik and Shipki La.
              Not much of a reaction from the other side, they have reported what TOI said here in Chinese

              India Wary Of Sino-Indian Border Ushering In A “Hot Summer” | GT (Chinese) | Apr 04 2018
              Last edited by Double Edge; 05 Apr 18,, 14:56.


              • Nirmala meets her counterpart

                India and China in rapprochement mode after Doklam crisis | Asia Times | Apr 02 2018

                Indian Defense Minister Nirmala Sitharaman’s visit to China this month will take place amid a climate of improved relations between the two countries. It will come in the wake of an important interview to the South China Morning Post last month by India’s ambassador to China, Gautam Bambawale.

                In his interview, Bambawale repeatedly said India had acted in reaction to “the change of status quo by the Chinese military.” He sidestepped the uncomfortable reality that India itself has no legal claims on that area. But he repeated that in order to maintain peace and tranquility, “there are certain areas, certain sectors which are very sensitive, where we must not change the status quo.”

                But his observation – and this is what makes the upcoming Sitharaman visit important – that the two sides had a deficit of strategic communication at a higher military level is significant. Sitharaman will, no doubt, meet her counterpart, the newly appointed minister of defense, General Wei Fenghe, who has been a long-standing member of the top decision-making body of the military in China, the Central Military Commission.

                Bambawale’s remarks indicate that what India is seeking is a modus vivendi over the Doklam issue. Given the way Chinese policy on the border is made, it is seeking to target the decision-making authorities in the People’s Liberation Army, rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Not surprisingly, for example, the Border Defense Cooperation Agreement, the last major pact signed by the two sides on building border confidence, was made between PLA Lieutenant-General Sun Jianguo and India’s defense secretary at the time, R K Mathur.

                What India is looking for is some understanding on the part of the PLA not to press on with its Doklam project, which in essence seems to involve developing a permanent position on the Jampheri ridge that overlooks the strategic Siliguri Corridor.

                The Chinese had built a road in the early 2000s to a point 100 meters or so below the Doka La Pass, where there is a strong Indian military post. They would park their vehicles and walk up and chat with Indian soldiers in Doka La and then patrol the last 4-5 kilometers to the ridge on foot. The Indian side would like the PLA to revert to this pattern because it does not essentially question the Chinese claim on Doklam, but at the same time does not immediately pose a danger to Indian security.

                The Sitharaman visit could provide a larger opening for a greater thaw in the Sino-Indian relationship that could see confirmation through a visit by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to China. He is scheduled to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Qingdao in June, but there could be an official visit either earlier or linked to the summit where issues that have been clouding the relationship between the two countries could be thrashed out.

                If India had the gumption, it could actually join the CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) initiative and demand road access from the Indian side to Pakistan-administered Kashmir or, for that matter, to Pakistan proper, Afghanistan and Iran. Beyond that, there is a larger agenda of cross-border trade, in itself not important, but something that could signal a changed relationship.

                With a trade war looming between the US and China, Beijing would be interested in ensuring that New Delhi does not throw all its weight behind Washington at this juncture. The Donald Trump administration’s National Security Strategy has designated China as a rival of sorts and embraced the categorization of the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean as a single “Indo-Pacific” strategic region. The first meeting of a naval quadrilateral that includes India has also taken place, in 2017, a prospect that would be discomfiting for China.


                • Chinese fire drills against India were propaganda: Western military experts

                  I .. don't .... have ..... words ...... to .....!!!
                  Politicians are elected to serve...far too many don't see it that way - Albany Rifles! || Loyalty to country always. Loyalty to government, when it deserves it - Mark Twain! || I am a far left millennial!


                  • Originally posted by Oracle View Post
                    Chinese fire drills against India were propaganda: Western military experts

                    I .. don't .... have ..... words ...... to .....!!!
                    Dated Sept 02 2017

                    Just after the thaw took place

                    BRICS summit in Beijing Sept 04. Modi attends

                    Kim fires off missiles half an hour before the summit begins, signal to Xi, he can hit China too
                    Last edited by Double Edge; 22 Apr 18,, 12:37.


                    • The Chinese foreign minister described India & China as natural partners and that there is no choice but to pursue an everlasting friendship.



                      • The two leaders had an informal meeting in Wuhan, a friendly get together with no big agreement to sign, no set agenda other than to improve the relationship. No joint statements instead, both sides organised separate media briefings and issued their own press releases. There will be an expected followup maybe in Nov in India

                        India, China Agree to Improve Strategic Communication at the End of Informal Talks | The Wire | Apr 29 2018

                        In answer to a query, India’s senior-most diplomat also said that no specific issues, like Indian membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the UN listing of the Pakistan-based terrorist Masood Azhar were discussed. Instead, it will be left to the 20-odd institutional mechanisms which exist bilaterally to thrash out a solution to these prickly matters.

                        “[Both] leaders also decided that existing mechanisms would be improved and [made] effective and used to address some of these issues,” said Gokhale.
                        The language Gokhale used was boilerplate bilateralspeak, and indicates the two leaders have not been able to move the boundary issue beyond where the two SRs have brought it after 20 rounds of discussion over 15 years.

                        However, Modi and Xi did agree to give operational instructions to improve communication between the two armies, so as to prevent border incidents from escalating into diplomatic crisis.
                        It's a tactical reset. Turn the clock back before Doklam, maybe further back. Since Doklam this relationship is on auto-pilot to nowhere. Stagnant

                        Idea here is to revive things again. Now that Xi has consolidated his position, in this context meaning pro vs anti-India factions in the CCP.

                        Not let differences hog the limelight like last Jun. One expects this includes distractions like Chinese troops lingering on our side longer than necessary and making the news.

                        When will the big bold steps by the big strong leaders come if at all ?

                        Echoing his Indian counterpart, Chinese vice foreign Kong Xuanyou described the visit as a “milestone” in bilateral ties.

                        He told reporters that President Xi had said the problems between India and China were of a “limited, temporary nature”.

                        According to Reuters, Kong noted that both Asian countries have “concrete differences but the summit was not aimed at addressing these specific issues”.
                        A limited, temporary nature then

                        “Despite some difficulties and obstacles in the bilateral military relationship, we are willing to

                        deepen understanding,

                        enhance mutual trust,

                        properly handle differences,

                        and incessantly accumulate positive energy

                        for the healthy and stable development of military ties under the guidance of the important consensus reached between leaders of both countries,” said China’s ministry of national defence spokesperson, Wu Qian.
                        says Zongnanhai
                        Last edited by Double Edge; 29 Apr 18,, 01:23.


                        • On the purpose of this summit. Three points of view.


                          Do you see such the agenda-less format of the summit of being a help in dealing with specific issues like Nuclear Suppliers Group, UN listing for Masood Azhar and Belt and Road initiative, even if they are not discussed during the summit?

                          A meeting at the level of leaders is not the occasion to negotiate outcomes. That is done at preparatory meetings held at the lower level. There can be some fine-tuning at the leadership level.

                          This time, what is being projected is that it is not outcome oriented, but understanding-oriented summit. The accent will not be on how to deal with issue ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’, but have a broader understanding on the global and regional situation and where they stand on the relations. I believe that the leaders will be addressing the structural challenges that have arisen. They will try to forge some consensus on how to address them, though it may not be in terms of specific issues as such. Unless structural challenges in India-China relationship are addressed and some roadmap is developed, taking this relationship forward in a meaningful manner would be challenging

                          The big issue that we are facing is of simultaneous re-emergence of India and China. How do we meet with each other on our shared periphery? What kind of prospect do we see for a global order that is in transition. Where do we meet in the greater vision?

                          The leaders may ask officials to follow up broad template… we don’t know. But, there will be some outcome. It won’t be that they met and discussed. Ultimately, to an extent, it will be about managing expectations.
                          Shen Dingli seems a perennial favourite in India. His answers are more brief than the other nuanced three.

                          Are there any current external geopolitical factors which may have convinced the Chinese and Indian leaders to sit down for this unusual diplomatic meeting? For example, is the US president’s preoccupation with China’s trade policies a possible reason for Beijing agreeing to a Modi-Xi meeting at this juncture?

                          I think not. China can easily make a compromise with the US on its trade dispute with Washington and would have no need to bother India. What India can do? To accept more Chinese goods when they cannot enter the US? India would definitely not welcome (such) Chinese goods.

                          As per Indian and Chinese sources, the ‘informal’ summit will not have a set agenda, no pre-negotiated joint documents and will largely be a free-wheeling discussion. Do you think such a format could help in “strategic communication” at the highest level? Are there successful precedents of such summits?

                          No. All similar China-US summits in 2013 in Los Angeles and in 2017 in Florida have failed to help relations, even for one or two years. What is important is not the formality, but the content and honesty.

                          According to Indian sources, a key purpose of the summit is for the two principals to understand the vision or domestic policy intentions of the other leader and how it shapes their external environment. Is that a useful outcome in your view?

                          It doesn’t hurt, while (it) doesn’t help (either). China cannot say as it has a domestic agenda of stimulating its economy through the time of New Normal, it shall have a reason to build CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) through PoK (Pakistan-occupied Kashmir). Such an explanation, if it aspires to do, would only destroy this informal talk.

                          Do you see such an agenda-less format of the summit of being helpful in dealing with specific issues like Nuclear Suppliers Group, UN listing of Masood Azhar and Belt and Road Initiative, even if they are not discussed during the summit?

                          As I said above, it neither hurts nor helps. What is important is whether one side would accept other’s term and change its own behaviour. If they only talk without mutual compromise, such talk could even hurt their relations.

                          Is there any possibility of flexibility from China on India’s concerns on NSG and blocking the UN listing of Jaish-e-Mohammad chief Masood Azhar? Similarly, can the Indian side slightly soften on opposition to Belt and Road Initiative?

                          I am not a part of the government and not in a position to comment. The view in this country is controlled and I am not supposed to say more. I would only say if I were Indian, I would not soften my position.
                          The obvious rebuttal to this is why would Modi spend 2 days in China if Xi hasn't offered the possibility of significant concessions vital to India's interests. Modi hasn't got a minute to waste let alone two days. There is also a strong belief in the commentary i read that China is feeling squeezed by the US and looking for ways to manage it. Reaching out to Modi is one way. This reason gets played down by all 4 commentators here i notice

                          Mohanty points out precedents with Xi meeting Obama & Trump in informal meets, Shen slams them as ineffective.

                          People's daily seems positive

                          Strong China India ties Hailed | People's daily | Apr 28 2018

                          Modi is in China on Xi's invitation. This is something that's been in the works for a while
                          Last edited by Double Edge; 29 Apr 18,, 13:56.


                          • Picked this based on the panelists. Don't see KC Singh in the shows i usually watch but he makes some interesting points here

                            If India - China relations improve, it sends a signal to all of India's neighbours that they cannot play one off the other

                            If a strategic adjustment does indeed take place a lot of other matters could eventually fall into place


                            • An interesting way of looking at transgressions using stats : D


                              • China doesn't want India & the US to do what the China & the US did to the Soviet Union!

                                Doesn't matter how corrupt or inefficient India's bureaucracy is, nothing will stop India being #3, Xi knows this and would prefer things not go off the rails at this point

                                Nalapat's gameplan for India remains the same. India walks on two legs, one leg is american defense and the other is Chinese business