Border face-off: China and India each deploy 3,000 troops

[Officer of Engineers]

I think what he meant to say by 2nd gen CICH-4 is first gen fatman. He's built nukes so he knows the tech. Everybody makes a fatman except the Norks apparently

Think about this. Chagai-I and II was 1998. There were 5 devices altogether. So, starting in 1990, the Pakistanis managed to design a whole new untested device and mass produce to at least 10 devices by 1998 (5 used in test and found out there were enough duds to make the rest useless).

Let me put this another way. How long did it took the NKs from the 1st test to a successful test?

Besides, the Pakistanis don't need a FATMAN. They've got one handed to them, allowing them to skip this step.

The only way 1998 makes sense with that many devices is that the Pakistanis started the CHAGAI-I and IIs the second the Chinese finished their lectures.

The person we really want to hear is Stillman. He's the guy who went to China and did all the visits. Can't find any talks by him, looks like Reed is the front man in this collaboration.

The political history and why countries went nuclear is quite interesting. Ike is blamed by three countries for going nuclear. China which he threatened twice within a year and France & Israel as Ike told them to cut it out in Suez. Ike threatened all three UK, France & Israel with economic sanctions otherwise. And people think Trump is tough with allies ; )

The UK went nuclear as after the war a lot of isolationist republicans entered office with the line no more european wars. So the UK decided they had to look out for themselves and tested in '52. Fear of abandonment is powerful

Another from 2010 with Reed

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dlmc6tJqCyI&t=3m26s

get the CICH-4 design in '82 but they tested in lop nur. Thrown in there like that.

He goes on about N.Korea

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dlmc6tJqCyI&t=5m20s

Norks don't want to nuke Honolulu, they want small diameter, oddly shaped, lightweight warheads they can sell to others

That's one way of looking at it[/QUOTE]

[Officer of Engineers]

Actually we do know when CHAGAI-1 was ready. The Chinese refused to test it for the Pakistanis in 92. So, two years from CICH-4 to CHAIGAI-1? That's fast. Real fast.

[Double Edge]

Besides, the Pakistanis don't need a FATMAN. They've got one handed to them, allowing them to skip this step.

The CICH-4 design which you said was a dead end. Paks couldn't use it you said. So they have to build their own

Let me put this another way. How long did it took the NKs from the 1st test to a successful test?

They pull out of the NPT by '93, they were also studying since the 80s, ten years to realise they could make nukes

Another ten to actually come up with a test, in 2006 which fizzled. 20 years

Another ten to conduct four more tests to get yield up to 25kt by 2016. 30 years

So ten years from first test to successful test

The only way 1998 makes sense with that many devices is that the Pakistanis started the CHAGAI-I and IIs the second the Chinese finished their lectures.

'82 was when their studies began, weapons labs in China opened by Deng because he believed more nuke states makes life harder for the US.

Can't speak mandarin? no problem. The teachers speak english

90 is eight years, and 98 is sixteen years

Think about this. Chagai-I and II was 1998. There were 5 devices altogether. So, starting in 1990, the Pakistanis managed to design a whole new untested device and mass produce to at least 10 devices by 1998 (5 used in test and found out there were enough duds to make the rest useless).

Eight years from '82 to come up with an alternative to CICH-4, test

Further refine, eight years later, CHAGAI (Norks needed ten)

What is the problem ? you disagree that lop nor may 1990 was a pak test

Paks can get something in '98 if the Chinese tested for them in 1990 but

IF the Chinese refused 1990, then their only first test was CHAGAI

It took 18 years for the Paks to do their first test from studies, Norks needed twenty

But the Paks couldn't wait to test again so they combined two tests in one, second didn't go as planned

[Officer of Engineers]

Let's back up a few steps here.

Unlike every other nuclear weapons powers, the Pakitanis did not have test devices ready for CHAGAI-I and II. These 8 devices were from their readied arsenal. This means that they had CHAGAI-I designs were finalized and put into production around 1995-96 in order to have that many devices by 1998

We know that CHAGAI-I and CICH-4 are totally unrelated since NATO has seen both sets of blueprints. This means you can't get CHAGAI-I from CICH-4. There's no development possible from CICH-4 to CHAGAI-I. In short, if the Pakistanis had tested a version of CICH-4 in 1990, the day after, they would have to start from scratch and produced an untested design in 4 years.

Now, we know that the CHAGAI-I wasn't tested beforehand or how the hell did you get so many duds in 1998. But this also means that the Pakistanis were NOT working on CICH-4 up to 1990 because CHAGAI-I was too complex to be developed in 4 years time.

Now, we do know the Chinese have turned down the Pakistanis to test a device in 1992. Given the timeframe to production, it can be safely assumed that the Pakistanis wanted to test CHAGAI-I in 1992 before putting the warhead into production. The Chinese said no.

However, this would directly contradict Reed and Stillman about the Pakistanis testing the CICH-4 in 1990 since they cannot have a brand new design in 2 years.

Now, did the Chinese test a failed CHAGAI-I in 1990? I don't know but I do know that the Chinese did not test a Pakistani CICH-4.

[Double Edge]

Digging into why HW couldn't certify the Paks and invoked Pressler and found a book blurb by Pressler

The requirement was

- cease production of highly enriched uranium,
- refrain from production of highly enriched uranium metal,
- demonstrate Pakistan does not possess any highly enriched uranium metal in the form of nuclear device components

As late as '89 people were stunned HW could still certify the Paks as compliant as they believed Pakistan had already crossed those borders and with no IAEA to check were just making good faith statements. Why did it continue as long

arms sales to Pakistan, including the delivery of numerous fighter jets with a nuclear delivery capability.

why did HW pull the plug in 90

US intel analysts believed the Paks had enough fissile material at this point and were machining uranium metal into bomb cores. Or the final step to 'possesing' nukes.

The whole idea behind Pressler had failed. Giving the Paks arms to address their insecurity so they don't go nuclear

What i was not expecting to read was Pressler endorsing a '93 Hersh New Yorker article and he's written a book about it. Total bunk.

The American intelligence community, also operating in secret, had concluded by late May [1990]that Pakistan had put together at least six and perhaps as many as ten nuclear weapons, and a number of senior analysts were convinced that some of those warheads had been deployed on Pakistan’s American-made F-16 fighter planes. The analysts also suspected that Benazir Bhutto, the populist Prime Minister of Pakistan, had been cut out of—or had chosen to remove herself from—the nuclear planning. Her absence meant that the nation’s avowedly pro-nuclear President, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, and the Pakistani military, headed by Army General Mirza Aslam Beg, had their hands, unfettered, on the button. There was little doubt that India, with its far more extensive nuclear arsenal, stood ready to retaliate in kind.

In 1990, the Paks had working nukes they could deliver via f-16. Forget Lop Nor, from nuke school in '82 to deployable nuke on a f-16 by 1990 sans test

Where does Hersh get this info ?

‘It was the most dangerous nuclear situation we have ever faced since I’ve been in the US government. It may be as close as we’ve come to a nuclear exchange. It was far more frightening than the Cuban missile crisis.’

— Richard J Kerr, former deputy director of the CIA, in an interview with reporter Seymour Hersh, describing the 1990 nuclear standoff between India and Pakistan.

The scenario..

Hersh was a controversial journalist, but on matters of Pakistan and the South Asia region, he was dead on. In this article, Hersh described how the American intelligence community witnessed in horror the fast-rising tensions between India and Pakistan in the spring of 1990, originating where it always seemed to, in Kashmir. Protests, rioting and an Indian police crackdown resulted in hundreds of Kashmiri civilian deaths. The Pakistanis’ reaction was frightening: intelligence analysts believed that Pakistan was training Muslim Kashmiri ‘freedom fighters’ on the border and outfitting a nuclear bomb that could be placed under the wing of an F-16.

The National Security Agency (NSA) had intercepted an order from the Pakistan Army’s chief of staff, General Mirza Aslam Baig, to actually assemble a nuclear weapon. The situation quickly escalated as India prepared an offensive ground strike into Pakistan and Pakistan planned to preempt this ground invasion with a nuclear hit on New Delhi.

There is no mention of Lop Nor test here. Neiher is it stated that Bush refused to certify as a result. he refused certification because it was clear they were going for a nuke

Hersh was dead wrong!

Conflict Prevention and Confidence-Building Measures in South Asia: The 1990 Crisis | Stimson | Jun 14 2012


Transcript of the talk given at Stimson in Feb '94 by US ambassadors to India & Pakistan at the time debunks Hersh

[Officer of Engineers]

I think I should explain something. Gun type nukes are the easiest to build without any test. What we're talking about here with the Lop Nor tests are warheads that can fit inside a missile. You don't need a test to verify the LITTLE BOY bomb.

[Double Edge]

Reed's reply to a critique of his book in airpower magazine ( "Letters to the editor." Air Power History, vol. 58, no. 2, 2011, p. 60)

Thanks so much for the highly accurate review by Lt. Col. Golda Eldridge, USAF (Ret.), of Danny Stillman’s and my book, The Nuclear Express (Vol. 58, No. 1,Spring 2011 issue). The reviewer has it exactly right—including the criticisms. Endnotes are lacking; sources are not cited; footnotes refer to sophomoric newspaper articles or movies. That is because our original sources are classified, or they are leakers (including foreign nationals) who do not care to be identified.

Since both Danny Stillman and I carried Q, nuclear weapon design and SCI clearances for decades, we had to go to great lengths to calm the concerns of DOE classifiers, CIA executives and our own consciences (we wish to warn of the dangers of proliferation, not help it along).Thus we often refer to unclassified sources to make the point that the information we discuss is out there in the open literature. As at least semi-pro authors, we did check every statement with a second source, but at the end of the day, the reader is only left with our personal reputations as his/her basis for belief.

Having terminated all clearances before we became authors, and on advice of counsel, we sought comments by the intelligence and weapons communities prior to publication, but we did not await their approval. Col. Eldridge is a most perceptive reviewer. Keep up the excellent book reviews.

Thomas C. Reed, former Secretary of the Air Force (1976-1977)

The review from the spring edition of the magazine can be found here

This book is a combination chronological narrative and country-by-country discussion of the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons. In the prologue, the authors state their opinion that both extremist Islamist terrorists and the Chinese are the main threats to world peace and security vis-à-vis nuclear weapons. Terrorists are a threat because of their desire to strike using any weapon available, and the Chinese because of their apparent lack of concern for the consequences of indiscriminately sharing nuclear weapons technology. This thread continues throughout the book. The narrative’s tone is journalistic which makes for an easy read, and technical discussions are couched in easy-to-understand language. Weapons design discussions are specific enough to help the reader understand why one type of weapon is a proliferative threat and another isn’t but are not written so as to lose one in the minutia. The book’s scope is broad enough to encompass the spectrum of weapons development and proliferation but specific enough to zero in on what the authors see as the continuing major areas of concern.

The book has several flaws that while not negating the book’s value—do detract somewhat from the arguments’ force and credibility. The footnotes are limited to explaining terms or names with very few citations for sources. When sources are cited, they are very often newspapers and, in one case, even a popular movie. I found this surprising given the authors’ backgrounds and credentials. The authors frequently allow a moralizing tone to creep into the narrative which, given their credentials and knowledge, isn’t necessary. When they feel compelled to state a position, their arguments and backgrounds are strong enough to carry it without a moralizing tone. Opinions are sometimes interspersed in factual discussions; this makes for an uneven narrative consistency.

Despite these issues, the book is an excellent discussion of the issues involved with nuclear weapons development and proliferation and provides significant insight into where the threats exist and are likely to develop further. Given the renewed emphasis on the U.S. nuclear arsenal and its safety, reliability and potential uses—much of which is entrusted to the Air Force—this is a timely and informative book.

Lt. Col. Golda Eldridge, USAF (Ret.)

[Double Edge]

Using armour at high altitude

Countering Chinese Tank Threat | Bharat Shakti | Sept 27 2017

[Oracle]

10km from Doklam face-off site, Chinese troops widen existing road

DE, why not use anti-tank missiles to counter Chinese tank threat?

China maintaining sizeable troops near Dokalam: Sources

[Double Edge]

Give the Bhutanese a stake in India's well being the way we are for their well being

[Oracle]

India, US boost ties as China puts on boots near Doklam

[Double Edge]

All quiet on the eastern front -- MEA

MEA says ‘no new development’ at Doklam, China defends patrolling ‘to exercise sovereignty’ | IE | Oct 7 2017

Following reports of Chinese troop build-up on Doklam plateau, India on Friday made it clear that there were “no new developments” at the “face-off site and its vicinity” since the disengagement on August 28.

New Delhi’s clarification comes on a day Beijing defended the presence of its troops in Doklam area, saying its soldiers are patrolling the region to exercise Beijing’s sovereignty, according to a PTI report from Beijing.“The Donglang (Doklam) area has always belonged to China and has been under the effective jurisdiction of China,” the Chinese foreign ministry told PTI in response to questions about a report that the People’s Liberation Army is beefing up troops in the area.

Sources told The Indian Express in New Delhi that after the “mutual and sequential withdrawal from the site where the border standoff took place”, there has been no movement of troops at the site. While questions were raised on New Delhi’s use of the term “vicinity”, a source said, “The military understands the meaning of the word ‘vicinity’…and they are monitoring the movements.”A top source, who was involved in the negotiations to resolve the border standoff, said, “There can be build-up anywhere else, away from the site, but that does not change the status quo. What was agreed by both sides, when they decided to disengage, has not been violated so far.”

On Friday evening, Ministry of External Affairs’ (MEA) spokesperson Raveesh Kumar stated, “We have seen recent reports on Doklam. There are no new developments at the face-off site and its vicinity since the August 28 disengagement. The status quo prevails in this area. Any suggestion to the contrary is incorrect.”More than five weeks after India and China stepped back from a standoff at Doklam, on the Sikkim border, Indian soldiers remain on high alert, with around 1,000 Chinese troops still present on the plateau, a few hundred metres from the site of face-off.The presence of Chinese soldiers in Chumbi Valley, where the plateau is located, was also acknowledged by Air Chief Marshal B S Dhanoa during his annual press conference on Thursday.

Sources told The Indian Express on Friday that there has been “no alarm bells” so far, although South Block was keeping a close watch on the situation.“We are not downplaying their presence, but till the time there is no change in the status quo…there is no reason to be alarmed at the presence of troops on the Chinese side,” the source said. “We have enough troops on alert, and as back-up…but there is no breach of the diplomatic understanding of August 28 so far.”

[Double Edge]

Another theory as to why this standoff ended as quickly as it did. That is not how people think of it but we were expecting it to go on longer. Sumdurong Chu certainly did

A mutual recognition of the others capability

[Oracle]

[Double Edge]

Excellent : D