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  • Originally posted by Double Edge View Post
    Lop Nor test for the Paks was 1990. It didn't cause a reaction in India. What pre-empted india was Clinton extending the NPT into perpetuity in 1995. Still have to get through Narasimha's book to understand the thinking after that Lop Nor test. I expect the thinking will be similar this time as well. Absent some additional catalyst, India isn't going to do a H test..
    What kind of catalyst will make India go for a H-bomb test? And do we really need it?

    Originally posted by Double Edge View Post
    China realised it had two rivals (actually 3). Then set about suitably assisting other countries to act as foils. NK towards Japan. Pakistan towards India. Cambodia towards Vietnam.

    The Vietnamese decided they weren't going to have a rogue regime next door and invaded and then deposed the Khmer Rouge. They fought the KR in the country for many years and won. The Khmer Rouge never returned. At the time India voted at the UN in support of Vietnam against the US, China and many others. Does anybody really wish the khmer rouge were still in power today ? Does the world need another dsyfunctional regime like NK. Of course not, the Vietnamese were right, they paid a high price but the reality is they are better off today as a result.
    Agree. Wish the Indian politicians of that time had some grey cells in their head. But that was also the time of uncertainty, as US was supporting Pak, China.

    Originally posted by Double Edge View Post
    But two out of three ain't bad. The Paks helped the Norks with enrichment via AQ Khan and got missile tech. China signs NPT in 1992 and CTBT in 2004, they say we didn't do anything. heh yeah. The damage is already done. This is nothing new, similar pattern of proliferation went on during the cold war for the same balancing reasons.

    All depends on how the US plays this, will the alliance hold and whether China via proxy is able to damage that alliance beyond repair. If so, Japan, SK & Taiwan will go nuclear and rebalance any advantage China had.
    I think the bold part is the biggest worry for China now, especially w.r.t to Japan. How long will American assurances work? US influence seems to be eroding with Trumphs changing statements.
    Politicians are elected to serve...far too many don't see it that way - Albany Rifles! || Loyalty to country always. Loyalty to government, when it deserves it - Mark Twain! || I am a far left millennial!

    Comment


    • DE, w.r.t your post # 345.
      Agree with his line of thinking. It's almost like what India thinks.

      This caught my eye -
      "I am a friend of both India and Pakistan. We must not do unnecessary harm against a potentially greater friend India. Instead the strategy should be to evolve mutual understanding and provide mutual concessions,”
      With time, I think more such voices will be heard. The long-term gains for China w.r.t. co-operation with India will be many times higher than what the Paks can offer.
      The people to people relations between India and China are much better, than say between India and Pak, which will get better in the future.
      Politicians are elected to serve...far too many don't see it that way - Albany Rifles! || Loyalty to country always. Loyalty to government, when it deserves it - Mark Twain! || I am a far left millennial!

      Comment


      • Originally posted by Oracle View Post
        This caught my eye -

        With time, I think more such voices will be heard. The long-term gains for China w.r.t. co-operation with India will be many times higher than what the Paks can offer.
        The people to people relations between India and China are much better, than say between India and Pak, which will get better in the future.
        Same line of thinking is starting to dawn in China wrt to SK over NK. Both realise they will be left holding the bucket if anything bad happens in NK

        Comment


        • Originally posted by Oracle View Post
          What kind of catalyst will make India go for a H-bomb test? And do we really need it?
          The option of a test was always there should the need arise , we would put together some safeguards for whatever intl reactions come. Anything that adversely challenges our credibility on the subject would require a demonstration. It would take a lot to go down that path though so its quite unlikely.

          In contrast '74 and '98 were more fundamental in motivation. To be or not to be.


          I think the bold part is the biggest worry for China now, especially w.r.t to Japan. How long will American assurances work? US influence seems to be eroding with Trumps changing statements.
          China's goal is in weakening alliances all around. Divided they fall. They vie for influence in Central Asia to challenge Russia, same in our neighbourhood and towards the far east with the US treaty partners. Trump showed up yesterday, China's been at this game for much longer. Trump may say the wrong things from time to time but i can't see him doing as much damage alone.

          The problem with extended deterrence is the US isn't going to trade LA for Tokyo or Seoul. So the objective would be not to let things go so far where the question comes up.

          If China could get Japan, Taiwan & SK to end their alliance then the US goes away without having to fight the US. But the US leaving means those three arming and balancing out China. So the US leaving then isn't entirely in China's interest. And those three rearming isn't in the NPT ayatollahs interest either.

          China wants to keep things at the right temperature but things are getting too hot to handle right now where the allies start to turn into liabilities.

          Comment


          • So i would like a double of whatever these guys are having...

            President Xi emphasised that we should be each other’s development opportunities rather than be threats to each other — “dragon and elephant should dance together”.

            PM Modi shared the same idea and believes that the political effects of “making one plus one eleven” can be achieved in China-India relations.
            Turn the page to a new chapter | Hindu | Sept 22 2017

            Faced with similar development objectives and common challenges such as “anti-globalisation” and trade protectionism, China and India should work together.
            ; )

            Both sides should set long-term goals for the development of our bilateral relations. We can consider

            - negotiating the Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation between China and India,

            - restarting the negotiations of China-India Free Trade Agreement,

            - striving for early harvests on boundary issues, and

            - actively exploring the strategic synergy between China’s Belt and Road Initiative and India’s ‘Act East Policy’.
            Quite the to-do list ...
            Last edited by Double Edge; 22 Sep 17,, 22:42.

            Comment


            • More facts come out..

              Its interesting how all sides played it down all along, in other words the domestic political management

              Doklam faceoff: China deployed more, standoff began earlier | IE | Sept 25 2017

              Contrary to public perception that the border standoff between India and China at Doklam involved a small number of troops, the Chinese had posted more than 12,000 soldiers, 150 tanks and artillery guns opposite Sikkim at Phari Dzong in Chumbi Valley during the 73-day standoff, a new book has revealed.

              The book, Securing India The Modi Way: Pathankot, Surgical Strikes and More (Bloomsbury), written by Nitin A Gokhale, also contains Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) images of the site, which show that the standoff had actually started in the third week of May — it was made public by the Chinese on June 26.

              The book reveals that when tensions rose between the two sides, the Chinese had built up their presence to a size that exceeded a division opposite Sikkim. The Indian Army had also matched the build-up but did not feel the need to get troops close to the border due to the shorter distance, it says.

              The UAV images in the book show the cheek-by-jowl stationing of soldiers and visible signs of the Chinese presence at Dolam plateau in third week of May. On May 21, the local Chinese commander informed his Indian counterpart that they were going to undertake “infrastructure activities in the area”, says the book. The Indian officer, aware of earlier instances of the Chinese repairing and starting annual maintenance of the existing road, noted the input but did not feel alarmed, it says.

              The Chinese returned on May 24 in what was their first patrol of this summer to the area, says the book. They came up to the parking area, which marks the end of the existing road from Yatung to Doklam Plateau via Sinchela, and interacted with personnel of the Royal Bhutan Army (RBA) as Indian Army troops watched from their post at Doka La, 200 metres away.

              An Indian Army UAV captured the encounter between the two sides, which ended quickly with the Chinese and Bhutanese soldiers returning to their posts. The book says that the next encounter between the two sides took place on June 5, when another Chinese patrol came to the parking area. This time, the Chinese soldiers jostled with Bhutanese soldiers and forcibly “escorted” them to the RBA posts after threatening them, it says.

              The Indians later learnt from their Bhutanese counterparts that the Chinese had warned the RBA to not interfere with the road construction they were about to undertake, the book says. The Indian officer on the ground duly reported the matter up the chain. And, according to the book, the Army Headquarters in Delhi decided to deal with the situation as it evolved but increased the vigil on ground. Then, at 7.30 am on June 16, a PLA light vehicle and nine heavy vehicles, including road construction equipment, reached the parking area.

              An interaction between Indian and Chinese personnel took place at Contact Point from 7.50 to 10.10 am, says the book. Between 12.51 and 1.31 pm, a patrol of eight Bhutanese soldiers, which had come from Chela Post on the Jampheri Ridge, interacted with the Chinese in the parking area. The Chinese accompanied the Bhutanese patrol along the alignment of an under-construction track up to Jampheri Ridge, which was meant to be an extension of the existing road from Yatung to Dolam Plateau. The Chinese had taken four years to construct this road starting 1999.

              At 1.50 pm, the book says, Indian troops delivered a message through a loud-hailer from Doka La to stop construction but the Chinese did not pay heed. According to the book, a temporary construction camp was also established by the Chinese in the parking area. The next morning, JCBs commenced construction work following which the Indian troops interacted twice with the Chinese, repeatedly asking them to stop but in vain.

              The Chinese commenced work again on the morning of June 18, south of the parking area, says the book. The Indian officers on location carried out four interactions with the Chinese, and asked them to stop the construction activity. The matter was reported up the military hierarchy, the book reveals, and orders were issued from Delhi to stop the Chinese. At 7.52 am, the book says, a “human chain’ was formed by Indian troops to effectively block the Chinese. In response, by noon, another human chain was formed by 150 PLA troops opposite the Indian formation — this was effectively overwhelmed by more Indian troops.

              Two days later, the highest Military Commander-Level flag meeting between two Major Generals was held at Nathu La with both sides stating their stance. The book says cordial interactions subsequently took place at Doka La on a daily basis between the Commanding Officers of both sides. A thaw started taking place from August 14 as diplomatic activity picked up pace, eventually leading to a disengagement on August 28. On September 7, as first reported by The Indian Express, both sides moved away by 150 metres from the faceoff site as the first major step in the disengagement.
              Last edited by Double Edge; 25 Sep 17,, 14:23.

              Comment


              • Originally posted by Double Edge View Post
                Lop Nor test for the Paks was 1990.
                The alleged test was 1986. There was a 1992 request that was denied. However, I found no concrete evidence of the 1986 test. Only hersay and innuendos and the resulting evidence didn't make sense. The 1986 test was Pu based but Pakistani nukes are uranium based.
                Chimo

                Comment


                • Originally posted by WABs_OOE View Post
                  The alleged test was 1986. There was a 1992 request that was denied. However, I found no concrete evidence of the 1986 test. Only hersay and innuendos and the resulting evidence didn't make sense. The 1986 test was Pu based but Pakistani nukes are uranium based.
                  What do you make of Thomas Reed ? he's the most recent source

                  His Physics today article [Physics Today 61, 9, 47 (2008)]

                  In some of the most startling revelations to emerge on the subject, a high-ranking former US official who was also a nuclear weapons designer has disclosed that ''in 1982 China's premier Deng Xiaoping began the transfer of nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan.''

                  The whistleblower isn't a think-tank academic or an unnamed official speaking on background. Thomas Reed, described as a former U.S ''nuclear weaponeer'' and a Secretary of the Air Force (1976-77) writes in the latest issue of Physics Today that China's transfers to Pakistan included blueprints for the ultrasimple CHIC-4 design using highly enriched uranium, first tested by China in 1966. A Pakistani derivative of CHIC-4 apparently was tested in China on 26 May 1990, he adds.

                  Reed makes an even more stunning disclosure, saying Deng not only authorized proliferation to Pakistan, but also, "in time, to other third world countries.'' The countries are not named. He also says that during the 1990s, China conducted underground hydronuclear experiments—though not full-scale device tests—for France at Lop Nur.

                  Reed's disclosures are based on his knowledge of and insights into the visits to China by Dan Stillman, a top US nuclear expert who went there several times in the late 1980s at Beijing invitation, in part because the Chinese wanted to both show-off and convey to the US the progress they had made in nuclear weaponisation.

                  One of Stillman's visit to the Shanghai Institute of Nuclear Research (SINR), writes Reed, ''also produced his first insight into the extensive hospitality extended to Pakistani nuclear scientists during that same late-1980s time period,'' which would eventually lead to the joint China-Pak nuclear test.

                  Chinese nuclear proliferation to Pakistan, including the supply of hi-tech items like ring magnets in the early 1990s, has always been known to the non-proliferation community (which largely slept on the reports). But this is the first time it has been confirmed by such a senior official.
                  Some disagree with the above

                  Some experts expressed similar skepticism. "I simply don't believe the French need the Chinese to do non-explosive testing. They have a very strong program and I can't see them exposing it to the prying eyes of the Chinese," says Peter Zimmerman, former chief scientist of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

                  "I think it is extremely unlikely that China tested a Pakistani bomb," he added.
                  Now the French might not need the Chinese to do tests for them but it's not explained why the Chinese would refuse the Paks

                  Now the worry is what do they have thanks to Kim. India has called for a probe
                  Last edited by Double Edge; 25 Sep 17,, 23:27.

                  Comment


                  • Reed relies on Stillman who said Chinese scientists bragged about testing Pakistani nukes. An highly unlikely event since all such meetings are always attended/monitored by CCP Party men.

                    However, what discreditted Reed and Stillmen is that Stillmen reported that the US helped Israel with their nuclear weapons program. Again, no firm evidence of such. Reed, thus far, has not come up with the evidence supporting such even though he was Secretary of the USAF.
                    Chimo

                    Comment


                    • Originally posted by Double Edge View Post
                      but it's not explained why the Chinese would refuse the Paks
                      Simple. China was in negotiation to sign the NPT. All fissile material production must be accounted for and verified by the IAEA. An unexplained test with unexplained fissile materials would be extremely hard to explain.
                      Chimo

                      Comment


                      • How to explain this ?

                        M 5.4 Nuclear Explosion - southern Xinjiang, China

                        1990-05-26 07:59:57 UTC 41.566N 88.688E

                        The precision impresses me, 8 AM on the dot. That's the military for you : )

                        Some thing went off, on whose behalf is unclear
                        Last edited by Double Edge; 26 Sep 17,, 02:17.

                        Comment


                        • Originally posted by Double Edge View Post
                          How to explain this ?

                          M 5.4 Nuclear Explosion - southern Xinjiang, China

                          1990-05-26 07:59:57 UTC 41.566N 88.688E

                          The precision impresses me, 8 AM on the dot. That's the military for you : )

                          Some thing went off, on whose behalf is unclear
                          That is a big assumption for it to be anything else other than Chinese.
                          Chimo

                          Comment


                          • The point remains, however, that Reed and Stillmen are not the best authorities on the matter. Stillmen did not identify the scientists who bragged about a Pakistani test and both men pointed to an American violation of the NPT without proof.
                            Chimo

                            Comment


                            • Originally posted by WABs_OOE View Post
                              The point remains, however, that Reed and Stillmen are not the best authorities on the matter. Stillmen did not identify the scientists who bragged about a Pakistani test and both men pointed to an American violation of the NPT without proof.
                              Both men are very experienced in the field. I don't see how one could just discredit them based on their background. Has to be on what they said and withheld

                              He couldn't say more, the CIA sued to block certain parts of the book and won

                              the Court said it was persuaded that “the government has properly classified the twenty-three passages in Stillman’s manuscript.”

                              Since those passages constitute about 15% of the total manuscript and include some of the most interesting and valuable information that he gathered in his travels to China, the author said he would not publish the remainder.
                              hence you found

                              Only hersay and innuendos and the resulting evidence didn't make sense.
                              Why is the CIA blocking info about another country's nuke program : )

                              Why should the US cover for China

                              In his statement from Aug 2001, Stillman says

                              2. I served as an employee of the University of California's Los Alamos National Laboratory ("LANL") from 1965-1993. I was the leader of LANL's intelligence division from July 1978 to January 1992. I retired from LANL in November 1993. During my employment at LANL, I often personally briefed high-level government officials including, but not limited to, three Directors of Central Intelligence (William J. Casey, William Webster and Robert Gates), William Sessions, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State, Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security Adviser, Caspar Weinberger, President Reagan's Secretary of Defense, then Congressman Dick Cheney, and several Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Directors of both the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency ("DIA").

                              5. Between Spring 1990 and Summer 1999, I made nine trips to China where I visited nearly all of China's nuclear weapons facilities including their nuclear weapons test site and participated in extensive discussions with Chinese scientists, government officials, and nuclear weapon designers. During my time in China, I maintained a personal journal in which I documented my experiences; basically what I saw and heard, and who I met.

                              9. After each trip to China, I did voluntarily meet with a representative of a United States government agency to inform this individual on what I had seen and heard in China. This is a common intelligence tactic of the United States government that is widely reported in the public domain. Scientists, in particular, like myself, are often used. I was not operating as an intelligence officer or agent of the United States government. I was merely a loyal American citizen who served as a voluntary source of information. I was never compensated for my activities, nor was I ever given any assignments or requests on what to see or do. In order to save time and so that I did not have to sit for hours with the agency official, I would simply give this person a copy of my typed trip summary that I had rewritten from my journal notes. If the person had follow-up questions, he knew how to reach me.

                              10. Based entirely on my own personal experiences in China, I wrote a manuscript - tentatively entitled Inside China's Nuclear Weapons Program - that is approximately 506 pages in length. The manuscript details my nine visits to China. Quite frankly, I went to places where few people, even those within the Chinese political and scientific community, have ever gone. In fact, more Americans have walked on the moon than been to the nuclear facilities and test sites I have visited in China. In my opinion, nothing in my manuscript was or is classified. During my 13-1/2 years as the leader of LANL's Intelligence Division, I was one of only three people at LANL authorized as an original classifier. The two other people were the LANL Director and the head of the LANL classification Office. Essentially, the United States government trained me to be the person to know what is and what is not classified. I wrote my manuscript from the vantage point of specifically excluding any classified information which is why I did not include any analysis or comparison between the nuclear weapons programs of China and the United States. More to the point, none of the information I obtained on my fourth through ninth trips to China was through the course of or as a result of my employment with LANL. My security clearance and the obligations that result therefrom - which I take very seriously - was not at issue. These were private trips.
                              Begs the question why the Chinese would grant access to an American to see and interview people in such sensitive areas. They must have been very keen to demonstrate their nuke capabilities to the US and in exchange maybe some discretion was required
                              Last edited by Double Edge; 26 Sep 17,, 14:56.

                              Comment


                              • Originally posted by Double Edge View Post
                                Both men are very experienced in the field. I don't see how one could just discredit them based on their background. Has to be on what they said and withheld
                                It's not what he said about the China trip that discredits him. It's what he said about the US aiding the Israeli nuclear weapons program, a direct violation of the NPT and as far as I can tell, a treasonous act not covered by Executive Order.

                                This puts everything else he wrote into doubt. Even if he did hear it, he's reporting hearsay from Chinese "scientists."

                                Given the fact that we have heard hearsay situation before, ie "You will not trade Los Angeles for Taipei," I find the lack of names unconvincing.

                                Also. No way in hell would the French allow the Chinese a glimps into their nuclear weapons program. The Chinese stole the W10 designs from the US for crying outloud.
                                Chimo

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