Border face-off: China and India each deploy 3,000 troops

[Funtastic]

And the threats from the 'most just, loving, caring, compassionate, and peaceful' nation on earth continue to bear on the most 'conniving, evil and filled with hypocrisy' nation on earth.

Chinese infrastructure construction in Doklam, on the level of funny that is right up there with 'with this artificial island we have created, we hold our historic claim to be true'

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/20..._136555787.htm

You can spit all the vile you like

Nevertheless,while under increasing diplomatic and military pressure India blinked first. She recalled her soilders thereby loosing the confrontration with China. Meanwhile China has regained her territory and is beefing up patrols. In the most recent news releases she has said she will be continuing with her road building in the area. (most probably after winter)

[n21]

You can spit all the vile you like

Nevertheless,while under increasing diplomatic and military pressure India blinked first. She recalled her soilders thereby loosing the confrontration with China. Meanwhile China has regained her territory and is beefing up patrols. In the most recent news releases she has said she will be continuing with her road building in the area. (most probably after winter)

Looks like you are not aware of the history of this region. It is a area which was patrolled by BOTH Chinese and Bhutanese forces before the standoff started. PLA has no permanent post in this region, while Bhutan does. According to 2012 agreement, China cannot change the status quo. So PLA patrolling makes no difference. The standoff is due to "extension of the road", not due to patrolling.

If you have to extend the road, why wait after winter? The best time is June to Early November, which is why PLA started off in June.

Regarding India, it has a permanent post, which is 100 meters from the standoff. India will just send it forces again, if PLA tries to extend the road.

Regarding military pressure, why would India feel the pressure having 12 divisions on LAC against 4 PLA brigades?

[Double Edge]

Nevertheless,while under increasing diplomatic and military pressure India blinked first.

Hard to tell who blinked first and for what reasons. Time will tell.

But then this is the idea, if the people don't know then there is room to manouever for both sides. China was in need of the face saver here not India which India was willing to offer. Won & lost are not good words to use here, i mean both sides have to claim some sort of win to withdraw in the first place

She recalled her soilders thereby loosing the confrontration with China. Meanwhile China has regained her territory and is beefing up patrols. In the most recent news releases she has said she will be continuing with her road building in the area. (most probably after winter)

Patrols are fine, going on since forever, we can also patrol too. The key point is the road construction has stopped and better remain that way otherwise indian troops will return. I think in this area the chapter is closed. Free to build roads in non-disputed areas like always.

Some Indians are complaining it was not a simultaneous withdrawal and only a mutual withdrawal which means it was sequential, so technically India would have withdrawn first but only with the expectation and verification that the Chinese complied.

heh, who cares. Is the road there or not, the primary reason we went in the first place.

This Nov will mark fifty years with no shots fired. Wow

[kuku]

You can spit all the vile you like

Nevertheless,while under increasing diplomatic and military pressure India blinked first. She recalled her soilders thereby loosing the confrontration with China. Meanwhile China has regained her territory and is beefing up patrols. In the most recent news releases she has said she will be continuing with her road building in the area. (most probably after winter)

In the great way the chinese speak in English "Stop Wagging your toung", and learn to respond to sarcasm with sarcasm.

For me this conflict is not a matter of patiotism, if i drive for 30 mins from my village, i am at the Indo-Tibet border, we had trade with the Tibetans, we knew them personally (very kind people), and we saw what happened to them in the hands of the communists.
Also lands which we have roamed around for over 300-400 years were suddenly claimed by China, which is rather funny, and stupid to be quite frank.

As for Doklam, the aim was to stop China building a road and then claiming the land like Askai Chin. If the chinese military comes with its road building euipment again, it knows that the Indian military will protest, with force, if so required, and the strech which is built will also dissappear between the mighty patrols.

China should stop scoring own goals, like those artificial Islands, and these stupid border disputes.

[Double Edge]

More parsing of the de-escalation and corresponding statements by Mr.Sibal

[Double Edge]

Was sceptical about the BRICS summit being a factor in reaching a resolution but i suppose he has a point. There wouldn't be a problem for India to attend BRICS in Beijing, more about China receiving India at BRICS that would be the issue.

China Miscalculated How To Handle India, Allowed Face-Saving Exit | NDTV | Aug 29 2017

China Miscalculated How To Handle India, Allowed Face-Saving Exit
Dhruva Jaishankar

To the considerable relief of all parties involved, India and China agreed yesterday to end a 74-day stand-off by their security forces near the trijunction with Bhutan. India initiated the announcement with a short statement that simply said that an "expeditious disengagement of border personnel...has been agreed to and is ongoing." China confirmed that India had withdrawn border personnel. Its spokesperson added that Beijing would "continue to exercise its sovereignty and uphold its territorial integrity" and reportedly that its forces "will continue to patrol in Doklam region." Beijing acknowledged that "adjustments" would be made on the ground.

A lot was left unsaid, and deliberately so. China did not say that its own troops had fallen back or that it was calling off the road building activities in the disputed territory that had provoked the stand-off. Equally - and more importantly - Chinese officials did not confirm that road building would continue or deny a disengagement of forces. Affairs had been choreographed so that both sides could claim victory. China was satisfied with Indian forces withdrawing to their prior positions to the west. But India accomplished its objective of ensuring that China would cease road building to its south.


The Doklam situation has provoked a host of commentary, much of it ill-informed, in part due to uncertainty and initially vague reports about its exact location, the competing legal claims made by China, Bhutan, and India, and the extraordinarily harsh rhetoric by China's officials and state media leading to concerns about escalation. But three questions remain. Why did the situation come about? Why did it end? And what might be the long-term consequences?

The exact reasons and timing for China's actions which precipitated the impasse on June 16 may never be known. Construction activities meant to strengthen China's position in disputed territory have become a common practice, including in the South China Sea. It is also now clear that China's leaders miscalculated, and did not anticipate an Indian intervention as their forces pushed forward in territory disputed with Bhutan. Speculative theories that China intended to teach a lesson to India - including possibly for its boycott of the Belt and Road Initiative - do not withstand scrutiny, given that events unfolded at a site where India had natural advantages.

The reasons for the stand-off's conclusion are easier to fathom. China had attempted to threaten and cajole India through public messages, mocking videos, and travel advisories intended to limit Chinese tourists from traveling to India. None of that worked. Indian forces were also better positioned on the ground, with more robust supply lines than their Chinese counterparts. The forthcoming BRICS Summit in the south-eastern Chinese city of Xiamen risked being overshadowed. It would have been awkward and embarrassing for China to welcome an Indian prime minister as a guest even as Indian forces were present in (what Beijing believes to be) Chinese territory. Finally, the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was looming, and an unresolved stand-off with India risked having domestic political ramifications. For these reasons, it was in Beijing's interest to ensure an early resolution to the stand-off, assuming a face-saving formula could be found.

What are the consequences? In the near future, it heralds a return to some possible normalcy in India-China relations. The two sides demonstrated that, despite the rhetoric, a peaceful and diplomatic solution could be found. But the long-term implications will be more uncertain. India has shown considerable resolve, not just in an effort to protect its own security interests but those of its neighbours. China, meanwhile, has done considerable damage to its reputation in India, less by precipitating the problem, and more by its poor handling of the situation. Whether on the border or beyond - in other domains, including regional security, multilateral affairs, or economic and trade relations - it would not be surprising if New Delhi was to approach its relations with Beijing with greater wariness. Particularly following its behaviour on the South China Sea, it would be natural for India not to trust Chinese promises on the disputed frontier, but to continue to remain vigilant.

If the Chinese state has hurt its reputation, so has the press, which did not acquit itself very well over the course of the past two months. The Chinese media resorted to ugly taunts and uglier threats. The Indian media, while more tepid, was often speculative and sometimes wildly misleading. Both the Indian and the international media were particularly insensitive in their portrayal of Bhutan, whose government proved admirably level-headed in what was an extraordinarily delicate and occasionally tense situation. But even the resolution of the impasse produced confident interpretations by journalists who lacked both immediate information and broader context.

Doklam shows that a military confrontation between two nuclear-armed powers can be resolved diplomatically, and without escalation. But for China's leadership there is perhaps a need for introspection about why it let relations with India deteriorate so sharply for no material gain.

(Dhruva Jaishankar is Fellow, Foreign Policy with Brookings India in New Delhi)

[Double Edge]

Memory from happier times

[Double Edge]

Told you the CCP can tamp it down



In the real world its about compromise and the sign of a good compromise is there will always be people on both sides that think they got cheated

[Double Edge]

Interesting development

Mandarin made a must for ITBP recruits | IE | Aug 29 2017

Following the Doklam standoff, the Indo Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) has decided to make it compulsory for new recruits to learn Chinese language — both Mandarin and the version of the language that is spoken in Tibet. “This year onward, learning of the language has been made part of the one-year training course for recruits,” said a senior ITBP officer.

“We are a force fully deployed on the border with China. It is only prudent that every personnel should know the language. We interact with Chinese soldiers almost on a daily basis. A good knowledge of their language may help avoid misunderstandings and lead to better resolution of confrontations that arise out of ground zero developments,” said the officer.

Currently, only about 150 officers and men in the 90,000-strong force which guards the 3,488 km-long India-China border know the language. Most of these officers learnt it during mid-career training programmes held at Army training academies or at the Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU). Sources said the move is aimed at making the entire force have a workable knowledge of the language so that they can communicate with China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers without difficulty.

At present, whenever there is a perceived transgression by either side, the two forces hold up banners which state the established position of the border at that place and ask the other party to retreat. “A verbal communication has a more personal feel and helps in defusing tension. At least fist-fights and stone-pelting, as witnessed recently in Pangong Tso, can be avoided. It will also help in building relations at the ground level,” said the officer.

Sources said the ITBP has already recruited 12 teachers for the purpose at its training academy in Mussoorie. The recruits will have to pass tests in the language, before they are deployed. “Those who get trained in the language will also go through refresher courses later, and will be used to train others in the units. Currently, those who know the language can barely speak 10 sentences. The idea is to help them hold a conversation, with proficiency in 50-60 sentences that they can use for an interaction with the Chinese. Eventually, the entire force will have a working knowledge of the language,” said the officer.

He said the focus is not just on Mandarin but also the version of the language that is spoken in Tibet. “Since we come across many PLA soldiers who speak the Tibetan version of Chinese, along the borders of Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh, we have prepared a training course that will cater to both,” said the officer. “We will have a regimen on the lines of physical training, so that there is an exercise everyday, and those who have learnt the language do not forget it even if they are deployed in Left Wing Extremism areas,” he said.

[Double Edge]

They work late in the Chinese ministry of external affairs

How the Doklam withdrawal was carefully choreographed | Catch News | Sept 01 2017

The India-China stand-off ended with a choreographed disengagement at Doklam plateau on August 28 after night long negotiations in Beijing. India agreed to withdraw its troops in a designated two hour period before noon on Monday August 28 and the Chinese did the same in a similar window that afternoon.

The withdrawal was monitored from New Delhi in real time – hence the reference in the statement of the Ministry of External Affairs that the process of disengagement was completed under “verification”.

According to multiple sources, this was the result of a carefully coordinated move led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi with the representatives of the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi, the Army Chief and the National Security Advisor. They spent a sleepless Sunday night in direct communication with Indian ambassador to China Vijay Gokhale who was negotiating with a high level Chinese official in Beijing.

Gokhale had been in Delhi for consultations for the entire previous week. He was advised not to go back to Beijing till he received a call from Beijing for a meeting. Sure enough, he received a call on Saturday/Sunday, with the Chinese foreign ministry seeking a meeting. It is not clear at this point whether during the week the Indian Ambassador to Beijing was in Delhi the two sides were still engaged at a higher level.

However, once Bejing made the approach, the Indian Ambassador was advised by the government to go for the meeting by the next available flight. The flight to Beijing was, however, delayed by about three hours because international flight schedules had been disrupted by Cyclone Harvey.

When Gokhale landed in Beijing it was already Sunday night. The Chinese foreign ministry apparently wanted him to come over directly from the airport. However, Gokhale went to his residence, changed, informed Delhi and then went for the meeting.

By the time the meeting began with the Chinese it was already 10.30 PM Indian Standard Time or 1 AM Beijing time.

In Delhi, Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar, Army Chief BS Rawat, and the National Security Advisor were instructed at the highest level to stay up as long as the meeting in Beijing lasted with the Prime Minister and External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj on standby to guide them.

Gokhale apparently was surprised to find that the Chinese had fielded a very senior negotiator, believed to be a confidante of President Xi Jinping. The Chinese negotiator apparently was extremely conciliatory and expressed the opinion that neither China nor India gained from the stand-off, especially when they could accomplish many things together as two responsible powers working cooperatively. This was close to the Indian position that neither side stood to gain from a military confrontation. India had suggested that a simultaneous withdrawal was the only way out

“EXPEDITIOUS” NOT SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL
While the exact details of the negotiations are not known, the Chinese apparently suggested that instead of “simultaneous withdrawal” perhaps the two sides could agree to a “near simultaneous” withdrawal. Gokhale sought instructions and was told by his superiors in Delhi that this was acceptable if it helped resolve the stand-off.

It may be recalled that some strategic affairs experts were quick to point out that the phrase “expeditious withdrawal” instead of “simultaneous withdrawal” leaped out of the statement issued by India and that this was not merely a question of semantics.

Indeed, it was not.

India agreed to withdraw its troops to pre-June 16 position the next morning and Chinese agreed to do so a couple of hours later in the afternoon but before sun-down which is roughly at 5 PM in the Doklam area. Strict windows of two hours each – before noon for India and before sundown for China – were agreed upon.

It was also agreed that the brigadiers in-charge from the two sides would meet in the morning of the disengagement, Monday August 28. India had requested that in that meeting, the brigadier of the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) should show a written order from his superiors to his Indian counterpart instructing him to withdraw his troops to the posts they occupied before June 16, along with the road construction machinery deployed and the tents they had pitched in the area.

This was done to ensure two things.

One, to ensure that the PLA did not move only a few metres back from its stand-off position and still claim that technically it had disengaged – hence the insistence that they had to move to their pre-June 16 posts.

Two, all the road construction equipment and the tents pitched for accommodation had to be removed permanently.

In the afternoon, the Chinese sought half-an-hour extra for the withdrawal. Their explanation to the Indian side was that some extra digging was involved for removing the tents pitched there because their pegs were quite deep. India agreed as it has also exceeded its withdrawal time that morning by half an hour or so. By 4.30 PM the PLA had completed its withdrawal with its troops, machinery and tents being moved to pre-June 16 positions.

According to sources, this was how the military disengagement took place with Indian diplomacy putting its best foot forward. Both sides, sources say, showed immense amount of maturity. If India refused to go for a military confrontation insisting on a diplomatic resolution of the issue, the Chinese also dropped their insistence that India withdraw its troops first before talks. They initiated the talks and India gave them a way out by agreeing to what the Chinese might still call near simultaneous withdrawal of troops to establish peace.

[Double Edge]

New chapter written by India

Countering Chinese Coercion : The case of Doklam | War on the Rocks | Aug 29 2017

The Lessons of Doklam

First, Chinese behavior in territorial disputes is more likely to be deterred by denial than by threats of punishment. China will continue the combination of consolidating its physical presence and engaging in coercive diplomacy, lawfare, and media campaigns unless it is stopped directly. This is what India did at Doklam — it directly blocked Chinese efforts to change the status quo. Denial in other areas would require different military tasks — for example, in the Indian Ocean, it may involve anti-submarine warfare and maritime domain awareness.

Second, denial strategies may be effective, but they have their limitations. Denial is inherently risky. Countering China’s playbook involves risks of escalation — which most smaller adversaries, and at times even the United States, are unwilling to accept. Moreover, denial strategies can only serve to halt adversary action, not to reverse what the adversary has already done. As Doklam shows, India could convince China not to proceed with its road-building — but China did not relinquish its claims or its established pattern of presence in the area. Denial by itself offers no pathway to politically resolving the crisis.

Third, the agreement to disengage suggests that Beijing’s position in crises can be flexible, and perhaps responsive to assertive counter-coercion. Domestic audiences, even those in autocracies, often prefer sound judgment to recklessly staying the course.

Finally, the Doklam agreement, even if it is temporary, tells us that when China confronts a significantly weaker target, such as Bhutan, it will only be deterred by the actions of a stronger third party — in this case, India. The lesson of Doklam for the United States is that arming small states and imposing incremental costs may not be enough. Washington may have to accept the greater risks associated with intervening more directly if it hopes to counter Chinese expansion in East Asia.

There is also an interesting counter view as to the general applicability of Doklam to other areas

Why India did not 'win' the standoff with China | War on the Rocks | Sept 01 2017

Had been reading a few op-eds stating had the US been more assertive there would be no seven artificial islands in the SCS. Well, US can't be more assertive because

Take, for example, Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. The Doklam “model” would suggest that if China sought to build a permanent presence on the reef, the United States could stop Chinese land reclamation by intervening on behalf of the Philippines to block Chinese dredgers. Yet unlike India’s open support of Bhutan’s claim to sovereignty over Doklam, the United States maintains a position of neutrality on the sovereignty of the contested land features in the South China Sea and around the world.

Any U.S. intervention at Scarborough, then, would require that the United States alter this policy of neutrality. But changing this policy would have far-reaching implications for the U.S. role in all of China’s territorial disputes. The United States would potentially shoulder a raft of new security commitments that it may not be able to meet, especially if states opposing China in territorial disputes actively seek greater material support from Washington.

[Double Edge]

Second installment to general panag's article that has been overtaken by events. Will be useful for future reference (First part here)

How will Chinese use of force in Doklam manifest? | TOI (blogs) | Sep 03 2017

September 3, 2017, 8:05 AM IST Lt General H S Panag in Shooting Straight | India | TOI

Part 2 of my column, “How will Chinese use of force in Doklam manifest?” – where I intended to cover the operational strategy to deal with the crisis, has been overtaken by events. On 28 August mid day, we saw a rather tame end to the 74 days standoff at the Doklam Plateau.

The jury is still out on as to who “lost face”. In my view, China is unlikely to resume construction of the road towards the Zompleri Ridge in the near future, though it has not overtly committed to do so. Thus, even if Indian troops withdrew first, given China’s high pitch jingoist stand and India’s firm and cool diplomatic and military resolve, it is China that has clearly lost face. More so, when the world notes that Chinese unilateralism can be met with firm resolve rather than acquiescence.

In my last column I had highlighted the the likely contours of China’s use of force in Doklam. I had predicted a high technology attack in winter based on overwhelming use of precision guided munitions (PGMs) and Cyber Warfare to neutralise the likely Indian operational strategy of forcing the PLA into close combat over unfavourable high altitude terrain. Such an attack is defeated by hardened defences, deception, dispersion, kinetic / electronic shield, similar counter strikes and above all by preempting the enemy with an offensive.

While I am not privy to the actual military plans, it is my assessment that despite the limitations of the prevailing asymmetry, we adopted an operational strategy encompassing all or most of these aspects. The armed forces were mobilised under the deception cover of annual “operation alert” and offensive formations were poised or postured to pre-emptively threaten Sinche La (the PLA entry point into the Doklam Plateau) at the tactical level and threaten Yatung and Phari Dzong in the Chumbi Valley from west and the east at the strategic level.

Similar operational strategy was put in place in Ladakh to preemptively seize the Kailash Range and areas across the Pangong Tso. The IAF and the IN were on high alert and prepared for a limited war. Our conventional cruise missiles and strategic assets were moved to battle locations. At the strategic level, diplomatically and militarily India acted like a mature emerging power and did a classic Sun Tzu, who said, that the acme of skill, is to win without fighting!

The ignorant may celebrate with or without the jingoist rhetoric that has become the characteristic of our political and public approach, but the wise will focus on the reforms with respect to national security and the armed forces. Let us face it squarely, India has a China problem which stems from the asymmetry in comprehensive national power. While the asymmetry in economic power will improve slowly, it is the asymmetry in military power which must be addressed urgently through a strategic approach rather than tactical responses to recurring crisis. Every crisis presents opportunities and we must seize the opportunity presented by the Doklam crisis. No two situations are alike and future confrontations may follow a different pattern. However, any future limited war or border confrontation will be hybrid in nature and use of high end military technology will be predominant. First and foremost the government must carry out a comprehensive strategic review with respect to all aspects of national security. This must be done and owned by the government.

There is no point in setting up committees and then sit in arbitration to pick and reject recommendations and initiate low end tactical reforms. A formal National Security Strategy must be laid down from which must flow the National Military Strategy and Force Development / Transformation Strategy. The latter must include structural and organisational reforms in the armed forces to focus on quality rather than quantity. Higher defence management and decision making must be stream lined. Appoint a Chief of Defence Staff and create tri-service theatre commands. The approach must be holistic and not knee jerk as is the norm at present.

Our biggest handicap vis a vis China is our border infrastructure. At present our state is only 30% of what is desirable. A national effort must be put in to to lay national highways to all our borders. The vacant places close to the LIne of Actual Control must be filled up with industry and tourism infrastructure. The more the civilian presence, the lesser the chances of conflict. If industry and population centres can be set up in Greenland and Siberia, why can not we do so in our high altitude terrain?

The transformation of the armed forces particularly in the field of high military technology must be completed in five years. The asymmetry vis a vis China in PGMs, cyber technology, surveillance, reconnaissance and target acquisition must be wiped out. The armed forces need anti missile shields based on kinetic and electronic systems. Our air defence capability needs to increase manifold.

Our defences stand out like sore thumbs, are no different from what we prepared a 100 years ago and are sitting ducks for stand off ground or air delivered PGMs. We need to create modern concretised tunnel based defences particularly in the areas of differing perceptions. ITBP must be placed under the command of the army.

At the moment we have only a dissuasive defensive strategy to stalemate the PLA over unfavourable terrain and that too based on premises of previous wars. Our offensive capability has severe qualitative limitations. We need to develop a potent offensive capability to take the battle on to the Tibetan plateau. There is no point raising Mountain Strike Corps based on World War 2 organisations. For offensive in the Tibetan plateau we need motorised/ mechanised formations supplemented by aero mobile capability for air transported operations and logistics. Military stations must set up in the vicinity of the LAC both for offensive and defensive formations to keep them trained and acclimatised for war at short notice. Our capability to fight in winters needs to be enhanced.

I have focussed on the army, but similar reforms are even more urgent for the IAF and the Indian Navy which will play a decisive role in a future conflict.

Our armed forces have been busy fighting a Fourth Generation War since 1990, arming and training to fight a Third Generation War with structures, organisations and operational strategy of a Second Generation War, and ignoring the high technology driven Hybrid War.

Despite our limitations, we have weathered the Doklam Storm, but now we must reform to bridge the asymmetry or we will bumble along from crisis to crisis fraught with apprehensions and uncertainty about the outcome.

[Double Edge]

Have we disengaged or not ?!? Disengaged yes, de-escalated yes, full withdrawal, not yet

Disengagement at Doklam: Troops stepped back 150 metres each side, remain on plateau | IE | Sept 07 2017

Sources also told The Indian Express that the current state of redeployment, where the two groups of soldiers are at a distance of 300 metres, is only an intermediary stage. They are hopeful that the two sides will further withdraw from their current locations, eventually resulting in a status quo as on June 16, when the Chinese road construction party had moved in. Sources refused to put a firm date on completion of full withdrawal but were hopeful that it could be in a matter of weeks, if not days, as it is dependent on the internal Chinese political calendar, which includes the Communist Party Congress next month.

Top government sources told The Indian Express that the Army’s proposal for better operational readiness of troops on the China border in Eastern Command has been implemented. This involves keeping one-third troops in every brigade in a high-altitude area at all time, where they remain acclimatised to operate at high altitudes and can be deployed at short notice.

Simultaneous plans to move forward certain artillery guns and ammunition from their peace-time locations has also been implemented, while Army engineers have been told to focus on construction of habitat, tracks and helipads in view of these deployments. A plan to improve surveillance capabilities on the China border, by deploying UAVs, is also being put in place, sources said. Although these actions have been initiated after the Doklam standoff, they are based on assessment of future Chinese moves in border areas, sources said.

Internal Chinese political calendar : |

[Double Edge]

Criticises the US for not seeing the parallels between Doklam and the SCS

A Failure of Strategic Vision: U.S. Policy and the Doklam Border Dispute | Stratblog | Sept 06 2017

Ten days before the dispute resolution, on August 18th, the Japanese Ambassador to India came out in support of India’s position, responding to reporter questions by stating, “What is important in disputed areas is that all parties involved do not resort to unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force, and resolve the dispute in a peaceful manner.”

Sadly, the United States never did join Japan in giving China a clear rebuke for its unilateral activity in the Doklam dispute. The Trump administration, seemingly pre-occupied with internal strife, an ongoing investigation of Russian interference in the 2016 Presidential election, and the challenge posed by a bellicose nuclear North Korea, never made an official White House or National Security Council statement about the India-China stand-off. In response to reporter questions in separate events, spokespeople for the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Department of Defense called for a peaceful resolution to the crisis without addressing the obvious issue of Chinese provocation. U.S. Pacific Commander, Admiral Harry Harris, also demurred when asked about the similarities in Chinese coercion in the South China Sea and Doklam, stating, “I think that’s a determination that India is going to have to make itself. I don’t want to speak for India …I believe that their (Chinese) actions in the East China Sea and the South China Sea are aggressive…And they are coercive to their neighbors…”

In these tepid statements, the Trump administration side-stepped the obvious parallels between Chinese coercion in the South China Sea and that witnessed in the Doklam events.

In the South China Sea, China used its coast guard and government controlled construction crews to seize, hold and build upon disputed atolls and shoals. China did so in a way that disadvantaged smaller states who were party to the dispute and in a fashion that confused and limited any timely military move by allied states – particularly the U.S. – to contest China’s unilateral change of the status quo.

At Doklam, China pushed forward a paramilitary road construction crew in an effort to pave over an unimproved road claimed by both Beijing and by Bhutan, a much smaller state. Informed by decades of border dispute experience with China and acutely sensitive to a move by Beijing in the Himalayas that looked frightfully similar to the pattern of Chinese coercion of smaller states in the eastern Pacific, India moved with alacrity and purpose. New Delhi’s move of its paramilitary and military forces into position to blunt the unilateral Chinese action upped the ante, demonstrating that India viewed Chinese moves in a security context – as a coercive attempt to change the status quo without regard to appropriate diplomatic resolution of territorial ownership.

The counter view is had the US said anything it would have made China less willing to negotiate as they would want to portray this as standing up to the US. This reason has been attributed to China blocking India's NSG bid.

Bilateral was better

By taking this first move with security forces in the Doklam dispute, India peacefully secured several important strategic objectives.

First, the Chinese road building crew won’t finish its assigned task in 2017. India’s military detachment blocked China from improving this disputed road before arrival of the monsoon rains of September and the subsequent harsh winter in the Himalayas.

Second, India exercised resolute and successful support for a longstanding regional ally, Bhutan. China’s road improvement gambit was seen in Bhutan and New Delhi as a grab of disputed land claimed by Bhutan, and a violation of the 2012 agreement that tri-junction boundary points are to be decided only through consultation between all three parties.

Third, India displayed an ability to arrest a Chinese effort to unilaterally alter facts on disputed ground by “exercising” jurisdiction on the territory with unchallenged physical activity. In this sense, India thwarted China from achieving what it has been doing successfully in the South China Sea: unilaterally changing the physical facts in a disputed area to enhance its claims over that territory by land building.

In this final strategic achievement – blunting a Chinese effort to unilaterally change the status quo with physical activity prior to consultation or accord with contesting parties – India accomplished something worthy of international acclaim.

Where U.S. and international response to China’s island-building in the South China Sea has arguably come too little and too late, the Indian military seized the moment and got security forces in front of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) bulldozer crews on June 16th before the Chinese could build-on and hold disputed territory. The Japanese understood the parallels, thus the Japanese Ambassador to India was unequivocal in calling out the Chinese attempt at coercion.

There certainly are lessons to be learnt by others here

[Oracle]

DE, I mixed things up. Those replies were not meant for you. It was for a Chinese/Pak troll that said there would be a nuclear war between Indian and China over the Doklam issue and Pak would take back PoK. I mixed it up, my bad buddy.

Yeah, I do post in different forums, terrorist forums.

Btw, I was on my spiritual break. In the north east. Damn, such bad infrastructure. Will post later. Just arrived. :-)))