Been a while since i read anything from Dan Markey of CFR on the subject. He's mostly on the right path
Preparing for Heightened Tensions Between China and India | CFR | Apr 19 2021
I'm surprised he thinks the US could be drawn into a direct confrontation with China because of India.
This atypical streak of nationalistic ambition and risk acceptance is what had reduced the Paks to insignificance and kept China at bay. We're not looking for a fight but are acting to deter it.
India too can force China into a costly trap of land border defenses which means less for their navy. That will in turn benefit others in the region.
Agreed
He agrees that the Bombay power grid failure was a result of Chinese hacking. No doubt we need to work more on cyber. Whenever GOI makes up its mind
He points to the article 370 decision likely contributed to regional tensions will hold no water in Delhi. Had posted a good rebuttal by Sushant Sareen to this point but am unable to locate that post
China has not mentioned what its reasons were for the latest standoff. What did come across to me was Pakistan's diminishing nuisance value which meant China had to take matters into their own hands.
I have no idea where his point 5 is coming from. Spring is over. Why will China want to start something again this year given how last year went.
Better to wait a bit, and then try again. We will be ready
Good idea. Thanks to Trump we were successfully able to deal with a staggered two front challenge and come out on top.
Took deft footwork by Pompeo to handle. Also Alice Wells deserves a mention here. Her performance at the senate hearing on 370 was exemplary. Doubt any GOI official could have put across our case better than she did.
Preparing for Heightened Tensions Between China and India | CFR | Apr 19 2021
Washington’s eagerness to cultivate deeper strategic ties with New Delhi needs to be tempered by an appreciation of the risks and how its own actions have the potential to affect Indian and Chinese behavior for better or worse. U.S. strategic commitments and support to India should be carefully calibrated in a way that satisfies two imperatives:
- On the one hand, Washington’s assurances and material assistance to New Delhi should aim to reduce India’s vulnerability to Chinese coercion and aggression, thereby lessening the likelihood that the United States would be placed in the uncomfortable position of either living up to its commitments and being drawn into a direct confrontation with China or backing off those commitments and dealing a blow to U.S.-India relations.
- On the other hand, however, U.S. support should avoid emboldening India to extend its strategic aims and act during any future crisis in ways that threaten U.S. interests. This concern is not hypothetical; under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s leadership, Indian policies in Kashmir and military escalations with China and Pakistan have already demonstrated an atypical streak of nationalistic ambition and risk-acceptance. Feeding aggressive Indian tendencies would also increase the likelihood that China would respond by accelerating its deployment of new or redirected forces along the land border. Together, those behaviors would raise the risks and stakes of China-India land border conflict. It would also suck New Delhi into a costly trap of focusing ever greater attention and resources on land border defenses rather than on its navy, even though India’s geography offers it unique strategic advantages in the Indian Ocean.
This atypical streak of nationalistic ambition and risk acceptance is what had reduced the Paks to insignificance and kept China at bay. We're not looking for a fight but are acting to deter it.
India too can force China into a costly trap of land border defenses which means less for their navy. That will in turn benefit others in the region.
The United States should thus aim to enhance India’s independent capacity to defend against Chinese aggression, taking care to prioritize assistance that helps India deter future Chinese aggression mainly by denying Beijing easy or low-cost opportunities to extend military control over territories along their contested land border and by improving India’s resilience against Chinese cyberattacks and economic coercion.
A U.S. strategy aimed at achieving the right combination of U.S. priorities—not only improving the U.S.-India partnership but also preventing or mitigating the escalation of crises between China and India—should have five components.
1) The United States should prioritize assistance that improves India’s ability to anticipate and parry Chinese military moves, without encouraging major new Indian investments in offensive capabilities.
2) In meetings of the U.S.-India Cyber Dialogue or a new working-level mechanism, the United States should identify opportunities to help India improve its resilience to Chinese cyberattacks.
3) To enhance India’s ability to deter and withstand possible Chinese economic coercion, the United States should work with India and other like-minded states, especially Quad partners Australia and Japan, to identify and develop a coordinated multiparty response strategy.
4) The United States should seek diplomatic opportunities to promote restraint and remove obstacles to the peaceful resolution of disputes between China, India, and Pakistan.
5) The United States should prepare its own policymakers for the possibility of a new China-India crisis as early as this spring or summer.
1) The United States should prioritize assistance that improves India’s ability to anticipate and parry Chinese military moves, without encouraging major new Indian investments in offensive capabilities.
2) In meetings of the U.S.-India Cyber Dialogue or a new working-level mechanism, the United States should identify opportunities to help India improve its resilience to Chinese cyberattacks.
3) To enhance India’s ability to deter and withstand possible Chinese economic coercion, the United States should work with India and other like-minded states, especially Quad partners Australia and Japan, to identify and develop a coordinated multiparty response strategy.
4) The United States should seek diplomatic opportunities to promote restraint and remove obstacles to the peaceful resolution of disputes between China, India, and Pakistan.
5) The United States should prepare its own policymakers for the possibility of a new China-India crisis as early as this spring or summer.
He points to the article 370 decision likely contributed to regional tensions will hold no water in Delhi. Had posted a good rebuttal by Sushant Sareen to this point but am unable to locate that post
China has not mentioned what its reasons were for the latest standoff. What did come across to me was Pakistan's diminishing nuisance value which meant China had to take matters into their own hands.
I have no idea where his point 5 is coming from. Spring is over. Why will China want to start something again this year given how last year went.
Better to wait a bit, and then try again. We will be ready
In addition to their outreach to Indian counterparts, Biden administration officials should consult closely with Donald Trump–era officials to learn from their experience during the 2020 China-India and 2019 India-Pakistan crises. Those consultations and exercises should help inform a playbook for future China-India crises that would include military and intelligence moves as well as U.S. options for coordinating diplomatic messaging with India in ways that bolster its ability to withstand Chinese pressure, encourage restraint, and open the door to a face-saving de-escalation.
Took deft footwork by Pompeo to handle. Also Alice Wells deserves a mention here. Her performance at the senate hearing on 370 was exemplary. Doubt any GOI official could have put across our case better than she did.
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