Border face-off: China and India each deploy 3,000 troops

[Double Edge]

I've often wondered why NATO does not join US in FONOPS. They do transits of the SCS but NATO will not pass through territorial waters of the disputed islands like the US. No article i've seen about transits by UK, France, Canada or Australia has the words territorial waters or 12 nautical miles. Am article i read of a planed German transit explicitly said it would not pass within territorial waters or the 12 nautical mile limit of disputed islands

No NATO ship transits territorial waters of disputed reclaimed islands as McCain advocated for USN.

NATO will pass through the EEZ but no closer. Why ? as far as China is concerned there is no difference between NATO & USN. Rather it is NATO members that are reluctant to do so. They have their own reasons.

Well, until recently this was Canada's position

Look for an Increasingly Active Canada in the South China Sea | The Diplomat | Jun 12 2021

In 2016, Conservative Canadian Senator Thanh Hai Ngo introduced a motion for Canada to take a more “principled position” on China’s adventurism in the South China Sea. Adopted in April 2018, Ngo’s motion was non-binding and passed by a chamber out of favor with Canadians – but its central proposition is actualizing in policy.

First, the Trudeau government has sharply changed its willingness to direct condemnations at China specifically, a departure from when it employed rhetoric that uniformly told all parties to adhere to international law.

Second, the Royal Canadian Navy’s (RCN) transits within the waters and traverses near the hotly contested islands demonstrate a Canada that is more resolved to standing up to China.

Interesting that a motion that fails to pass somehow ends up in policy. Maybe the motion was ahead of its time.

The RCN has on various occasions transited the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea (while shadowed by Chinese vessels), raising the ire of Beijing. One very recent example came on March 29-30, when the frigate HMCS Calgary passed by the Spratly Islands during a trip from Brunei to Vietnam. Even if Canada does not engage in U.S. freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs), its naval presence in the South China Sea is unmistakably higher compared to years past. Those that know Canadian foreign policy well also know the importance of maintaining a healthy separation from U.S. policy – so it shouldn’t be too surprising that Canada is choosing its own path in demonstrating assertiveness against China’s adventurism.

Very good

The tone has changed for Ottawa. Sajjan told the House of Common’s special committee on China in April of this year that “Canada opposes land reclamation projects and building outposts in disputed areas for military purposes.” Canadian Ambassador to the Philippines Peter MacArthur stated in a March 24 tweet that Canada “opposes recent Chinese actions in the South China Sea, including off the coast of the Philippines.”

What is behind this change from maintaining a healthy separation from US policy ? or what has caused a rapprochement with US policy by Canada

Today, a big question remains whether Canada should participate in U.S.-led FONOPs in the South China Sea. Canada’s conspicuous silence on U.S.-led FONOPs is chained to the concern that Ottawa will set a precedent for the Canada-U.S. dispute over the Northwest Passage, a bourgeoning waterway through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago that the U.S. maintains is an international conduit.

Canada does not want others transiting its internal waters but may not have a choice since the US insists its international waters..

On the other hand, it can be argued that Canada’s Arctic sovereignty interest is a pull factor to the South China Sea. Worryingly, as Ngo highlighted in his position paper: “in 2016, the China Maritime Safety Organization published a detailed shipping guidebook to the Northwest Passage.” In September of 2017, Xinhua News Agency wrote that the icebreaker Xuelong “accumulated a wealth of experience for Chinese ships going through the Northwest Passage in the future.”

If China is already willing to sail through a narrow, weaving waterway in what Ottawa claims as Canadian internal waters, why should Canada hesitate to sail through an open sea that hosts trillions of dollars’ worth of international trade?

That's why

[Double Edge]

Notable because this is the first time China has ever been declared so by NATO. Called out by name.

Nato summit: leaders declare China presents security risk | Guardian | Jun 14 2021

The Nato leaders declared their concern about China’s “coercive policies” – an apparent reference to the repression of the Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang – the expansion of its nuclear arsenal and its “frequent lack of transparency and use of disinformation”.

Odd there is no mention about neighbouring countries in the context of coercion ?

I'm still not onboard for this Chinese expansion of nuclear arsenal bit. Chinese decided they only needed so many when there were far more nukes around in the world so why would they want to increase their stockpile now when there are fewer nukes these days.

Makes no sense.

The language, notably stronger than the China remarks contained in the G7 statement agreed on Sunday, follows lobbying and pressure by the Biden administration, seeking to create a counterweight of democratic nations in response to Beijing’s growing economic and military might.

However, Nato’s secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, insisted China was “not an adversary”, saying instead the emerging strategy was to address “the challenges” posed by Beijing, which will “soon be the biggest economy in the world” and “already has the second-largest defence budget, the biggest navy”.

Wish he'd unpack "the challenges"

China had never previously been mentioned in a Nato summit declaration, apart from a brief reference in 2019 to the “opportunities and challenges” the country posed for members of the western alliance – a time when Biden’s predecessor, Donald Trump, was president.

On Sunday night, Jake Sullivan, the US national security adviser, promised Nato would increase its focus on Beijing, saying that China “will feature in the communique in a more robust way than we’ve ever seen before”.

So the tone has changed then since Biden entered office.

Alliance members agreed a new cybersecurity strategy in response, and will for the first time help each other out in the case of “cyber-attacks of significance”, mirroring Nato’s obligation of collective defence in the traditional military sphere, enshrined in article 5.

Agreed

[Officer of Engineers]

I'm still not onboard for this Chinese expansion of nuclear arsenal bit. Chinese decided they only needed so many when there were far more nukes around in the world so why would they want to increase their stockpile now when there are fewer nukes these days.

Makes no sense.

The term should be modernization, not expansion. The threat to the Chinese nuclear arsenal has increased dramatically or more accurately, the threat to the Chinese nuclear strategic effectiveness has increased dramatically. Non-nuclear precision guided munitions has put all of Chinese launch sites under question. Whatever survives now must punch through American ABM defences. You can do much with shell games, mobility, and camoflauge but at some point, you have to increase numbers.

[Double Edge]

The term should be modernization, not expansion. The threat to the Chinese nuclear arsenal has increased dramatically or more accurately, the threat to the Chinese nuclear strategic effectiveness has increased dramatically. Non-nuclear precision guided munitions has put all of Chinese launch sites under question. Whatever survives now must punch through American ABM defences. You can do much with shell games, mobility, and camoflauge but at some point, you have to increase numbers.

Not modernization then, but survivability.

And this entails an increase of numbers.

Their doctrine remains unchanged,

I do not consider this increase a threat then.

NATO leaders disagree

[Officer of Engineers]

NATO leaders disagree

Of course they do. How else to justify NATO's existence, and, therefore, some sort of tempering of American military dominance. China got the largest blue water navy in terms of numbers but in terms of tonnage, the Americans outweigh them 2 to 1. The Russians are number 2 in tonnage. To prevent the Americans from unilaterally declaring WWIII, you have to put your people in harm's way - to say you can handle the Chinese without American help ... and therefore, without American fingers on the WWIII trigger. The easiest way to do this is to get the Chinese to back down. A united front is a way to accomplish this.

[Double Edge]

Of course they do. How else to justify NATO's existence, and, therefore, some sort of tempering of American military dominance.

Does not make good copy. Sure.

I mean it makes no difference. All China is doing is maintaining a credible deterrent.

A deterrent China had to get because they were threatened twice, by Mack during the Korean war and Ike during the Straits crisis later that decade.

If NATO was ok with their test at Lop Nor and all it entailed back then why the fuss now ?

Why did you let them into the nuclear club to begin with. At the time China was not a friend and most definitely a foe.

From India's perspective nothing changes. We're not the ones being threatened with a nuke attack by warfighting powers Russia or the US like China.

Should that change we too would follow a similar path to increase the survivability of our nuclear deterrent.

China got the largest blue water navy in terms of numbers but in terms of tonnage, the Americans outweigh them 2 to 1. The Russians are number 2 in tonnage. To prevent the Americans from unilaterally declaring WWIII, you have to put your people in harm's way - to say you can handle the Chinese without American help ... and therefore, without American fingers on the WWIII trigger. The easiest way to do this is to get the Chinese to back down. A united front is a way to accomplish this.

I don't know how things will develop with China. We're in a brave new world says our former ambassador.

Our former ambassador to China does not rule out a border skirmish escalating into a war. We may not have a choice in the matter.

From a commentators pov this is a safe position to assume but i'm not sure how likely. China has nothing to gain going to war with India.

He figures relations are in a downward spiral given
- we've blocked their apps, 5G participation is restricted and their investments will face more scrutiny.
- no consensus on the border or any willingness to delineate it for long now.
- we're not normalising relations unless border issues are more stable. India is predicating improvement of relations on restoration of status quo ante which the Chinese are not interested in.

As for your bolded bit, best India can hope for from the Americans should things go south is
- threatening moves on China's east coast. We saw this already last year with the two CBG's in the SCS.
- help with supplies. The cold weather gear came in handy last time around.

So that is a working model. At this point in time. Barring any alliance coming about.

The rest is in our hands.

India isn't just a front line state. India is a first responder and should be gearing up for that role.

The first casualties in this fight with China are Indian.

India is the only country this century to have killed PLA. Nobody else can claim that yet.

I get your point though. It would be a good outcome if their deterrent is not increased which then makes them more vulnerable.

Thing is i don't know how you stop them increasing their deterrent given Chinese experience of the 50s.

[Officer of Engineers]

It's called the Great Powers Game, something India should be very well aware of.

[Double Edge]

TIme to start playing it then

Couple of advocacy pieces

NATO: India’s next geopolitical destination | HT (op-ed) | Mar 23 2021

When the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) leaders meet later this year, they will debate the recommendations from a group of experts (which I co-chaired) that advocates, among other things, extending a formal offer of partnership to India. Such an idea has been discussed before but has always foundered on India’s aversion to entanglement in rival geopolitical blocs. It’s time to overcome this obstacle.

As China’s aggressive actions in the Galwan Valley and other border areas demonstrate, Beijing is increasingly willing to depart from its hide-and-bide strategy to directly challenge even the largest of its neighbours. This behavioural shift is likely to accelerate as China’s military capabilities expand. Already, China spends more on its military than all of its immediate neighbours combined, and nearly three times as much as India.

In these circumstances, India’s longstanding strategy of careful equi-distancing, punctuated by tilts toward China and Russia, is not viable; inevitably, New Delhi will have to undertake more deliberate efforts to counter-balance the juggernaut of Chinese power. To this end, it has already begun to deepen bilateral defence ties with Japan, the United States (US), and other regional players threatened by China, including through Quad.

Becoming a NATO partner would be a natural extension of this evolution with several upsides and few risks.

While NATO partnerships do not carry the Article 5 guarantee of collective defence against armed attack, they nevertheless come with regular defence dialogues, military-to-military planning, and joint exercises that improve readiness, interoperability and predictability.

In the event of a conflict, India would benefit from having prior planning and arrangements in place for cooperating with NATO and its Mediterranean partners (including Israel, with which India has a close strategic relationship) to secure its western flank and the approaches to the Red Sea.

Partnering with NATO would not significantly constrain India’s broader geostrategic options. Egypt and Israel are both NATO partners who maintain defence relationships with Russia. Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, and Austria are all NATO partners with long-standing neutralist traditions. NATO’s partnerships are highly customised arrangements. In India’s case, the sheer size and importance of the country may warrant a new and special category of partnership — one that combines periodic high-level dialogue, technological cooperation and defence planning for maritime contingencies.

Strengthening ties with NATO now, while China is still in the early phase of a shift to a more assertive posture toward both South Asia and Europe, could pay dividends in dissuading aggression and ensuring that, should China continue on its current trajectory, India has as many friends as possible in the right places.


A Wess Mitchell served as US assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia from 2017-2019 and as co-chair of the NATO 2030 Reflection Process. He currently serves as a principal at the Marathon Initiative.

Why India must not say ‘no’ to NATO | IE | Apr 06 2021

India has military exchanges with many members of NATO — including the US, Britain, and France — in bilateral and minilateral formats. Why, then, is a collective engagement with NATO problematic? If Delhi does military exercises with two countries with which it has serious security problems — China and Pakistan — under the rubric of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), why should talking to NATO be anathema?

India’s real problem is not with NATO, but with Delhi’s difficulty in thinking strategically about Europe. This inhibition has deep roots. Through the colonial era, Calcutta and Delhi viewed Europe through British eyes. After Independence, Delhi tended to see Europe through the Russian lens. In the last few years, Delhi has begun to develop an independent European framework, but has some distance to go in consolidating it. Talking to NATO ought to be one important part of India’s European strategy.

British Rule in India involved a continuous struggle against rival European powers. First it had to prevail over the Portuguese, Dutch and the French. Then it had to constantly keep an eye on the plans of other European powers to undermine British hegemony in the Subcontinent. In this so-called Great Game — with France, Germany and Russia at different stages — suspicion of Europe was written into the Indian establishment’s DNA. In the great reversal after Independence, driven by multiple considerations that we need not go into here, Delhi came to rely on the Soviet Union for its security in the Cold War, amidst India’s widening political divide with the West.

As the Cold War enveloped the world, nuancing Europe became harder in Delhi. India began to see West Europe as an extension of the US and Eastern Europe as a collection of Soviet satellites. Europe’s many internal contradictions did not disappear in the Cold War; but Delhi’s rigid ideological framing of the world in East-West and North-South axes left little room for a creative engagement with Europe.

Delhi appears to be poised for a vigorous new push into Europe this year. A pragmatic engagement with NATO must be an important part of India’s new European orientation especially amidst the continent’s search for a new role in the Indo-Pacific.

NATO is not offering membership to India; nor is Delhi interested. At issue is the question of exploring potential common ground. To play any role in the Indo-Pacific, Europe and NATO need partners like India, Australia and Japan. Delhi, in turn, knows that no single power can produce stability and security in the Indo-Pacific. India’s enthusiasm for the Quad is a recognition of the need to build coalitions.

Would Russia be upset with India’s engagement with NATO? Russia has not made a secret of its allergy to the Quad and Delhi’s dalliance with Washington. Putting NATO into that mix is unlikely to make much difference. Delhi, in turn, can’t be happy with the deepening ties between Moscow and Beijing. As mature states, India and Russia know they have to insulate their bilateral relationship from the larger structural trends buffeting the world today.

China has long understood Europe’s salience and invested massively in cultivating it. Delhi’s continued reluctance to engage a major European institution like NATO will be a stunning case of strategic self-denial.

If India can join the quad i don't see what the obstacles are for becoming a NATO partner. It's not like we'd be the only one having relations with Russia.

The obstacles are not coming from NATO that is clear.

I also get the feeling that Russia's opposition to India getting into the quad is the byproduct of a bigger fear that India would become NATO partner next.

Well, India needs to decide which of the two Russia or NATO can help India deter China. The answer is both.

[Officer of Engineers]

TIme to start playing it then

Why don't you ask Pakistan how well NATO partnership has worked out for them?

[Double Edge]

Why don't you ask Pakistan how well NATO partnership has worked out for them?

Don't see the relevance. They didn't have a choice. India does.

Can't see any scenario where their experience could be remotely comparable.

As i sad earlier we either win together or lose.

Hang together or hang separately as the Aussie PM put it recently.

Early days still, not seen much domestic discussion about NATO partnership yet.

Some see it as unnecessary at this point in time which begs the question when does it become necessary if at all.

I prefer deterrence by denial vs. by punishment.

Partnerships are an extension of joint-ness from intra to inter country

Like Japan, Korea, NZ & Australia. They interact with NATO

The kind of reply you gave i expect from an Indian bureaucrat of the foreign office that is avoiding doing his damn job.

Strengthening ties with NATO now, while China is still in the early phase of a shift to a more assertive posture toward both South Asia and Europe, could pay dividends in dissuading aggression and ensuring that, should China continue on its current trajectory, India has as many friends as possible in the right places.

This is the bit that needs more thought.

What does now bring that can't be had later.

What does now entail giving up in exchange. What are the tradeoffs.

India's fundamental problem with the west is you propped up our opponents and left a bigger mess to clean up.

The silver lining is over time our problems became yours.

Your relations have since soured with the Paks & Chinese.

We've come full circle. So India's erstwhile ideological objections to such a partnership are outdated today.

Modi is making a push for trade with the EU after the deal with China collapsed. So reaching out to the EU is going to increase.

What i didn't expect with better EU relations is the possibility of a NATO partnership

[Double Edge]

Raja explains more in this discussion. It's about opening dialogue

Nobody is asking India to join NATO. This is a more of a consultative mechanism.

Political, military, intel consultations. Operational engagements are way way down the road. We are no way near to doing that.

Engaging with NATO's military diplomacy

India does military diplomacy with a few countries already so what is the harm with interacting with NATO here.

Simple consultations are doable, strategic ones will take more time.

Raja says it does not matter what Russia thinks. Russia talks to NATO. India does not. After quad, talking to NATO does not make things worse.

Russia does not stop talking to China because we don't like it. Russians find ways to keep us happy. We will need to do the same with Russia as well.

We talk to the Americans & French on Indo Pacific. We exercise with them.

If NATO wants into the region India does not have a mechanism to interact with them as yet.

NATO has lot of experience with Afghanistan. India has no way to talk to them about it.

NATO is a key platform to forge convergence on responding to the security implications of a rising China

Very often the main tool of NATO isn't a military operation but political dialogue, partnerships, capacity building, different kinds of political cooperation.

So there are many ways to work together that does not directly involve military operations and missions..

NATO Sec. General Stoltenberg was invited to this years Raisina dialogue. This is the first visit by NATO at this dialogue.

[Officer of Engineers]

Don't see the relevance. They didn't have a choice. India does.

Can't see any scenario where their experience could be remotely comparable.

Simple. You think India will be in the driver's seat. Pakistan's experience tells you that NATO will be in the driver's seat. Everytime Pakistan tries to move into the driver's seat such as blocking transit ways into Afghanistan, NATO worked around it. Despite having a major leverages, Afghanistan, killing the Taliban on her own territory, sufferring 1000s of casualties (including civilian), NATO gave zero conisderations to Pakistan's needs. Now, you think you have leverage because a dozen Chinese soldiers died? That is delusional to say the least.

BTW, India will be joing the same club as Pakistan, major Non-NATO ally. It conveys ZERO treaty obligations. India will NOT be joining NATO, being she is NOT in the North Atlantic.

[Double Edge]

Simple. You think India will be in the driver's seat. Pakistan's experience tells you that NATO will be in the driver's seat. Everytime Pakistan tries to move into the driver's seat such as blocking transit ways into Afghanistan, NATO worked around it. Despite having a major leverages, Afghanistan, killing the Taliban on her own territory, sufferring 1000s of casualties (including civilian), NATO gave zero conisderations to Pakistan's needs.

Pakistan was never a partner you could rely on because your aims were at cross purposes at the outset. Best part is everybody knew this and still went ahead.

Show me where that is the case with India & the wider world ?

What is NATO's net result in Afghanistan today ? the people your toppled are coming back. Thanks to Pakistan who strung you along.

Now China will fill the vacuum there. And all of us have to find some sort of modus vivendi.

It's not about being in the drivers seat but being in a position to influence actions. Think about that. We know the region, what works and does not.

We had no say before.

Now, you think you have leverage because a dozen Chinese soldiers died? That is delusional to say the least.

Until you get in the firing line like us then what i said stands true. Add to that our actions of late Aug.

Yes, it shocked them. Psychological leverage. They knew we were not backing off. They knew they had been bested.

They don't have the grit to fight in the mountains like we can. This has become increasingly clear over the months especially to them.

A dozen ? no. The Russians peg it at 45, the Americans at over a 100.

A bunch of conscript kids has no chance against pros. Figures will be way higher for them

Took them eight months to even acknowledge their casualties. Their families lost their only child.

Who wants to fight for such an army.

BTW, India will be joing the same club as Pakistan, major Non-NATO ally. It conveys ZERO treaty obligations. India will NOT be joining NATO, being she is NOT in the North Atlantic.

This has been made clear right from the start. The surprise is why would a North Atlantic org be interested in the region. Their threat perceptions changed.

Whatever present alliance structures that exist are inadequate. More partners needed. More collaboration needed.

Backstop India and you defer problems later. Even Bush realised this and that's how we got the nuke deal.

What was the result of that deal ? did we buy American reactors. Did we increase our power generation from nuclear. Was it NPT through the back door as Brig. Ray said. No.

America's friends became our friends. The people that sanctioned us and did not want to talk to us invited us into this quad.

Now, continue decoupling, diversify supply chains, knit a network of allies and partners together and we never have to fight China.

Samir mentioned starting a track two when some one called Bregelman was in charge but nothing came of it. That was a decade back.

Figures. Back then China was not on anybody's radar. Until 2019 everybody wanted China to succeed. We certainly tried.

NATO thinks otherwise these days as their Sec. General mentioned.

From an Indian pov, whatever NATO has in mind for China had damn well be better than their Afghan plan

[Double Edge]

AIM mentioned buildup in Tibet but never got into much details. Here is an article that goes in depth

Tracking China's Sudden Airpower Expansion On Its Western Border | The Drive | Jun 16 2021

It's finally dawned on them that they were outclassed as far as their air force against India is concerned so they are making amends.



Question is how effective will they be at high altitude.

All a long runway does is allow fully loaded planes to LAND. It does not allow them to take off more than 50% loaded.

So they will need twice as many birds. This means more targets for us to take out.

Across its westernmost provinces, China has laid down new runways that expand the overall capacity for the PLAAF to operate in this strategic border region. The emergence of hardened aircraft shelters and underground facilities associated with various airbases has also increased the survivability of military assets deployed in the region, while the enlargement of support facilities helps boost readiness levels and the potential sustainability of air operations along the wider Chinese border with India.

Though much of this infrastructure development is focused on enabling and supporting fixed-wing airpower, there are many other significant aspects of this relentless infrastructure expansion effort. This includes expanding or building entirely new bases for helicopters, as well as ground forces, to include air defense assets, and logistics facilities.

The sudden acceleration of infrastructure development in Tibet and Xinjiang is linked directly to the rising geopolitical tensions between India and China. Border tensions between the two countries have informed a heightened military posture, though the competition between the two powers covers much more than competing territorial claims within the Himalayas. The expansion of military capabilities in this border area underpins a wider and longer-term regional competition over political, economic and military power.

The massive expansion of China's existing airbase facilities and the building of new ones underscores just how aggressive its push to wield power over the region truly is. To put it frankly, the expansion is breathtaking in its scale and harkens back to the early 2010s in the South China Sea in terms of how fast Beijing is working to shift the strategic reality in the region on its own terms.

Air force does not win wars. Show me what their ground forces can do. Their last demonstration impressed nobody.

With deployments increasing in the area, the new hardened aircraft shelters will also allow China to increase the survivability of its aircraft when on the ground, by protecting them against bombardments as well as environmental exposure. Perhaps more importantly, they will also conceal their presence to future observation through reconnaissance flights or satellite imagery. Until now, aircraft at Ngari Gunsa had been stationed on the open tarmac, without means of cover or concealment.

So its the concealment aspect they are going for. Address this with HUMINT. India has more pull with the Tibetans than China ever will.

The overall purpose of these PLAAF infrastructure developments in China's westernmost regions is clearly centered around projecting increased airpower along the largely disputed border with India, and improving the sustainability of air operations in case of actual armed conflict. As such, the construction drive backs up China’s aggressive territorial policies along its western border areas by helping to ensure control of the skies over them.

Increased airpower from not a lot. Does not mean offensive. It means better able to defend.

The unavoidable strategic implication of the buildup, of course, is a significant expansion of China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) bubble along the entire stretch of its western border. As Chinese capabilities in this area grow, it will become more difficult for India or other neighboring nations to attempt to match its pace and maintain anything resembling a balance of power in the region.

It's not like we're sitting still. China no longer has any say on our infrastructure builds and build we shall to bring the fight to them.

More they spend in the region the less they have elsewhere. We're already making our presence felt.

In addition, it is important to note that these developments are well in line with similar military and dual-use infrastructure expansion initiatives in other Chinese border regions, such as across areas that are the responsibility of the PLA's Southern Theater Command and deep into the South China Sea. All of these combine to form an assertive infrastructure-driven policy toward securing vast territorial claims. The well-documented development of Chinese military facilities in the South China Sea in fact provides what can be regarded as a template to the rapid development of persistant military capabilities and combat capacity, as well as the sustainment of A2/AD bubbles that other border areas are now witnessing.

Don't know why he compares this buildup with the SCS where that infrastructure is worth squat in a conflict.

The growth of Chinese strength along its western border will surely embolden Beijing in the pursuit of territorial claims and in future border clashes that may in fact translate into an even more aggressive posture. By also logistically unlocking the Chinese ability to project offensive military power from the western part of the country, toward India or Central Asia, it raises a perception of a Chinese military threat beyond the geographically limited border disputes themselves. With this in mind, the buildup of combat capability on China's western edge will likely become a greater international concern as time goes on.

This is the key part. How do we interpret this expansion ? To what end. Is it just for show.

We're not going to be cowed by any of this. We will be acting as we see fit wherever and whenever.

China is already an international concern and moves are afoot by major powers to address this challenge. India is not alone in this fight. Far from it.

There will be more coercion from them in the future. They will have learnt from their last cockup and strive to do better next time.

[Officer of Engineers]

You make it sound like we didn't have bastards for allies before. Stalin, Mao, Deng, Samosa, Chiang, Tito, the Shaw of Iran. Yes, Pakistan is a bastard but she's our bastard. I strongly suggest you look at Cold War China and today's India and to see what your future with us will be like, look at modern day China. There are fundamentals that we will not abandon and that smacks in direct odds with Indian strategic needs. For one, we will not abandon Pakistan. She is a check on future Indian expansion.

The Great Game.

As for Afghanistan, we learning the same lesson the Soviets did. We can't win but we can keep them killing each other. The same lesson the British learned a over a century ago.