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Border face-off: China and India each deploy 3,000 troops

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  • Glad this last policy move to allow more interactions between US govt officials and their Taiwanese counterparts was not reversed

    Now more countries must follow suit.

    Looking at the new administrations policy towards China and the region compared with Trump the difference so far is small.

    Trump's administration had a problem with the CCP per se, Biden's has a problem with the CCP's conduct.

    Biden has reaffirmed support for Trump's policy of not recognising China's maritime claims in the SCS.

    Biden's China Reset Is Already on the Ropes | RAND | Mar 15 2021
    Last edited by Double Edge; 11 Apr 21,, 03:26.


    • China-Philippines Whitsun Reef dispute could get worse as US chips in | SCMP | Apr 10 2021

      Analysts say the Philippines has taken a tougher stance against Beijing in the South China Sea in the dispute, with Philippines Defence Secretary Delfin Lorenzana and the country’s foreign affairs department both engaging in a heated war of words with the Chinese embassy in Manila. Rising tensions over Whitsun Reef complicate Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s push for closer ties with Beijing and tests the US President Joe Biden administration’s ability to push back against Beijing’s strategy in the South China Sea.

      Richard Heydarian, a professorial chairholder in geopolitics at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, said the incident had “exposed fault lines within the Philippine government” between Duterte’s efforts to avoid escalation to keep his pivot to China on track and an indignant defence establishment.

      On the Whitsun Reef issue, while Lorenzana slammed Beijing’s “utter disregard” for international maritime law as “appalling”, Duterte’s spokesman took a softer line, saying the issue would be resolved “through diplomatic channels and through peaceful means”.

      “We clearly see that the defence minister, and the broader defence establishment of the Philippines, including the military, are livid,” Heydarian said. “They are still writhing from the incident in 2009 at Reed Bank, which galvanised anti-China sentiments in the Philippines, sentiments that remain to be overwhelmingly negative towards China.

      So you have an American-trained military and a broader Philippines defence establishment expressing its discontent with the direction of the Philippines’ foreign policy.”

      Heydarian said there were concerns that China was exploiting gaps in the US-Philippines alliance at a time when it was aggressively using militia forces to intimidate other countries and restrict their supply lanes. Another issue was over China’s new coastguard law , which allows its vessels to use force to defend its maritime claims, he said.

      “China has gone full grey zone in terms of its South China Sea strategy, but how long it will remain grey zone, or whether China can keep within the parameters of grey zone, is an open question,” he said.

      “That’s inevitably going to bleed into broader discussions about what is going to be the Biden policy in the South China Sea, and how can the Biden administration coordinate an effective response.”
      So defense & foreign policy are at odds with the President. Interesting.

      The best outcome here has to be PH and US getting closer.

      Pluck ASEAN countries from China's orbit, one by one.
      Last edited by Double Edge; 10 Apr 21,, 23:26.


      • Reading other articles on SCMP i happened on a curious comment by some one called Melissa L. Hague's ruling is here for reference.

        The Philippine Department of Justice and Department of Foreign Affairs have been concealing from the Fiilipinos and their government officials and legislators the fact that the Philippines made strategic sacrifices of vast areas in the South China Sea in order to get the Arbitral Tribunal to exericse jurisdiction over the Philippine v. China arbitration.

        As a consequence, the Arbitral Tribunal issued specific rulings that restricted the maritime entitlement of the Philipppines.

        In para. 574-575 it held that the Philippines cannot maintain the straight baselines around the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG). Thus, there is no more KIG as a defined area.

        In para. 683 it held that the Philippine EZZ will be pushed back by the territorials seas of the various rocks in the South China Sea. Thus, the territorial sea of rocks occupied by China and Vietnam are not within the Philippine EEZ.

        In para. 812-813, it held that the state in control of Scarborough Shoal must allow traditional fishing by other littoral states. Thus, Philippines authority over fishing in Scarborough shoals is limited to its own nationals.

        In para. 637-639, the Tribunal held that the award is not binding on third-parties.

        Thus, Vietnam which occupies 8 of the 13 rocks in the area of Juan Felipe is not bound by the award.

        Vietnam, rather than the Philippines, is the target of China's maneuvers in that area.

        Vietnam's plan of allowing a US base or outpost or mooring in that area is the real story behind Juan Felipe (Whitsun Reef)
        Things that make you go hmm.....

        To understand some of this FONOPS terminology ie. straight baselines here is good explainer

        Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea: A Practical Guide | Belfer Center | Jun 2017

        Baselines are the point from which the territorial sea, contiguous zone, and exclusive economic zone are measured. Generally speaking, they exist at the low-water line along the coast.

        Click image for larger version  Name:	legal maritime zones.jpg Views:	0 Size:	14.1 KB ID:	1573065

        That is all that can be claimed under UNCLOS if the country is NOT solely made up of islands or archipelago.

        Click image for larger version  Name:	illegal straight baseline.jpg Views:	0 Size:	13.8 KB ID:	1573066

        On May 15, 1996, China issued a statement establishing straight baselines around the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. The purported straight baselines, drawn between 28 basepoints, enclose the Paracel Islands in their entirety.

        Straight baselines are important because—where they are established legally—they become the point from which a state can measure the breadth of its territorial sea, the contiguous zone, and other claimed maritime zones. By drawing straight baselines around the Paracel Islands, China claimed the entire enclosed area as part of its sovereign waters as well as a 12 nautical mile territorial sea surrounding the enclosed area.

        The United States does not recognize China’s straight baselines claim around the Paracel Islands for the reason that UNCLOS allows only archipelagic states (i.e. countries comprised entirely of islands) to draw straight baselines around island groups. China, as a continental state, cannot claim such a right.
        Not only does China lose its claim so does PH. Of illegal straight baselines that is.

        PH only gets to claim area indicated by the first graphic above which has a bearing on the eventual size of EEZ.

        How can Vietnam allow a US base ? Goes counter to their policy of the three No's

        Or does it

        The three no's have been extended by one more as of 2019 and a 'depend'

        Vietnam now has a four No's and one Depend defense policy
        Last edited by Double Edge; 11 Apr 21,, 15:36.


        • People say we can't cut off trade with China.

          Here's the Aussies leading the way, slowly but surely decoupling from China and we haven't even begun to talk about Aussie iron.

          How about the other way around. China doing the same ?

          Coal, not consumer goods which are replaceable or as essential.

          China is paying a high price for its ban on Australian coal | Reuters | Apr 09 2021

          China, the world’s biggest importer, producer and consumer of coal, has effectively ended imports from Australia, the biggest shipper of coking coal used to make steel and number two in thermal coal used to produce electricity, as part of an ongoing political dispute between the two nations.

          The restrictions on imports from Australia came into effect in the second half of last year, resulting in China’s imports dropping to virtually zero in the first two months of this year from a 2020 high of 9.46 million tonnes in June, according to Refinitiv vessel-tracking and port data.

          However, China’s consumers of imported coal have been facing higher costs, with prices for alternatives to supplies from Australia, both local and foreign, rising as the market adjusts to the unofficial ban.

          If a Chinese importer switched from Australian cargoes to those from the United States, the price difference is currently $39 a tonne more expensive than supplies from Australia, and this doesn’t account for the higher shipping costs given the longer distance from the U.S. east coast to China.

          China’s neighbour Mongolia has become its biggest supplier of coking coal, meeting 61.7% of imports in the first two months of this year, up from just 17.7% in the same period in 2020, according to official data.

          Australia’s share of imports came down to zero from 68.4% in January-February 2020, according to the data, while the United States boosted its share to 9.1% from under 2%, and Canada went to 12.1% from 6.1%.
          Dalai Lama visited Monogolia some time back and the CCP sanctioned Mongolia. They won't be able to do that again. hehe.

          US exports of coking coal are as much as Russia exports to China. It's thermal coal where Russia has a bigger share.

          Indonesia is the largest supplier of thermal coal to China. Rising from 46.9% to 69.2% in a year

          This means China can't push Indonesia too far over Natuna.

          For thermal coal, the main impact from the ban of Australian cargoes appears to have been strength in Chinese domestic prices, with benchmark coal at Qinhuangdao, as assessed by SteelHome, closing at 747 yuan a tonne on Thursday, equivalent to about $114.

          While this is down from the winter peak of 1,038 yuan a tonne, it’s still 22% higher than the 612 yuan that prevailed at the start of October.

          China has turned to Indonesia, the world’s top exporter of thermal coal, to plug some of the gap caused by the absence of Australian cargoes, as well as buying more from Russia and South Africa, two countries that can offer similar quality coal to Australia.

          But boosting supplies from these countries appears to have done little to lower domestic prices, meaning Chinese users are still paying substantially more for the fuel than what they were prior to the ban of Australian coal.
          China can offset this increase if they allow their currency to strengthen otherwise rising living costs will fuel domestic unrest.

          But this will increase the price of their exports and make it easier for others to out compete them.

          World 1 CCP 0
          Last edited by Double Edge; 14 Apr 21,, 19:57.


          • Thing with this border conflict means a relationship that is uncertain & tense into the future. India needs to plan for it.

            Counter China's policy of the three E's : Encirclement, Envelopment & Entanglement

            ‘Encirclement’ is a kind of “strengthened Chinese strategic presence [encircling India] in Tibet, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Burma and in the Indian Ocean island states.”

            ‘Envelopment’ is essentially “integrating all of India’s neighbours into the Chinese economy.”

            And ‘Entanglement’ is “exploiting India’s domestic contradictions and multiple security concerns.”

            For India, the above three elements of Chinese strategy directly translate to strategic, economic and internal security concerns respectively.
            Recalibrating strategic ties with China | Tribune | Apr 06 2020

            For almost 50 years, the bilateral relationship between India and China was able to keep the thorny issues of border settlement and of deeper economic engagement separate. Bilateral trade grew at 20 per cent per annum during the first 15 years of this century. India went from being number 19 to six in Beijing’s list of export destinations.

            Both were enthusiastic supporters of the BRICS grouping which has led to the formation of a development bank and an annual summit, of which the thirteenth one will be held in Delhi next month. Over the years, the frequent meetings between President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi have created an expectation that this could truly be the hallmark of an Asian century when the two countries could work as partners and friends.

            But the events of the summer of 2020 and the Galwan conflict have irreversibly changed the equilibrium. With this military conflict, which follows the long standoff in Doklam in 2017, China has unilaterally dismantled the status quo, and has signalled a more hostile stance towards India. This has raised important questions for policymakers in India. How should India navigate this new landscape in which the relationship is evolving? The immediate response to the Galwan incident was correctly to mobilise our troops and the Indian Army gave a fitting reply to the aggressors. This was combined with economic sanctions like the banning of Chinese apps, restrictions on capital flows and emotional boycott of Chinese goods. What of the medium-to-long term? What should be the strategy?

            This calls for seeing the challenge on a larger scale of time, space and force.

            What are the forces shaping Chinese behaviour?

            What is their path of evolution in the coming decades?

            What is the best path for India in the short term and the long term?

            How can diplomacy and economic policy work in an intertwined fashion, to best further India’s interests?

            These questions have been addressed in a recent comprehensive policy paper authored by six people (including the present two authors) associated with the Pune International Centre. It is ironic that the recalibration is happening when China continues to be India’s biggest trading partner. India’s import dependency in key areas like pharmaceutical intermediaries, capital goods, electronics and telecom equipment cannot be eliminated overnight. But we believe that the long-term strategy calls for lesser economic dependency, stronger diplomatic and geopolitical coalitions with likeminded democracies, and a stance of calm confrontation of Chinese aggression.

            We argue that in the short run, India will have to build balancing coalitions with likeminded countries, as, indeed, we are doing through Quad with the United States, Japan and Australia. We envisage three groups of countries that we can engage with in such coalitions: major democracies of the world, countries bordering China, and India’s own neighbours, all of whom have a lot to gain in preventing the rise of China as a malevolent and autocratic superpower. We need to go beyond treaties and agreements and engage deeply with these 20 countries, encouraging frequent exchanges at multiple levels: diplomats, economists, scientists, academics, innovators and entrepreneurs.

            There have been many discussions and debates about protectionist measures to keep Chinese imports and Chinese firms from playing any role in the growth of the Indian economy. We believe that a significant proportion of such moves will be self-defeating because they can hurt India’s productivity and exports.

            There is certainly a case for three groups of restrictions:
            - limit companies controlled by the Chinese State from controlling stakes in a number of sensitive infrastructure assets, including 5G and telecom,
            - steer clear of China-controlled technology standards and
            - block any surveillance of Indian persons.

            A selective retreat from economic engagement with China and increased emphasis on the global market would be an ideal approach to take in the next two decades, which can result in starting with ‘less China’ and eventually approaching a near-‘China-less’ state of our nation.

            This represents a call to action, which the military demonstrated so admirably and which now must be heeded by political parties, diplomats, policy planners, bureaucrats, industrialists, indeed, all citizens. And the starting point of the new race is less than equal, which is only to be expected. Whether we look at the size of the economy, state capacity, capabilities of the best firms, extent of internationalisation, mastery of science and technology or the pace of filing of patents, China is significantly ahead of India. China’s economy is five times bigger, and the bilateral trade balance is heavily skewed in its favour.

            The trade imbalance can be partly corrected by a focused approach. India has recently launched the productivity-linked incentives (PLI) and chosen sectors for deep investments and creating ‘global champions’. Investments of over $28 billion from India and abroad have been announced. Iconic companies like Apple are the early beneficiaries of this PLI opportunity. We did an assessment of the global opportunities and the relative status of India and China to identify and advocate industry-specific strategies in the following three broad categories of the industry sectors:

            1. Huge asymmetry areas where India must progressively reduce dependence. Rare Earths are a classic example.

            2. Opportunities to focus on atmanirbharta and meet all domestic demand. Telecom is an immediate imperative.

            3. Global industry-building opportunities. These exist in chemicals, pharmaceuticals — where we have made a good start with vaccine manufacturing — automotive, particularly with autonomous connected and electric vehicles and hydrogen as an alternative fuel source, hardware, consumer electronics and even agriculture — where a resolution of the current standoff can become the beginning of a practical domestic and exports policy that would help millions of farmers in the country.

            In the medium-to-long term, China has its own vulnerabilities. Its demography is ageing and workforce declining. Its growth will surely slow down. It has an uneasy geopolitical relationship with several countries. It has adopted an adversarial relationship with large private sector companies like Alibaba.

            It is possible that China may grow at four per cent while India can grow at close to eight per cent for the foreseeable future. This changes the skewed ratio of economic size from 5:1 to just about 2:1. To achieve this high and sustained growth, India has a domestic economic reforms agenda to pursue.

            As a nation, we can and must move towards being an alternative centre of the global supply chain and join the race for being a major global manufacturing hub. This needs strategic patience and has the potential to create additional employment for 200 million people. The atmanirbharta strategy has to be combined with reforms which can make India globally competitive and give it atmavishwas or self-confidence.

            Ganesh Natarajan & Ajit Ranade

            Strategic Affairs Experts
            For some reason, the PIC website is down but google has a cached copy of the policy paper and here is the virtual discussion they held.
            Last edited by Double Edge; 14 Apr 21,, 21:45.


            • Russia knows a good relationship with India is in its long term interest.

              Moscow plays down Beijing, pledges deeper Delhi ties: S-400 to Afghanistan | IE | Apr 07 2021

              Lavrov, responding to a question on a possible military alliance between Moscow and Beijing, said: “…In the course of the Russia-China Summit, we said our relations are at the highest in the history. But these relations do not pursue a goal of establishing a military alliance.

              By the way, we have had speculations about pro-military alliances not only regarding Russia-China relations, we also heard about such alliances, allegedly being promoted as such as Middle East NATO, and we also heard about Asian NATO. Today, we exchanged views on these, and Indian friends have the same position and we believe that this is counterproductive, we are interested in inclusive cooperation, that is for something, not against somebody.”
              As for mil to mil with Russia watch how the US deals with Vietnam. They too have a similar large share of Russian arms in their military.

              What is curious is John Kerry was in town at the same time as the Russian foreign minister.


              • Can Japan defend itself ?

                Mr. Suga goes to Washington | Japan Forward | Apr 14 2021

                Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga will be meeting President Biden on April 16.

                His stated objectives: discuss China, North Korea, Taiwan, climate change, and the corona virus, and strengthen the US-Japan relationship. But Suga, like his recent predecessors, really has just one main objective in Washington: to keep the United States on the hook to defend Japan.

                No matter that Suga and the Japanese government have already gotten this promise three times from President Biden, Secretary of State Blinken, and Secretary of Defense Austin.

                He wants to hear it again. Sort of like some gal asking, “do you love me?” every five minutes. If she’s asking, she ain’t sure.

                Now, one sort of understands why Suga keeps asking.

                Without American support or the possibility of it, China would likely have already moved to occupy the Senkakus and dare the Japanese to do something about it.

                So one understands the urgency (even if unstated) Japan feels to ensure Washington will defend Japan. What Japan wants more than anything is a promise of U.S. firepower – though it doesn’t seem to realize that improving its own military capabilities would enhance what U.S. forces have to offer.
                I find it amazing that Japan still has work to do as an American ally.

                What Japan wants more than anything is a promise of U.S. firepower – though it doesn’t seem to realize that improving its own military capabilities would enhance what U.S. forces have to offer.

                So in an ideal world – which this one isn’t – a meeting between the Japanese Prime Minister and the U.S. President would produce tangible measures to strengthen capabilities needed to deter the PRC – and if necessary defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

                Here’s what those objectives might look like:

                The two leaders agree that Japanese and American forces will improve capabilities to conduct a joint/combined defense of Japan. And they describe the concrete measures to be taken, including: What? When? How?

                They agree that Japan will do what is necessary to remedy the Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) shortcomings: inadequate funding, recruiting shortfalls, and lack of joint capability. And the JSDF will become a force that is able to fight a war. And once again: What? When? How?

                References to Taiwan will go beyond “mutual concern” or even “deep concern” over the situation in the Taiwan Strait, and instead offer concrete support to Taipei. Such as: the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) joins the recently concluded U.S.-Taiwan Coast Guard Working Group and dispatches JCG liaison officers to Taiwan.

                And Japan enacts its own version of the United States’ Taiwan Relations Act. And for all of these: What? When? How?

                The QUAD of course gets a mention. And more than just promises to hold a lot of future meetings – which Tokyo has traditionally considered a substitute for developing its own solid military capabilities. There are any number of possibilities.

                For example, establish a standing joint U.S.-Japan operational headquarters in Japan – with extra seats for the Australians and Indians, for starters. Or perhaps agree to invite an Australian air force squadron to set up in Japan, say at Misawa Air Base or Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station. And don’t forget: When? Where? How?

                If by some miracle this should happen, Suga ought to then announce the following:

                “When I get back to Tokyo I’m going to send my best man out to Yokota Air Base to talk to the Commander, U.S. Forces Japan.

                Here’s what he will say:

                I hear you Americans have to leave Japan to train properly so you are able to defend Japan. That doesn’t sound right. We shouldn’t make things so hard for our only ally. Tell me what you need and Prime Minister Suga will take care of it. And take care of it immediately."

                Suga’s biggest worry ought not to be that the Americans won’t defend Japan. They will. But if Japan does not develop its own defenses into a serious force able to operate with the Americans (and the QUAD), U.S. promises – and even its actions – may not be enough.

                Times have changed. Objectives must as well.
                Last edited by Double Edge; 16 Apr 21,, 07:30.


                • China's manmade islands in the South China Sea are vulnerable to attack and may not be worth much in a war | SCMP | Dec 07 2020

                  an article in the latest edition of Naval and Merchant Ships, a Beijing-based monthly magazine, highlighted the artificial islands' weaknesses in four areas:

                  - their distance from the mainland
                  - small size,
                  - the limited capacity of their airstrips
                  - the multiple routes by which they could be attacked

                  The magazine, published by the China State Shipbuilding Corporation, which builds ships for the Chinese navy, also warned that they had yet to achieve any significant offensive capabilities.
                  They allow China a degree of control ONLY during peace time

                  Whatever offensive capabilities they try to add there won't amount to much.

                  In other words they are non tactical gains. Just a PR win. An illusion.

                  If you operate below the threshold of war and if war comes then whatever was gained via grey zone is worth squat (!)

                  That is the downside of the grey zone tactics they use.

                  The same applies to their border infrastructure at the Indo Tibet border.

                  Allows them to mobilise for standoffs faster in peace time, completely toast in war time.

                  Unfortunately, we have to play the same game to keep the peace there.

                  So have the Viets

                  How Vietnam Quietly Built Up 10 Islands in Asia’s Most Disputed Sea | VOA | Apr 19 2019

                  Vietnam is upgrading islets to make them harder for China to take without a cost, not for offensive military use, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative Director Gregory Poling said.
                  Viets have no choice, under China's claims they lose the most of their EEZ compared to others

                  Click image for larger version  Name:	Vietnam EEZ.jpg Views:	0 Size:	62.5 KB ID:	1573153

                  Could we challenge China in the SCS ? that call has not been made yet.

                  Coercing them back in another area they do not expect when they coerce at our border has to become an option.

                  The magazine said the islands were deep in the South China Sea and far from the Chinese mainland. It also warned there was no coherent chain connecting them, so it would be difficult to provide support if one came under attack.

                  "Take the example of the Fiery Cross Reef. It has a runway now, but it's 1,000km (600 miles) away from Sanya city in Hainan province." The distance means that China's fastest combat support ships would need more than 20 hours to reach the island.

                  The article also argued that the islands were too far away to deploy the J-16, China's most advanced multi-role strike fighter, effectively. The fighters could not patrol the area because of the distance and could be easily intercepted or attacked by surface ships.

                  It continued that most of the islands only had one runway and did not have the space to provide the facilities to support more than one aircraft at a time.

                  The magazine also said the artificial islands were too small to survive major attacks. Most of the islands are flat and have very limited vegetation or rocks.

                  This means there is little cover against an attack and the best the Chinese military can do to protect equipment and supplies is build defensive shelters out of materials like steel — which has to be transported from the mainland and cannot withstand a sustained missile barrage.

                  The article also warned that nearby islands were held by rival claimants, and said that if the US supported allies such as the Philippines or Malaysia in any conflict, the were multiple approaches from which it could attack — such as the Philippine island of Palawan, to the east of the Spratlys, or the Strait of Malacca to the west.
                  Hmm, now what could we do here and still remain under the threshold of war ?

                  A blockade perhaps in concert with the neighbours.
                  Last edited by Double Edge; 16 Apr 21,, 22:59.


                  • These are the key changes Army has made in Ladakh to counter China in summer | The Print | Apr 12 2021

                    Giving the 1st corp facing Pakistan a dual job of watching China as well.

                    Cobbling together an extra division to assist 17 Corps making it two division.

                    We now have two strike corps facing Pakistan instead of 3 and 2 fully equipped strike corps ready to strike China.

                    Army plans to keep 2 strike corps for mountains facing China amid Ladakh crisis | The Print | Jan 06 2021

                    The rejig was done before the Pangong Tso withdrawal
                    Last edited by Double Edge; 18 Apr 21,, 16:06.


                    • Another enlightening discussion with the General

                      Aadi's doing great work here. Can't think of any other source that has this level of clarity other than Nitin's USI sessions.
                      Last edited by Double Edge; 19 Apr 21,, 02:35.


                      • Time to catch up with replies.

                        Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
                        You're missing the point. China could not have survived a Soviet nuke strike supported thrust towards Lop Nor. It would have split China in half and at least 50 Chinese cities would have been growing mushroom clouds. What stopped it? Nixon saying no to Brezhnev. Did China and the US have an alliance? No. Were they allies? Also no (they were opposing sides in the Vietnam War). Did China asked for this? No. What made the Americans do what they did? They could screw up Moscow and they did. Circumstances saved China.

                        Get it?

                        Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
                        The point is that India wants the US to do India's bidding. That's always the case since the days of Alexander the Great - that Great Powers want smaller powers to bleed for them and smaller powers want the Big Powers to commit to do their bidding.

                        You're not getting it. I used the Chinese example as AN EXAMPLE of a smaller power (China) getting a bigger power (US) to do her (Chinese) bidding.

                        Did China get F-15s? No. Did China get Taiwan back? No.

                        Did China GET the US to STOP a Soviet Invasion?

                        Now, tell me WHY Indian diplomats DON'T WANT THIS? I'm not talking about CAN they get this? I'm talking about DO THEY WANT THIS? Get it now?
                        We have the makings of a strategy in place already and it happened last year.

                        India's continental strategy ties up China on their western flank. The US maritime strategy with the two CBG ties them up on their eastern seaboard.

                        China is bottled up and can't do a thing.

                        This works for both India & Taiwan for either contingency.

                        Originally posted by Double Edge View Post
                        Can India pull off a Mao ?
                        Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
                        Simple enough answer. A Chinese army would have been FORCED to march north if a Soviet Army had moved west. Would India march an army north if a Chinese fleet sails east?
                        If necessary, yes. But there are other options. Causing unrest will tie them up too. Tibet & XJ are restive provinces. We can create a half front for them to worry about.

                        We have the capability and Tibet is far away from their eastern seaboard. China will be up against 12 divisions, 2 strike corps and whatever the IAF wants to throw at them.

                        Good enough ?

                        If China wants to make a go at Taiwan they will have to consider India's response henceforth, and they have only themselves to blame for this turn of events.

                        Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
                        The US wants India to be able, willing, and readied to sink those Chinese man-made islands.
                        This is not how it works.

                        We do our bit on our side so the others can do theirs in the Pacific. We won't be going into their AO.

                        We will have our hands full in the Indian Ocean already.

                        Indo pacific means problem in the Indian ocean affects the pacific and vice versa.

                        We work in our respective AO's. We do what we know and can do best.

                        If quad is on board with this idea then we have the makings of a suitable response.

                        Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
                        What? The answer is so that India can foot the bill both monetarily and in blood. It's not that the Americans cannot do the job alone. It's that it's a hell of a lot cheaper if someone else does it, read India. Again, dancing around the issue and not coming straight out asking for what the US wants.
                        Helping the US to me is doing something they cannot do. Like massing on the Tibet border and if you like taking China on in the Indian Ocean.

                        Tackling China in the SCS, will be good for us and helps ASEAN. Desirable.

                        But do we want to fight them 3,000 km away or do we prefer China fight us from as far

                        Stretched to fight in Tibet, stretched to fight in the Indian Ocean not SCS.

                        For now, the General made a good point.

                        Our threats are primarily land based.

                        Presently we speak of preparing for a two and half front war.

                        Sea is a third front nobody talks about and that means our navy is also available.
                        Last edited by Double Edge; 19 Apr 21,, 03:31.


                        • Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
                          If I was the American commander, do I want Dehli, Tokyo, or Canberra vetoing my decisions? Do I want to spend time to negotiate all 3 not to veto my decisions?

                          Hell no! I would go it alone at that point. If I am forced to use Indian, Japanese, and Australian resources, I want it clearly spelled out what I can do and what I cannot do so I don't have to goto all 3 capitals for a go-no-go. That is treaty obligations, ie, an Indian destroyer under American admiralty command. If Dehli doesn't want that destroyer shelling Chinese islands. Fine, it would be protecting my flank. If Dehli wants to veto my decision to shell Chinese islands, I'm sending that destroyer home.
                          In other words the American baseline is the same as the Indian one.

                          We won't be going to any capitals, we know we're on our own

                          This is why it makes very good sense to work together. I think its a strategic imperative.

                          But we will not hear much about it in public.

                          The foreign minister's strident statement last June about no alliance sounds like domestic politics management.

                          He does not want the opposition playing football over it before there even was such an arrangement,

                          This would allows enemy entities to disrupt the public discourse and shape it towards a break up.

                          Just see how the India FONOPS things went and neither Paks or China had to do anything for people to get the wrong idea.

                          I put the blame on 7 out f 10 media commentators not doing their homework and as a result misleading people. What ws si hard in looking up the DOD's website. Did not get enough time before they went on air.

                          The govt had no problem with the FONOPS and the only reason the foreign office had to put out a statement was because the media blew it up.

                          Any partnership arrangements will have to be done behind closed doors and be carefully managed.
                          Last edited by Double Edge; 19 Apr 21,, 16:07.


                          • India is going to backfill squat. Is India going to sink the Iranian Navy? Check the Russian Navy in the Indian Ocean? You do know that the USN faces more than one adversary. All these a platitudes that amongst to zero co-operation between the participants. QUAD is a dog and pony show and everyone knows it.


                            • knows it, yes, but playing on paranoia is a cheap and easy way of keeping adversaries off balance.

                              There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that "My ignorance is just as good as your knowledge."- Isaac Asimov


                              • Originally posted by astralis View Post
                                knows it, yes, but playing on paranoia is a cheap and easy way of keeping adversaries off balance.
                                It's also too easy an excuse to cut defence spending. "Let the Americans do it."