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  • Originally posted by Firestorm View Post
    Sir, I don't think we can make the comparison to the Chinese example without looking carefully at the geography of the region. The Chinese gave up 100 miles of uninhabited land which none of their citizens would even know (at the time) that it was given up. Giving up that land also did not cut off any of their other deployed troops.
    It was much more than that and the consequences much more servere than anything than the current Sino-Indo spat. Giving up 100 miles essentially allows the Soviet Army to march unooposed to the gates of Lop Nor. If Beijing loses Lop Nor, China is split in half. More over, Tibet's occupation would be unsustainable. Of course never mind the fact that this was going to be a nuclear lead strike, a nightmare that India currently does not face.

    And the Chinese populace knew it. Hence, all the civil prep work to receive a nuclear strike.

    Originally posted by Firestorm View Post
    The IA does not have that luxury in Ladakh. Like I pointed out above, giving up land in one area threatens troops deployed in other areas. So you have to first withdraw them. That has a cascading effect in other places including populated regions. Pretty soon you would have to abandon the whole of eastern Ladakh to the Chinese. There are people living there whom we have a duty to protect. The Chinese did not have this problem in the areas they gave up. Having said that there are some areas which we already have given up to an extent, like the fingers 4-8 area north of Pangong Tso. The Chinese presence there has been built up over years and gives them no real access route to sensitive areas. So as you can see we aren't fighting them for it beyond occupying the heights around their positions in some cases. But that is not an option in most of the other locations where the two sides are now in an eyeball to eyeball confrontation. The IA could not afford to let them take the Galwan river bend where the June skirmish happened for instance. That would have been a tactically unsound move.
    Again, no one is advocating abandoning anything, just don't make a mountain out of a molehill. In 1962, Chinese LOCs collapsed. Nothing I see makes me believe that they're any better at extending their LOCs. It is one thing to stockpile everything on your side of the line but a whole different matter of getting ammo and especially water to where your people need it. This last brawl should not stand in the way of a peaceful resolution, whether you trust the Chinese or not.

    But that does not mean that you should not have a plan to draw them into a KZ of your own making. If a repeat of 1962, I would have a readied force ready to cut Chinese LOCs once they collapsed and isolate their invasion force to be reduced at liesure. Which is a better victory? Repelling an invasion force so that they could run away and try again? Or trapping them to be destroyed once and for all?

    And again, if I could think of it, I have absolutely zero doubt so does the Indian Army.
    Chimo

    Comment


    • Originally posted by WABs_OOE View Post
      What I am saying is don't fight and die for the rocks. Prepare to use the rocks to kill them.
      Very good point. I think this is what our military planners are also thinking.

      Since Firestorm brought up Kargil, I am certain of one thing. None of what I wrote is unthought of. I'm damned sure the Indian Army has no intention to die for these rocks. They are fully prepared to use these rocks. However, using the Kargil example again, Dehli may have other ideas and overrule sound military thinking.
      The IA wanted to open other fronts and march inside Pakistan, but the Vajpayee led Government over-ruled that.
      Politicians are elected to serve...far too many don't see it that way - Albany Rifles! || Loyalty to country always. Loyalty to government, when it deserves it - Mark Twain! || I am a far left millennial!

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      • Originally posted by WABs_OOE View Post
        Again, no one is advocating abandoning anything, just don't make a mountain out of a molehill. In 1962, Chinese LOCs collapsed. Nothing I see makes me believe that they're any better at extending their LOCs. It is one thing to stockpile everything on your side of the line but a whole different matter of getting ammo and especially water to where your people need it. This last brawl should not stand in the way of a peaceful resolution, whether you trust the Chinese or not.

        But that does not mean that you should not have a plan to draw them into a KZ of your own making. If a repeat of 1962, I would have a readied force ready to cut Chinese LOCs once they collapsed and isolate their invasion force to be reduced at liesure. Which is a better victory? Repelling an invasion force so that they could run away and try again? Or trapping them to be destroyed once and for all?

        And again, if I could think of it, I have absolutely zero doubt so does the Indian Army.
        Agree fully. What is KZ?
        Politicians are elected to serve...far too many don't see it that way - Albany Rifles! || Loyalty to country always. Loyalty to government, when it deserves it - Mark Twain! || I am a far left millennial!

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        • Had we suspected things the delays in our mirror deployment due to Covid-19 wouldn't have happened.

          With an enemy state we will have to keep troops posted permanently and develop infra.

          KZ: kill zone, boom boom bang bang

          Comment


          • Originally posted by WABs_OOE View Post
            It was much more than that and the consequences much more servere than anything than the current Sino-Indo spat. Giving up 100 miles essentially allows the Soviet Army to march unooposed to the gates of Lop Nor. If Beijing loses Lop Nor, China is split in half. More over, Tibet's occupation would be unsustainable. Of course never mind the fact that this was going to be a nuclear lead strike, a nightmare that India currently does not face.

            And the Chinese populace knew it. Hence, all the civil prep work to receive a nuclear strike.
            But does this solely explain why the Soviets did not push further.

            Doesn't the loss of 38,000 sq km in 1962 count for anything. That's Aksai Chin. Didn't stop them. They pushed further.

            As a condition for peace they want us to withdraw after they made an advance. Salami slicing. Some time later they will do the same.

            No, it stops and now.

            Originally posted by WABs_OOE View Post
            Again, no one is advocating abandoning anything, just don't make a mountain out of a molehill. In 1962, Chinese LOCs collapsed. Nothing I see makes me believe that they're any better at extending their LOCs. It is one thing to stockpile everything on your side of the line but a whole different matter of getting ammo and especially water to where your people need it. This last brawl should not stand in the way of a peaceful resolution, whether you trust the Chinese or not.

            But that does not mean that you should not have a plan to draw them into a KZ of your own making. If a repeat of 1962, I would have a readied force ready to cut Chinese LOCs once they collapsed and isolate their invasion force to be reduced at liesure. Which is a better victory? Repelling an invasion force so that they could run away and try again? Or trapping them to be destroyed once and for all?

            And again, if I could think of it, I have absolutely zero doubt so does the Indian Army.
            If the heights can be held, there are plenty of KZs in the valleys they have to use to advance.

            The road from Rutog to Spanguur gap is one such example. Moutains on one side, lake on the other.
            Last edited by Double Edge; 08 Nov 20,, 10:29.

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            • Another installment from Nitin

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                Politicians are elected to serve...far too many don't see it that way - Albany Rifles! || Loyalty to country always. Loyalty to government, when it deserves it - Mark Twain! || I am a far left millennial!

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                • Originally posted by Oracle View Post
                  Beijing has since imposed a large anti-dumping duty on
                  - Australian barley,
                  - banned beef exports from five abattoirs and
                  - instigated anti-dumping and subsidy investigations into cheap Australian wine in China.
                  Why can't the other three pick up these items

                  We can use barley to make beer, their beef will be awesome and what better to wash it down with their wine.

                  Comment


                  • Originally posted by kuku View Post
                    Had we suspected things the delays in our mirror deployment due to Covid-19 wouldn't have happened.

                    With an enemy state we will have to keep troops posted permanently and develop infra.

                    KZ: kill zone, boom boom bang bang
                    Think this article was posted earlier, i certainly remember that 'breach of trust' line


                    First intel on PLA came mid-April, long before Pangong clash | IE | Jul 15 2020

                    The army chief had no clue even as late as mid May. It starts to dawn by May 17/18 when they occupy foxhole point.

                    So what happened ?


                    A second intelligence official said the question is not of an intelligence input of massive movement of PLA troops in Tibet but of analysis and assessment of such an input where “hostile intent” can be detected.

                    The official, who has been a part of the intelligence set-up for more than three decades, said “this was reminiscent of the Kargil incursions in 1999 where the mechanism of analysing the inputs had failed”.

                    It is after the abolition of JIC in 2018, as part of the reform of the national security council secretariat structure, the official said, that the process for joint assessment and sharing of information at cutting-edge level between various stakeholders has changed.
                    And ??? the article does not go further to explain any more...

                    But, the implication is we noticed unusual movements on Apr 18 and it took a full month before the army actually realised what was happening.

                    Comment


                    • It was the novel coronavirus that delayed a key annual Army drill along the LAC, giving Chinese troops a crucial window to move into and grab strategic positions inside Indian territorial limits — a move that eventually led to a prolonged standoff and the slaying of at least 20 Indian Army personnel.Jun 17, 2020
                      https://www.google.com/amp/s/m.econo...w/76406957.cms

                      Could've helped, Yes, seems to be failure to analyse intent

                      Comment


                      • Originally posted by Double Edge View Post
                        But does this solely explain why the Soviets did not push further.
                        What stopped the Soveits was the Americans saying no but their OPOBJ was to destroy the Chinese nuclear threat and that was Lop Nor. Chinese IRBMs could only have reached Moscow from Lop Nor. Take Lop Nor and China lacked the range to hit Moscow (and their only 12 nukes in existence)

                        Originally posted by Double Edge View Post
                        Doesn't the loss of 38,000 sq km in 1962 count for anything. That's Aksai Chin. Didn't stop them. They pushed further.

                        As a condition for peace they want us to withdraw after they made an advance. Salami slicing. Some time later they will do the same.

                        No, it stops and now.
                        Again, no one is advocating to give up squat but to read the ground and to read the enemy. However, to read the enemy, you have to allow them to make a move, to allow them to commit to an avenue of advance.

                        We committed to the defence of the Fulda Gap precisely because the Warsaw Pact committed such large forces pointed towards the Fulda Gap. In the 1990s when they withdrew to the Est German/Polish Border, we had zero clues on where they were going to advance (they were not).

                        Talk with the Chnese. Find a peaceful solution but whether you trust the Chinese or not, they told you an avenue of advance. Forcing them to change their minds about another avenue of advance is just more headaches on the Indian Army's part.

                        Originally posted by Double Edge View Post
                        If the heights can be held, there are plenty of KZs in the valleys they have to use to advance.

                        The road from Rutog to Spanguur gap is one such example. Moutains on one side, lake on the other.
                        The toher thing you have to do is to channel them into the KZ, ideadlly passively, making it like it seems to be their choice and thus, not expecting a trap.

                        Chimo

                        Comment


                        • Exclusive: China Building New 'Tunnels' For Winter At Border Hotspot Doklam - NDTV https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/excl...akamai-rum=off

                          PLA is doubling down on its actions, while discussing disengagement, that is most certainly no prepration for disengagement.

                          This winter's going to be a tough one.

                          They will stare us all thorough the border

                          Comment


                          • Was looking for articles of Sumdurong Chu stand off from 1986 and found one from BR. The article is no longer on the website but archive caught a copy before it disappeared.

                            The Sumdurong Chu Incident | BR Monitor Vol3(3) | Nov - Dec 2000

                            The Sumdorong Chu Incident
                            V. Natarajan







                            The Sino-Indian border has been a long and vexed issue and its role in the 1962 conflict needs no elaboration. Barring an armed clash at Nathu La in eastern Sikkim in 1967, the border between India and China (Tibet) – and specifically the ill-defined Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh/Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh - had remained free of any major incidents through the '70s and the early '80s. While relations between the countries remained frosty for the most part, official statements from Beijing and New Delhi professed a desire to solve the border tangle peacefully through mutual consultations. Beginning in 1981, officials from both countries held yearly talks on the border issue and these talks continued till 1989 [1]. The 7th round of border talks held in July 1986 was overshadowed by reports in the Indian media of Chinese incursions into the Sumdorong Chu valley in Arunachal Pradesh. This was followed by reports of large-scale troop movements on both sides of the border in early 1987, and grave concerns about a possible military clash over the border. While this incident raised the temperature in Delhi and Beijing for a while, it soon faded from the headlines, overtaken by other events in both sides of the border - Operation Brasstacks, Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988, and the Tianamen Square incident in 1989 among others.

                            This article is an attempt to piece together the events that occurred, beginning in the summer of 1986 at the Sumdorong Chu valley. A description of the initial incident is followed by the subsequent escalation in tension in early 1987 and the diplomatic steps taken to cool those tensions. In the concluding section, some speculations concerning the motives behind the actions of the two countries are examined.

                            The Incident: June - October 1986

                            Sumdorong Chu (S-C) - referred to as Sangduoluo He in the Chinese media - is a rivulet flowing north-south in the Thag La triangle, bounded by Bhutan in the west and the Thag La ridge to the north. On June 26, 1986, the Government of India (GoI) lodged a formal protest with Beijing against intrusions in this region by Chinese troops, that had occurred beginning on June 16. Beijing denied any such intrusions and maintained that its troops were in a location north of the McMahon Line (ML), while the official Indian stance was that the Chinese troops had intruded south of the ML. (The actual region of the incursion has been described as the Thandrong pasture on the banks of the S-C, and also as the Wangdung region - which comes under the Zimithang circle of Tawang district [2]). This region has been located to the north of the ML by outside sources [3,4], as also by independent Indian observers [5,6].

                            This region falls along a traditional route from Lhasa to Tawang - and from there to the Brahmaputra valley - and the nearby Thag La ridge had witnessed serious clashes in the '62 conflict. The area had been considered a neutral area by both sides since 1962/63 [5,6] and had not been monitored by India between 1977 and 1980 [4]. However with the improvement of logistics on the Indian side, the Indian Army sought to reinforce and strengthen forward areas in Arunachal Pradesh in the early '80s. Patrols resumed in 1981 and by the summer of 1984 India had established an observation post on the bank of S-C [5,6] – which apparently afforded a view of Chinese positions on the other side of Thag La [3]. This post was manned by personnel of the Special Security Bureau (SSB) through the summer and vacated in the winter. In June of 1986, when a patrol from the 12th Assam Regiment returned to the area, it found a sizable number of Chinese already present, engaged in constructing permanent structures [2,8].

                            Initial reports put the number of Chinese at 40 - some of them armed and in uniform - who were soon reinforced to a total strength of about 200 men. Statements by Indian ministers in the Parliament described the intrusion as being between 1-2 km deep as the crow flies, supplied by mules along a 7 km trail [2]. By August the Chinese had constructed a helipad and began supplying their troops by air. Regarding the Chinese presence as a fait accompli and to prevent further 'nibbling', the Indian Army began aggressive patrolling across Arunachal Pradesh at other vulnerable areas. In September ’86 – while under pressure from both the public and opposition MPs to adopt a strong posture - the GoI sought a way out of the crisis by suggesting that if the Chinese withdrew in the coming winter, India would not re-occupy the area in the following summer. This offer was rejected by China whose troops were by now prepared to stay through the winter. By September-October, an entire Indian Army brigade of the 5th Mtn. Division was airlifted to Zimithang, a helipad very close to the S-C valley. Referred to as Operation Falcon [7,9], this involved the occupation of ridges overlooking the S-C valley, including Langrola and the Hathung La ridge across the Namka Chu rivulet. (These ridges are to the south of Thag La.)


                            Escalation: October '86 - May '87

                            In October, the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping warned N.Delhi that if it continued nibbling across the border, China would have to "teach India a lesson" [10]. This threat – identical to that made to Vietnam in 1979 - was conveyed by the US Defense Secretary during a stopover in N.Delhi from Beijing. The rise in tensions was not helped, when in December 1986, Arunachal Pradesh was made a full state of the Indian Union. This drew a chorus of protests from across the border and Indian reactions that any change in Arunachal Pradesh’s administrative status was an internal matter. The spring and summer of 1987 saw media reports of heavy troop movements on both sides of the border and the very real possibility of a serious military clash [11,12,13]. Deng Xiaoping's earlier warning was conveyed again on March - this time by the US Secretary of State. By spring '87, Indian and Chinese camps were right next to each other in the S-C valley [3,10].

                            China – which has always had a large military presence in Tibet since its occupation – was said to have moved in 20,000 troops from the "53rd Army Corps in Chengdu and the 13th Army in Lanzhou" [23] by early 1987 along with heavy artillery and helicopters. By early April, it had moved 8 divisions to eastern Tibet as a prelude to possible belligerent action [6].

                            Troop reinforcements on the Indian side – which had begun with Operation Falcon in late 1986 – continued through early ’87 under a massive air-land exercise. Titled Exercise Chequerboard, it involved 10 divisions of the Army and several squadrons of the IAF and redeployment of troops at several places in the North-East. The Indian Army moved 3 divisions to positions around Wangdung [14], where they were supplied and maintained solely by air. These troop reinforcements were over and above the 50,000 troops already present across Arunachal Pradesh [11].


                            Denouement: May '87 - present

                            Rising tensions were lowered after a visit to China by the Indian External Affairs Minister in May 1987, where both sides reaffirmed their desire to continue talks on the border issue and to cool things down on the border. In August '87, Indian and Chinese troops moved their respective posts slightly apart in the S-C valley, after a meeting of the field commanders. During the 8th round of border talks on November '87, it was decided to upgrade the talks from the bureaucratic to the political level. Following Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988, a Joint Working Group (JWG) was set up to discuss, among other things, the alignment of the LAC [15]. In 1993, an agreement was inked between the foreign ministers of the two countries on the reduction of troops along the LAC. It was decided to pull back from respective forward check posts in the S-C valley from a situation of "close confrontation" and in 1994, the Indian MEA described the situation as one of "close proximity" where the respective posts were 50-100 yards apart [16]. Following the JWG meeting on April 1995, the two sides agreed to a simultaneous withdrawal of their troops from the four border posts - two Indian and two Chinese - in the S-C valley [3,15,17]. As of June 1999, the valley was unoccupied by either army, and their respective posts in the area were close to a kilometre apart [18].


                            Conclusions
                            The initial incident at S-C valley, viz. the establishment of a SSB post in the summer of 1985, can be considered to be a consequence of the uncertain and disputed nature of the LAC. The Indian side has been criticized by some [5] for being the first to intrude in a neutral area, and the subsequent events characterized as a Chinese reaction to India's 'forward policy' in the early '80s.

                            On the other hand, there is no unanimity as to the reason an isolated incident on the border should have led to such an increase in tension in early 1987. Prevailing international and domestic developments have been suggested as possible explanations. The troop reinforcements on the Indian side in the later months - during Operation Falcon, leading on to Exercise Chequerboard - have been thought by some to be an Indian reaction to growing Sino-Soviet rapprochement in 1986 [1,11]. The Indian reactions were apparently to test the extent of normalization in relations between China and the USSR and its effect on the Indo-Soviet relations. Reiterating his analysis of the 1962 conflict, Maxwell holds India solely responsible for the escalation [12], claiming the incident to be Rajiv Gandhi's method of provoking a confrontation with China in order to unite the nation and facilitate the imposition of an internal emergency. Regardless of the plausibility of some the explanations offered, many observers are agreed on the effect of the robust military moves on the Indian side. It is believed that the Indian Army used the events through 1986/87 both as an effective palliative for the bitter events of 1962, and to demonstrate the difference in the ground situation since that time, to the Chinese military [6,19,20,21].

                            On Chinese motivations behind the escalation, the consensus view seems to be that it was part of a strategy of indicating that the border issue in the Eastern sector was far from settled. While the early border talks had focussed mainly on the Aksai Chin region and not on the Eastern sector, the mid-'80s saw a change in Chinese attitude. The Chinese strategy changed to linking the border issues in the Eastern and Western sector, and demanding matching concessions in the Eastern sector for any Chinese withdrawals in Aksai Chin/Ladakh, in contrast to the Indian position that the two sectors be considered separately. In this view, a Chinese reluctance to react to a strong Indian military presence near or over the ML would weaken their negotiating position.

                            While an exchange of maps of the LAC would be an essential step towards the avoidance of such incidents, and eventually to a resolution of the boundary dispute, there has been a marked Chinese reluctance to comply with this, even after several years into the multi-level border talks [22]. There have been some reports following President Narayanan’s recent visit to China, of the increasing likelihood of such an exchange, particularly in the "middle sector" (Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh) [24,25]. It remains to be seen if such an event comes to pass.

                            Notes
                            [1] "Sino-Indian Border Talks 1981-1989: A View from New Delhi", Sumit Ganguly, Asian Survey, Vol.29, n.12, December 1989.
                            [2] China Report , compilation of news reports in Vol. 23, Nos. 1 & 3, 1987, published by The Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, N.Delhi.
                            [3] "Sino-Indian Border Dispute Reconsidered", Neville Maxwell, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol. 34, No. 15, April 10-16, 1999. http://www.epw.org.in/34-15/sa2.htm
                            [4] The Economist, May 23, 1987. The S-C valley "seemed to lie to the north of the McMahon line; but is south of the highest ridge in the area, and the McMahon line is meant to follow the highest points". The highest ridge in the area is the Thag La (claimed by India to be on the border), which is actually to the north of the McMahon Line as drawn on a map.
                            [5] Gopal Ji Malaviya in "Indian and Chinese Foreign Policies in Perspective", edited by Surjit Man Singh, 1998, Radiant Publishers, N.Delhi.
                            [6] The Militarization of Mother India, Ravi Rikhye, 1990, Chanakya Pub. N.Delhi.
                            [7] "George in the China Shop", India Today, May 18, 1998 - http://www.india-today.com/itoday/18051998/cover.html
                            [8] "Midstream: George and the Dragon", Rakshat Puri, The Hindustan Times, April 22, 1998 http://www2.hindustantimes.com/ht/nonfram/220498/detopi02.htm
                            [9] "Warrior as Scholar", India Today, February 22, 1999 - http://www.india-today.com/itoday/22021999/obit.html
                            [10] "China and India: Moving beyond Confrontation", Surjit Mansingh and Steven Levine, Problems of Communism, Vol. 38, no. 2-3, Mar-June 1989.
                            [11] "Eye-witness in Tibet", Far Eastern Economic Review, June 4, 1987.
                            [12] "Towards India’s Second China War?", Neville Maxwell, South, May 1987.
                            [13] "The Dragon’s Teeth", India Today, August 15, 1987.
                            [14] "Disputed Legacy", India Today, May 15, 1988.
                            [15] "Sino-Indian CBMs: Problems and Prospects",Swaran Singh, Strategic Analysis, July 1997, Vol.20, n.4
                            [16] "Parliament and Foreign Policy - Reflections on India-China Relations", Naheed Murtaza, 1998, Cadplan Pub., N.Delhi.
                            [17] Reuters report on August 21, 1995 - http://www.tibet.ca/wtnarchive/1995/8/21_1.html
                            [18] "A Border which is Quiet and Tension Free", Barun Das Gupta, The Hindu, June 7, 1999 http://www.indiaserver.com/thehindu/1999/06/07/stories/0207000g.htm
                            [19] "Getting Tough With China: Negotiating Equitable, Not "Equal" Security",Bharat Karnad, Strategic Analysis, January 1998, Vol. 21, n.10
                            [20] "China's Long March to World Power Status: Strategic Challenge for India", Gurmeet Kanwal, Strategic Analysis, February 1999, Vol. 22, n.11
                            [21] "The China Syndrome", The Hindustan Times, June 6, 1999 http://www2.hindustantimes.com/ht/nonfram/200699/detfea01.htm
                            [22] "Time to Draw the Line", Brahma Chellaney, The Hindustan Times, November 17, 1999 http://www2.hindustantimes.com/ht/nonfram/171199/detopi01.htm
                            [23] Quoted portion taken from [10]. However, most reports on the PLA assign the 13th Group Army to the Chengdu Military Region, and there is no mention of a 53rd Group Army (or Corps) in the PLA.
                            [24]"Sino-Indian JWG to meet often", The Hindu, July 23, 2000 http://www.indiaserver.com/thehindu/2000/07/23/stories/01230001.htm
                            [25] "Sino-Indian Border Talks Next Week", The Hindu, November 11, 2000 http://www.indiaserver.com/thehindu/2000/11/11/stories/01110009.htm
                            Last edited by Double Edge; 09 Nov 20,, 22:12.

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                            • Good news. What did the CPC gain? Peace?
                              Politicians are elected to serve...far too many don't see it that way - Albany Rifles! || Loyalty to country always. Loyalty to government, when it deserves it - Mark Twain! || I am a far left millennial!

                              Comment


                              • Politicians are elected to serve...far too many don't see it that way - Albany Rifles! || Loyalty to country always. Loyalty to government, when it deserves it - Mark Twain! || I am a far left millennial!

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