Xi Jinping's historic power grab in China

[Oracle]

Does Xi’s bid to tighten his grip signal the potential for impending instability in China?

Manoj Joshi says - Taking more and more titles and power may actually be a sign that Xi Jinping is not being able push through his policies in the way he wants.

A terse announcement published in Xinhua news agency on Sunday says “The Communist Party of China Central Committee (CC) proposed to remove the expression that the President and Vice-President of the People’s Republic of China “shall serve no more than two consecutive terms” from the country’s Constitution.”

It is not clear when the meeting of the CC occurred, probably at the second plenum of the CC in January, but it is obvious that the target of the announcement is the 13th session of National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s equivalent of Parliament, which opens for its annual session on March 5.

Xi Jinping was given a second term as general secretary by the 19th Communist Party of China (CPC) Congress in October 2017, now the NPC will confirm him to a second term as President in March 2018. Once the new amendment is approved, it will give Xi Jinping, aged 64, the institutional authority to remain President beyond 2023, when he should have retired, having completed two terms. In other words, Xi could well be President for life.

Other amendments could see the Xi Jinping Thought being written into the state constitution as well as the establishment of a new anti-graft body called the National Supervisory Commission (NSC). This last named body will be one of the biggest institutional changes in recent times. Currently, the Central Commission on Discipline Inspection (CCDI) monitors party members, while the NSC will supervise all public workers, including those in government, courts, as well as doctors, academics and teachers. Wang Qishan, the powerful head of the CCDI, who retired at the party congress last year, was elected as a delegate to the NPC in January, suggesting that may be appointed head of the new NSC.

China has a complicated parallel system where the Communist Party and the Chinese State, both with their own constitutions, coexist. While the CPC runs the military through the Central Military Commission, other ministries and departments are run through the authority of the state constitution. It has its own institutions like the President, NPC, the State Council headed by a Premier, state councillors, ministries, etc. who are all largely party members. In other words, the state constitution and state law are made by “the people” through the NPC under the leadership of the CPC. Usually a minister not only heads the ministry, but is also the secretary of the ministry’s party committee. So, as minister, he reports to the state Premier, in this case Li Keqiang, and as party secretary, up the chain to the general secretary who is Xi Jinping.

Xi Jinping wears three hats – the general secretary of the CPC, president of China and the chairman of the Central Military Commission. Note that he was elected general secretary in November 2012, months before he became president at the annual NPC meeting in March 2013.

The signs of Xi continuing beyond his term in 2023 have been visible for some time now. In 2016, Xi was officially designated by the CC as “the core” of the leadership, a title he shares with Mao Tse Tung, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. More recently, two prominent newspapers conferred the title lingxu on him. This word means leader, but one of the highest calibre in contrast to simply being a leader or lingdao, and this designation he shares with Mao and Deng only.

Xi has also used the institution of Leading Groups to take direct charge of a range of areas. He is the chairman of the Leading Groups for comprehensively deepening reforms, on military and civilian development, internet security, financial affairs, foreign affairs, defence and military reforms and the national security commission. These Leading Groups comprise core officials and party members and call the real shots in the Chinese government system.

The party constitution is vague on the issue of term limits of its general secretary. In the past two years, there have been hints at the scrapping of age limits. In October 2016 , a senior party leader Deng Maosheng said that the concept of term limits were “pure folklore.” There have been several other instances of the age limits being revised for senior leaders.

However, the 19th Party Congress in October 2017 stuck to the established convention by retiring leaders who had crossed or were approaching the age of 68. Among these was CCDI chief Wang. Significantly, the new politburo standing committee did not see the promotion of any leader who looked likely to succeed Xi in 2023. This was a departure from the post-Deng norm where successors were more or less identifiable well in advance.

More germane to the current issue, the party constitution was amended to introduce Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. By juxtaposing it with Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Theory of Three Represents and the Scientific Outlook on Development, it virtually made Xi’s pronouncements as the working guide of the party in this era.

This was a huge departure from the party norms set by Deng Xiaoping to stabilise the Chinese system after the ravages of the Mao era. This means that Xi, as long as he is alive, is the dominant figure in the party because his theory guides it in the new era. Now, with the authority of the Presidency as well, Xi is set to be the supreme ruler of China into the foreseeable future.

China today is the strongest it has been since the 18th Century and is set to become even more powerful in the coming decades. Xi has already set the benchmarks— a moderately prosperous country by 2020, fully modern socialist society by 2035, and attain the China Dream of being a “prosperous, powerful, democratic, harmonious and beautiful socialist modern country” by 2050.

But by extending his term into the future Xi is putting personal power over the institutional process that has been working quite well in China for the past decades. By taking all the reins of power in his own hands, Xi assumes enormous personal responsibility for virtually everything happening in China, good or bad. Taking more and more titles and power may actually be a sign that he is not being able push through his policies in the manner he wants.

Experience around the world, whether in democracies or authoritarian systems, is that leaders usually begin to pall after about a decade and so, this development could actually signal the potential for instability in China in the coming period.

CPC proposes change on Chinese president's term in Constitution

[Oracle]

Who's attacking western journalism?
If you want to get picky, you might have said that I was criticizing non-Western and / or non-Journalists analysts ...

Where do you come up with these ideas?

This is what you wrote -

The only ones I've seen even hinting at this kind of thing -- staying in formal positions of power for more than 10 years -- are Western journalists.

Pardon my free speech, if not an attack, then definitely a snide remark. Your defense of anything Chinese doesn't go unnoticed, again freedom to choose whom to support, is not a communist characteristic, rather western. But it's your choice nonetheless. Please do continue.

[DOR]

Yes. Free speech is what the Western Journalists peddled when the false notion of a peaceful rise of China was spread by the communist propaganda machine. Ironic, that you would attack Western Journalists and don't value free speech.

Who's attacking western journalism?
If you want to get picky, you might have said that I was criticizing non-Western and / or non-Journalists analysts ...

Where do you come up with these ideas?

= = = = =




Term limits were agreed upon – not put in place by Deng Xiaoping – for more than one reason. Yes, they Elders agreed Mao had ruled too long. But, they also recognized that leaving the succession issue to the last man standing wasn’t very smart. They wanted younger men to take over, but to be guided by their Elders in major issues.

Then, they interfered and screwed things up on more than one occasion. Jiang Zemin hung on to power beyond his 10-year terms by retaining the chair of the Military Affairs Committee throughout Hu Jintao’s first term.

Term limits exist for party leaders right down to the lowest levels. It isn’t just the top jobs.

[Oracle]

ORDER FROM CHAOS
7 things you need to know about lifting term limits for Xi Jinping - Brookings

At its annual meeting beginning on March 5, the Chinese National People’s Congress appears poised to adopt a “recommendation” by the Communist Party that the two-term limit for president and vice president be eliminated. The change is of course not an expression of a preferred governance norm for longer terms, but rather a dramatic shift designed to permit President Xi Jinping to stay in power after his second presidential term expires in 2023.

This bolt out of the blue changes decades of Chinese government practice and appears also to be the prelude to changing the Communist Party norm that leaders cannot serve a new term after age 68. Xi, who was born in 1953, will be 69 when his term as general secretary of the Party ends in 2022. Given the practice since Jiang Zemin to ensure that the president and general secretary are one and the same, it appears that if Xi intends to serve a 3rd term as president, he will be invited to stay on as general secretary beyond the age limit.

At this point, there are more questions than answers about what this means for China, and for other countries. I will pose some of the major questions below and offer best guesses on the answers.

1. Why does China have term limits and age thresholds for its leaders?

Deng Xiaoping put the limits in place in the 1980s as part of his effort to ensure that China was never again subjected to a crushing dictatorship like that of Chairman Mao and the turmoil it occasioned. China’s Communist system not accepting the Western notion of formal checks and balances, Deng instituted a system with Chinese characteristics designed to prevent return of one-man rule or a cult of personality by preventing leaders from staying indefinitely in power. The term limits for senior government leaders are constitutionally mandated. The age limits for Party leaders are norms that have been respected for over two decades.

2. Will this change be limited to the president and vice president?

It will be a huge challenge for the leadership to maintain limits for the tenure of other officials. Deng and his successors have forced powerful Party leaders to retire when they reach the age norm limit, but have been able to do so because they themselves accepted those limits, at least insofar as formal positions were concerned. Party veterans in the future will point to Xi’s defiance of the age limit and assert their right to continue in power. Deng’s system to ensure a rotation of officials in leadership positions will be very much in peril.

3. Is this change a sign of Xi’s strength?

Yes and no.

Yes in that it is unlikely that any leader since Deng could have forced such a change in the face of competing personalities and factions. Xi has successfully used his first term in office to monopolize an array of leadership positions, to have himself declared the “core” of the leadership, and to eliminate other pockets of power through a rigorous anti-corruption campaign (which, to be fair, also has targeted many corrupt officials).

No in that there is reason to believe that the decision to allow Xi indefinite tenure reflects deep concern over instability. Economic restructuring and reform promised when Xi took over the Party in 2012 has been disappointing at best. Mounting debt at the regional level, in banks, and by private and state-owned companies alike has caused international credit institutions to flash yellow lights and is preoccupying Chinese leaders. The younger generation is notably unimpressed by the repressive heavy hand of the Party in general and Xi in particular, as evidenced by the constant chase by censors to keep up with social media critics. Investigations have taken down an extraordinary number of senior leaders, from Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang to the former vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission and director of the General Office, among many others. With so many leaders having bitten the dust, it seems likely that others who have remained in place feel both unease and uncertain loyalty to the top.

4. What does this mean for Chinese governance and decisionmaking?

It is likely to mean an even greater centralization of decisionmaking and slowness in getting important matters resolved. Lower-ranking officials, always cautious, will be more hesitant to stick their necks out to decide consequential and inconsequential matters, knowing that power at the very top is even more concentrated than before. Officials will wait for guidance rather than offering suggestions, and internal Party dissent—which has long been more lively than outsiders realize—will shrivel away to be replaced by fawning demonstrations of loyalty.

Dictatorships are able to make some decisions more easily than democratic or consensus-based systems. China has been a dictatorship since 1949, so the decisionmaking strengths and weaknesses of the system will be more of degree than kind.

5. How will this affect the transition of power to the next leadership, whenever that may come?

Negatively. Since 1989, Chinese leadership transitions have been smooth and without visible turmoil. There has been a regularity and predictability to the process. Differences have been worked out behind the scenes among the Party leadership. At least several years out, there has been a presumptive successor, who has invariably moved up when his time came.

That is now all up for grabs. If Xi chooses to stay on, it will signal to other ambitious would-be leaders that norms and consensus do not matter. The chances of leadership transitions descending into wars of all against all will be real. Chinese turmoil and repression in 1989 surrounding the pro-democracy demonstrations were made possible by deep splits in the leadership over policy and succession. Since then, in the interests of stability, the Party has not allowed any public splits. Preserving such unity in a Party that has abandoned Deng’s norms will be much harder, with consequences for the stability that Chinese so value.

6. Is this primarily about Xi’s overseas imperial ambitions or domestic concerns?

It is almost certainly owing to a combination of unease over domestic instability and personal ambitions rather than foreign policy. Xi already has the authority he needs to project China’s expanded and expanding interests overseas. Having a longer term in office will not affect his ability to do so.

There are heightened concerns in China over the direction of U.S.-China relations, particularly in the economic sphere as the Trump administration contemplates draconian measures to combat unfair Chinese trading practices. But there is no reason why such concerns should affect a power transition four or five years away. While there is anxiety in China over American policy and mood toward China, it is not a Code Red presenting such a challenge that Chinese institutions and norms need to be transformed.

7. Is there any good news for China and outsiders looking for sound decisionmaking in this change?

It is hard to find silver linings, but there are a few.

For all of the shortcomings of Xi’s rule on economic reform, the increased domestic repression, and the security challenges to China’s neighbors, Xi is not an impulsive, hot-headed, or irrational leader. The comparisons to Chairman Mao are thoroughly wrong-headed, as Chinese who experienced the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution point out. Foreign leaders tend to value rationality and predictability, and Xi is likely to provide that, though he certainly is capable of boldness, creativity, and assertiveness unsettling to Americans and some neighbors (e.g. South China Sea reclamation, the Belt and Road Initiative, and the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank). One should not assume that having him around longer will prevent some preferable or more emollient leader from emerging.

Also encouraging, those apparently primed to become top advisors to Xi in the wake of this soft coup include two of China’s most capable and outward-looking officials: Wang Qishan and Liu He. The talk of Wang becoming vice president, with special responsibility for the relationship with the United States, is more and more credible (we will know the outcome by mid-March). Wang, who served as the highly capable counterpart of Hank Paulson and Tim Geithner through the economic crisis of 2008-09, has a history of serving as a Mr. Fixit in handling China’s largest problems. He also brings a global and market-oriented perspective to China’s economic challenges. Liu He, who currently serves as Vice Chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission and director of the Leading Group for Financial and Economic Affairs, is likely to be promoted to Vice Premier at the National People’s Congress. He is already Xi’s most trusted economic advisor, and arguably the official with the best understanding of the reforms needed if China is to sustain economic growth and not sink into the so-called “middle income trap.” His promotion as key advisor to a strengthened Xi could provide an opportunity to give some needed fuel to the economic reform process. Whether Xi intends to be bolder in his next term in that respect is, like much else, unknown and unpredictable.

[Oracle]

Xi term limit proposal sparks rare public dissent in China

In a rare public expression of dissent in China, a well-known political commentator and a prominent businesswoman have penned open letters urging lawmakers to reject a plan that would allow President Xi Jinping to rule indefinitely.

Their impassioned statements on a popular messaging app were circulated widely after the ruling Communist Party announced a proposal on Sunday to amend the constitution to scrap term limits on the president and vice president.

In a statement on Monday on WeChat to Beijing's members of China's rubber-stamp parliament, Li Datong, a former editor for the state-run China Youth Daily, wrote that lifting term limits would “sow the seeds of chaos".

“If there are no term limits on a country's highest leader, then we are returning to an imperial regime,” Li told The Associated Press on Tuesday.

“My generation has lived through Mao. That era is over. How can we possibly go back to it?”

Wang Ying, a businesswoman who has advocated government reforms, wrote on WeChat that the Communist Party's proposal was “an outright betrayal” and “against the tides".

“I know that you (the government) will dare to do anything,” she wrote. “And one ordinary person's voice is certainly useless. But I am a Chinese citizen, and I don't plan on leaving. This is my motherland too!”

In a message that was swiftly deleted by censors, sociologist Li Yinhe called the removal of term limits “unfeasible” and would “return China to the era of Mao".

Li added, however, that delegates to the National People's Congress, China's parliament, are likely to pass the amendment unanimously since “they aren't really elected by the people, therefore they don't represent the people in voting, but will vote according to the leadership's design".

An official at the information department of the Congress' Standing Committee said on Tuesday that he was not aware of the open letters.

While Xi, 64, is broadly popular in China for his economic stewardship, muscular foreign policy and emphasis on stability, it's difficult to determine how the move to end term limits has been received overall. Few Chinese dare to speak out on political topics, even online, while the media are entirely state-controlled and public polling on sensitive issues is nonexistent.

The Congress is all but certain to pass the constitutional amendment when it meets for its annual session early next month, at which it will grant Xi a second five-year term and appoint new ministers and other government officials.

Under the 1982 constitution, the president is limited to two five-year terms in office, but Xi — already China's most powerful leader since Mao — is seemingly convinced that he's the only one who can realise his vision for China and wants additional terms to see through his agenda of fighting corruption, eliminating poverty and transforming China into a modern leading nation by midcentury.

A simple thirst for power is another possible motivation.

Government and party spokesmen have yet to offer any detailed explanations of the reasoning behind the dropping of term limits. Nor is it clear whether Xi will seek to remain president for life or will only stay on for a set number of additional terms.

“The fact that this proposal was possible means that Xi Jinping's influence is growing,” said Chen Jieren, a Beijing-based independent political scholar. “The party is recognising his achievements in fighting corruption. People have confidence in and respect for his resoluteness.”

But Chen added: “China is not Cuba. Through the past few decades, Chinese people have come to understand that no one should be in power for life.”

Foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang said on Monday that the proposal “was made in accordance with the new situation and the practice of upholding and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era".

In a commentary on Tuesday, the official China Daily newspaper mentioned the proposal to strip out language in the constitution limiting the president and vice president to two five-year terms, saying it was “necessitated by the need to perfect the party and the state's leadership system".

While Chinese censors have moved swiftly to delete satirical online commentary on the move, a range of opposition views continue to be shared. The Global Times, a newspaper published by the Communist Party, said “outside forces” were trying to challenge the party's leadership.

[Oracle]

Oracle,
Let me take a guess.
That "Free press" thing had some kind of meaning behind it ?

Yes. Free speech is what the Western Journalists peddled when the false notion of a peaceful rise of China was spread by the communist propaganda machine. Ironic, that you would attack Western Journalists and don't value free speech.

[DOR]

http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/26/...inese-monster/

The story isn’t even remotely about “globalization.” Liberalization helped China recover from Maoism, but ending the idiotic notion of “to each according to his needs, from each according to his ability” did most of the heavy lifting.

The notion that democracy and capitalism go hand in hand died when the GOPers applied voter suppression techniques so as to ensure they could pass massive tax cuts for the rich. Having said that, capitalism has survived monarchy, imperialism, theocratism, socialism, communism, fascism and democracy.

I wouldn't bet against it.

[DOR]

DOR,
Let me take a guess. Free press.

Oracle,
Let me take a guess.
That "Free press" thing had some kind of meaning behind it ?

[Ironduke]

http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/26/...inese-monster/

Globalization Has Created a Chinese Monster
Xi Jinping's dictatorship isn't what the end of history was supposed to look like.

On Sunday, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee recommended ending the two-term limit on the presidency, paving the way for President Xi Jinping to stay in office indefinitely. This surely marks the end of an era — and not just for China, but also for the West.

For the West, the era in question started with the end of the Cold War, as old enemies became “emerging markets.” China had already started opening its markets to foreign investment since 1978 under Deng Xiaoping’s reforms. But only in the 1990s did the private sector take off there, and Western firms promptly rushed in to profit from the breakneck speed of Chinese economic growth.

The beauty of the post-Cold War emerging market story was that it was apolitical. Recall the famous identification of the leading emerging markets by Jim O’Neill in 2001 as the “BRICs” (Brazil, Russia, India, China) — four states from different groupings during the Cold War now viewed together as the leading protagonists in a new era of peaceful globalization under the Pax Americana. Some called it the end of history.

But this apolitical approach was premised on the assumption, inherited from the Cold War, that democracy and capitalism go hand in hand, and that the extension of free markets would bring global convergence to the Western economic model, as the Washington Consensus predicted.

Confidence in globalization saw massive amounts of Western capital and intellectual property flow to emerging markets, above all to China. But few in the West registered the geopolitical significance of this at the time. Instead, they praised the economic growth story. And not without good reason: the integration of China into global markets lifted a billion people out of poverty. It remains a testament to the material benefits of removing geopolitical obstructions from the development of global business.

But this story of global cosmopolitan peace has been on the rocks for some time. Russian privatization in the 1990s ultimately produced a mafia state controlled by an oligarchy. More broadly — with a few exceptions, mainly in Eastern Europe, where democracy did take hold (current problems notwithstanding) — capitalism has expanded since the end of the Cold War in spite of democracy, not alongside it.

And nowhere is this more evident than in China. It’s now abundantly clear that despite the West’s pious belief in the transformative power of free markets to encourage “reform,” China is headed toward more, not less autocracy. Indeed, it might not be an exaggeration to say that China has broken a path toward a new form of totalitarianism in which one man will sit atop a police state with access to ubiquitous data gathered about citizens by social media and online shopping platforms and a vast human and electronic surveillance apparatus to track their every move. Look no further than the ghastly “social credit score” system that Beijing wants to roll out by 2020 to get a sense of how wrong the idea has proven to be that free markets will bring about democratic change, or even minor liberalizing reform in China. A billion people may have been lifted out of poverty, but only to find themselves living under cyber-totalitarianism.

The geopolitical consequences of this realization could be very profound indeed. In the Cold War, the West faced totalitarian communist regimes whose economic model and political system were both alien to what the “free world” claimed to stand for. Of course, the link between capitalism and democracy was always tenuous, not least given the reality that many of the West’s allies were not democratic. But now, if it was ever in doubt, we know for sure that capitalism and democracy don’t have to go together: Capitalism is up for grabs, and you don’t even need to support the Pax Americana to plug into it.

How does this end? We don’t yet know, but the question may well come to be the defining feature of a new geopolitical phase the world seems to have entered. Note how far removed from the happy story of liberal globalization is the language of the Trump administration’s December 2017 National Security Strategy: “China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity.”

Admittedly, this comes in the context of a presidency that bizarrely refuses to carry out U.S. congressional sanctions on Russia for interference in the U.S. 2016 elections. But the more important point is that Western states and their citizens are becoming increasingly alert to the need fundamentally to reappraise the value of the integrated global capitalism they have more or less promoted since the early 1990s. I am not talking about a reappraisal in light of the inequality that economic growth has produced, or the massive outsourcing of manufacturing jobs that created rust belts on both sides of the Atlantic, which is a separate discussion. Rather, this reappraisal concerns the inconvenient truth, which surely now is undeniable, that the West’s own economic policy has encouraged, if unwittingly, the rise of deeply illiberal regimes in much of the former communist world.

What practical effect this produces in the foreign and economic policies of the West depends, on the one hand, on the extent to which the West is prepared to sacrifice material wealth in support of its public values; and, on the other hand, on the extent to which authoritarian states, above all Russia and China, attempt to export their values abroad. One could list any number of areas where this dilemma will play out, but the most important near-term litmus test will be whether the West responds to China’s Belt and Road Initiative as a benign economic project, or as a geopolitical threat.

[Ironduke]

More here: http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/26/...-myth-is-dead/

China’s Stability Myth Is Dead

The announcement on Sunday that China would abolish the two-term limit for the presidency, effectively foreshadowing current leader Xi Jinping’s likely status as president for life, had been predicted ever since Xi failed to nominate a clear successor at last October’s Communist Party Congress. But it still came as a shock in a country where the collective leadership established under Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s was once considered inviolable. Xi, like every leader since Deng, combines a trinity of roles that embody the three pillars of power in China: party chairman, president, and head of the Central Military Commission. But like every leader since Deng, he was once expected to hand these over after his appointed decade, letting one generation of leadership pass smoothly on to the next.

It’s virtually impossible to gauge public opinion in China, especially as censorship has gripped ever tighter online. But among Chinese I know, including those used to defending China’s system, the move caused dismay and a fair amount of gallows humor involving references to “Emperor Pooh” and “West Korea.”

U.S. President Donald Trump’s electoral victory in 2016 similarly prompted rounds of reflection about and criticism of American democracy. But the Chinese case merits significantly more alarm. For all the erosion of norms under Trump, he seems unlikely, despite the fears of some, to fundamentally change the way the United States is governed. Xi, meanwhile, appears to have entirely transformed Chinese politics from collective autocracy to what’s looking increasingly like one-man rule. This switch should leave everyone very worried, both inside and outside China. A country that once seemed to be clumsily lurching toward new freedoms has regressed sharply into full-blown dictatorship — of a kind that’s likely to lead to dangerous and unfixable mistakes.

The Chinese Constitution itself is a largely meaningless document, promising as it does freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and personal privacy. Amendments are frequent, proposed by a committee of “experts” and rubber-stamped by the National People’s Congress, China’s annual — and equally meaningless — parliament. Brave efforts to give the constitution genuine significance were crushed, as with any other attempt to curtail party power, in the early years of Xi’s rule.

But the most recent change signals something far deeper than the party’s primacy over the law; it spotlights the essential instability of the entire political system. For the last two decades, defenders of China have pointed to collective leadership and the smooth succession from one leader to another as signs that the country had solved the problem that bedeviled other autocracies such as the Soviet Union. The new leadership was established five years in advance of taking power, allowing strong continuity without the upsets of elections. The handover of power from Hu Jintao to Xi was considered a model of good rule, without the hangovers and struggles that continued for several years after Jiang Zemin reluctantly passed power to Hu in 2002.

Perhaps the system was always doomed, as soon as a cunning enough leader emerged — though Xi was not only skilled but lucky, utilizing the fall of his likely rival Bo Xilai to consolidate his own supremacy. There will be a certain grim amusement in watching intellectual apparatchiks scuttle to explain how their previous arguments in favor of collective rule have been superseded by the needs of the times and that strongman rule is now the only answer. As the New York Times’s Chris Buckley pointed out, Hu Angang, a regular and vocal apologist for the government, made collective rule the centerpiece of his book on the superiority of the Chinese political system — published in 2013, just after Xi’s initial ascension.

[Double Edge]

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee’s decision to amend the state constitution to permit Xi Jinping – and whoever he eventually chooses as his successor – to serve more than two terms is widely seen as proof that Xi is the strongest leader since Mao Zedong. That may not necessarily be the case.

After the war with Japan, the Chinese Civil War and the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Mao Zedong was content to hold just two formal titles: Chairman of the party and head of its Military Affairs Commission (MAC). When Deng Xiaoping began dismantling Maoism, he also held few formal titles (army Chief-of-Staff, party vice chair and state Vice Premier).

Deng took power by convincing his peers that Chairman Mao had hurt the party and the country by creating a cult of personality and remaining in power too long. Among the deals struck were an agreement that successors would be carefully groomed and elders would gradually retire. Between the final purge of latent leftists in the early 1980s and the dismissal of Hu Yaobang in 1986, Deng and his senior colleagues wrestled with exactly how – and when – to release the reins of power.

Like Mao, Deng outlasted his first two chosen successors and in his final days was forced to acquiesce to a weak, third string choice. Twenty years after Mao launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, at least partly to get rid of second ranked Liu Shaoqi, Deng dumped his chosen successor and life-long ally, Hu Yaobang. Within a few years, both men were replaced, by Lin Biao and Zhao Ziyang, respectively, amid chaos and confusion.

The mid-1989 Tiananmen Massacre and removal of Zhao Ziyang forced Deng to turn to the untested Jiang Zemin. Like Hua Guofeng, Jiang was relatively new to national politics, having been named CCP Secretary of Shanghai (and a member of the politburo) only in 1987. In a stroke, he was elevated to the PBSC, named General Secretary of the Party and chair of its MAC and, in 1993, President of the PRC.

Which brings us to Xi Jinping.

The party and state constitutions stipulate that the top leaders may serve a maximum of two five-year terms. Jiang Zemin dutifully gave up his key titles on schedule, but retained his position as head of the armed forces. This ensured that Hu Jintao – who was not Jiang’s chosen successor but one foisted upon him by the elders – would not be able to significantly threaten either Jiang or his allies. As a result, Hu was a weak leader throughout his decade in office.

Xi Jinping, on the other hand, took all the titles as soon as possible. He now seeks to keep those titles, which suggests he does not think he can protect his legacy and his allies without them. What Mr Xi now needs to watch for is a coalescence of forces opposed to his prolonged rule. While it may not come soon, history suggests that it will arise, one day.

Yes, he is weaker than he looks

https://youtu.be/VypsYrMRGHo?t=1015

[Oracle]

Some prediction.

[Oracle]

The only ones I've seen even hinting at this kind of thing -- staying in formal positions of power for more than 10 years -- are Western journalists.

DOR,
Let me take a guess. Free press.

[DOR]

Xi Jinping may be weaker than he looks

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee’s decision to amend the state constitution to permit Xi Jinping – and whoever he eventually chooses as his successor – to serve more than two terms is widely seen as proof that Xi is the strongest leader since Mao Zedong. That may not necessarily be the case.

After the war with Japan, the Chinese Civil War and the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Mao Zedong was content to hold just two formal titles: Chairman of the party and head of its Military Affairs Commission (MAC). When Deng Xiaoping began dismantling Maoism, he also held few formal titles (army Chief-of-Staff, party vice chair and state Vice Premier).

Deng took power by convincing his peers that Chairman Mao had hurt the party and the country by creating a cult of personality and remaining in power too long. Among the deals struck were an agreement that successors would be carefully groomed and elders would gradually retire. Between the final purge of latent leftists in the early 1980s and the dismissal of Hu Yaobang in 1986, Deng and his senior colleagues wrestled with exactly how – and when – to release the reins of power.

Like Mao, Deng outlasted his first two chosen successors and in his final days was forced to acquiesce to a weak, third string choice. Twenty years after Mao launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, at least partly to get rid of second ranked Liu Shaoqi, Deng dumped his chosen successor and life-long ally, Hu Yaobang. Within a few years, both men were replaced, by Lin Biao and Zhao Ziyang, respectively, amid chaos and confusion.

The mid-1989 Tiananmen Massacre and removal of Zhao Ziyang forced Deng to turn to the untested Jiang Zemin. Like Hua Guofeng, Jiang was relatively new to national politics, having been named CCP Secretary of Shanghai (and a member of the politburo) only in 1987. In a stroke, he was elevated to the PBSC, named General Secretary of the Party and chair of its MAC and, in 1993, President of the PRC.

Which brings us to Xi Jinping.

The party and state constitutions stipulate that the top leaders may serve a maximum of two five-year terms. Jiang Zemin dutifully gave up his key titles on schedule, but retained his position as head of the armed forces. This ensured that Hu Jintao – who was not Jiang’s chosen successor but one foisted upon him by the elders – would not be able to significantly threaten either Jiang or his allies. As a result, Hu was a weak leader throughout his decade in office.

Xi Jinping, on the other hand, took all the titles as soon as possible. He now seeks to keep those titles, which suggests he does not think he can protect his legacy and his allies without them. What Mr Xi now needs to watch for is a coalescence of forces opposed to his prolonged rule. While it may not come soon, history suggests that it will arise, one day.

[citanon]

More disturbing signs:

http://www.realcleardefense.com/arti...es_110637.html