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What's Xi Jinping Up To?
Chinese leader Xi Jinping is the most powerful Chinese politician since Chairman Mao Zedong. He assumed his formal offices in 2012 and 2013, but unlike his predecessors he isn't retiring after completing two five-year terms. The so-called Chairman of Everything1 is staying put.
But, that's just one symptom of how Xi is different from other Chinese leaders.
First, unlike Deng Xiaoping and other recent leaders, Xi does not appear to need the support of other senior leaders.2 He has effectively side-lined the powerful factions that have dominated Chinese politics for the last 25 years. That includes his own supporters in what was known as Jiang Zemin's Shanghai Clique.
More, he has effectively bypassed his colleagues to rewrite the rules of the game, and in doing so sidelined an entire generation of rising stars.At the end of two five-year terms as state president and party boss, the two previous leaders – Jiang and Hu Jintao – stepped aside, and let others take over. Jiang did retain the role of head of the armed forces during Hu's first term, which Hu did not do during Xi's initial five years. Still, there is no precedent since Chairman Mao himself of the top leader staying on for more than 10 years. 3
In October 2022, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), will hold its 20th National Party Congress. This meeting, which has been held every five years since 1977, concludes with the formal declaration as to who will lead China, and in what direction.4
Top of the list is deciding who will sit at the decision-making table. In past years, different political factions have jostled for seats at the table, sometimes sharing turns taking the lead, and at other times closing the door to alternative voices. Deng Xiaoping was rarely able to completely shut down his colleagues, and, after the experience of Chairman Mao, he may not have thought it wise to do so. As powerful as he was, he had to negotiate with other party elders. Previous party secretaries such as Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang and Jiang Zemin, also had old men looking over their shoulders as they tried to run the country. It was only after the elders passed from the scene that the factions worked together, for a time. Until, that is, Xi Jinping decided to change the rules.
Xi Jinping does not appear to be following this tradition. Rather, he has purged, demoted, or retired key members of the various factions, and made each of them subordinate to himself. The factions, which are both influential and illegitimate in Chinese politics. From the late 1990s until the early 2010s, the most powerful one centered around cadres with close ties to Shanghai. The second main group, affiliated with Hu Jintao, was those who rose up through the Communist Youth League (CYL), a training ground for future cadres. The children of former senior leaders, known as princelings, are roughly grouped together as a third force, although there is considerable overlap. Another group sometimes identified by scholars of elite politics, centers around graduates of Tsinghua University, China's top science and engineering campus.
The Shanghai Clique was led by Jiang Zemin, who was rapidly elevated into the top party post in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre. It has dominated elite politics since the late 1990s, and with the support of the princelings, promoted Xi Jinping to power. Xi then turned on his colleagues and removed any continuing threat to his own authority.
Jiang Zemin's successor, Hu Jintao, was head of the CYL Faction, and had high hopes for the further elevation of Premier Li Keqiang. In recent years, Xi has decimated the ranks of the CYL Faction, and greatly reduced the organization's status.
The third group, the Princelings, has none of the geographic or organizational cohesion of the others. The sons and sons-in-law (and rarely, daughters) of former high ranking cadres shared many experiences in their formative years, both good and bad. Many went to one of a small handful of elite schools, joined the CYL, and suffered when their parents were purged during the Cultural Revolution. Some studied abroad, others went into business in and used their connections to get rich. They are not, however, a faction per se.5
Like all previous senior Chinese leaders, Xi Jinping's first main task was to insert his own key allies into as many senior positions as possible, hopefully by removing people allied with his opponents. His followers are loosely grouped into three camps, those from Shaanxi (Xi's home province), and those with whom he worked in Hubei (1982-85), Fujian (1985-02), and Zhejiang (2002-07).
It would appear that Xi Jinping intends to remain in power for another 5-15 years, by which time he would be in his late 70s or early 80s. It is by no means clear that the other top leaders – either those with substantial power today, or their successors – are united behind this approach, but there does not seem to be any concerted effort to force Xi to step down. Most important, there is no clear successor, as there had been during the previous seven or eight Party Congresses.
One side effect of this development is that a generation of leaders born in the late 1950s and early 1960s are seeing their collective futures being curtailed. While many enjoy high office and significant prestige today, they probably expect someone 5-10 years younger to be Xi's successor. Whether that leads to cohesive resentment remains to be seen.
For the moment, Xi is The Man, the Core Leader and Chairman of Everything.
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Notes
1 The term appears to have been coined by Geremie Barme, to highlight the many roles Xi has assumed that previously were delegated to other. Quoted in The Economist, April 2, 2016.
2 Deng was first among equals, but had to consider the views – both on policy matters and in crucial personnel appointments – of the so-called Eight Immortals (or, Elders). They were Chen Yun (d. 1995), Li Xiannian (d. 1992), Peng Zhen (d. 1997), Bo Yibo (d. 2007), Wang Zhen (d. 1993), Song Renqiong (d. 2005), Deng Yingchao (Madam Zhou Enlai; d. 1992), Xi Zhongxun (father of Xi Jinping, d. 2002), Yang Shangkun (d. 1998), and Deng Xiaoping himself (d. 1997). Confusingly, there were 10 post-Mao elders, although some scholars would omit Deng Yingchao and Song Renxiong.
3 Deng Xiaoping was effectively the leader from the late 1970s to the late 1990s, but did not have many formal titles.
4 The first party congress was held in 1921, effectively establishing the Chinese Communist Party. There is some uncertainty as to who attended, particularly the participation of Mao Zedong. Prior to the Chinese Civil War, congresses were held in 1922, 1923, and 1925. After Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang, or KMT, still active on Taiwan) drove the CCP underground, a congress was held in 1927, and again in 1928 (the 6th). The next congress was held at the end of the Sino-Japanese War, in 1945. In 1956, after the founding of the People's Republic of China, the 8th National Party Congress was held. The 1969 9th Congress was held during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) upheaval, and effectively purged the Immortals and their moderate allies. After Marshall Lin Biao reputedly staged a failed coup d'etat in 1971, Mao began to bring back some of the purged leaders. They assumed significant authority after the 10th Congress, in 1973. Deng and some key allies were purged in the run-up to Mao's September 1976 death. The coup d'etat that followed set the stage for the reform era, which was launched at the 1977 11th National Party Congress. From then until now, congresses have been held every five years 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2012, 2017, and 2022.
5 Or, joined the armed forces. A current example is People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) General Xu Qiliang, the senior Vice Chair of the MAC and a member of the 19th Politburo. He father also served as a senior PLAAF officer.
`
What's Xi Jinping Up To?
But, that's just one symptom of how Xi is different from other Chinese leaders.
First, unlike Deng Xiaoping and other recent leaders, Xi does not appear to need the support of other senior leaders.2 He has effectively side-lined the powerful factions that have dominated Chinese politics for the last 25 years. That includes his own supporters in what was known as Jiang Zemin's Shanghai Clique.
More, he has effectively bypassed his colleagues to rewrite the rules of the game, and in doing so sidelined an entire generation of rising stars.At the end of two five-year terms as state president and party boss, the two previous leaders – Jiang and Hu Jintao – stepped aside, and let others take over. Jiang did retain the role of head of the armed forces during Hu's first term, which Hu did not do during Xi's initial five years. Still, there is no precedent since Chairman Mao himself of the top leader staying on for more than 10 years. 3
In October 2022, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), will hold its 20th National Party Congress. This meeting, which has been held every five years since 1977, concludes with the formal declaration as to who will lead China, and in what direction.4
Top of the list is deciding who will sit at the decision-making table. In past years, different political factions have jostled for seats at the table, sometimes sharing turns taking the lead, and at other times closing the door to alternative voices. Deng Xiaoping was rarely able to completely shut down his colleagues, and, after the experience of Chairman Mao, he may not have thought it wise to do so. As powerful as he was, he had to negotiate with other party elders. Previous party secretaries such as Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang and Jiang Zemin, also had old men looking over their shoulders as they tried to run the country. It was only after the elders passed from the scene that the factions worked together, for a time. Until, that is, Xi Jinping decided to change the rules.
Xi Jinping does not appear to be following this tradition. Rather, he has purged, demoted, or retired key members of the various factions, and made each of them subordinate to himself. The factions, which are both influential and illegitimate in Chinese politics. From the late 1990s until the early 2010s, the most powerful one centered around cadres with close ties to Shanghai. The second main group, affiliated with Hu Jintao, was those who rose up through the Communist Youth League (CYL), a training ground for future cadres. The children of former senior leaders, known as princelings, are roughly grouped together as a third force, although there is considerable overlap. Another group sometimes identified by scholars of elite politics, centers around graduates of Tsinghua University, China's top science and engineering campus.
The Shanghai Clique was led by Jiang Zemin, who was rapidly elevated into the top party post in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre. It has dominated elite politics since the late 1990s, and with the support of the princelings, promoted Xi Jinping to power. Xi then turned on his colleagues and removed any continuing threat to his own authority.
Jiang Zemin's successor, Hu Jintao, was head of the CYL Faction, and had high hopes for the further elevation of Premier Li Keqiang. In recent years, Xi has decimated the ranks of the CYL Faction, and greatly reduced the organization's status.
The third group, the Princelings, has none of the geographic or organizational cohesion of the others. The sons and sons-in-law (and rarely, daughters) of former high ranking cadres shared many experiences in their formative years, both good and bad. Many went to one of a small handful of elite schools, joined the CYL, and suffered when their parents were purged during the Cultural Revolution. Some studied abroad, others went into business in and used their connections to get rich. They are not, however, a faction per se.5
Like all previous senior Chinese leaders, Xi Jinping's first main task was to insert his own key allies into as many senior positions as possible, hopefully by removing people allied with his opponents. His followers are loosely grouped into three camps, those from Shaanxi (Xi's home province), and those with whom he worked in Hubei (1982-85), Fujian (1985-02), and Zhejiang (2002-07).
It would appear that Xi Jinping intends to remain in power for another 5-15 years, by which time he would be in his late 70s or early 80s. It is by no means clear that the other top leaders – either those with substantial power today, or their successors – are united behind this approach, but there does not seem to be any concerted effort to force Xi to step down. Most important, there is no clear successor, as there had been during the previous seven or eight Party Congresses.
One side effect of this development is that a generation of leaders born in the late 1950s and early 1960s are seeing their collective futures being curtailed. While many enjoy high office and significant prestige today, they probably expect someone 5-10 years younger to be Xi's successor. Whether that leads to cohesive resentment remains to be seen.
For the moment, Xi is The Man, the Core Leader and Chairman of Everything.
-------------------
Notes
1 The term appears to have been coined by Geremie Barme, to highlight the many roles Xi has assumed that previously were delegated to other. Quoted in The Economist, April 2, 2016.
2 Deng was first among equals, but had to consider the views – both on policy matters and in crucial personnel appointments – of the so-called Eight Immortals (or, Elders). They were Chen Yun (d. 1995), Li Xiannian (d. 1992), Peng Zhen (d. 1997), Bo Yibo (d. 2007), Wang Zhen (d. 1993), Song Renqiong (d. 2005), Deng Yingchao (Madam Zhou Enlai; d. 1992), Xi Zhongxun (father of Xi Jinping, d. 2002), Yang Shangkun (d. 1998), and Deng Xiaoping himself (d. 1997). Confusingly, there were 10 post-Mao elders, although some scholars would omit Deng Yingchao and Song Renxiong.
3 Deng Xiaoping was effectively the leader from the late 1970s to the late 1990s, but did not have many formal titles.
4 The first party congress was held in 1921, effectively establishing the Chinese Communist Party. There is some uncertainty as to who attended, particularly the participation of Mao Zedong. Prior to the Chinese Civil War, congresses were held in 1922, 1923, and 1925. After Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang, or KMT, still active on Taiwan) drove the CCP underground, a congress was held in 1927, and again in 1928 (the 6th). The next congress was held at the end of the Sino-Japanese War, in 1945. In 1956, after the founding of the People's Republic of China, the 8th National Party Congress was held. The 1969 9th Congress was held during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) upheaval, and effectively purged the Immortals and their moderate allies. After Marshall Lin Biao reputedly staged a failed coup d'etat in 1971, Mao began to bring back some of the purged leaders. They assumed significant authority after the 10th Congress, in 1973. Deng and some key allies were purged in the run-up to Mao's September 1976 death. The coup d'etat that followed set the stage for the reform era, which was launched at the 1977 11th National Party Congress. From then until now, congresses have been held every five years 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2012, 2017, and 2022.
5 Or, joined the armed forces. A current example is People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) General Xu Qiliang, the senior Vice Chair of the MAC and a member of the 19th Politburo. He father also served as a senior PLAAF officer.
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