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Afghanistan 'had Abbottabad lead four years ago'

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  • #91
    Yusuf Reply

    "...What if direct complicity is found at the highest level in GHQ in sheltering OBL and otter terrorists?"

    I fear this administration would turn a blind eye. I doubt, though, that any such evidence will be found by the Pakistanis of which we'd be aware.

    What's more interesting and relevant to me is what can satisfy Congress. Are they sufficiently dissatisfied with Pakistan to act upon it and cut funding? If not, what would push them to do so?

    We'll simply have to see what evolves.
    "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
    "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs


    • #92

      You have just confirmed my worst fears. Pakistan not forged out will be the biggest mistake.

      Obviously you will not find direct papers leading to kiyani. He will have it all destroyed by now. They will offer a fall guy. But it is amply clear who is doing what.

      US turned a blind eye to China Pak nuke proliferation. See what we gave got today. Turn a blind eye to pak terror and the result is going to be equally frightening. What stops the US from declaring Pakistan a sponsor of terror and US directly starts operations in Pak, B2s etc??

      Supplies to Astan can't be the excuse for not going after Pakistan when te root cause IS Pakistan. The Logical end to WoT is defeat of Pakistan sponsored terror. Which means end of Pakistan in it's current form as well.
      Last edited by Yusuf; 09 May 11,, 04:31.


      • #93
        Originally posted by Yusuf View Post
        What stops the US from declaring Pakistan a sponsor of terror and US directly starts operations in Pak, B2s etc??
        Cutting aid is one thing. Bombing them with B2s is totally another. America will do whatever is sufficient for her security needs, as it should, and they need not bomb Pakistan, atleast in the present set up, to accomplish their security goals.

        India... well, its entirely up to her how she deals with her own security threat. My first goal would be to keep the Afghan Taliban weak, and to that affect, I'd open the cash taps for all the anti-Taliban groups within Afghanistan. Meanwhile, I'd be stoking up the internal fires in Pakistan just enough to keep the Pakistani army busy and bogged down internally. RAW needs to seriously catch up with the ISI if it wishes to have a one up in the proxy wars in the region.

        Theres only so far you can go piggy backing on another country's hard work. There eventually comes a time where you must run the last laps yourself. If India can't do that much, she doesn't deserve to be called a regional player, let alone, aspire to be a global one.
        Last edited by Tronic; 09 May 11,, 05:40.
        Cow is the only animal that not only inhales oxygen, but also exhales it.
        -Rekha Arya, Former Minister of Animal Husbandry


        • #94
          The key to success in Afghanistan

          Amrullah Saleh
          To turn the tide against insurgency in Afghanistan, the Obama administration has pursued a three-pillar strategy: First, it has used both carrots and sticks to secure Pakistan’s cooperation; second, it has sought to bolster Afghan government institutions; and, third, it has embarked on a military surge to defeat the Taliban.

          However, Afghanistan president Hamid Karzai resorts to religious and nationalist rhetoric to avoid the hard work needed to deliver services to the populace and to create the political narrative necessary to justify the military mission. Washington, too, has failed to articulate to Afghan society the true aims of U.S. efforts.

          Amidst this communications vacuum, conspiracy theories swirl. Some Afghans speculate that the United States implanted the Taliban in the country in order to harass Russia, China, and Iran. Others argue that the United States prolongs the war to test new weapons, destabilize central Asia, or maintain a stepping stone to Caspian oil reserves. The Pakistani establishment and its Afghan supporters believe the United States harbors a hidden agenda to destabilize the region in order to dismantle Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, and thus have remained uncooperative in efforts to end the Taliban insurgency.

          Afghans of all social strata perceive the huge gap between Kabul and Washington over good governance, development, corruption, military policy, and diplomacy. Only when it comes to the transition to full Afghan control does there appear to be a confluence of opinion, although it is unclear whether this is due to Afghan transition chief Ashraf Ghani’s public diplomacy or, more likely, NATO’s desperation to leave and Karzai’s desire to see NATO go.

          While the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) can brag about its recent military success, that success will be unsustainable without Kabul’s cooperation. The White House has tried a number of strategies to pressure Karzai. After years of quiet diplomacy, President Obama’s White House has used bullhorn diplomacy to criticize Karzai publicly. Obama briefly suspended the two presidents’ regular video conferences. Provincial Reconstruction Teams, the centerpiece of American and European development efforts, have promoted provincial authority to undermine central power. Most recently, Washington has threatened to cut assistance if Karzai does not investigate corruption. None of these strategies, however, has persuaded Karzai to embrace good governance or cooperate with ISAF, perhaps because Karzai knows, despite American bluster, that he retains unconditional financial support.

          The Obama administration has not tried the one strategy that will work, however: the reconstitution of Afghanistan’s anti-Taliban constituency, both to recreate a political context for the NATO mission and to force Karzai to choose sides between the Taliban and Afghanistan. The anti-Taliban constituency is not an ethnic alliance against the south, but rather a political umbrella for all Afghans who seek a pluralistic society and oppose the Talibanization of the society as part of a so-called reconciliation deal. Perhaps 80 percent of Afghans oppose the Taliban. Such an umbrella will be Afghans’ best representative in any talks with the Taliban, since Karzai and his High Peace Council lack credibility among Afghans who experienced the Taliban’s oppressive rule. Acquiescence to the Taliban’s return has demoralized society and fuels further conspiracy theories about America’s true intentions. Karzai’s embrace of Taliban rehabilitation also deprives ISAF and NATO of vital political support in Afghanistan.

          An anti-Taliban constituency can mobilize society around the grand strategy of a prosperous Afghanistan largely immune from Talibanization. The massive flow of international aid and ISAF support for Karzai undercuts efforts to solidify an anti-Taliban constituency which would best promote Afghanistan’s interests, justify the American investment in Afghanistan, and protect the national security of both countries. The massive flow of Western assistance to Karzai — not to mention discretionary cash assistance from our ambitious neighbors — has eviscerated civil society and promoted a binary choice between Karzai and political marginalization. That nearly a decade after the 9/11 attacks, America now allows its money to, at least indirectly, support the group responsible for those attacks shocks Afghans and should shock all Americans. It is time to embrace true change, rather than stumble along a failed path to 2014 — the year in which NATO hopes to withdraw forces, and the year of the next Afghan presidential election
          In the realm of spirit, seek clarity; in the material world, seek utility.



          • #95
            Former top Afghan spy on Pakistan, bin Laden

            Tells "60 Minutes" he traced Osama bin Laden in 2007 to within 12 miles of where U.S. forces eventually killed him

            (CBS News) As the U.S. re-evaluates its relationship with Pakistan, House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Rogers (R.-Mich.) says the word "ally" may be too strong a word to describe the country where Osama bin Laden and, he now believes, al-Qaeda's number-two, Ayman al-Zawahir, have been hiding.

            Lara Logan also speaks to Amrullah Saleh, the former intelligence chief of Afghanistan, who tells her he traced the Qaeda leader to a Pakistani city in 2007 that was just 12 miles from Abbottabad, where U.S. forces killed bin Laden last week.

            Logan's report will be broadcast on "60 Minutes" Sunday, May 15 at 7 p.m. ET/PT.

            Saleh says that when he told Pakistan's then-president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, that bin Laden was in the Pakistani city of Mansehra, the Pakistani leader lunged at him.

            Pakistan has harbored America's enemies for years, says Saleh. "The senior Taliban leaders, we would learn about their locations every day," he tells Logan. He was even able to get their telephone numbers, which were traced to the Pakistani city of Quetta. The leaders there are known as the Quetta Shura.

            Did the U.S. ever move against them? "Not against Quetta Shura, never," says Saleh. While American soldiers fought against an endless stream of enemy fighters staged in Pakistan, their leaders remained protected in Quetta, Saleh says.

            Congressman Rogers says the U.S. has known for years that the Taliban's leaders are living inside Pakistan. "It was one of those, I think, arranged trade offs for other bits of cooperation," says Rogers.

            "[The U.S.] knew [Pakistani military] weren't being aggressive there," he says, but did arrest hundreds of terrorists in other places in Pakistan.

            Asked whether he thought Pakistan was a good ally of the U.S., the chairman of the committee that oversees U.S. intelligence agencies says, "I would say Pakistan is an ally. There are challenges, there's serious challenges there and 'ally' may be too strong a word," Rogers tells Logan.

            Rogers says he knows the Pakistanis have disclosed U.S. operations and held back information, but believes the killing of bin Laden may lead to more cooperation.

            "I hope they see this as an opportunity to be more cooperative. To be more open, to help us with other targets that we have in Pakistan that we're very interested in having apprehended and brought to justice," he tells Logan, who suggests that al Qaeda's number-two would be on that list. "Zawahiri is a great example," replies Rogers. "I believe he's in Pakistan."

            Former top Afghan spy on Pakistan, bin Laden - 60 Minutes - CBS News