The Battle Of Wanat

[S2]

There's been some interesting developments WRT this battle fought in the high summer of 2008. Evidently, the U.S. Army has over-ruled recommendations that senior battlefield commanders be reprimanded for actions taken and not taken during the course of the battle. They've, instead, allowed the hammer to fall solely upon the company-grade officers involved with this battle.

In addition, the CSI report on this battle has been revised. There's some new commentary that's developed regarding both of these developments. I include here the CSI report and that commentary-

Wanat: Combat Action In Afghanistan 2008-CSI

Bing West has offered his thoughts on the matter here-

Assigning Blame For Wanat-Bing West NRO Dec. 29, 2010

He references a report from WAPO-

Army Edits Report From Wanat-Greg Jaffe WAPO Dec. 29, 2010

It is disturbing because in the zero-tolerance culture of the U.S. Army, a reprimand will effectively cease the career potential of an officer at any grade. The margin for error is exceedingly small yet we've a real world of combat operations that are conducted against a thinking, learning enemy who has his own objectives in mind. Both play to win.

Where the axe should fall- if it should fall at all, becomes a difficult decision made by officers who generally weren't there. It's not inconceivable that those rendering decisions here might have less practical experience with the realities than those whom they judge. Further, I'm aware that Sen. Jim Webb (Dem. Va) was deeply concerned with the findings too-

Sen. Jim Webb: Army's Rejection Of Wanat Battlefield Findings "Deeply Troubling"-June 23, 2010

“On July 9, 2009 I asked that the Department of Defense conduct an independent ‘re-investigation’ of the actions taken at Wanat at each level of command, rather than having the Army conduct an internal investigation. The Department of Defense concurred with this request.

“CENTCOM conducted an intensive, three-month independent investigation which concluded that the company, battalion and brigade commanders were ‘derelict in the performance of their duties through neglect or culpable inefficiency.’ General Petraeus approved this reinvestigation on January 21, 2010, and on June 23, the DOD Inspector General concurred with the findings as well. As a result of these findings, the Army issued letters of reprimand to all three officers.

“However, the Army also conducted its own review of the independent investigation, resulting in the annulment of all three letters of reprimand.

“I find it deeply troubling that the Army has exonerated these officers and in the process rejected the findings of the independent review. This development raises concerns regarding the principle of command accountability in the Army.”

[RoccoR]

S-2, et al,

I am confused.

I'm not sure why anyone would be held accountable (negligent or culpable).

What triggered the investigation?

Most Respectfully,
R

[Shek]

Steve,

The Army has a problem in its culture of telling officers how they really stack up. I came in under the Atlas OER that I'm sure you're familiar with. Because senior raters didn't have the guts to rack and stack officers properly, the OER that was introduced in 1998 had only four blocks - above center of mass (ACOM), center of mass (COM), below center of mass (BCOM), and below center of mass - do not retain (DNR ). The goal was no more than 33% ACOMs (but up to 49.99% permitted). What is reality? 49.99%. Because senior raters don't have the guts to tell folks that you're a BCOM officer (they won't even do it by and large on OERs that are masked for promotion boards!), then everyone ends up with COMs and ACOMs, meaning that other extraneous information must be used by promotion boards. What you get then is that letters of reprimand that are filed on the microfiche are a screening mechanism just as is the beauty contest (fat/non-fat in the DA Photo - nevermind that your "fat" frame allows you to hump the Hindu Kush all day long).

To change the culture, you have to start with holding senior rater feet to the fire, and then the other information becomes less a deciding factor.

[S2]

Shek Reply

"The Army has a problem in its culture of telling officers how they really stack up."

Concur. I suspect they also, however, have a problem with discerning relevant information-especially nuanced and difficult circumstance. These company grade officers will be evaluated just as others stateside. The career consequences are the same but the circumstances dramatically different.

Further, there seems an excessive concern about the consequences to senior raters and their field grade subjects, i.e. battalion and brigade staff officers and commanders at the expense of these affected company-grade officers. You know the particulars of this battle and they were trying if not unique to Konar. I'm not sure that ways and means were connected to end expectations.

[S2]

RoccoR Reply

"I'm not sure why anyone would be held accountable (negligent or culpable)."

Because mistakes were made. There will also be battlefield lessons drawn. Unfortunately, other cultural lessons might be inferred as well that are less accurately assessed.

"...What triggered the investigation"

A difficult action where a platoon COP was nearly over-run. Read the CSI staff study. There's also, I believe, an AR 15-6 report floating about.

[RoccoR]

S-2, et al,

Because mistakes were made. There will also be battlefield lessons drawn. Unfortunately, other cultural lessons might be inferred as well that are less accurately assessed..

(COMMENT)

I've never seen a combat engagement when "mistakes" were not made. It is the nature of combat and command.

A difficult action where a platoon COP was nearly over-run. Read the CSI staff study. There's also, I believe, an AR 15-6 report floating about.

(COMMENT)

Yes, I read the CSI study. The first 40 pages were unimportant.

I don't think the 15-6 said anything incriminating, otherwise it would have been referred for an Article 32. (Although that is just a guess.)

(THOUGHT)

I would not be surprised if the Afghan Security Guards (ASG) were involved in some way. There are reports floating about suggesting that some of them have Taliban connections. In a previous insurgency, we had a similar problem with local nationals pointing out the times and places where we were the weakest; for enemy attack.

But, I'm still confused. Either we have a competent chain-of-command or we don't.

I find it hard to believe that the entire chain failed; although that was also the claim in the Abu Gharb affair. These are not a one-off things. These guys are clones, having the same training and ticket punches. If the entire chain is held accountable (Company thru Brigade), then there are more latent problems out there than just that of the 2d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment.

There is either a credibility problem with the honesty and integrity of the investigations and assessment process; or, there is something wrong in the way we train and select commanders (a systemic problem). Maybe it is both, and much more than that.

Most Respectfully,
R

[Mihais]

At the time I read all I could about that battle.Judging from the perspective of one who also had a few readings on mil. history I found amazing the way things are.In any other war this would have been considered a minor incident worthy of,at best,a note in the combat log.In Vietnam or Afghanistan 1(that's the one starring the Soviets) there were a lot of outposts captured by the opponents. But in year of the Lord 2008 we have a big hoopla for ONE incident,that did not even ended in defeat.Perfectionism is good,excesses aren't.While is good to learn from experience,punishing the guys that might actually learn something,first of all the officers from that brigade is a bit unfair.True,at tactical levels the positioning was not the most fortunate.But let's not forget that the decisions on the ground were also consistent with the mission and resources allocated by the higher echelons and the overall strategy.The reinforcements could not have arrived sooner because there was no way,unless somehow the Bde had a heliborne coy in reserve,which they could not afford(the LZ was hot anyway).Arty coold not had reacted quicker and more accurately.And the darn ANP could not have been more traitorous.

[S2]

RoccoR Reply

"But, I'm still confused."

Really?

"Either we have a competent chain-of-command or we don't.

I find it hard to believe that the entire chain failed; although that was also the claim in the Abu Gharb affair. These are not a one-off things. These guys are clones, having the same training and ticket punches. If the entire chain is held accountable (Company thru Brigade), then there are more latent problems out there than just that of the 2d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment..."

I sense no confusion from your comments. You appear to have drawn conclusions without itemizing your concerns for the rest of us. I sense you working the edges under the camoflauge of false innocence.

I take exception to "clones" however. That seems harsh, judgmental and needlessly damning. While a culture may persist in any organizational entity, it is still the product of its human material.

[S2]

Webb Again Weighs In

Sen James Webb (D Va) has again weighed in on the U.S. Army's revised history of the Battle of Wanat-

Sen. Webb Decries Army's Flawed History Of Controversial Wanat Battle-WAPO Jan. 9, 2011

1Lt. Jonathan Brostrom died in battle and isn't here to tell his side of the story. That he's assumed the vast bulk of responsibility for the battle's outcome remains bothersome to me given the past findings prior to this revision. Those findings were the product of an investigation by a Marine Corps lieutenant general. They were subsequently rejected by an army general, Charles Campbell who then conducted his own investigation which absolved any fault on the part of the company, battalion and brigade commanders.

This remains a very disturbing event.