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Karzai's Monkey Business With Afghan Electoral Laws

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  • #61
    Karzai is no dictator and that's part of the problem.

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    • #62
      Kermanshahi Reply

      "...both merely replaced one dictatorhips with another..."

      Oh really?

      Can you explain this post written by yourself?

      "I'm talking about the parliamentary elections of March, this year. The coalition were Sadr was part of came out third (due to bad preformance of his coalition partners), as a single party the Sadr Movement is largest in the entire parliament with 40 seats (in total there are 325), the State of Law Coalition came in 2nd with 89 seats but it's a coalition of 10+ parties, it's main party Dawa, led by PM Maliki got just 22 seats, other factions of Dawa got 14, in total 36. Iraqiyya got 91 seats only 27 of which for Allawi's party.

      Sadr might have not built the best coalition, but his movement is the biggest among Shi'as and infact in all of Iraq, all potential Prime Ministers realise they cannot form a government without him, they're all offering him concessions, public support has put him in a position of power again."


      How many shias did you manage to reference in that paragraph? Like any of the above would have happened in Iraq without America.
      "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
      "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

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      • #63
        pChan Reply

        "I have read some of his other posts before, he just wants a Persian proxy in Iraq."

        You could be correct but I'm really trying to keep this an Afghanistan discussion as much as possible. I've now got 1979 thinking we need to discuss Uzbekistan here as well.

        This thread is being de-railed by sloppy posters like Kermanshahi and 1979 for their own purposes.

        From today's Washington Post-

        U.S. Can't Ignore Karzai's Tantrum-WAPO April 11, 2010
        "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
        "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

        Comment


        • #64
          Article starts with the wrong premise and goes downhill...


          A Smart Pashtun Play
          Why Washington should back Karzai.
          Karzai Consolidates Power - Newsweek
          While the U.S. struggles to get its act together in Afghanistan, President Hamid Karzai, widely ridiculed as corrupt and ineffectual, is consolidating his power and moving toward a peace deal with the Taliban. The U.S. is trying to stop him, but Karzai’s bold moves could help the U.S. and NATO find a graceful way out of the deepening Afghan quagmire.

          Internally, Karzai is seeking to win over his fellow Pashtuns—the biggest ethnic bloc in the country—who had been largely excluded from key security posts, which were held by U.S. protégés representing the Tajik ethnic minority. Three weeks ago Karzai replaced his Tajik intelligence czar, Amrullah Saleh—an outspoken opponent of his outreach to the Taliban—with a respected Pashtun in the intelligence hierarchy, Ibrahim Spinzada. Now, in a little-noticed move, he has promoted two Pashtun generals, Shir Karimi and Mohammed Akram, to the pivotal posts of chief and deputy chief of staff of the Army, both posts previously held by Tajiks.

          Externally, Karzai is carrying on an exploratory dialogue with Pakistan’s Army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, who has come to see him twice recently in Kabul to explore a peace settlement with the Taliban, which has close ties to Islamabad’s intelligence agencies. Since the Taliban’s leaders and fighters are all Pashtuns, and its propaganda depicts Karzai as a U.S.-Tajik puppet, his peace initiative helps him consolidate Pashtun support.
          James Reeve

          After the Taliban, Back to Normal: Click on image to view gallery

          Washington is alarmed by the terms of the peace deal now being explored. Former Pakistan foreign secretary Riaz Mohammad Khan suggested recently what that agreement might look like, observing that the Taliban is entrenched in certain key Pashtun provinces, such as Khost and Paktia, “where they should be accommodated.” Significantly, he made no mention of power-sharing in Kabul and dismissed the possibility of another nationwide takeover.

          If it is the price for his continuance as president, Karzai might be prepared to accept Taliban control over some of its local strongholds, perhaps as part of broader constitutional reforms strengthening provincial autonomy. But the U.S. should not object to such a deal, provided that the Taliban and its Islamabad backers agree to safeguards barring the use of these provinces as bases for international terrorist activity. What matters most to the U.S. is barring or limiting Taliban power-sharing in Kabul, and ceding power to the Taliban in some local strongholds might be necessary to achieve this goal.

          For a variety of reasons, Washington has ignored the historic Pashtun dominance in Afghanistan. Pashtun kings ruled Afghanistan from its inception in 1747 until the overthrow of the monarchy in 1973. Today the Pashtuns make up an estimated 44 percent of a population of 28 million. The Tajiks make up 27 percent. Yet Tajiks have held the levers of power in Kabul because they were in the right place at the right time during the confused months leading up to the U.S. ouster of the Taliban government that ruled from 1996 until 2001. When victorious U.S. forces marched into Kabul, the Northern Alliance—a Tajik-dominated, anti-Taliban Afghan militia—was there too, and with U.S. help, a clique of Tajik generals seized the key security posts in the new government.

          Supporting Karzai’s overtures to the Pashtuns would counter Taliban propaganda that the U.S. doesn’t care about the nation’s largest ethnic group. But one risk of Karzai’s strategy is that it could lead to a Tajik counterattack. Strong American support for Karzai would be necessary to keep the Tajiks in check. That would also avoid the appearance that America is opposing Pashtun interests again, which would only strengthen the Taliban’s position in the insurgency and in the peace process that appears likely to unfold. U.S. cooperation with Karzai is also necessary because if he and his Pakistani interlocutors can come up with a formula for peace, Taliban leaders will still insist on a U.S.-NATO timetable for withdrawal as a precondition for definitive negotiations. Ironically, when and if a timetable is announced, the Taliban’s emotive appeal as the spearhead of opposition to a foreign occupation will be deflated. As Howard Hart, a former CIA station chief in Pakistan, told Nicholas Kristof of The New York Times, “the very presence of our forces is the problem. The more troops we put in, the greater the opposition.”

          Harrison has reported on Afghanistan since 1963. He is director of the Asia program at the Center for International Policy.
          To sit down with these men and deal with them as the representatives of an enlightened and civilized people is to deride ones own dignity and to invite the disaster of their treachery - General Matthew Ridgway

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