Collapse in Afghanistan

[Mihais]

1.Bagram could have been used to bring in reinforcements and as an alternate.
2.Flying CAS from Bagram looks much better than flying from Indian Ocean.
3.If it comes to a fight,the Taliban can interdict the evacuees easier in Kabul than to a much wider area.
4.If it comes to a fight,it's faster to secure the high grounds around Bagram than half of Kabul.
5.Civilians can walk from the city to HKIA ,Bagram would have required some transport for children,sick and elderly.Organizing transport in this mess would suck,but on the other hand vetting process and security would have been more properly carried out.
6.No crowd to shoot,bomb and stampede.And no horrible optics.
7.Bagram had international forces.Local ANA might have stood their ground.
8.Taliban forces are spread thin all over the place.Securing Kabul and Bagram might have stretched them and they would have done neither properly.SecuringKabul=securing the airport.

[Firestorm]

And yet we got actionable intelligence in less that 48 hours on the ISIS K planners.

Do you really think the CIA and/or their assets pulled out over a month ago?

How accurate was that actionable intel?

https://edition.cnn.com/2021/08/29/a...ntl/index.html

Ten members of one family -- including seven children -- were killed in a US drone strike targeting a vehicle in a residential neighborhood of Kabul, a relative of the dead told CNN.

The US carried out a defensive airstrike in Kabul, targeting a suspected ISIS-K suicide bomber who posed an "imminent" threat to the airport, US Central Command said Sunday.
The youngest victims of Sunday's airstrike were two 2-year-old girls, according to family members.Relatives found the remains of one of the girls, Malika, in the rubble near their home on Monday. A family member told CNN that it was unclear whether Malika had been inside the vehicle or in the compound when the strike hit.They were "an ordinary family," a brother of the one of those killed said. "We are not ISIS or Daesh and this was a family home -- where my brothers lived with their families."

Both CNN and NYTimes reporting the same.

[Albany Rifles]

I was wondering about that. The way we do it is to resign first, then spout your mouth off. We've had a number of Canadian Generals and Admirals who did this. The most famous is Senator Romeo Dallaire of the Rwanda Infamy.

Yes Sir. While taking the AQueen's shilling must follow certain rules....you get the drift.

[Albany Rifles]

How accurate was that actionable intel?

https://edition.cnn.com/2021/08/29/a...ntl/index.html



Both CNN and NYTimes reporting the same.

While a tragedy, the casualties came from the secondary explosion of the explosives in the vehicle not from the Hellfire hitting the civilians.

From the article:

The US military said in their statement on Sunday that "significant secondary explosions from the vehicle indicated the presence of a substantial amount of explosive material," and "may have caused additional casualties."

As bad as this is, how many casualties would there have been if this VBIED had gotten to the crowds around Kabul Airfield.

[zraver]

Well its all over but the impending hostage crisis and executions. The last US plane has left.

[Gun Grape]

Well its all over but the impending hostage crisis and executions. The last US plane has left.

Their country. They should have fought harder for it

[Parihaka]

I was wondering about that. The way we do it is to resign first, then spout your mouth off. We've had a number of Canadian Generals and Admirals who did this. The most famous is Senator Romeo Dallaire of the Rwanda Infamy.

And the retired ones are now crawling out of the woodwork

Read and sign our letters (flagofficers4america.com)

[Mihais]

Their country. They should have fought harder for it

That's completely disconnected to the reality.And it's a symptomatic for the utter failure of understanding the reality on the ground.
As the main one in the coalition,your opinion and the perception of the vast majority of Americans on A-stan is akin to this https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fJIjoE27F-Q

It's unbelievable to me that after 20 years Americans still speak in terms of country,government,rule of law and all that BS.A-stan has its own institutions and anything that is not a natural outgrowth of those is artifcial nonsense.You were dead set on fighting a plan not adapting the plan to the enemy.
The issues with A-stan are real.But the American debate right now should be:''why did we not adapt to the circmstances on the ground?''.Why the bureaucracy lied for 20 years?Why everybody in positions of power ignored those who knew and spoke the truth?Why the American media did not made a scandal(yeah,they reported on the failures,but it wasn't news for 2 months in a row)?

[tbm3fan]

Reflections...

https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/26/o...pgtype=Article

In 2005, two of my colleagues at The American Prospect, Sam Rosenfeld and Matt Yglesias, wrote an essay I think about often. It was called “The Incompetence Dodge,” and it argued that American policymakers and pundits routinely try to rescue the reputation of bad ideas by attributing their failure to poor execution. At the time, they were writing about the liberal hawks who were blaming the catastrophe of the Iraq war on the Bush administration’s maladministration rather than rethinking the enterprise in its totality. But the same dynamic suffuses the recriminations over the Afghanistan withdrawal.

To state the obvious: There was no good way to lose Afghanistan to the Taliban. A better withdrawal was possible — and our stingy, chaotic visa process was unforgivable — but so was a worse one. Either way, there was no hope of an end to the war that didn’t reveal our decades of folly, no matter how deeply America’s belief in its own enduring innocence demanded one. That is the reckoning that lies beneath events that are still unfolding, and much of the cable news conversation is a frenzied, bipartisan effort to avoid it.

Focusing on the execution of the withdrawal is giving virtually everyone who insisted we could remake Afghanistan the opportunity to obscure their failures by pretending to believe in the possibility of a graceful departure. It’s also obscuring the true alternative to withdrawal: endless occupation. But what our ignominious exit really reflects is the failure of America’s foreign policy establishment at both prediction and policymaking in Afghanistan.

“The pro-war crowd sees this as a mechanism by which they can absolve themselves of an accounting for the last 20 years,” Senator Chris Murphy, Democrat of Connecticut, told me. “Just think about the epic size of this policy failure. Twenty years of training. More than $2 trillion worth of expenditure. For almost nothing. It is heartbreaking to watch these images, but it is equally heartbreaking to think about all of the effort, of lives and money we wasted in pursuit of a goal that was illusory.”

Emma Ashford, a senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, phrased it well: “There’s no denying America is the most powerful country in the world, but what we’ve seen over and over in recent decades is we cannot turn that into the outcomes we want. Whether it’s Afghanistan or Libya or sanctions on Russia and Venezuela, we don’t get the policy outcomes we want, and I think that’s because we overreach — we assume that because we are very powerful, we can achieve things that are unachievable.”

It is worth considering some counterfactuals for how our occupation could have ended. Imagine that the Biden administration, believing the Afghan government hollow, ignored President Ashraf Ghani’s pleas and began rapidly withdrawing personnel and power months ago. The vote of no-confidence ripples through Afghan politics, demoralizing the existing government and emboldening the Taliban. Those who didn’t know which side to choose, who were waiting for a signal of who held power, quickly cut deals with the Taliban. As the last U.S. troops leave, the Taliban overwhelms the country, and the Biden administration is blamed, reasonably, for speeding their victory.

Another possible scenario was suggested to me by Grant Gordon, a political scientist who works on conflict and refugee crises (and is, I should say, an old friend): If the Biden administration had pulled our allies and personnel out more efficiently, that might have unleashed the Taliban to massacre their opposition, as America and the world would have been insulated and perhaps uninterested in the aftermath. There have been revenge killings, but it has not devolved, at least as of yet, into all-out slaughter, and that may be because the American withdrawal has been messy and partial and the Taliban fears re-engagement. “What is clearly a debacle from one angle may actually have generated restraint,” Gordon told me. “Having spent time in places like this, I think people lack a real imagination for how bad these conflicts can get.”

Let me offer one more: Even though few believed Ghani’s government would prevail in our absence, and the Trump administration cut them out of its deal with the Taliban, there’s widespread disappointment that the government we supported collapsed so quickly. Biden has been particularly unsparing in his descriptions of the Afghan Army’s abdication, and I agree with those who say he’s been unfair, underestimating the courage and sacrifice shown by Afghan troops throughout the war. But put that aside: Americans might have felt better seeing our allies in Afghanistan put up a longer fight, even if the Taliban emerged victorious. But would a multiyear civil war have been better for the Afghans caught in the crossfire?


Brian Katulis, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, put it simply: “I think there’s a lot of cognitive dissonance, and smart people are struggling with how to rationalize defeat. Because that’s what we have here in Afghanistan — a defeat.”

I will not pretend that I know how we should have left Afghanistan. But neither do a lot of people dominating the airwaves right now. And the confident pronouncements to the contrary over the past two weeks leave me worried that America has learned little. We are still holding not just to the illusion of our control, but to the illusion of our knowledge.

This is an illusion that, for me, shattered long ago. I was a college freshman when America invaded Iraq. And, to my enduring shame, I supported it. My reasoning was straightforward: If George W. Bush and Bill Clinton and Tony Blair and Hillary Clinton and Colin Powell and, yes, Joe Biden all thought there was some profound and present danger posed by Saddam Hussein, they must have known something I didn’t.

There’s an old line: “It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble. It’s what you know for sure that just ain’t so.” And so it was with the Iraq war. Bush and Clinton and Powell and Blair knew quite a bit that wasn’t true. As Robert Draper shows in his book “To Start a War: How the Bush Administration Took America Into Iraq,” they were certain Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. Only he didn’t. They were also certain, based on decades of testimony from Iraqi expats, that Americans would be welcomed as liberators.

There were many lessons to be learned from the Iraq war, but this, for me, was the most central: We don’t know what we don’t know, and, even worse, we don’t always know what we think we know. Policymakers are easily fooled by people with seemingly relevant experience or credentials who will tell them what they want to hear or what they already believe. The flow of money, interests, enmities and factions is opaque to outsiders and even to insiders. We do not understand other countries well enough to remake them according to our ideals. We don’t even understand our own country well enough to achieve our ideals.

“Look at the countries in which the war on terror has been waged,” Ben Rhodes, who served as a top foreign policy adviser to President Barack Obama, told me. “Afghanistan. Iraq. Yemen. Somalia. Libya. Every one of those countries is worse off today in some fashion. The evidentiary basis for the idea that American military intervention leads inexorably to improved material circumstances is simply not there.”

I wrote a book on political polarization so I am often asked to do interviews where the point is to lament how awful polarization is. But the continuing power of the war-on-terror framework reflects the problems that come from too much bipartisanship. Too much agreement can be as toxic to a political system as too much disagreement. The alternative to polarization is often the suppression of dissenting viewpoints. If the parties agree with each other, then they have incentive to marginalize those who disagree with both of them.

At least for my adult life, on foreign policy, our political problem has been that the parties have agreed on too much, and dissenting voices have been shut out. That has allowed too much to go unquestioned, and too many failures to go uncorrected. It is telling that it is Biden who is taking the blame for America’s defeat in Afghanistan. The consequences come for those who admit America’s foreign policy failures and try to change course, not for those who instigate or perpetuate them.

Initially, the war in Afghanistan was as broadly supported and bipartisan as anything in American politics has ever been. That made it hard to question, and it has made it harder to end. The same is true of the assumptions lying beneath it, and much else in our foreign policy — that America is always a good actor; that we understand enough about the rest of the world, and about ourselves, to remake it in our image; that humanitarianism and militarism are easily grafted together.

The tragedy of humanitarian intervention as a foreign policy philosophy is that it binds our compassion to our delusions of military mastery. We awaken to the suffering of others when we fear those who rule them or hide among them, and in this way our desire for security finds union with our desire for decency. Or we awaken to the suffering of others when they face a massacre of such immediacy that we are forced to confront our passivity and to ask what inaction would mean for our souls and self-image. In both cases, we awaken with a gun in our hands, or perhaps we awaken because we have a gun in our hands.

To many, America’s pretensions of humanitarian motivation were always suspect. There are vicious regimes America does nothing to stop. There are vicious regimes America finances directly. It is callous to suggest that the only suffering we bear responsibility for is the suffering inflicted by our withdrawal. Our wars and drone strikes and tactical raids and the resulting geopolitical chaos directly led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Afghans and Iraqis.

This is the deep lacuna in America’s foreign policy conversation: The American foreign policy establishment obsesses over the harms caused by our absence or withdrawal. But there’s no similar culpability for the harms we commit or that our presence creates. We are much quicker to blame ourselves for what we don’t do than what we do.

My heart breaks for the suffering we will leave behind in Afghanistan. But we do not know how to fix Afghanistan. We failed in that effort so completely that we ended up strengthening the Taliban. We should do all we can to bring American citizens and allies home. But if we truly care about educating girls worldwide, we know how to build schools and finance education. If we truly care about protecting those who fear tyranny, we know how to issue visas and admit refugees. If we truly care about the suffering of others, there is so much we could do. Only 1 percent of the residents of poor countries are vaccinated against the coronavirus. We could change that. More than 400,000 people die from malaria each year. We could change that, too.

“I want America more forward-deployed, but I want it through a massive international financing arm and a massive renewable energy arm,” Senator Murphy told me. “That’s the United States I want to see spread across the world — not the face of America today that’s by and large arms sales, military trainers and brigades.”

The choice we face is not between isolationism and militarism. We are not powerful enough to achieve the unachievable. But we are powerful enough to do far more good, and far less harm, than we do now.

[Mihais]

You don't know,or don't want to know?It's effing simple.If there is no general chaos,of every man killing his neighbour on a daily basis,there must be some sort of institutions that work at keeping a semblance of order,some sort of law agreed upon by most.In A-stan the working parts are the family,the clan and tribe.The laws are islam and/or pashtunwali.

The way to approach these people is simple.Give them something,and demand something in return,in very simple ways.We'll give roads,shools,clean water,bridges,guns and ammo to secure yourself.In exchange we want all of you to talk to us before you start a feud with your neighbours and to reject Al Qaeda and the Taliban.If the Taliban wants to come back home,you're welcomed,as long as you stop fighting.EVERYTHING is personal in A-stan.You talk to a chief and the elders,you hold them responsible.If you have to kill someone,make it clear WHY.The MF slighted our honor,attacked our guys,cheated on our deals.Then kill the bastard.Everybody gets it.

The requierements for such a winning approach would have been a corp of experts,with a wide autonomy on how to spend money without too much red tape,with license to kill and able to call support if need be.They would have had to be moderately profficient in local languages and learn the local intricate customs.And stay there for a few years(with breaks from the rotation).
In essence,to do what the Taliban did,but better.

[Double Edge]

How accurate was that actionable intel?

https://edition.cnn.com/2021/08/29/a...ntl/index.html



Both CNN and NYTimes reporting the same.

I was sceptical too, seemed like a face saver.

But they hit a truck with explosives presumably going in for a second attack.

Whether they were the planners is up for debate but they got some jihadis.

[Double Edge]

Trump's deal with the Taliban

Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the emirate & the US (PDF) | State Dept | Feb 29 2020

4 points

1. Guarantees and enforcement mechanisms that will prevent the use of the soil of Afghanistan by any group or individual against the security of the United States and its allies.

2. Guarantees, enforcement mechanisms, and announcement of a timeline for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan.

3. After the announcement of guarantees for a complete withdrawal of foreign forces and timeline in the presence of international witnesses, and guarantees and the announcement in the presence of international witnesses that Afghan soil will not be used against the security of the United States and its allies, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban will start intra-Afghan negotiations with Afghan sides on March 10, 2020, which corresponds to Rajab 15, 1441 on the Hijri Lunar calendar and Hoot 20, 1398 on the Hijri Solar calendar.

4. A permanent and comprehensive ceasefire will be an item on the agenda of the intra-Afghan dialogue and negotiations. The participants of intra-Afghan negotiations will discuss the date and modalities of a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire, including joint implementation mechanisms, which will be announced along with the completion and agreement over the future political roadmap of Afghanistan.

Considering the suicide and rocket attacks we saw that 1 is iffy

2 is done

3 & 4 have seen no movement

[Mihais]

It doesn't matter.The US no longer gives a damn,no matter what the Taliban do.Even if they host AQ again,they'll stick to drone strikes and pretend they took action.All it's mutually agreed posturing for now.

Heck,the Taliban might even hire the USAF,like AQ did in Syria.

The game has changed places.A-stan is no longer in the game.Nobody gives a damn anymore.

[Officer of Engineers]

1.Bagram could have been used to bring in reinforcements and as an alternate.
2.Flying CAS from Bagram looks much better than flying from Indian Ocean.
3.If it comes to a fight,the Taliban can interdict the evacuees easier in Kabul than to a much wider area.
4.If it comes to a fight,it's faster to secure the high grounds around Bagram than half of Kabul.
5.Civilians can walk from the city to HKIA ,Bagram would have required some transport for children,sick and elderly.Organizing transport in this mess would suck,but on the other hand vetting process and security would have been more properly carried out.
6.No crowd to shoot,bomb and stampede.And no horrible optics.
7.Bagram had international forces.Local ANA might have stood their ground.
8.Taliban forces are spread thin all over the place.Securing Kabul and Bagram might have stretched them and they would have done neither properly.SecuringKabul=securing the airport.

Big flaws in your arguements. The primary one is that civilians would stay put than to exposed themselves for a two day walk (old and infirm here) without adequate food and water to Bagram.

You will need another two brigades (one to secure the route and one to secure Bagram) and frankly, I would not be comfortable without a division on Bagram and even then, I cannot prevent annoyance attacks (IEDs). Hell, a single IED and your injured and dying would effectively create a traffic jam with those closest to Kabul turning back.

Defending Bagram ain't the OPOBJ. The evac is and Bagram makes things harder, not easier.

[Double Edge]

And the retired ones are now crawling out of the woodwork

Read and sign our letters (flagofficers4america.com)

If they did everything within their authority to stop the hasty withdrawal and the President did not accept their recommendations, then knowing the disastrous consequences looming, the retired flag officer signers believe these top military advisors should have resigned as a matter of conscience and public statement.

#326
They were ignored and the ones in a position to advise were sacked