Collapse in Afghanistan

[Versus]

The appearance of ISIS was only a matter of time. No surprises there at all.

[Officer of Engineers]

Can't defend against a suicide bomber even if you have intel.

Clear fields of fire and have every evauee strip down to underwear 100 metres out from the checkpoint and carry only your clothes you wore through the checkpoint. Anyone not complying will be shot on the spot. Militarily effective. Politically unacceptable.

[zraver]

Clear fields of fire and have every evauee strip down to underwear 100 metres out from the checkpoint and carry only your clothes you wore through the checkpoint. Anyone not complying will be shot on the spot. Militarily effective. Politically unacceptable.

Create a deadspace where one person at a time has to pass through a scanner. And then past a MWD's.it wont protext the afghans though.

[Double Edge]

An Afghan general's viewpoint

I Commanded Afghan Troops This Year. We Were Betrayed | NYT (op-ed) | Aug 25 2021

By Sami Sadat

General Sadat is a commander in the Afghan National Army.

For the past three and a half months, I fought day and night, nonstop, in southern Afghanistan’s Helmand Province against an escalating and bloody Taliban offensive. Coming under frequent attack, we held the Taliban back and inflicted heavy casualties. Then I was called to Kabul to command Afghanistan’s special forces. But the Taliban already were entering the city; it was too late.

I am exhausted. I am frustrated. And I am angry.

President Biden said last week that “American troops cannot and should not be fighting in a war and dying in a war that Afghan forces are not willing to fight for themselves.”

It’s true that the Afghan Army lost its will to fight. But that’s because of the growing sense of abandonment by our American partners and the disrespect and disloyalty reflected in Mr. Biden’s tone and words over the past few months. The Afghan Army is not without blame. It had its problems — cronyism, bureaucracy — but we ultimately stopped fighting because our partners already had.

It pains me to see Mr. Biden and Western officials are blaming the Afghan Army for collapsing without mentioning the underlying reasons that happened. Political divisions in Kabul and Washington strangled the army and limited our ability to do our jobs. Losing combat logistical support that the United States had provided for years crippled us, as did a lack of clear guidance from U.S. and Afghan leadership.

I am a three-star general in the Afghan Army. For 11 months, as commander of 215 Maiwand Corps, I led 15,000 men in combat operations against the Taliban in southwestern Afghanistan. I’ve lost hundreds of officers and soldiers. That’s why, as exhausted and frustrated as I am, I wanted to offer a practical perspective and defend the honor of the Afghan Army. I’m not here to absolve the Afghan Army of mistakes. But the fact is, many of us fought valiantly and honorably, only to be let down by American and Afghan leadership.

Two weeks ago, while battling to hold the southern city of Lashkar Gah from the Taliban, President Ashraf Ghani named me commander of Afghanistan’s special forces, the country’s most elite fighters. I reluctantly left my troops and arrived in Kabul on Aug. 15, ready to fight — unaware how bad the situation already was. Then Mr. Ghani handed me the added task of ensuring the security of Kabul. But I never even had a chance: The Taliban were closing in, and Mr. Ghani fled the country.



There is an enormous sense of betrayal here. Mr. Ghani’s hasty escape ended efforts to negotiate an interim agreement for a transition period with the Taliban that would have enabled us to hold the city and help manage evacuations. Instead, chaos ensued — resulting in the desperate scenes witnessed at the Kabul airport.

It was in response to those scenes that Mr. Biden said on Aug. 16 that the Afghan forces collapsed, “sometimes without trying to fight.” But we fought, bravely, until the end. We lost 66,000 troops over the past 20 years; that’s one-fifth of our estimated fighting force.

So why did the Afghan military collapse? The answer is threefold.

First, former President Donald Trump’s February 2020 peace deal with the Taliban in Doha doomed us. It put an expiration date on American interest in the region. Second, we lost contractor logistics and maintenance support critical to our combat operations. Third, the corruption endemic in Mr. Ghani’s government that flowed to senior military leadership and long crippled our forces on the ground irreparably hobbled us.

The Trump-Taliban agreement shaped the circumstances for the current situation by essentially curtailing offensive combat operations for U.S. and allied troops. The U.S. air-support rules of engagement for Afghan security forces effectively changed overnight, and the Taliban were emboldened. They could sense victory and knew it was just a matter of waiting out the Americans. Before that deal, the Taliban had not won any significant battles against the Afghan Army. After the agreement? We were losing dozens of soldiers a day.

Still, we kept fighting. But then Mr. Biden confirmed in April he would stick to Mr. Trump’s plan and set the terms for the U.S. drawdown.That was when everything started to go downhill.

The Afghan forces were trained by the Americans using the U.S. military model based on highly technical special reconnaissance units, helicopters and airstrikes. We lost our superiority to the Taliban when our air support dried up and our ammunition ran out.

Contractors maintained our bombers and our attack and transport aircraft throughout the war. By July, most of the 17,000 support contractors had left. A technical issue now meant that aircraft — a Black Hawk helicopter, a C-130 transport, a surveillance drone — would be grounded.

The contractors also took proprietary software and weapons systems with them. They physically removed our helicopter missile-defense system. Access to the software that we relied on to track our vehicles, weapons and personnel also disappeared. Real-time intelligence on targets went out the window, too.

The Taliban fought with snipers and improvised explosive devices while we lost aerial and laser-guided weapon capacity. And since we could not resupply bases without helicopter support, soldiers often lacked the necessary tools to fight. The Taliban overran many bases; in other places, entire units surrendered.

Mr. Biden’s full and accelerated withdrawal only exacerbated the situation. It ignored conditions on the ground. The Taliban had a firm end date from the Americans and feared no military reprisal for anything they did in the interim, sensing the lack of U.S. will.

And so the Taliban kept ramping up. My soldiers and I endured up to seven Taliban car bombings daily throughout July and the first week of August in Helmand Province. Still, we stood our ground.

I cannot ignore the third factor, though, because there was only so much the Americans could do when it came to the well-documented corruption that rotted our government and military. That really is our national tragedy. So many of our leaders — including in the military — were installed for their personal ties, not for their credentials. These appointments had a devastating impact on the national army because leaders lacked the military experience to be effective or inspire the confidence and trust of the men being asked to risk their lives. Disruptions to food rations and fuel supplies — a result of skimming and corrupt contract allocations — destroyed the morale of my troops.

The final days of fighting were surreal. We engaged in intense firefights on the ground against the Taliban as U.S. fighter jets circled overhead, effectively spectators. Our sense of abandonment and betrayal was equaled only by the frustration U.S. pilots felt and relayed to us — being forced to witness the ground war, apparently unable to help us. Overwhelmed by Taliban fire, my soldiers would hear the planes and ask why they were not providing air support. Morale was devastated. Across Afghanistan, soldiers stopped fighting. We held Lashkar Gah in fierce battles, but as the rest of the country fell, we lacked the support to continue fighting and retreated to base. My corps, which had carried on even after I was called away to Kabul, was one of the last to give up its arms — only after the capital fell.

We were betrayed by politics and presidents.

This was not an Afghan war only; it was an international war, with many militaries involved. It would have been impossible for one army alone, ours, to take up the job and fight. This was a military defeat, but it emanated from political failure.

[Officer of Engineers]

Create a deadspace where one person at a time has to pass through a scanner. And then past a MWD's.it wont protext the afghans though.

Not practical. We have to clear whole planeloads within a half hour span. The only way to do that is mass observation of half naked human beings.

[Gun Grape]

Bagram was untenable if we were also going to use Kabul for an airbridge.

As the Colonel said, without a massive infusion of troops, we could not hold Kabul & Bagram. What is happening now is what is called Non-Combatant Neo Evacuation...a NEO Operation. Other than breakout from encirclement and assault across a defended river a NEO Operation is the most difficult operation to pull off for the military...and usually one that is done on a small scale. NEO is intended to all registered noncombatants out of an active theater. You hope to have a quiet permissive environment...something which does not always happen. And you usually plan on running from the national capitol since that is where the embassy is and the majority of noncombatants who need evacuation. Hence, why this is being done from Kabul.

Also a NEO is a joint Department of Defense/State Department operation. DOD has the lead for operations & security and State has the lead on personnel vetting and repatriation. That is exactly what you see being executed. And looking at the scale of Afghanistan it was not anything you could just snap your fingers & and start executing. Assets could be planned for and prepositioned as best could but C-17s have taskings around the globe daily...they can't just be lined up at Ramstein sitting. Takes time to gather.
.

I was part of Noble Obelisk, the largest NEO since Frequent Winds. There is nothing easy in a NEO

In a few years when all the political BS is forgotten the current NEO will be studied as one of the most successful operations since the Berlin Airlift. The amount of people we are pushing through that place, and all the coordination that that entails, from getting fueled planes there to clearing those planeloads of people in host countries is showing the world what we can do.

China and Russia aren't looking at "Oh they cut and ran" they should be looking at how fast the US can rapidly move a ton of people in a 24 hr period. This makes the airbridge during Desert Storm look like a Bn (squadron) field op

[Mihais]

They know already.This only confirms their estimate.Hence they will try to oppose such a move.
This one has not even a mortar round landing nearby.

Ohh,and the thing NATO did cut and ran.And we did all the effort backwards.
So US might show great logistical capabilities,but it also showed a complete inability to understand the basic situation and have a sensible,realistic and coherent strategy.
Great operationql and terrible strategic plannings.

[Officer of Engineers]

Ohh,and the thing NATO did cut and ran.And we did all the effort backwards.
So US might show great logistical capabilities,but it also showed a complete inability to understand the basic situation and have a sensible,realistic and coherent strategy.
Great operationql and terrible strategic plannings.

It was the ONLY strategic plan that we ALLOW ourselves to do. The ONLY way to win in Afghanistan is to BUTCHER Afghanistan and that is a bill that we could not pay. Hell, the Soviets could not pay that bill, only doing a half ass job. The Taliban's strategic plan, as was the Mujahadeen, was to outbleed the occupiers. The most obvious answer, in fact the only answer, to that strategy is then to bleed them white. That means, every man, woman, child, and dog. We needed our own Mountain of Skulls outside of Helmand and Khandahar. We could not do that. I could not do that.

This leaves our only answer was to try to turn Afghanistan into a democratic and properous nation. An impossiblity at best. Afghanistan's only worth is an invasion route to wealthy India.

[Mihais]

No ,Sir.It did not.It required a corp of experts in every valley.Medics,builders,de facto mayors,judges,policemen.AKA a SF team.Guys that live there instead of FOB,that eat what the locals sell instead of flying frozen burger kings .Guys that learn their language with their local accent.Who come to be arbiters of every little local feud that made the big boogie Taliban.Guys that train a local defense force in light infantry tactics,that involves scouting,tracking& pursuing every outside fvcker that arrives in a given area and after every contact.Pursue unti they surrender for being to tired to take a step.
The best of the locals come to be Afghan SOF,which is the national mobile reserve.
What we got instead was an expensive lie and a waste of everything.

A-stan may be a gateway to India,but is also a staging points for raids on future Chinese land LOC's with the ME,via the Stans and Iran.By abandoning Central Asia America actually makes a conflict with China more likely.

[Officer of Engineers]

You do realize that there are no single homogenious group in Afghanistan. There are multiple ethnic groups who have been/are/will be at each other's throats. Your solution will not prevent them from killing each other. Our main objective was to deny Afghanistan as a staging ground to Al Qaeda and their ilk. Your solution will not stop someone from bribing their way into a stronghold.

[Mihais]

It does.You give them more money than they can count.Which is still pennies compared to waste.And you can prevent them from killing each other too much by having eyes on the ground.NATO is the biggest tribe and has CAS on the other end of the radio.An universal language,sticks and carrots.
Preventing AQ after 2010 when priorities switch to great power competition becomes a bonus.

The real danger lies in that it emboldens every opponent of the West in the future.America,unlike in Vietnam was attacked.And now ME and Central Asia are abandonned.To people that understand only force,which is everybody,this is a defeat.Weakness only invites more war.

[Versus]

It does.You give them more money than they can count.Which is still pennies compared to waste.And you can prevent them from killing each other too much by having eyes on the ground.NATO is the biggest tribe and has CAS on the other end of the radio.An universal language,sticks and carrots.
Preventing AQ after 2010 when priorities switch to great power competition becomes a bonus.

The real danger lies in that it emboldens every opponent of the West in the future.America,unlike in Vietnam was attacked.And now ME and Central Asia are abandonned.To people that understand only force,which is everybody,this is a defeat.Weakness only invites more war.

Doesn't work Mihais. It never did. But I must admit, it seems so alluring, it seems so easy. But it is just that, it seems. Universal language of carrots and sticks doesn't apply when the other side has no fear of death. Better re learn how to use stakes, because they are coming.

[Double Edge]

I'd fire a dozen rounds and 1 hour later I'd make an apology:"twas rogue elements".Just for the optics of the mess.
Also a pretext for rounding and shooting folks on my list,while pretending to keep law and order.

You got what you said. Actually better. I could not figure the purpose at the time but it benefits both groups. TB & ISKP

TB becomes the good TB and ISKP the bad. ISKP are the rogue elements. Now Americans get led down the same garden path as the Russians.

Work with TB to counter ISKP. Just as the Paks planned it.

Great for the TB isn't it if Russia & US take out the TB trash.

Funny. The role the super powers have been relegated to.

They have similar plan for India as well. Send their undesirables for us to take care.

India has it easier. We get home delivery.

ISKP are nothing but disgruntled TB. ISKP is not ISIL.

ISKP are dead men walking in Afg. Cannot have two kings for one state.

ISKP get headlines now which is good for recruitment.

[Versus]

You got what you said. I could not figure the purpose at the time but it benefits both groups. TB & ISKP

TB becomes the good TB and ISKP the bad. ISKP are the rogue elements. Now Americans get led down the garden path like the Russians.

Work with TB to counter ISKP. Just as the Paks planned it. Great for the TB isn't it if Russia & US take out the trash.

ISKP are nothing but disgruntled TB. ISKP is not ISIL.

ISKP get headlines which is good for recruitment.

ISKP is ISIL. Or IS do be exact. See, they have big goals and they are doing great.

[Versus]

The way how it is going, Afghanistan might take over Pakistan in a very near future.