Frankly! WHAT WAS SOUTH ASIA'S WWIII SCENARIO?

[Officer of Engineers]

That was an attack sub. Not a boomer. Wouldn't even enter their calculations.

The ASW screen would have kept a keen eye out for her.

[lemontree]

Incidentally, Captain, the primary nuclear target in India is Dehli whether you're Chinese, Pakistani, Russian, British, French, or Israeli. The National Command Authority is always the first target you have to take out.

I know sir, I was only referring to Chandigarh and Bhatinda as a reference to point our local/ regional targets.

[lemontree]

An update on Indian sub launched missile development...The Hindu : News / National : India successfully test-fires underwater missile

This is a capability that the USN had 40 years ago, with nuclear capability. Also their missile had thrice the range of the our missile.

[Deltacamelately]

Defcon5 Reply

Major ( I am sure you must have been promoted to higher ups now, do advice me :)),

Way to go.

I dont get this is at all, It seems our Nuclear strategy is shaped by Pakistan. It was in their interest to limit the nuclear retaliation. Personally as a citizen, I am not ready for my Army to bore the brunt of a Nuclear attack; There is so much more at stake if the army is crippled and counter attack is formed by them (be advised I am not Orbat or Military man, just a layman) Are we going to conduct Nuclear War like Kargil? Are we going to tell our Army not to cross IB and fight with one hand tied even in a Nuclear War? How can we trust Pakistan not escalate from attack on armed forces to civilian targets, how can we be sure of their control structures after start?

I think it is not for Nuclear Forces but it is rather Politicians and people who are interested to stop nuclear damage(at our cost) who needs space to maneuver. If Pakistan initiates a Nuclear Strike, the only way to save India and our interests, is to make Pakistan a huge glass bowl.

Here is a nice read which talks about the fallacy of "Massive Nuclear Retaliation".

The Illogic of ‘Massive’ Punitive Retaliation

The latest CRS Report for the US Congress, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues’, estimates that there are plans to increase Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal beyond its estimated current holding of 60 weapons, in the near future. What are its implications for India’s nuclear deterrent capability? Expansion in the Pakistani arsenal could have two motives. One could be to gain a second strike capability with respect to India, thereby contributing to deterrence stability. Second could be to acquire a first strike capability, defined as sufficient weapons, to degrade India’s nuclear retaliatory capability, substantially. It is perhaps the latter interpretation of Pakistan’s nuclear expansion that prompted India’s Army Chief to comment, “Even if Pakistan is looking at deterrence, they require a minimum amount. But when you keep increasing it, it is a matter of concern….” For Pakistan to attempt to acquire a first strike capability would worry New Delhi only in case India’s arsenal was small. It has been estimated in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that India has 70 warheads. If this is enough to survive a Pakistani first strike has perhaps prompted Indian concerns. A Pakistani ‘first strike’ would require destroying at least 50 Indian weapons. For this it would require over 100 weapons. Since India’s arsenal is not going to be static in the interim, a first strike capability for Pakistan is ruled out. In case Pakistan is only assuring itself a second strike capability, what are the implications for India’s doctrine of ‘massive’ punitive retaliation? In case India responds to Pakistani first use with ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation, it exposes itself to a similar counter strike. In case Pakistan’s arsenal is taken at the higher estimated figure of 90 weapons, India would require destroying up to 70 weapons to preserve itself from a counter strike of similar ‘massive’ proportions. This implies expending about double the number of weapons in the attacks. Adding for reserves and a second strike capability with respect to China, the numbers India requires move beyond 300. Since India has abjured arms racing, it requires rethinking its doctrine of ‘massive’ punitive retaliation. ‘Massive’ retaliation implies inflicting ‘unacceptable damage’. Since this has not been defined by India, it can be along three dimensions – counter value, counter force and mixed. Going in for the last without degrading the enemy’s retaliatory capability would open up India to unthinkable retaliation. This is the problem with the estimate that India requires busting 10 Pakistani cities for deterrence. In case its nuclear retaliatory capability is degraded through counter force strike, as has been estimated above, India requires jettisoning ‘minimum’ in its doctrine of ‘credible minimum deterrence’. The implication of mixed targeting is the same as that of counter force targeting. Unless the adversary is deprived of his means of nuclear retaliation, it would be imprudent to go in for a ‘massive’ strike against it. This can never be guaranteed since the location of dispersed, hardened and camouflaged weapons can never be known with any degree of certainty. Even achieving 90 per cent levels of degradation is not good enough since the surviving weapons are liable to be used in a counter value mode as vengeance; even a defeated enemy can launch limited and sporadic attacks. Achieving such levels of degradation is possible against minimal nuclear arsenals. In expanding its arsenal, Pakistan is no longer in that category. With respect to China, ‘massive’ punitive retaliation makes even less sense since China certainly would have enough nuclear warheads left over from any nuclear exchanges with India to prevail. Even if China’s seaboard is devastated, India would be grievously hurt. Therefore, there is no reason to provoke a Chinese ‘massive’ response by unnecessarily going ‘massive’ in the first place, even if in response to Chinese nuclear first-use. No-first use pledges notwithstanding, going ‘massive’ would be suicidal. Therefore, ‘massive’ punitive retaliation requires a rethink. It has been averred that the nuclear doctrine is only for deterrence. Once deterrence has broken down, India has the option of departing from the doctrine meant for deterrence in favour of one meant for war-fighting. This implies that India requires a distinct nuclear war-fighting doctrine. The idea would also face the criticism that there cannot be two doctrines, one for deterrence and another for war-fighting. It is perhaps due to this that little thinking has been done on these issues The argument here is that ‘massive’ punitive retaliation as doctrine is incredible on two counts. One is that it is untenable against lower order nuclear first use by the enemy, which is the more likely manner of nuclear use. Second, it lays India open to like retaliation since the enemy’s nuclear retaliatory capability cannot be degraded sufficiently. Attempting to do so would be to engage in an arms race as witnessed in the Cold War. Therefore, there is reason to shift to a war-fighting nuclear doctrine. Efficacy of deterrence would remain in Assured Retaliation; only Assured Deterrence needs to be jettisoned. The Illogic of ‘Massive’ Punitive Retaliation by Ali Ahmed

[Deltacamelately]

The ASW screen would have kept a keen eye out for her.

Sir,

Shadowing subs coming out fresh from construction is also considered?

[Officer of Engineers]

Anything that would be a threat to the carriers and boomers would be actively sought out. If they stay in port, they're safe but I'm willing to bet that during wartime conditions, the Americans would have a few sharks lying in ambush outside of Indian ports.

[Deltacamelately]

Anything that would be a threat to the carriers and boomers would be actively sought out. If they stay in port, they're safe but I'm willing to bet that during wartime conditions, the Americans would have a few sharks lying in ambush outside of Indian ports.

Sir,

But won't that also provide others to record your acoustic signatures? The Akulas would also love to get the shark's signature given the proximity we are talking about.

[Officer of Engineers]

But won't that also provide others to record your acoustic signatures? The Akulas would also love to get the shark's signature given the proximity we are talking about.

Maj,

If the AKULAS right now are NOT ACTIVELY hunting for acoustic signatures, then someone should be fired. However, the conditions I spoke of was wartime conditions. It's way too late to hunt for signatures then.

[Officer of Engineers]

Here is a nice read which talks about the fallacy of "Massive Nuclear Retaliation".

There should be a course on this. Deterrence is not war fighting. I still remain absolutely amazed at the brilliance of this thought. I truly wonder if only Eastern culture could have came up with this. Western culture is way too coloured by "Si vis pacem, para bellum."

[Double Edge]

Don't know if its too late to add anything in here but i'll try..

We are dealing with historic unknowns from both sides. We from the West are damned surprised that you were not ready for WWIII and you Indian gents are damned surprised to find out we had nukes targeting you.

Why do you think the call to use them might have come against India ?

Possiblities are countless, what about probabilities or how likely.

I agree with you & Z about what american perceptions of India were at the time, i recall reading similar from TIME magazine articles from the era (when their archive was open). Americans saw NAM and India in particular as benefitting the soviets more.

but i also think it isn't as cut & dry. In war flexibilty matters.

Again, I point to the Soviet Invasion of Pakistan scenario. The Pakistanis must have thought they were next when the Soviets marched into Kabul. And so must have Dehli. Anything pointing to their thoughts in this matter?

Do the americans have any say over this before India gets into the picture. After all, Pakistan is america's ally. If the Americans respond by rushing troops there then no Indian adventure is possible. America's warming up with China also means no possibilty for Indian action towards China either.

Z's posts make it amply clear that any navy that expects to operate effectively in the IOR needs India on board. Its really with or against India to operate there.

What India & the US will do is get on the phone to each other and work out a deal. Where the red lines are and what is acceptable. That's it. India will also have to talk the Soviets and find out what is acceptable with them.

How we balance out these two will determine who nukes India first or none at all. There will be no interference nor assistance to either warring party.

No adverse Indian action towards China & Pakistan + access to the IOR. Tell me why the US is going to nuke India. I don't think they will. The Soviets are another matter as they might see India in a very different light after, which would be a defacto American win.

When the nukes start flying its best to limit the area where they operate. Concentrate on the knowns. And the biggest known in this case is the soviets and vice versa.

Soviets going at China & NATO means they are the only parties to the fight. Eveybody else is going to do their best to skip that party. That means planning for all parties concerned just got easier.

Bear in mind India's word holds so long as the americans retain their ability to carry out their threats, otherwise all bets are off. If there's going to be any Indian adventures it might be better to wait for the day after.

[Officer of Engineers]

Don't know if its too late to add anything in here but i'll try..

Never too late. My mind needs exercise.

Why do you think the call to use them might have come against India ?

Possiblities are countless, what about probabilities or how likely.

I agree with you & Z about what american perceptions of India were at the time, i recall reading similar from TIME magazine articles from the era (when their archive was open). Americans saw NAM and India in particular as benefitting the soviets more.

but i also think it isn't as cut & dry. In war flexibilty matters.

Because mainly, we have two allies (Pakistan and China) that we have absolutely no control over, ie not under our command, but absolutely need to keep the Soviets from concentrating all their force in Europe - well, we needed China and China needed Pakistan. Chinese threat perception is different from ours but we cannot afford their collapse.

Do the americans have any say over this before India gets into the picture. After all, Pakistan is america's ally. If the Americans respond by rushing troops there then no Indian adventure is possible. America's warming up with China also means no possibilty for Indian action towards China either.

Never mind the Americans. Concentrate on the Chinese. The Chinese can absolutely not afford a Soviet occupied Pakistan. Combined with India, that meant all of Western China is lost. The Chinese would attack. They would have to ... and India would be drawn in with or without her concent.

[Double Edge]

Never mind the Americans. Concentrate on the Chinese. The Chinese can absolutely not afford a Soviet occupied Pakistan. Combined with India, that meant all of Western China is lost. The Chinese would attack. They would have to ... and India would be drawn in with or without her concent.

ok, so you're suggesting here that the Chinese would need to find another route to reinforce Pakistan and would have to overrun Indian lines.

But what about the 82nd & 101st. If they arrive in Pakistan unimpeded then where is the desperate need for China to get there. Chinese supplies can always come via the sea. The Americans have the same interest as the Chinese here in propping up Pakistan. Unfettered access to the IOR means the Paks can be resupplied. Whether this would be sufficient to halt a soviet advance in Pakistan i cannot say but failure to do so cannot be laid on India's door step.

The fundamental point behind setting up NAM was precisely to stay aloof from the very scenario you've outlined or other similar ones involving the big two. The objective for all non-belligerents would be to stay in one piece. How successful they would have been is debatable but they'd give it their best shot.

India would not be impeding anything here, at the end of the conflict there will be a weak US, SU & China. Who will there be to challenge India after that ? nobody.

What i got from Z's posts in this thread is that in times of conflict, India isn't just India the landmass but rather the IOR is India. If India intends to pursue an independent course into the future then India has to develop the capacity to deter any navy from operating in that region.

[Officer of Engineers]

But what about the 82nd & 101st.

REFORGER

If they arrive in Pakistan unimpeded then where is the desperate need for China to get there. Chinese supplies can always come via the sea. The Americans have the same interest as the Chinese here in propping up Pakistan. Unfettered access to the IOR means the Paks can be resupplied. Whether this would be sufficient to halt a soviet advance in Pakistan i cannot say but failure to do so cannot be laid on India's door step.

I'm not sure that is a point. Here we're speaking the NATO/Warsaw Pact/China fighting for their national survival. With one single army, the Soviets could collapse all of Western China (Northern China was already lost, the Chinese planned it that way). I cannot see how they would NOT attack.

[Double Edge]

REFORGER

Ok, so they would go to Europe then.

I'm not sure that is a point. Here we're speaking the NATO/Warsaw Pact/China fighting for their national survival. With one single army, the Soviets could collapse all of Western China (Northern China was already lost, the Chinese planned it that way). I cannot see how they would NOT attack.

If the soviets move into western China, then China has no way to invade India. China has no way to resupply Pakistan either other than via sea convoys.

That leaves the Americans. If India stays put and does not move ie take sides as well as granting access to the IOR why should India be a target for the Americans.

[Officer of Engineers]

If the soviets move into western China, then China has no way to invade India. China has no way to resupply Pakistan either other than via sea convoys.

Which is why China MUST attack before the Soviets can be ready.