China invades Taiwan

[Officer of Engineers]

Train as you fight. Fight as you train.

Thus far, there is zero indications that the Americans expect Japan or South Korea to put full stop in their defence efforts to protect Taiwan.

[Dazed]

If the ROK and Japan sit out the conflict. Does that mean that no US assets, US bases and US personal from those countries be used by the US in the conflict? I am thinking October 1973, except for Portugal no NATO country allowed a transport or support tanker to operate from their soil destined for Israel. Is Guam going to be the US closest airfield?

When the PRC held their exercises in August 2022 flying into China was not a direct line proposition. If the shooting starts the airspace over Taiwan, for transport category aircraft is going to be a very hazardous. I don't think any civil aviation is going to be flying to China. While there is CRAF they are going to be crewed by civilians somewhere along the line. Asking a civilian flight crew to go into harms way in contested airspace maybe asking too much?

Does the PRC only have to execute a selective naval blockade and a selective no fly area to cut off Taiwan? I know the PRC will be cutting itself off as well in any conflict. The Belt and Road wouldn't make up for the loss off air and shipping.

[Officer of Engineers]

kill the invasion fleet/ROROs first, then transition to blinding.

That is fighting the exact war China wants. Our planes will fight their planes in the sky while their home bases are safe while our carriers are not. I don't even want them to have the ability to find our carriers. As soon as that fleet sails east, they should be blinded right off the bat so they don't know where the hits are coming from. I don't even want them to be able to co-ordinate air strike groups

[astralis]

Aside from assuming AShBMs would ever work without a test, attacks on ML China is out of bounds - on what freaking planet? This resulted in 2 carriers lost and at least 290 aircrafts. In other words, fight the kind of war China wants to fight. Well, how about fighting our kind of war instead. Kill the Chinese C4ISR.

kill the invasion fleet/ROROs first, then transition to blinding.

in fact, the PLAN will probably push out first to quasi-blockade Taiwan and act as a meat shield so that USAF/USN are delayed from intervention. so after initial invasion is knocked back, the USN/USAF would need to take out the PLAN, then finally be in a position to hit mainland to wipe air defense/C4ISR.

Taiwan and Japan would probably be in a better position to hit PRC C4ISR nodes via their own long-range strike, but god knows there's a shit ton of targets.

[Officer of Engineers]

CSIS wargame this out and I cannot believe a USMCR Colonel wrote this crock

https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazona...hFolxC_gZQuSOQ

Aside from assuming AShBMs would ever work without a test, attacks on ML China is out of bounds - on what freaking planet? This resulted in 2 carriers lost and at least 290 aircrafts. In other words, fight the kind of war China wants to fight. Well, how about fighting our kind of war instead. Kill the Chinese C4ISR.

[Officer of Engineers]

Am I the only one left on the planet who refused to believe that AShBM can hit squat without a freaking test?

[Officer of Engineers]

“fire a clip into a 7-meter target with the full understanding that unrepentant lethality matters most. Aim for the head.”

That got me laughing my ass off. Birdbrains trying to be Rambos. That ain't their jobs. Leave the bellycrawling to the the bellycrawlers.

[statquo]

U.S. General’s Prediction of War With China ‘in 2025’ Risks Turning Worst Fears Into Reality

In his 5th-century B.C. History of the Peloponnesian War, ancient Athenian historian and military general Thucydides posits, “it was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.”

It’s a musing that prompted American political scientist Graham T. Allison in 2012 to venture a theory known as the “Thucydides Trap,” noting that of 16 historical occasions when a presumptive power challenged an established one, no less than 12 resulted in war.

Today, the “Thucydides Trap” is most often used to describe fractious U.S.-China relations and where they may lead—though it is a matter of hot debate. Objectors cite intertwined supply chains, established international governance mechanisms, and bilateral trade that reached a record $760 billion last year. Endorsers point to resurgent nationalism, concerted military build-ups, and increasingly bellicose rhetoric on both sides—arguably the most worrying of which emerged Friday, when U.S. Four-Star General Mike Minihan warned his troops of China: “My gut tells me we will fight in 2025.” (The Pentagon says that Minihan’s comments “are not representative of the department’s view on China.”)

“I hope I am wrong,” Minihan, who heads the Air Force’s Air Mobility Command, wrote in a memo, which circulated on social media, to the leadership of its 110,000 members. Chinese President Xi Jinping, he explains, “secured his third term and set his war council in October 2022. Taiwan’s presidential elections are in 2024 and will offer Xi a reason. United States’ presidential elections are in 2024 and will offer Xi a distracted America. Xi’s team, reason, and opportunity are all aligned for 2025.”

The subject of the memo is “February 2023 Orders in Preparation for — The Next Fight,” and Minihan goes on to direct troops to undergo a monthly progression of readiness, including ordering personnel to “consider their personal affairs” and to “fire a clip into a 7-meter target with the full understanding that unrepentant lethality matters most. Aim for the head.”

The sensational remarks have provoked consternation on both sides of the Pacific. “All these are things that you say when you’re getting ready to go to combat,” retired U.S. Lt. Col. Daniel L. Davis tells TIME. “Either he knows something that we don’t, or he’s just really trying to get everybody fired up. But I can tell you, for sure, it’s very out of the ordinary.”
The Pentagon’s press secretary Brig. Gen. Patrick Ryder, meanwhile, said in a statement that “China is the pacing challenge for the Department of Defense and our focus remains on working alongside allies and partners to preserve a peaceful, free and open Indo-Pacific.”

Minihan’s memo was described as “reckless and provocative” in a headline by the strident Chinese Communist Party tabloid Global Times. And Zhou Bo, a retired senior colonel of the People’s Liberation Army and senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University, tells TIME that Minihan’s projection is “irresponsible,” adding that the American general is “probably just using the tactics of smearing the image or credibility of China without wasting a bullet.”

Chest-Thumping or the Drumbeat to War?

Minihan’s comments are merely the most immediate of a worrying, emerging consensus that the U.S. and China are destined to clash over Taiwan, the self-ruling island of 23 million that Beijing claims as its sovereign territory. On Jan. 23, former chief of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Philip Davidson said he stood by an earlier assessment that China may attack Taiwan by 2027.

Notably, when asked about Minihan’s remarks at a press conference, a spokeswoman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry was quick to direct official ire toward Taipei. “The real cause of the new round of tensions across the Taiwan Strait is the [ruling Democratic Progressive Party] authorities’ continued act of soliciting U.S. support for ‘Taiwan independence,’” she said.

It’s clear that a war between the world’s top two economies would upset the global economy at a scale utterly eclipsing the disruption wrought by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But recently, there were signs that China was attempting to mend fences. So-called “Wolf Warrior” diplomats—named after a jingoistic action movie—have been reassigned to less prominent roles.

Liu He, the CCP’s outgoing chief economic strategist, was all smiles at the World Economic Forum in Davos, where he gushed that China’s “opening up to the world is a must.” And unlike the previous year, Xi didn’t use his New Year address to call for China-Taiwan reunification. Instead, he said, “We cherish peace and development and value friends and partners.”

Observers suggest that China is keen to repair some of the damage done to his country’s foreign and economic relations caused by the pandemic and Xi’s backing of Putin’s aggression. But the same red lines remain, and the nature of American democracy means that, on both sides of the aisle, needling them scores easy political points. On Jan. 10, 365 lawmakers in the House voted to form a new China Select Committee to probe the most divisive areas of bilateral ties.

“There is bipartisan consensus that the era of trusting Communist China is over,” new Republican House Speaker Kevin McCarthy told legislators. McCarthy, worryingly, has indicated that he intends to follow the example of his predecessor, Nancy Pelosi, who in August visited Taiwan—a trip that Beijing met with unprecedented military drills.

Meanwhile, a military build-up by both sides gathers pace. While the U.S. maintains a strong lead in aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered submarines, and larger ships, China’s navy is now the world’s largest by raw numbers. And China is expected to expand its navy by nearly 40% between 2020 and 2040, according to the U.S. Navy. In November 2021, the U.S. Department of Defense predicted that China was set to quadruple its nuclear stockpile and “have at least 1,000 warheads by 2030.” In December, China and Moscow held joint military drills in the East China Sea close to both Japan and Taiwan. Beijing is also reportedly opening a new military base in Cambodia.

The U.S., meanwhile, continues to spend more on its military than the next nine countries combined—the defense budget was recently approved to hit a record high of $858 billion this year—and it has been busy beefing up regional alliances such as the Quad and AUKUS. In January, President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida agreed to new cooperation on thwarting potential threats from space, developing uninhabited islands for joint military drills, and reconfiguring U.S. troop deployments on Japan’s island of Okinawa with a new $8 billion base opening on Guam.The U.S. is also reportedly negotiating for enhanced access to Philippines military bases this very week.

The trap is set. The world can only hope we avoid walking into it. “I see hotheads in Beijing, and I see hotheads in the Pentagon and the various commands,” says Davis, the American former army man. “And I worry about it a lot.”

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[Officer of Engineers]

I don't know but this would inevitably lead to more J20s flying closer and closer to Taiwanese coastline.

[Albany Rifles]

J20 pilot claims he was unopposed over the Taiwan Straits

https://eurasiantimes.com/chinas-j-2...an-undetected/

This will lead to stupid being done.

So here's the question...could the Taiwanese known and just not react to it?

Why show your hand?

[Officer of Engineers]

J20 pilot claims he was unopposed over the Taiwan Straits

https://eurasiantimes.com/chinas-j-2...an-undetected/

This will lead to stupid being done.

[Officer of Engineers]

Well before Nixon's visit, no one was going to strike a defense arrangement with Taiwan (except R&D with Israel or South Africa).

So what? Neither Seoul, Tokyo, nor Taipei saw the need of a united front then. They don't now.

Japan, Taiwan, and Korea all supported the US in Vietnam, the latter more openly than the others.

Yes, they supported the UNITED STATES, not each other.

As for the Japanese navy cruising through Taiwan-claimed waters, why twist China's tail like that?
In the 1980s/90s, Japanese companies were just beginning to invest in China, and Deng Xiaoping was playing nice with the (northern) neighbors, for the most part.

You're ignoring the fact it was Taipei who said no. Taipei does not want Japanese help.

[DOR]

And attitude is precisely the point. The three most powerful American allies in East Asia do not have an alliance with each other and it ain't because the Americans ain't trying. In the 1980s/1990s, the US got Japan to agree to support American efforts, not Taiwanese efforts, but American efforts in protecting Taiwan. Taipei said thanks but no thanks and still refuse to have any Japanese warships in their waters.

Well before Nixon's visit, no one was going to strike a defense arrangement with Taiwan (except R&D with Israel or South Africa).

Japan, Taiwan, and Korea all supported the US in Vietnam, the latter more openly than the others.

As for the Japanese navy cruising through Taiwan-claimed waters, why twist China's tail like that?
In the 1980s/90s, Japanese companies were just beginning to invest in China, and Deng Xiaoping was playing nice with the (northern) neighbors, for the most part.

[Officer of Engineers]

No argument there.
But, the topic was Taiwanese attitude toward Japan, wasn't it?
By the way, do you know of any Asian nation that trains to fight with Taiwan?

And attitude is precisely the point. The three most powerful American allies in East Asia do not have an alliance with each other and it ain't because the Americans ain't trying. In the 1980s/1990s, the US got Japan to agree to support American efforts, not Taiwanese efforts, but American efforts in protecting Taiwan. Taipei said thanks but no thanks and still refuse to have any Japanese warships in their waters.

[DOR]

Again. Train as you fight. Fight as you train. The Japanese do not train to fight in Taiwanese waters nor with Taiwanese ships in any way. When push comes to shove, all Japan can do is to get out of the way.

The ONLY country who can intervene is the US and in that case, it is the Taiwanese who would have to get out of the way.

No argument there.
But, the topic was Taiwanese attitude toward Japan, wasn't it?
By the way, do you know of any Asian nation that trains to fight with Taiwan?