The US Navy's Greatest Battle...Leyte Gulf

[tbm3fan]

As you have already mentioned the Japanese loved elaborate plans and to create diversions. So from their point of view what they did no doubt seems logical while not so much to us. I'm sure part of their thinking was how to even up the odds given the strength of American forces compared to theirs.

So given that Nishimura sails from Brunei and Shima from the Ryukyus to link the Northern Force with the Southern Force. Kurita had already alerted Nishimura that his Central Force wouldn't engage till the next morning after turning back around. Shima was now 90 minutes behind Nishimura at the time. Nishimura had to decide whether to slow down and enter Surigao Strait in the morning to coincide with Kurita. He decided not to but instead make a dash through the Strait thinking that once through he could engage the Americans in a night battle on the other side. He felt that a night battle played to his strength while a daylight battle to the Americans. Of course, Nishimura had no idea their plans were now bupkis. Consequently he didn't slow down, which would allowed him to meet up with Shima, and he plowed through to his defeat.

Some blame Shima for this debacle but what about Nishimura's part in deciding to sail through the Strait at night despite Kurita's message? In the end if they had come through together, in daylight, the results would have been the same given that air power could be used along with Olendorf's ships at the same time.

[Monash]

Yes I can see all that and obviously even if Shima and Nishimura has successfully linked up it wouldn't have changed their tactical situation one iota.

What puzzles me is why they had separate starting positions to begin with. It's not as if Shima's force was so powerful on it's own that it could have been interpreted as an existential threat to US plans on its own. (I.E. a potential 4th Japanese 'task force'.) Hell it was basically no more powerful than some convoy escorts of the period.

So why not have it sail to Brunei days before the offensive and start the op with Nishimura? Wouldn't change the outcome but it would have ensured Shima arrived 'on time on target' rather than stumbling in late like a drunk at a wedding as he did.

[tbm3fan]

Maybe the only way to truly know is that we would either have to be Japanese at the time or have been a fly on the wall when they designed the plan. Other than that I don't think anyone will truly know.

[Officer of Engineers]

Southern Force makes perfect sense to me. Do recall that there were actions long before both TFs even left their respective ports. The chances of an American intercept were high. Leaving from two ports gives a better oppertunity that a strong force could be assembled in open seas.

[Albany Rifles]

As we are approaching the 75th Anniversary of this epic event I will post some things I wrote for another group here commemorating the events of those days.

First, the prelude battle.

As a prelude to the Battle of Leyte Gulf, The USN fought the Imperial Japanese Navy & Army air forces in the Formosa Air Battle 1216 October 1944 in the summer of 1944 the US had breached the main inner Japanese defensive belt by seizing the Marianas (Guam, Saipan & Tinian). This placed the Japanese Home Islands in range of the new B-29s. The Japanese countered the invasion in the Battle of the Philippine Sea with disastrous results for them. They would lose 3 carriers and lose over 600 aircraft. More importantly they lost most of their remaining experienced carrier pilots.
In the wake of this the US had to decide where the strategic pivot would be: to take Formosa (Taiwan) as a place to base for an invasion of China or to attack the Philippines. Both would have the results of cutting off the Japanese Home Islands from the oil and other resources from the Southwest Pacific. The Philippine route under MacArthur was selected over the Formosa route under Nimitz. In order to support the Philippines assault the Task Force 38 Fast Carriers would attack Japanese air strength in Formosa & Northern Philippines.

The Japanese forces had over 1,400 aircraft split amongst the Imperial Japanese Navys 1st (Philippines), 2nd & 3rd (Taiwan) Air Fleets and the Imperial Japanese Armys 4th Air Army in Manila area (Clark Field). Against them were the US Navys Third Fleet under William Halsey with 17 carriers, 6 battleships, 4 heavy & 11 light cruisers and 57 destroyers. They were assigned to Marc Mitschers Task Force 38 (TF 38): Task Group 38.1 (TG 38.1): USS Cowpens, USS Hornet, USS Monterey, USS Wasp; Task Group 38.2 (TG 38.2): USS Bunker Hill, USS Cabot, USS Hancock, USS Independence, USS Intrepid; Task Group 38.3 (TG 38.3): USS Essex, USS Langley, USS Lexington, USS Princeton; Task Group 38.4 (TG 38.4): USS Belleau Wood, USS Enterprise, USS Franklin, USS San Jacinto. All total TF 38 had almost 1200 aircraft.

The 5 day battle began when Japanese radar equipped aircraft from Formosa picked up the approach of TF 38 on 11 OCT. Forewarned the IJN/IJA were prepared for the opening attacks against airfields and facilities at first light on 12 OCT. At 0600 USN F6F Hellcat fighter sweeps encountered Japanese fighters aloft defending their airfields. Antiaircraft fire was heavy but not too accurate. Quickly, the more experienced Americans gained the upper hand and inflicted massive casualties on the inexperienced Japanese forces. This was followed up by strikes later in the day by SB2C Helldivers & TBM/TBF Avengers against airfields and facilities which caused widespread damage.
In response the Japanese launched a special attack force from Japan, the T Attack Force which was trained to attack in all weather and at night and evasive maneuvers. The T Force attacked near dusk with little damage except to one US destroyer which suffered damage from over aggressive antiaircraft fire.

The weather degraded on 13 October restricting strikes. Radio intercepts and radar reports indicated more Japanese strikes later that day. Admiral Mitscher ordered no attacks after 1400 and to shift to fleet defense. The TF 38 Combat Air Patrols (CAP) pushed out aggressively and intercepted most raids well out of antiaircraft gun range. Just before sunset T Air Attack Force appeared and made for Task Group TG 38.1 at 1823 Ten Yokosuka P1Y Frances torpedoes bombers attacked low on the water. One dropped a torpedo before being shut down which hit the heavy cruiser USS Canberra amidships, flooding both engine rooms and killing 23 of her crew. Dead in the water, the Canberra had to be taken under tow by the USS Wichita around 2200. The Wichita towed the cruiser to the southeast away from the fight. Additional escort ships were attached and they became Task Group 30.3

With the damaged Canberra making slow progress Mitscher was forced to stay in the area on 14 October much longer than planned. More fighter sweeps hit Formosa and the Philippines to suppress the IJN/IJA attacks. Japanese reconnaissance aircraft made appearances all day. Massed enemy air attacks began around 1500 and would continue into the night. The USS Hancock was hit by a dud bomb. The USS Houston was sent to replace the Wichita which returned to its previous station escorting the Wasp. At 1630 torpedo bombers attacked CG 30.3 and torpedoed USS Houston. Like Canberra, her engine rooms were flooded. She flooded so quickly the Houston quickly took on a 16 degree list. The USS Boston was tasked to tow the second crippled cruiser.

15 October was supposed to be a refueling day for the fleet but only TG 38.2 & 38.3 could get away. TG 38.4 kept up the pressure on the IJA forces on Luzon and TG 38.1 provided escort to the nicknamed Cripple Division 1. Fleet tugs took over tows so Boston could return to duty. No strikes went out that day. Instead all efforts were made for suppression and fleet protection. Several strikes came at the fleet all day long but were destroyed without further damage to the fleet. Fighter Squadron 14 aboard the USS Wasp alone shot down 30 aircraft.

16 October marked the end of the battle. The light carriers USS Cowpens and USS Cabot (with my Dad aboard) provided close cover to CG 30.3. One last raid made it through. The Houston was torpedoed again but stayed afloat and continued to be towed by the fleet tug the USS Pawnee. The remainder of the fleet withdrew out of range of land that day and went to resupply .

The outcome of the Formosa Air Battle was the destruction of IJN/IJA offensive aviation. Radar directed fighters and centrally fire controlled 5 inch/38 antiaircraft fire from destroyers, cruisers and battleships provided an almost impenetrable barrier for conventional tactics. It was the result of this that the Japanese reverted to the Divine Wind or Kamikaze tactics for the remainder of the war..

Bumping because of the dates...

[Archdude]

I have read all the posts but think Halsey was not given accurate data from pilots. A lot of information was disinterested by his staff.