Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

question regarding Sherman variant

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • #16
    Originally posted by tbm3fan View Post
    If you want to learn about how the Sherman did in combat then get the book "Death Trap" written by a Lt. Belton Cooperwho was a maintenance officer in the 3rd Armored Division. Chilling account of the Sherman against Tigers and Panthers. While we had lots of Shermans by January 1945 we didn't have many tank crews left that had any experience. There is one section in the book where the writer talks about a Super Pershing that they modified a little with extra armor and then tested out the new 90mm 3,850 per second projectile in late February 1945. This is the tank we really needed. His description of how that shell went clear through a German Jagdpanzer IV assault gun, when examined, is amazing.

    Apparently there was a point just after D-Day where a demonstration was held in England showing what a M26 could do. Many armored officers were impressed except one and he mattered. It was Patton who maintained that tanks were not for fighting tanks but for helping infantry. However, once they got into Northern Europe it became apparent that head on battles with German PzKw IV, PzKw V Panther and PzKw VI King Tiger tanks could not be avoided and the losses were horrendous. This demo was to decide if the M26 should be first priority or continue with the M4. Patton said M4 and the fate of the M4 and her crews was sealed.

    Still have the last 85 pages to go out of 346.
    That book has been so thoroughly debunked that its not even considered history. He served in the least performing of the American armored divisions and the only one that took 100% or more causality rates from D-day to VE day compared against establishment strength. the Division suffered 2540 killed in action including attached but non organic TD and AAA units. The division suffered a further 7331 wounded/injured in action, 95 missing and 139 captured for a total battle casualty number of 10105. The division suffered a further 6017 losses including 470 dead due to disease and non- action related accident.

    Of the battle dead if you subtract attached non-organic units the number of battle dead drops 1810 dead and 6963 wounded/injured in action. here is where Cooper is proven to be a windbag and nothing more. The division lost 633 medium tanks (total write off) and the division repaired 1305 medium tanks classified as temporary losses from combat. The division lost more medium tanks than it did dead... where is the death trap? many perhaps most of the bead and wounded are not even tankers but armored infantrymen and other ranks. of those who are tankers, 1/3 of the tanks lost and then repaired an additional 395 units were light tanks. You can't even make the case that he meant wounded worse than death. of the wounded and injured inaction, 4408 are conformed return to duty from units organic to the divisions excluding the attached units.

    1810 dead, 2285 permanently disabled or otherwise unfit to return to duty from wounds and injuries.

    The divisions lost 1832 vehicles all types permanently lost and a further 6324 vehicles lost in combat but repaired and returned to service. Do the math, even if not a single rifleman was killed and all the dead were in a vehicle the division didn't suffer as many dead as it did total vehicle write offs from combat losses.

    Comment


    • #17
      Ok, what is your point? Debunked? How is that? I know one thing for sure and that is he was there. I wasn't. You weren't. None of us were. So I see no reason to debunk what he wrote in such detail. Least performing divisions. How does that matter since he was a maintenance officer who essentially tallied up the losses. Does that make his impressions and comments about the M4 any less valid? As for "Death Trap" that is the name he picked for his book. If there is an issue with that name and statistics then I think talking with him would be the way to go.

      I'm not arguing with you here it is just that a first hand eyewitness account carries more weight with me versus others who weren't there to witness.

      Comment


      • #18
        tbm3fan reply

        "Ok, what is your point? Debunked? How is that? I know one thing for sure and that is he was there. "

        Cooper's knowledge of US tank development was meager. For example, the alleged M26 demonstration (IIRC it never happened) would not have mattered. There was no question of deploying the M26 tanks for the Normandy Campaign since there were only 4 tanks produced by D-Day and it took months to deploy tanks from the US to ETO. Not only the Pershing won't fit an LST, but had they been mass produced somehow, they wouldn't be able to replace the Sherman in any significant numbers until Normandy was over.

        "How does that matter since he was a maintenance officer who essentially tallied up the losses. Does that make his impressions and comments about the M4 any less valid?"

        Cooper was not an armored tactician and he had virtually no experience in commanding tanks. He was not familiar with what the tankers demanded from their vehicles. And he didn't know what combat against other tanks was like. The commander of the 8th Tank Battalion/4th Armored would later testify that his men wanted more gun power but no additional armor unless engine power was increased to match weight. This squared poorly with his advocacy of the M26 Pershing. Indeed, some 3rd AD veterans expressed dissatisfaction with the M26s they were given, because they were unable to keep up with the M4 tanks, and the front was where the action was.

        Also, Cooper was not privy to the German record, which indicates that their attrition rates in armored units was much higher than that of the allies in spite of heavier armor and better guns.

        Z,
        Do you mind to elaborate on how the 3d AD was an under-performing unit? Casualty rates alone is not a good indicator for the success or failure of a combat formation and Bradley had high praise for the 3d AD after Maurice Rose became it's commander.
        Last edited by Triple C; 07 Apr 12,, 22:42.
        All those who are merciful with the cruel will come to be cruel to the merciful.
        -Talmud Kohelet Rabbah, 7:16.

        Comment


        • #19
          In Eisenhower's Lieutenant, Weigly credited the 3d AD for being the unit that came closest to penetrating the West Wall during first contact and its performance the Battle of the Bulge seems to indicate a unit with high morale and professionalism, functioning in far-flung battle groups that contained elements from no less than 3 Panzer Divisions and 1 VGD. Its drive through the Ruhrgebeit was also very impressive, especially considering the unit lost its commanding general and continued on with its mission. I agree with you on Belton Cooper. His book is a valuable as a historical source on what the soldiers on the ground thought about the war but it is a poor analytical history.
          Last edited by Triple C; 07 Apr 12,, 22:25.
          All those who are merciful with the cruel will come to be cruel to the merciful.
          -Talmud Kohelet Rabbah, 7:16.

          Comment


          • #20
            Originally posted by Triple C View Post
            Also, Cooper was not privy to the German record, which indicates that their attrition rates in armored units was much higher than that of the allies in spite of heavier armor and better guns.
            Based on what I know about the Western Front in 1944-45, I'm guessing this had more to do with overwhelming Allied air superiority rather than tank-vs-tank action; one on one, Allied tanks didn't fare very well against German tanks, but they DID have a lot of airpower (and numbers) to back them up.
            "There is never enough time to do or say all the things that we would wish. The thing is to try to do as much as you can in the time that you have. Remember Scrooge, time is short, and suddenly, you're not there any more." -Ghost of Christmas Present, Scrooge

            Comment


            • #21
              Originally posted by Stitch View Post
              Based on what I know about the Western Front in 1944-45, I'm guessing this had more to do with overwhelming Allied air superiority rather than tank-vs-tank action; one on one, Allied tanks didn't fare very well against German tanks, but they DID have a lot of airpower (and numbers) to back them up.
              I think you underestimated the effects of crushing numerical superiority in armor and artillery tubes. Very few Panzer losses were directly attributable to air power. I remember reading BDAs of Mortain and Falaise, and in both cases air weapons accounted for less than 5% of German tanks knocked out.

              The overwhelming majority of German armor losses were caused by abandonment. Arguably lack of fuel, parts and air attack had much to do with it, but those factors were the result of allied maneuvers that cut off German armor and made it vulnerable to air and artillery attacks.

              To turn the question on its head, in 1941 the Soviets lost the majority of their tanks due to breakdowns and abandonment by crew, and historians see it as evidence of German doctrinal, operational, and organizational superiority in armored warfare. I don't think Western Front 44-45 should be judged by different metrics.

              In simpler terms, on the tactical level, I think it's probably true that Germans routinely inflict heavy losses on allied armor. But at the end of the fight the Germans got wiped out as often as they managed to hold their own, and being out numbered three or four to one means your nice kill ratios was almost never good enough.
              Last edited by Triple C; 08 Apr 12,, 07:06.
              All those who are merciful with the cruel will come to be cruel to the merciful.
              -Talmud Kohelet Rabbah, 7:16.

              Comment


              • #22
                Belton Cooper was no maverick with his Deathtraps book - he simply echoed the views of anyone 'in the know', like his tanker colleagues.

                As Eisenhower wrote to the commanders of the 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions:

                "Our men, in general, realize that the Sherman is not capable of standing up in a ding-dong, head-on fight with a Panther. Neither in gun power nor in armor is the present Sherman justified in undertaking such a contest. On the other hand, most of them realize that we have a job of shipping tanks overseas and therefore do not want unwieldy monsters; that our tank has great reliability, good mobility, and that the gun has been vastly improved. Most of them feel that we have developed tactics that allow them to employ their superior numbers to defeat the Panther tank as long as they are not surprised and can discover the Panther before it has gotten in three or four good shots."

                Steve Zaloga puts the blame on both the machinations of the Ordnance Branch, and the deliberate strategy imposed by the AGF's Lesley McNair to restrict it ... a 'battle need' requirement that unlike other nations systematically delayed any innovation or upgrading. What was possibly the best tank in the world in 1942 changed very little up to D-Day, even as new threats appeared.

                Zaloga ends his history of the Sherman with a spirited defence of the vehicle, saying:

                "Like the Energizer Bunny, the Sherman just kept running, and running, and running. This was not luck, but the result of deliberate AGF policy that placed a premium on durability. The Wehrmacht did not place the same value ... and its panzer units suffered from high breakdown rates, especially in the last year of the war ... Most American tankers would have preferred to be sitting in a more powerful tank likethePanther,but no commander would have been content to substitute his many Shermans for a much smaller number of Panthers."
                Last edited by clackers; 08 Apr 12,, 12:18.

                Comment


                • #23
                  Clackers,
                  Cooper's general impressions are not in dispute. His specific claims, especially in regard to the deployment of M26 tanks, and Patton's role within it, are.
                  All those who are merciful with the cruel will come to be cruel to the merciful.
                  -Talmud Kohelet Rabbah, 7:16.

                  Comment


                  • #24
                    Originally posted by tbm3fan View Post
                    Ok, what is your point? Debunked? How is that? I know one thing for sure and that is he was there. I wasn't. You weren't. None of us were. So I see no reason to debunk what he wrote in such detail. Least performing divisions. How does that matter since he was a maintenance officer who essentially tallied up the losses. Does that make his impressions and comments about the M4 any less valid? As for "Death Trap" that is the name he picked for his book. If there is an issue with that name and statistics then I think talking with him would be the way to go.

                    I'm not arguing with you here it is just that a first hand eyewitness account carries more weight with me versus others who weren't there to witness.
                    1. You're right we were not there, but neither was he. His reports about Patton are wrong because the meeting never happened- he wasn't there at a meeting that never happened and he wasn't in Third Army.

                    2. He wrote the book around 1988 some 43 years after the end of the war, not a first hand eyewitness account but the recollections of a man with an ax to grind.

                    3. Yes the performance of a division matters, a poorly handled unit will take more losses than one in the hands of a master like Wood. First this is important becuase even the under performing 3rd AD didn't have Sherman losses worthy of the term death traps as the statistics of dead and wounded against vehicle losses show. Second the 4th AD. the 3rd Army's tip of the spear spent 220 in combat and went up against the best the Germans had and ripped them apart taking far fewer losses than they took and knocking out more panthers than they lost Shermans in a number of engagements. The 4thAD (and attached non-organic units) suffered 1236 dead and 4246 wounded as compared to 2540 dead and 7331 wounded. Soe US armored divisions took even less, far less in fact so the whole idea that the Sherman is a death trap is a joke. It had good armor, especially the wet storage versions. It was reliable, mobile, had a good gun in 42 and an adequate gun in 44. Yes it had a gasoline engine, but so did the panther, Tiger, pz IV... Western Europe and the US Army used gasoline.

                    Triple C, compared to some of the other US armored divisions the 3rd fails to shine. Not only did it lose more tanks than any other armored division, it lost more tanks than any division. It managed this while never facing crack German units anywhere near full strength.

                    Comment


                    • #25
                      Z,

                      The 4th AD did not engage many crack German armor units either. Its largest battle was fought against two Pz Bde's that were not well-trained. It fought 1st SS PzD in Bastogne but the 1st SS was burned out by that point.

                      The 3d AD on the other hand was consistently the spearhead unit for the First Army and had to handle some deeply unpleasant missions such as frontal assault against the West Wall, and had the misfortune of having a poor division commander during the Normandy campaign. I think successfully containing KG Peiper, 2d SS and 116th PzD plus a VGD at the same time should earn the 3d AD some respect.

                      Do I rate it as highly as 2d or 4th AD, probably no. But compared to 7th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 14th ADs? 3 AD's performance was a last above average.
                      All those who are merciful with the cruel will come to be cruel to the merciful.
                      -Talmud Kohelet Rabbah, 7:16.

                      Comment


                      • #26
                        Originally posted by Triple C View Post
                        Cooper's general impressions are not in dispute.
                        They are, Triple C.

                        Not by you, but by others, including in this thread.

                        Originally posted by Triple C View Post
                        His specific claims, especially in regard to the deployment of M26 tanks, and Patton's role within it, are.
                        Cooper's not a historian, but a vet. He can't know what happened behind the scenes, except what he was told. I'd be reading researchers like Hunnicutt and Zaloga for background details.

                        But the tragedy of the T20/T22/T23/T26 is undeniable.

                        A follow-on tank for the Sherman had been worked on since 1942, but with little urgency.

                        In the autumn of 1943, ETO commander Jacob Devers wanted one T26 issued per five M4s in his theatre.

                        But McNair 'flatly turned down the request on the grounds that there was no demand from troops in the field and that the new Sherman with its 76mm gun was perfectly adequate'.

                        It was not until April 1944 that Allied intelligence realized that the Panther was not a battalion sized corps or army level asset like the Tiger but a regimental addition to the standard Panzer division, and the Fort Knox Armored Command concluded that 'no American tank' could equal its all-around performance. The T26 project took off again.

                        As far as Patton was concerned, his Third Army was initially equipped only with 75mm Shermans. He and the commanders of 2nd, 5th and 6th Armored Divisions witnessed the 76mm version in a firing demonstration on June 12, 1944.

                        "All the commanders were reluctant to see it take the place of the 75mm tank gun in any quantity." Patton was willing to accept some so long as they were confined to separate tank battalions, but none were allotted to the Third Army prior to its transfer to France. "Patton knew as little about tanks as anybody I knew," commented one of the US Army's best tank commanders in World War II, Gen. Bruce Clarke, striking to the heart of the matter. Clarke was not highlighting Patton's tactical genius, but rather his technical ignorance. Patton knew how to use tanks in combat, but he did not know much about tank design" Zaloga, Armored Thunderbolt.
                        Last edited by clackers; 12 Apr 12,, 13:01.

                        Comment


                        • #27
                          Originally posted by Triple C View Post
                          Z,

                          The 4th AD did not engage many crack German armor units either. Its largest battle was fought against two Pz Bde's that were not well-trained. It fought 1st SS PzD in Bastogne but the 1st SS was burned out by that point.

                          The 3d AD on the other hand was consistently the spearhead unit for the First Army and had to handle some deeply unpleasant missions such as frontal assault against the West Wall, and had the misfortune of having a poor division commander during the Normandy campaign. I think successfully containing KG Peiper, 2d SS and 116th PzD plus a VGD at the same time should earn the 3d AD some respect.

                          Do I rate it as highly as 2d or 4th AD, probably no. But compared to 7th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 14th ADs? 3 AD's performance was a last above average.
                          4AD victms- 11th panzer, 2nd SS panzer, 17th ss panzergrenadier division, Panzer lehr, 9th SS panzer, 1st SS panzer, 2 panzer brigades.... you need to read up on the 4th AD.

                          Comment


                          • #28
                            Z,
                            I am aware that 11th Panzer & 2d SS PzD plus two independent Panzer Brigades had engaged the 4th AD, but with the exception of the two inexperienced Panzer Brigades, those formations only sent weak battlegroups to fight the 4th AD and were generally already worn out. The 2d SS PzD was badly bloodied by the 2d AD during Cobra and in no shape to counterattack the 4th AD in Avranches. In the Battle of Lorraine the 11th PzD had little tanks left after escaping from the encirclement battles of Dragoon, and still, was far from a helpless victim in the fights around Arras. If memory serves, the 11th PzD inflicted severe losses on the 4th AD, especially in infantry, though its own losses equaled that of the Americans. 4th AD's exploits with 17th SS PGD (admittedly not the best of the SS formations) are however unfamiliar to me.

                            Further, under Patton's command the 4th AD frequently engaged German units in their deep flank, whereas Hodge's First Army more often than not used its heavy armored divisions (2d & 3d ADs) as sledgehammers. Almost all of the 3d AD's engagement with German armor were frontal assaults through no fault of its own and perhaps dictated by necessity. That said, 3d AD's performance in Cobra was not stellar, due to poor coordination with the 1st ID which it was supposed to support.
                            Last edited by Triple C; 16 Apr 12,, 00:19.
                            All those who are merciful with the cruel will come to be cruel to the merciful.
                            -Talmud Kohelet Rabbah, 7:16.

                            Comment


                            • #29
                              Originally posted by clackers View Post
                              They are, Triple C.

                              Cooper's not a historian, but a vet. He can't know what happened behind the scenes, except what he was told. I'd be reading researchers like Hunnicutt and Zaloga for background details.
                              I agree with the caveat that Cooper was also unfamiliar with tank tactics. In a post war conference, General White of the 2d AD and Major Irzyk of the 8th Tank Bn/4th AD both argued that excessive armor was undesirable and their men wanted more gun power above all other considerations. The consensus was that they were willing to bleed for victory, but found inadequate firepower demoralizing. This implied M-26s was not the solution. The 3d AD's official history later remarked that M-26s were great tanks but they were too slow and rarely where they were needed.

                              Originally posted by clackers View Post
                              But the tragedy of the T20/T22/T23/T26 is undeniable.

                              ... McNair 'flatly turned down the request on the grounds that there was no demand from troops in the field and that the new Sherman with its 76mm gun was perfectly adequate'.

                              It was not until April 1944 that Allied intelligence realized that the Panther was not a battalion sized corps or army level asset like the Tiger but a regimental addition to the standard Panzer division, and the Fort Knox Armored Command concluded that 'no American tank' could equal its all-around performance. The T26 project took off again.
                              The American intelligence believed Panthers would be field in special battalions because that was the Soviet experience in Kursk. Thereafter the encounters with Panther tanks were too sporadic to make any determination with reasonable certainty how they'd be fielded later. By late 1943 it was too late to introduce any changes. The armored divisions and tank battalions gathered in England had all of their equipment sitting in storage or loaded in transport ships and I can scarcely see how the US Army was going to remove and replace them. If you look at the photographs of divisions that went to Normandy they were invariably equipped with "vintage" M4/M4A1s produced circa the North African campaign. I believe that 76-mm gun armed Shermans with wide tracks were good enough to fight the war on, an opinion supported by Major Irzyk.

                              But more importantly, in my opinion, McNair should be judged by the standard of what he achieved, converting an army more used to border skirmishes with Latin American states and colonial police action to a war machine capable of taking on an enemy in the major league of warfare. The United States had industrial potential, but it had no military industrial complex. His job was to tap that potential and translate it into reality and it was unenviable, hard work.

                              The failure of designing and fielding a first rate tank need to be balanced with the strategic and economic challenges involved in overcoming the lack of a tradition in military-industrial cooperation. In WWI, the US Army went to battle without modern doctrine, organization, or domestically produced supporting arms, the result of the army's failure to exert firm control over the R&D and the production of armament. The potential for a disastrous repetition was far from academic. McNair's overriding goal was to give his army a complete package of adequate weapons in overwhelming numbers, not pursuing perfection. It was the right choice.
                              Last edited by Triple C; 15 Apr 12,, 23:29.
                              All those who are merciful with the cruel will come to be cruel to the merciful.
                              -Talmud Kohelet Rabbah, 7:16.

                              Comment


                              • #30
                                Originally posted by zraver View Post
                                First combat was July 1944, don't have a unit or a date for sure.
                                That is what i thought too but
                                there is some info on line that the first unit to use it was the free french 2nd armored division and that the 2nd and 3rd american armored divisions had m4a1 (76) variant during Cobra.
                                J'ai en marre.

                                Comment

                                Working...
                                X