Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

Germany's strategic error? Barbarossa...

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • zraver
    replied
    Originally posted by Monash View Post

    Again possibly, but upon reflection maybe it was just a matter of that one key phrase you mentioned - loss of face. That and the need for 'Nemawahsi'. Point is you'd think any objective/cool headed analysis of Japan's strategic situation just prior to the commencement of the war (like Yamamoto's) would have placed the need for the earliest possible peace deal with the US at the forefront of Japan's priorities after it had achieved it's primary objectives. And yet what was there nothing, not even a peep.

    Even allowing for the huge disparity in industrial capacity, population and education I starting to think cultural issues may have been an even bigger weak spot. Perhaps there's a lesson there for everyone.
    Well it was a government by assassination.... The Japanese government was at cross purposes with itself. The Army and Navy hated each other. Neither had a firm grip on the political aspirations of mid-level officers and the Prime Minister had no constitutional authority over either, and the Emperor rarely intervened. The War with China was deliberate, but contrived at the level of colonels not generals. The Army had its own aircraft carriers.... The two services would meet and try to hammer out compromises on the direction of the war for the next six months.

    Doolittle scrambled them though. Coral Sea was a set back, but Doolittle opened up a whole new dimension to the war. For the First time in living memory, Japan itself had been attacked, and the emperor almost killed. The Navy couldn't catch the American carriers, so the army went crazy in China. They razed multiple cities, devastated 20,000 square km of country side and fully unleashed UNit 731 against the provinces where Dolittle was supposed to land and where the planes actual bailed out. Hundreds of thousands died in what can only be described as a revenge offensive. They also redirected JAAF ad JNAF fighters back to the home islands to defend against repeat raids. It really messed with their whole decision matrix. It was the impetus for taking Kiska and Attu and for Midway.

    Leave a comment:


  • Monash
    replied
    Originally posted by zraver View Post

    They never got the chance to make overtures. The Dolittle Raid completely scrambled them, they were still trying to build a defensive position to stop a repeat of that when they lost the Kido Butai at Midway, nd then got bogged down in PNG/Solomons. After that, asking for peace would have been a loss of face. No one had the balls, so they settled on a strategy to make it too expensive for the Allies to win. They thought Yamamoto Spirit could overcome allied material superiority, or at least negate it enough to make taking each fortified island an even up body count. They were wrong. We never suffered as many casualties as they did, and when you count the virtual POW camps we established via bypassing the count of troops out of action gets even more lopsided.
    Again possibly, but upon reflection maybe it was just a matter of that one key phrase you mentioned - loss of face. That and the need for 'Nemawahsi'. Point is you'd think any objective/cool headed analysis of Japan's strategic situation just prior to the commencement of the war (like Yamamoto's) would have placed the need for the earliest possible peace deal with the US at the forefront of Japan's priorities after it had achieved it's primary objectives. And yet what was there nothing, not even a peep.

    Even allowing for the huge disparity in industrial capacity, population and education I starting to think cultural issues may have been an even bigger weak spot. Perhaps there's a lesson there for everyone.

    Leave a comment:


  • zraver
    replied
    Originally posted by Monash View Post


    Possibly but continuing military operations with the intention of securing your gains and putting more pressure on the enemy after proposing an armistice is pretty much SOP. You might not go full tilt but you certainly act to consolidate your gains. In fact until such time as your opponent formally agrees to (or at least shows signs of seriously considering) your proposal you more or less obliged to maintain military pressure. Slacking off after opening negotiations hands the initiative over to the enemy and only encourages them to keep looking for viable military options.

    And I said I can't find any record of Japans wartime government even considering an approach to the Allied powers while they still held most of the cards in the western pacific in late 42/ early 43. It just staggers me that they could have ignored such an obvious warning (obvious to me anyway) from the the architect of their opening gambit. I would have expected the navy at least to start ticking days off in the calendar from the moment the first bombs fell on Pearl.
    They never got the chance to make overtures. The Dolittle Raid completely scrambled them, they were still trying to build a defensive position to stop a repeat of that when they lost the Kido Butai at Midway, nd then got bogged down in PNG/Solomons. After that, asking for peace would have been a loss of face. No one had the balls, so they settled on a strategy to make it too expensive for the Allies to win. They thought Yamoto Spirit could overcome allied material superiority, or at least negate it enough to make taking each fortified island an even up body count. They were wrong. We never suffered as many casualties as they did, and when you count the virtual POW camps we established via bypassing the count of troops out of action gets even more lopsided.

    Leave a comment:


  • Triple C
    replied
    Richard Frank mentioned that Japan's peace faction sent out feelers to neutral countries, but they were not taken seriously because they had no authority to set or negotiate terms.

    Leave a comment:


  • Monash
    replied
    Originally posted by zraver View Post
    Monash, thier pre-war conceptions of what woukd be a winning posistion got scrambeled to hell and gone when a B25 flew over the imperial palace. Midway and tge Akytians were at least partly an effort to create a bigger safe zone for the Home Islands.

    Possibly but continuing military operations with the intention of securing your gains and putting more pressure on the enemy after proposing an armistice is pretty much SOP. You might not go full tilt but you certainly act to consolidate your gains. In fact until such time as your opponent formally agrees to (or at least shows signs of seriously considering) your proposal you more or less obliged to maintain military pressure. Slacking off after opening negotiations hands the initiative over to the enemy and only encourages them to keep looking for viable military options.

    And I said I can't find any record of Japans wartime government even considering an approach to the Allied powers while they still held most of the cards in the western pacific in late 42/ early 43. It just staggers me that they could have ignored such an obvious warning (obvious to me anyway) from the the architect of their opening gambit. I would have expected the navy at least to start ticking days off in the calendar from the moment the first bombs fell on Pearl.
    Last edited by Monash; 02 Aug 21,, 02:43.

    Leave a comment:


  • zraver
    replied
    Monash, thier pre-war conceptions of what woukd be a winning posistion got scrambeled to hell and gone when a B25 flew over the imperial palace. Midway and tge Akytians were at least partly an effort to create a bigger safe zone for the Home Islands.

    Leave a comment:


  • Monash
    replied
    Bigfella's point above was something I should have addressed earlier because it's always perplexed. Yamamoto himself (couldn't find an official reference BTW ) apparently cautioned the Japanese High Command that his plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor, if it succeeded would only guarantee Japan naval dominance in the Western Pacific region for a year or so, after which America's industrial capacity and manpower advantages would turn inevitably start to turn the balance back the other way and that a long war would lead to an American victory.

    Yet I have never found any historical references that, having fore-filled all their immediate strategic priorities (i.e securing their oil supplies etc) that the Japanese leadership even contemplated for a moment opening talks for an armistice, let alone actively sounded out the Allies about such a possibility. Its like they were struck down by the worlds most severe case of collective amnesia AND victory fever at the same time. The guy who who made their 'victory' possible tells them they have 12 months and that a long war is a losing war and what happens? Nothing.

    Leave a comment:


  • zraver
    replied
    Originally posted by Bigfella View Post

    Yep. They needed America out by the end of 1942 or it was all over. If the US goes wobbly and agrees to a negotiated peace with Japan returning US possessions and Japan keeping what it has then Japan wins. Britain isn't going to be in a position to do much for years and China can only play defence.
    But Pearl Harbor prevented the US being out in 42. Had Japan acted conventionally with a declaration of war, and ana ttack on the Phillipines they may have gotten the decisive engagement they wanted. By damaging the battleline they forced the US to adopt a defensive posture and write off the Philippines. Had the combined US/Japanese fleets met in a Jutland style battle in say Feb 42, the bulk of the USN likely would have been sunk in deep water. Losing say battleships and 3 carriers in deep water blocks US offensive action till at least 44. Enough time for diplomats to work since there would not have been the rage factor.

    LIke Germany with Russia, Japan seriously underestimated US toughness & willingess to fight. Oops.
    Japan knew we would fight, their whole pre-war strategy the Kentai Kessen was based on our willingness to suck up losses as we doggedly tried to cross the pacific to relieve the Philippines. Its why Japanese destroyers and cruisers carried so many torpedo weapons, why they developed low light optics and drilled incessantly for a night battle. What they did off Savo Island is what they had planned to do to the entire US fleet. Yamamoto's gambit skuppered their entire doctrine.

    I read somewhere that Japan built less than 20 aircraft carriers from 1941-45. The US built something like 120. Hard to take on that sort of power in a stand up fight.
    We built more Essex carriers IIRC than Japan built carriers of all types. Also our carrier designs got better, after Taiho, Japan downsized their aspirations to the Unryu class.

    Leave a comment:


  • Albany Rifles
    replied
    Originally posted by Dazed View Post

    The 49ers won their first 5 the last 2 well..

    I am as old as the Pats, First 19 years of life spent in MA. Son of season ticket holders. Never seen a quarterback take a beating like Jim Plunkett. Back to topic/
    I'm older than them!!!!

    Leave a comment:


  • Dazed
    replied
    Originally posted by Albany Rifles View Post

    To lose 5 they have to get to 5.....
    The 49ers won their first 5 the last 2 well..

    I am as old as the Pats, First 19 years of life spent in MA. Son of season ticket holders. Never seen a quarterback take a beating like Jim Plunkett. Back to topic/

    Leave a comment:


  • Albany Rifles
    replied
    Originally posted by Dazed View Post

    A Bills fan will tell you they only lost 4 Super Bowls not 5,
    To lose 5 they have to get to 5.....

    Leave a comment:


  • Dazed
    replied
    Originally posted by Albany Rifles View Post
    And as a Pats fan....the corollary is Marv Levy can't win a Super Bowl!
    A Bills fan will tell you they only lost 4 Super Bowls not 5,

    Leave a comment:


  • Albany Rifles
    replied
    And as a Pats fan....the corollary is Marv Levy can't win a Super Bowl!

    Leave a comment:


  • Dazed
    replied
    June 25, 1940 the Germans are in the same place as they were in 1918. They now occupy all of France, Russia is still out of the war, British Navy can still blockade the the Germans. The German economy is not heading in the right direction. On the sea German ASW is not even close to the Allies ASW capabilities. Russia could supply fuel. Germany will not be able to import what it needs.

    Going into Russia up until about 1943 the Germans are still making gains. The Russians had collapsed in WW1, faltered in the Russian Civil War, paid an enormous price in Finland. In the beginning of the campaign the Russian losses were catastrophic. The Allies Military and civilian leadership except for FDR considered the Russians finished. The only part of the German Military that was realistic in it's goals and capabilities was the the German logistics Corp. They promised and delivered on a 700 to 800 kilometer thrust and they delivered. Russia is to Germany as China is to Japan, Too large to supply and conquer. To quote Buffalo Bills legendary coach Marv Levy. "The Germans can't win on the road."

    Dr. Robert Cintino gave a great talk. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UNDhswF1GKk&t=13s

    Also a great book but a tough read The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West
    Last edited by Dazed; 05 Jan 21,, 02:07. Reason: Left out an important part.

    Leave a comment:


  • Monash
    replied
    Originally posted by Albany Rifles View Post

    Actual numbers....158 total with 28 Essex class Fleet carriers, 8 Independence class light carriers & 122 escort carriers (many were for RN/RCN service).

    Now let's do aircraft...the Japanese produced a little over 60,000 aircraft from 1938-45. The US produced over 89,000 aircraft....in 1944 alone.
    If anyone's interested here's a Youtube video that shows/charts US and Japanese naval construction rates across all classes from Day 1 of the Pacific War until its conclusion. (I suggest turning up the viewing speed and turning off the Music)

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l9ag2x3CS9M
    Last edited by Monash; 04 Nov 20,, 00:58.

    Leave a comment:

Working...
X