I have been thinking on Germany's strategic thinking in the early years of world war 2, especially in comparison to the Japanese who made a definitve and obvious strategic error at Pearl Habour. Operation Barbarossa is clearly remembered as a major strategic error where the germans understimated Soviet tank production, morale, soviet reserves and a failure to prepare for the operational challenes of a long campaign over the wide geogpraphical expanses of the soviet union and its difficult winter weather.
But is this perspective suffering from Hindsight bias https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hindsight_bias or was Hitlers penchant for optimism and a gamble https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Optimism_bias the defining feature of Barbarossa from a strategic perspective?
It seems reasonable to me that if the german victories of 41/42 had been explained to thinkers in 1940 the expectation would have predicted a soviet collapse and the removal of stalin, a la 1917.
This is not a gamble based on an operational or strategic analysis, but other qualities such as morale, politics and psychology. If that gambit wins, Germany win even though they made a "strategic" error.
Hitler infamously predicted a rapid german victory after watching the soviet invasion of Finland and didn't even fully ramp the german war economy upon the lauch of Barbarossa. But perhaps his greatest error was not sticking to his gambit and pursuing the capture of Moscow instead of focusing north and south and the capture of yet more soviet armies. To pursue a strategy that forced the soviets out of the war by not actually winning it on the battlefield...
Wasn't the damage inflicted on the soviet union enough to reasonaly expect a collpase witthout the rapid fall of moscow? I find it remarkable that both the soviet union and stalin managed to hold together in 1941 and 1942. Logic would dictate that when the chips were down that stalins past actions would leave him terminally weak in this moment. Hindsight suggests his purges may have helped him. i think you have to forget that it actually happened and you cant study the reasons why after the fact. The failure of the soviet union to collpase under the rapid damage inflicted was truly remarkable and this made germanys invasion look particurly and perhaps unfairly foolish with hindsight.
But is this perspective suffering from Hindsight bias https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hindsight_bias or was Hitlers penchant for optimism and a gamble https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Optimism_bias the defining feature of Barbarossa from a strategic perspective?
It seems reasonable to me that if the german victories of 41/42 had been explained to thinkers in 1940 the expectation would have predicted a soviet collapse and the removal of stalin, a la 1917.
This is not a gamble based on an operational or strategic analysis, but other qualities such as morale, politics and psychology. If that gambit wins, Germany win even though they made a "strategic" error.
Hitler infamously predicted a rapid german victory after watching the soviet invasion of Finland and didn't even fully ramp the german war economy upon the lauch of Barbarossa. But perhaps his greatest error was not sticking to his gambit and pursuing the capture of Moscow instead of focusing north and south and the capture of yet more soviet armies. To pursue a strategy that forced the soviets out of the war by not actually winning it on the battlefield...
Wasn't the damage inflicted on the soviet union enough to reasonaly expect a collpase witthout the rapid fall of moscow? I find it remarkable that both the soviet union and stalin managed to hold together in 1941 and 1942. Logic would dictate that when the chips were down that stalins past actions would leave him terminally weak in this moment. Hindsight suggests his purges may have helped him. i think you have to forget that it actually happened and you cant study the reasons why after the fact. The failure of the soviet union to collpase under the rapid damage inflicted was truly remarkable and this made germanys invasion look particurly and perhaps unfairly foolish with hindsight.
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