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WW ll wartime era typhoons

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  • WW ll wartime era typhoons

    This is about the typhoon "Cobra", one of the most destructive typhoons to hit a Pacific Fleet.

    USS Altamaha (CVE 18)
    "Between this time and about 0930, every effort was made to hold the ship on the fleet course. This was very difficult, as the sea was making up rapidly the winds increasing, and the ship tended to yaw, roll heavily, and was in some danger of being pooped. The use of full rudder was continually necessary to maintain this heading. The heavy rolling resulted in the cargo shifting in supply storeroom A-403-A, causing breakage of ammonia bottles with consequent intense fumes in this confined area. The work of securing was accomplished only with the use of rescue breathers, and was completed by about 0845. In the meantime considerable water was flooding in over fantail, (caused by the following seas) and resulted in the after elevator well starting progressively to fill up with sea water. Most of this was shipped through the hangar deck curtains adjacent to the fantail. At 0845 a report was received that the six-ton aircraft crane (Hyster Karry) had broken loose on the hangar deck and, carrying with it a finger lift, had wrecked three aircraft and two jeeps in its vicinity, and was in danger of breaking through the side of the ship. This piece of equipment had been well secured prior to getting underway, with half-inch wire; however, the heavy rolls had caused the deck fittings to pull completely out of the hangar deck, allowing it to get adrift. Excellent work on the part of the damage control party and the air department accomplished the securing of all this equipment again by 0930. During this time, wind and sea had increased. The barometer was now falling very rapidly, and the wind had started to veer counter-clockwise to North by West. The force at this time was estimated at over 70 knots, the starboard anemometer cups having started to carry away at a reading in excess of 60 knots. It was found impossible to maintain the course down wind without imminent danger of the ship being pooped so badly as to risk capsizing. Speed was increased to eleven and then to twelve knots in an effort to maintain control, but this resulted in long surfing runs down the swells with tremendous rolls at the end. Several instances were recorded on the inclinometer of 29º to starboard, and 31º to port, and it is believed that these figures were somewhat exceeded during the unrecorded rolls. As the Bureau of Ships has indicated that the maximum safe roll of this type vessel is 27½º, considerable anxiety was felt for the safety of the vessel, and it was felt that some other course must be taken to ride out the storm. It was found that the ship assumed a rather comfortable condition with the wind on the starboard quarter, with 30º left rudder (to head down wind), and with a low speed of seven to eight knots. Under these conditions, she rode almost in the trough of the sea, but with the wind about 20º abaft the starboard beam . An attempt was made to back the ship into the wind, the engines going first one and then two thirds astern, but this had no effect in getting the ship out of the trough. Later in the afternoon, the ship was headed into the wind for a short time, but so much engine power was required to maintain steerage under these conditions that it is not believed that the vessel would have survived the pounding which would have resulted. At about 0948, a change of fleet course of 140º was intercepted over the TBS, and it was decided to try to approximate this course by turning to port (down wind), and taking the wind and seas on the port quarter. At 1009, this was accomplished by going ahead at fifteen knots, at which speed the ship answered full rudder very sluggishly. The roll during this maneuver was tremendous, and shortly after steadying on a course of 090º with the winds from 330º, force estimated from seventy to eighty knots, the planes on the flight deck started carrying away. Unfortunately the first plane to carry away after the change in course was immediately adjacent to the forward elevator opening, and dropped down onto the lowered elevator, completely jamming it in the down position . . . . Between this time and 1200, the planes on the after part of the flight deck began to part their securing lines, with the result that they were blown over the starboard side, carrying away life rafts, nets, lines and radio antennas, and inflicting major damage to the 20mm and 40mm battery on the whole starboard side. The wind during this period appeared to have arisen to a force or ninety to one hundred knots; its intensity was almost inconceivable. The barometer had fallen steadily throughout this period, and at 1215 reached the low point of 28.20 . . . .At 1130 a report was received on the bridge that there was a large hole in the side of the ship at the after elevator well, Page 2 - and that compartments below were flooding. Immediate investigation discovered that the flooding was caused by the heavy seas coming in over the fantail as previously discussed, plus a large rupture in the after fire main loop .
    At 1130, a second plane in the vicinity of the forward elevator carried away, and crashed on top of the first on the elevator below. Planes were continually getting adrift on the flight deck, and crashing into the island, stack, or walkways, usually taking several other planes with them. Even those which did not become adrift were rapidly rendered useless and beyond repair by the terrific force of the wind. The commanding officer frequently saw the wings and tail surfaces of planes still otherwise secured, ripping bodily from their fittings and blown over the side .
    At 1230, a third plane, which had been partially secured to the searchlight platform after getting adrift, fell over the edge of the elevator well, but was prevented from going all the way down by heavy manila securing lines. By this
    time most of the deck load of planes had gone over the side, only some ten renaming, and the ship was consequently riding much easier. Serious doubt exists under the conditions experienced during the afternoon, if the ship would have survived had not the deck load in question been lost. A quick check showed that the wind had shifted to about 200º, with the result that the ship's heading was now 330º and that we were apparently working ourselves into the dangerous semicircle; and although somewhat south of the center of the typhoon, were heading toward its center. It was realized that the ship must again be brought around to take the wind on the opposite quarter if we were to work ourselves clear. In vies of the almost disastrous rolls resulting in turning down-wind previously, it was decided to try and turn into the eye of the wind. To do this it was necessary to go ahead, first full, and then flank speed, and turns were being made for sixteen knots before the ship could finally be brought into the wind. The intensity at this time had again increased in spite of the rising barometer, and is estimated to have been well in excess of one hundred knots. These are estimates, as the anemometer head had long since been blown away, cup by cup. As this ship has frequently experienced winds of fifty-five to sixty knots over the flight deck, and the winds in question were so far and away stronger than sixty knots relative wind, it is not believed that the forces estimated above are excessive. An idea of the intensity can be appreciated by the fact that when we reached the point of heading directly into the wind, the propellers of three or four planes still, parked on the bow began windmilling at about 200 RPM's (new engines), and a few seconds later these planes were torn from their moorings and flung like chips over the side. After passing through the eye of the wind, a comparatively easy riding course of about 100º resulted. The total of aircraft lost overboard from the Altamaha was 31, with 12 additional planes damaged beyond repair.
    USS Lawrence C. Taylor (DE 415) Typhoon Cobra Off The Philippines December 18, 1944.
    “We were escorting the Third Fleet Oilers. Three destroyers had pumped ballast and were waiting refueling at sea when the typhoon hit suddenly with great force. All three destroyers, the Hull, Spence, and Monahan capsized within our view with tremendous loss of life. We were flagship for the division and stationed front of the escort carrier, then called the Coral Sea, and rode out the storm on station. Three of our division got sideways to the wind and lost superstructure and returned to Pearl and were decorated. The last reading on the carrier's anemometer was near three hundred knots, or so we were told. Her planes on deck were blown overboard. At the height of the storm, I was told one of my depth charges was loose and I was sent on deck. I was stopped going through the hatch and a line was attached around me. When I cleared the lee of the deckhouse the wind smacked me and blew me up and over the side. The two men who lashed the line yanked me aboard. I would give a lot to learn of these men who saved my life. The following day we pulled a number of bodies aboard and conducted funerals. This storm is often confused with the one that hit a year later at Okinawa, but was one was much worse. In a book called "Sea Fights and Shipwrecks", the December 1944 Typhoon Cobra is described as the worst in recorded history. David J. Woodland, TM2c USS L. C. Taylor (DE-415)
    Hamp
    USS LCI (L) & (G) 450
    WW ll Gator Navy

  • #2
    USS Cowpens (CVL - 23) Cobra Typhoon

    USS Cowpens (CVL-23) “The mighty Moo.'Typhoon Cobra', December 18, 1944 - Hell began to break loose aboard the USS Cowpens at 1051 when a Hellcat was freed from her lashings by a 45-degree roll, tumbled onto the nearby catwalk, and started a fire. Although the fire ended when the burning plane tumbled overboard, it seems to have served as a signal to start a chain reaction. Tractors and other planes soon broke loose from their lashings and careened wildly on the flight deck. A second fire was started when a fighter belly tank caught fire from the friction. Because of wind and seas, fire fighters could not find firm footing but had to lash themselves to the deck to avoid being washed overboard. In the struggle to push the aircraft over the side, Lieutenant Commander Robert Price, ship's air officer, went overboard and was lost. Lt. Charles White, was the Assistant Air Officer and was also in the detail that went out to jettison the Hellcat. Nobody knew LCDR Price was missing until the detail came in out of the weather. Lt. White became the Air Officer and served as such until the war's end. When this loss became known throughout the Cowpens, many crewmen recalled her earlier reputation as a jinx ship. She started this off in Norfolk, Virginia, by running afoul of an antisubmarine net and hanging there like a trapped fish. Later, at Pearl Harbor, she was rammed by a destroyer. Off the Marshall’s, a "lost" carrier pilot tried to land on her deck, crashed over the side, and killed four gunners. Some of her complement even began to regret her nickname, "Mighty Moo," which had to be said with a smile by those who used it. But, as the Cowpens settled down to the business of war and made a very fine showing, the "jinx" faded into limbo. She had seen a lot of rough weather and a lot of rough fighting, but Typhoon Cobra was harder to handle than both put together. Winds over 120 knots buffeted her. She wallowed in monstrous seas, rolling in her struggle as much as 45 degrees which, for a top-heavy carrier with a lot of overhang, is close to the capsizing point. Looking back on that storm-tossed day, her captain, now Rear Admiral G. H. DeBaun, U.S.N. (Ret.), recalled that when the Monterey got into trouble, "we on the Cowpens were rolling heavily but so far nothing had got loose. However, we soon took a roll to starboard which flooded our radar and radio-transmitter room and put our radar and most radio circuits out. This same roll threw a couple of jeeps and a TBM plane over the starboard side of the flight deck between number two and three stacks. It also caused a plane on the hangar deck to break loose and go banging around, with the danger of fire, until it was secured again." Being virtually blinded by the combination of visibility and loss of radar, Captain DeBaun asked for and received permission from Rear Admiral A. E. Montgomery, commander Carrier Task Group 2, to leave the formation and take an easier riding course. Two destroyers were assigned as guides and escorts. Of these only the Halsey Powell was able to find the "blinded" Cowpens and to serve as her seeing eye DD through zero-zero weather. "We were rolling to such an extent that on each roll to starboard the flight deck edge would hit green water on the starboard side," continued Admiral DeBaun. "The rolls to port were almost as bad but always about five degrees less due to our built-in starboard list. On the big rolls one could reach down from the starboard wing of the bridge and touch green water as we rolled to starboard. "All hands not on watch were ordered into their bunks for safety reasons as we left the formation. Finding an easier course and keeping on it required steering the ship with her engines as the rudder could not keep her from falling off at the low speed we were making through the water. At all times, I was ably assisted and advised by my Navigator Lieutenant Commander Ed Jarman. "We had just come to what we hoped would be an easier riding course when an F-6F fighter plane on the after-starboard corner of
    P
    age 2 - the flight deck broke loose and slid into the catwalk and caught fire. The wind was on the starboard quarter at that time so I had no choice but to turn the ship so as to keep the flames away from the other planes that were parked around it on the flight deck. Otherwise, I would soon have had the whole deck covered with burning planes. During the turn to port the F-6F was jettisoned, and we were free to return to our easier riding course. However, before we got back we took a couple of very heavy rolls to starboard which could have been our last but the Good Lord was on our side. It was during this period that Bob Price disappeared. No one saw him go overboard, although they remembered seeing him at the F-6F as it was being jettisoned. Bob was an excellent officer and well-loved by his men. "On one of the big rolls, our radar antenna on the mast carried away and went sailing across the flight deck to port and disappeared into the sea. About this time our anemometer gave up the ghost, and the rotating cups on the mast took off after the radar antenna to port. Before the rotating cups carried away, the pointer of the instrument on the bridge was hard against the stop at 120 knots several times and always above 100 knots. Visibility all during this time was, at most, about half a ship's length due to the heavy rain and the spray from the wind and waves. As to the degree of roll, our instrument, located in central station, registered only to 45 degrees where the moving arm was stopped by a pin. We hit the pin several times to starboard for at least 50 degrees. "A couple of large Air Force bombs (about 2,000 pounds each) picked this time to work loose in the forward bomb magazine. They started banging around with such force that you could feel it on the bridge seven decks above. They were finally lassoed and secured; otherwise, the bombs would have, in a very short time, battered themselves through the side of the ship. The men who secured these loose bombs were all volunteers, and they all risked their lives in saving the ship. You may wonder how these bombs got adrift and why. The bomb stowage in our magazines was not designed for so large a bomb and consequently, the storage battens, etc., provided could not be used as these bombs were too large. Hence a jury rig for securing which failed under typhoon conditions as many other things did. "After noon conditions improved and by the middle of the afternoon we were out of it. I have, so far, mentioned only the serious happenings, but there were a few humorous ones, too. I am sure that there were smiles on the bridge when I lost my footing and skated clear across the bridge from port to starboard on the seat of my pants. Our aerologist, who had just reported aboard, was a young fellow born and raised in the vicinity of New York City. I am sure that he had never seen a good line squall or any kind of heavy weather. After our anemometer carried away I asked him to come up to the bridge to look the weather over, but he never made it until late that afternoon. Rumor has it that he was slightly under the weather and had so many life preservers on that he just couldn't make the long climb to the bridge. "I also remember two youngsters in their teens who came up in the middle of things to relieve the lookouts and I heard one of them say to the lookout he was relieving, 'It's a stinker, ain't it?' just enjoying it and not the least bit fearful. "Some may have considered the Cowpens unlucky, but I didn't. The only thing wrong with her was the built-in five to seven degree list to starboard that she and all her sister ships had when fueled to capacity. We were fueled to capacity on the day in question, hence our trouble. Well, anyway, that big blow did more damage to the Cowpens than the Jap’s ever succeeded in doing.
    Hamp
    USS LCI (L) & (G) 450
    WW ll Gator Navy

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    • #3
      USS Dewey

      Adm. William Halsey’s Third Fleet suffers major damage during Typhoon Cobra

      Interest in this typhoon was generated by Glenn & Georgiana Bruhl, shipmates of mne off the LCI 450, after they mailed me an account they were sent by a survivor of this storm. This is the first of several accounts I found on the Internet from ships that survived and some that didn’t when they encountered Typhoon Cobra. This typhoon had sustained winds estimated at 145 mph and probable guests to 185 mph. Three destroyers capsized and sunk, but a few men on them survived to be picked up by other ships. Numerous other ships were heavily damaged and 146 airplanes were destroyed. This typhoon killed 778 men.

      USS Dewey (DD 349) December 18, 1944 Typhoon Cobra Report.
      At about 1000 on 18 December 1944, Dewey was steaming on course 180º, wallowing in a quartering sea, but still under control. In order to avoid collision with a carrier which appeared ahead, she came left to 130º, and slowed to 5 knots. "This slackening of speed, and turn into the wind, resulted almost at once in partial loss of control of the ship. Dewey crossed through her formation from starboard to port. Despite hard rudder and every possible engine combination, it was impossible to come back to the right. It was found that 2/3 ahead on the port engine and 1/3 ahead on the starboard engine, with full right rudder, kept the ship's head close to steady, although even then it persisted in falling slowly to the left (in swinging between 090º and 070º). At 1015, the barometer read 29.09", wind force 15, from 035º, and the sea had built up considerably, to about force 6. Under these conditions the ship began to pound heavily, and it was necessary to slow to l/3 ahead on the port engine. With the sea broad on the port bow, the ship rolled heavily to starboard, and lubricating oil suction was lost on every roll of 40 degrees or more, this necessitated stopping the engines. This gradually slackened what little bit of 'way on' we had, and left us practically dead in the water. (It should be noted here that we had previously also tried to head further to the left, into the wind, but not only was this less satisfactory from the standpoint of pounding–it was just as impossible to turn the ship to the left as it was to turn it right!). We therefore found ourselves at a heading of about 090º; almost exactly in the trough of the sea, the wind direction shifting constantly to the left! Sometimes before this, when it became apparent that the wind and sea would be continually from the port side, Commander Destroyer Squadron One directed that the ship be heavily ballasted to port. This order was carried out at once, and at maximum pumping rates all the port side fuel oil tanks were filled to capacity; resulting in an unbalanced distribution, with about 30 thousand gallons more to port. (Dewey was at this time fueled to 76% capacity). The barometer continued to fall rapidly, wind and sea continued to increase, the ship was rolling very heavily to starboard (45º to 55º). Condition 'AFIRM' was set in an spaces. All hands were directed to remain inside, and all hands were further ordered to move to, and remain on, the port side of the ship. (This required little urging–most of them were already complying voluntarily!). By 1100, the barometer read 28.84"; wind was force 17, from 030º true, sea force 7, and we were rolling even more heavily to starboard (50º to 60º). At this time, several things occurred in rapid succession; steering control was lost from the bridge due to short circuiting of the switchboard in the steering motor room (sea and spray leaked through the mushroom ventilator despite all efforts to make it watertight), and was shifted to hand steering, holding constant full right rudder; lube oil suction was again lost and all engines stopped; heavy seas leaked through engine race hatches (which were dogged down as tightly as they would go), short circuiting the main switchboard, and causing loss, of light and power; pounding seas sprung #1 fireroom starboard hatch open, flooding the air lock and leaking water into the fireroom; seas entered through #2 main forced draft lower blower intake (located on main deck forward starboard) 500 or 1000 gallons at a time, and the situation seemed to be going from bad to worse. Word had been passed to the steering motor room to form a bucket brigade and keep the water bailed out. Steam fire and bilge and main circulating pumps were reported pumping in the engine rooms and #1 fireroom, and apparently were well able to handle the inflow of ocean. At about 1130, sound powered telephone circuits began to go 'dead' and in about fifteen minutes, Bridge had contact with C.I.C., and Wardroom, by voice tube. (Mouthpieces were full of salt water). The fierce wind which was raging against us by this tine was such as no one on board had ever experienced before! The spray, driven horizontally across the surface, blotted
      out the sea from the sight of those of us on the bridge, and felt like a barrage of thousand of needles against the
      Page 2 - face and hands. It was impossible to stand against the gale without bracing against the ship's structure. The needle-like spray removed the paint from metal surfaces in many places like a sand blaster. No one had a stitch of dry clothing (nor had we had for hours) and we were in constant danger of falling overboard into the sea almost every time the ship rolled to starboard. By this time (1210) our roll had increased to a consistent 65º, and several officers personally witnessed the inclinometer needle bang against the stop at 73º, hang there for several seconds (while the ship continued to roll - hang - and then after a breathless eternity, roll back). Competent engine room personnel, including the Chief Machinist's Mate, later reported that the engine roan inclinometer also rested against its stop (about 75º) on two or three occasions. The barometer was still going down - until it finally went completely off the scale, and still kept going! It was so nearly unbelievable that a few of the unusual occurrences must of necessity be related in order to better afford a full appreciation of the situation. For example: On one occasion, an officer fell straight across the pilot house from port to starboard – grabbing a stanchion with both hands on the way, he hung with both feet completely clear of the deck by several feet, pointed directly down at the starboard side, until the ship righted herself several seconds later. An adding machine fell from the cabinet top in one officer's room straight through to the room opposite without ever striking the deck, and finally hit the bulkhead about three feet above deck level. A tube of toothpaste fell across a living compartment from the port longitudinal angle iron, and landed in the corresponding longitudinal angle iron on the starboard side! During this tine, ComDesRon ONE authorized removal of any removable topside weight, but this was considered too dangerous since almost all removable weights were on weather decks which were constantly swept by wind and sea. For a time it was considered advisable to cut off the mast at bridge level; but when cutting equipment arrived on the bridge several minutes later, this too was believed dangerous, since it involved strong possibility of the yardarm punching a hole in the side of the ship. It was inconceivable that the ship could continue to 'take it". On several occasions, the starboard (lee) wing of the bridge dipped under and scooped up solid green water! None of us had ever heard at a ship righting herself from such a roll–but this one did! The storm continued to grow even worse, and at about 1230, the number one stack pulled out from its mooring at the top of the uptake (boat deck level), and fell across the ship, finally hanging limply, completely flattened, over the starboard side of the main deck. This also carried away our whaleboat (which had been scooping water on every roll), and the forward boat davit. Apparently this loss of stack, boat, and davit was a good thing. Almost immediately there was a perceptible change for the better in the way the ship rode. Loss of the stack had several serious disadvantages, however. It caused several flarebacks in #1, fireroom, (burning away the skivvy drawers of one man almost completely), and permitted additional opening to the sea. Also, the steam line to the whistle and siren carried any, and we vented precious boiler pressure steam to the atmosphere for many minutes before it was possible to shut it off. The engineers on watch remained faithfully at their posts, and by their combined efforts in maintaining boiler pressure and operating the pumps, they performed the real work of keeping the ship afloat! At about 1300, the barometer reached its lowest point (27.30 estimated, since it was off the scale), and at 1340 showed its first slight 'rise. We had passed the center of the storm! During the slight slackening of the wind and sea, which occurred near the center, communications with the engine room spaces was established by messenger. All main propulsion machinery was ready for operation, but since we had safely depended on the ship to bring us through, and had weathered the first half by merely lying to, it was decided to try the same method during the second half. The remainder was almost the exact duplicate of what had gone before, but to an infinitesimal degree not quite so bad, and at about 1800, we were safely through, on a mean heading of 270º True, barometer 29.18", wind force 14, from 240º, sea force 6, at which the we went ahead 1/3 on both engines, and were quickly out of danger. The behavior of the officers and crew throughout this 10-hour ordeal was a sight which will, never be forgotten. Faced with the constant threat of sudden (seemingly certain) death, there was never the slightest display of panic. Every man was completely calm, and the supply of volunteers who offered to perform tasks which would have been practically suicide had they been allowed to attempt them, was inexhaustible. It can be truly said that this ship's company (and the ship) conducted themselves in keeping with the highest traditions of the naval service! Except for minor injuries, there were no casualties to, or loss of personnel."
      Hamp
      USS LCI (L) & (G) 450
      WW ll Gator Navy

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      • #4
        USS Hull (DD-350)

        Philippine Sea Typhoon Cobra 18 December 1944 - USS Hull (DD 350) Lt. Comdr. James A. Marks Official Report of his ship capsizing.
        "I received a report during the morning from the Engineer Officer that we were well above the required ballasting point, having between 125 and 120 thousand gallons of fuel aboard. This represented a little over 70% of our practicable fueling capacity. In view of the fact that the ship was riding the seas satisfactorily at the time, and that I estimated that we would be fueled on short notice as soon as the heavy weather abated, I did not consider ballasting advisable.... At a time I estimate roughly about 1130, the seas became mountainous, and the wind increased to hurricane proportions. Considerable damage was occurring as the sea grew worse. The motor whaleboat was smashed in at the bow, and finally was torn clear of the boat davits, falling into the sea. Several depth charges were torn loose from the K-guns and were lost overboard. All charges were set on safe, so no damage was done by them. The smokestacks were under terrific strain because of the wind. Up until shortly before the ship turned over, I was greatly concerned that either or both of the stacks might be torn off the ship. One of the pad eyes supporting the mast stay pulled out at the deck. Just before the ship went over I estimated that if one of the stacks had been torn or cut loose, it might have lowered the center of wind pressure on the hull sufficiently to reduce the ship's rolling, but at this point no man could have possibly existed in an exposed position topside long enough to do the job; he would have been quickly blown overboard. Several of the metal covers on ammunition ready boxes were ripped completely off the boxes by the wind. The bridge structure was under such great strain that I was greatly concerned that the structure itself or a portion thereof might be torn off the ship. In endeavoring to alleviate the heavy rolling of the ship, I tried every possible combination of rudder and engines, with little avail. An attempt was made to bring the ship's head into the sea, but she would not respond. Then an attempt was made to turn away from the wind, and bring it as far on the port quarter as possible, but again the ship would not answer. It was apparent that no matter what was done with the rudder and engines, the ship was being blown bodily before the wind and sea, yawing between headings of 100º and 080º true. At all times until the ship went over; the true wind was from approximately north, which was most of the time abaft the beam. Shortly before noon, steering control went out on the bridge, but was regained in the steering motor room in a few minutes. The engine telegraphs went out for awhile, but were also reported operating satisfactorily in a few minutes. The chief engineer reported at this time that the forward fireroom blowers had stopped because of heavy amounts of water being taken down the intakes, the after fire room was reported as having taken over, and it is believed that all bells were properly answered... At this tine the ship took several deep rolls because of high velocity wind gusts. I estimated the rolls to have been about 70 degrees. At one time the Junior Officer of the Deck was catapulted from the port side of the pilot house completely through the air to the upper portion of the starboard side of the pilot house... Shortly after twelve 'o'clock the ship withstood what I estimated to be the worst punishment any storm could offer. She had rolled about 70 degrees and righted herself just as soon as the wind gust reduced a bit . . . . Just at this point the wind velocity increased to an unbelievable high point which I estimated at 110 knots. The force of this wind laid the ship steadily over on her starboard side, and held her down in the water until the seas came flowing into the pilot house itself. The ship remained over on her side (starboard) at an angle of 80 degrees or more as the water flooded into her upper structures. I remained on the port wing of the bridge until the water flooded up to me, and I stepped off into the water as the ship rolled over on her way down. The suction effect of the hull was felt, but it was not very strong. Shortly after, I felt the concussion of the boilers exploding under water. The effect was not very strong, and caused me no ill effects. I concentrated my efforts thereafter to trying to keep alive in the mountainous seas which pounded us."

        I've got a couple more tales from that storm but I''ll post them later - run out of time.
        Hamp
        Hamp
        USS LCI (L) & (G) 450
        WW ll Gator Navy

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        • #5
          Nice to see you back again Hamp. Thanks for sharing.:)
          Fortitude.....The strength to persist...The courage to endure.

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