Thread: Douglas MacArthur - A brilliant commander or a pathetic faker?

Originally Posted by tttcomrader

Dalem,

I like your comments. I admit that I have prejudge the American performance from the start.

But are there any sources you have that perhaps I can read more about the American performance?

The best sources are the U.S. Army "Green Books" that detail all aspects of the American involvement in WWII, and a very good and very readable source I have recommended before is Perret's "There's a War to be Won!"

Charles McDonald's WWII books, "Company Commander" and "A Time for Trumpets" are also excellent. "Company Commander" is a great "warts and all" look at McDonald's experience as a late-war Company Commander with the U.S. 2nd Infantry, and "Trumpets" is an in-depth canvass of the Battle of the Bulge, including a nice analysis of the gross Allied intelligence failures that allowed it to happen in the first place.

Those are the ones I think of at first. Doubler has a nice analysis, I forget the title.

BTW, from Guderian's Panzer Leader, he had written that most of the infantry units in Normandy were 2nd or 3rd rated soldiers. Most of the 1st line are in the East. I do not have the book with me at the moment (I'm using the campus computer now), but I will certainly look it up more.

I am shocked that Guderian would write such a thing. But was 12SS a 2nd rate unit? Panzer Lehr? LAH? Das Reich? 2nd Panzer? 17SS Panzergrenadier? 6th FJ? They were all in Normandy and all in the Normandy campaign, along with all those cruddy Ost units and static divisions. Then there all the other German units that were in the rest of the NWE campaign. The fact is that the German army was outfought time and time again.

After the break out in Bocage, yes, it was nothing but a war of movement. But what was left to stop the Americans? They already used up all of their reserves from June to August.

But how did they break out of the bocage? They learned how to outfight the Germans and outfought them, that's how.

Let's be fair, most of the sources I have read before are from the German points of view, and recently I have started to read some Soviet accounts. But I never really get into the American side, perhaps you can point me to the right direction, sir?

Sure thing, please see above. German sources are notoriously... German.

Thank you.

tttcomrader
Ex. SGT, US Army
15 NOV 05

No problem. Happy to help.

-dale

Originally Posted by dalem

Even if you're right, and I don't think you are, that the majority of opposition faced in Normandy was made up of Volksgrenadiers, so what? VG divisions were perfectly reasonable and capable formations. The VolksSTURM divisions were the sad ones made up of old men and boys, but they were not encountered until much later.

Volksgrenadiers were second and third rate infantry formations, and were treated as such when compared to regular Heer formations by the German General Staff.

Pure fantasy.

Hardly. German units were consistently put up against 4-5-10 times their number on the Eastern Front, and still managed to hold their own. At an operational level, you simply can't compare with that kind of experience.

You're 100% dead wrong and way off the mark, and I simply fail to understand why any of these myths still prevail among educated people. Why would a well-trained and well-led platoon of Germans be inherently any 'better' than a similar group of Commonwealth, Soviet, or American troops?

Ok, I think it is here where we are miscommunicating. First of all, I would like to discount the Soviets from your comment, because on the tactical level Germany was getting casualty ratios of four or five to one well into 1944 due to Soviet method of employing their infantry (it was considered highly expendable to say the least). However, you are right when you assert that a well led platoon of Germans would not be any better than a similar group of Commonwealth or American soldiers with similar leadership. While a marginal advantage my exist in favor of the Germans (after all, most Allied units were not blooded in the same manner as German units were), that difference would be marginal.

However, Germany had an unprecedented advantage in experience at the operational level that the allies simply couldn't match. Battalion and brigade headquarters staffs of the line divisions were almost all veterans of the Eastern front, and it was on this level that Germans proved themselves to be more flexable than everyone time and time again. This was a combination of doctrine, superior experience (6 months on the Eastern front would teach any brigade staff how to survive against superior numbers), and an extremely effective system of decentralized battlefield control that no one else ever really instituted.

The Battle of the Buldge should dispell any illusions about German operational superiority. Patton's flanking move towards Bastonge the Germans would not even dream of.

Originally Posted by lwarmonger

Volksgrenadiers were second and third rate infantry formations, and were treated as such when compared to regular Heer formations by the German General Staff.

Volksgrenadier divisions were based on the core units of reconstituting infantry divisions, and were mainly a paper solution to a very real problem of getting the divisional and corps command establishment back into place after the crushing blows the German army suffered on both fronts in Summer 1944. I really think you are confusing them with the later Volkssturm divisions.

Hardly. German units were consistently put up against 4-5-10 times their number on the Eastern Front, and still managed to hold their own. At an operational level, you simply can't compare with that kind of experience.

Experience at what? Getting outnumbered time and time again? That just means you're constantly in the wrong place at the wrong time - hardly something to be proud of.

The problem with gaining all that kind of experience is that for every 1 experienced guy you end up with you end up with another 20 casualties. Unsurprisingly that was discovered to be the losing strategy.

Ok, I think it is here where we are miscommunicating. First of all, I would like to discount the Soviets from your comment, because on the tactical level Germany was getting casualty ratios of four or five to one well into 1944 due to Soviet method of employing their infantry (it was considered highly expendable to say the least). However, you are right when you assert that a well led platoon of Germans would not be any better than a similar group of Commonwealth or American soldiers with similar leadership. While a marginal advantage my exist in favor of the Germans (after all, most Allied units were not blooded in the same manner as German units were), that difference would be marginal.

Still grasping at the myth a bit there, but at least a nod to reality.

However, Germany had an unprecedented advantage in experience at the operational level that the allies simply couldn't match. Battalion and brigade headquarters staffs of the line divisions were almost all veterans of the Eastern front, and it was on this level that Germans proved themselves to be more flexable than everyone time and time again. This was a combination of doctrine, superior experience (6 months on the Eastern front would teach any brigade staff how to survive against superior numbers), and an extremely effective system of decentralized battlefield control that no one else ever really instituted.

A clear understanding of the war will show you that the German Army was actually particularly awful at the Operational level. The Soviets, for instance, while remaining relatively abysmal at the tactical level (on that I agree with you), became masters of their Operational Art - constantly massing the troops and equipment needed to hammer the Germans at the right place, and most of the time it worked very well for them. Battlefield intelligence and reconnassaince was an infamous weak spot for the Germans all through the war - quite often they simply were not aware of the units opposite them until combat was joined.

In the NWE campaigns of '44 and '45, for instance, the Germans were constantly beaten at the Operational game by the Americans, so much so that even when they managed to achieve 100% strategic surprise, as in the Bulge campaign, they pissed it away through operational blunder after operational blunder while the Americans, much as OoE points out above, were busy plugging holes and racing to hold the shoulders of the breakthrough and attack the flanks.

The Germans achieved most of their early victories because they achieved political and then strategic surprise, beat up the weaklings and the slow learners, and were prepared for a modern war when no one else was.

Kudos to them for that.

But by 1943 the survivors and latecomers had learned the game of modern warfare too, and the thing of it is is that they got a lot better at it than the Germans ever could.

Another way to look at it is that the German knife was pretty good against guys with clubs and rocks, but then the Allies brought guns, and we all know what happens to the guy who brings a knife to a gunfight.

Which is kinda sorta why the German army got beat and the German cities were bombed into rubble and the German government killed itself or was put on trial and why the German people had to get themselves a brand-new government.

Ain't knowing bits of history grand?

-dale

Originally Posted by dalem

Experience at what? Getting outnumbered time and time again? That just means you're constantly in the wrong place at the wrong time - hardly something to be proud of.

That was more of a strategic problem then an operational one. Given the correllation of forces on the Eastern Front, the Germans were bound to be outnumbered most of the time. They generally only lost when the numbers went two to four to one against them, and many times not even then.

The problem with gaining all that kind of experience is that for every 1 experienced guy you end up with you end up with another 20 casualties. Unsurprisingly that was discovered to be the losing strategy.

But the ones you have left, man for man, are very good, and casualties among battalion level and higher staff tend to be less than those suffered on the front line.

A clear understanding of the war will show you that the German Army was actually particularly awful at the Operational level. The Soviets, for instance, while remaining relatively abysmal at the tactical level (on that I agree with you), became masters of their Operational Art - constantly massing the troops and equipment needed to hammer the Germans at the right place, and most of the time it worked very well for them. Battlefield intelligence and reconnassaince was an infamous weak spot for the Germans all through the war - quite often they simply were not aware of the units opposite them until combat was joined.

Generally the Germans only lost on the operational level when Hitler had directly intervened in the planning and/or execuation of an operation. Operation Barbarossa was executed brilliantly by the Whermacht, as were the second (1942) and third (1943) battles of Kharkov. Kursk was a strategic disaster of the first magnitude, but on the corp, division and brigade level the Germans consistently outpreformed their Soviet counterparts. Manstien's counter-attack in 1942 outside of Stalingrad was brilliantly executed, and Rommel's campaigns in the North African desert were nothing short of magnificent. Towards the end of the war, you begin to see German leadership on the Army and Army Group level suffer, as Hitler had managed to get rid of most everyone competent by that point, but German mid-level formations still consistently outpreformed their Soviet counter-parts until the end of the war.

In the NWE campaigns of '44 and '45, for instance, the Germans were constantly beaten at the Operational game by the Americans, so much so that even when they managed to achieve 100% strategic surprise, as in the Bulge campaign, they pissed it away through operational blunder after operational blunder while the Americans, much as OoE points out above, were busy plugging holes and racing to hold the shoulders of the breakthrough and attack the flanks.

I would make three points to counter this. First, by this point in the war most of the competent German generals were gone. Field Marshal Walther Model, the man who led the highly unsuccessful northern pincer at Kursk, gave a most unspectacular performance as head of Army Group B, and most of the generals in charge by this point in the war were not much better (although their staffs were generally pretty good). Second, the road network through the Ardennes really was insufficient to mount an armored thrust through, and the lack of infrastructure enabled American forces to move quickly to blocking positions. Finally, by this point in the war, Germany was incapable of massing the supplies necessary to support a major offensive, and so success was contingent upon living off of captured supply stocks. While this was not indicative of Germany's operational effectiveness per se (after all, this offensive was getting everything Germany could scrape together), it was demonstrative of Germany's strategic difficulties at that point.

But by 1943 the survivors and latecomers had learned the game of modern warfare too, and the thing of it is is that they got a lot better at it than the Germans ever could.

I haven't seen any evidence of this whatsoever. When one compares casualty ratios, especially on the Eastern Front, the unavoidable conclusion is that the Soviets simply had a lot more, and that Hitler did his level best to lose after 1942.

Which is kinda sorta why the German army got beat and the German cities were bombed into rubble and the German government killed itself or was put on trial and why the German people had to get themselves a brand-new government.

I think that this had a lot more to do with it than allied operational talents (source is Paul Kennedy's "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers"):

Aircraft Production during 1944
US: 96,318
USSR: 40,300
Britain and Commonwealth: 40,000
Germany: 39,807
Japan: 28,180

Tank Production during 1944
Germany: 17,800
Russia: 29,000
Britain: 5,000
United States: 17,500 (29,500 in 1943)

Amount Spent on Weapons production in 1943 (in billions of 1944 dollars)
Germany: 13.8
Japan: 4.5
Russia: 13.9
Great Britain: 11.1
United States: 37.5

Originally Posted by lwarmonger

That was more of a strategic problem then an operational one. Given the correllation of forces on the Eastern Front, the Germans were bound to be outnumbered most of the time. They generally only lost when the numbers went two to four to one against them, and many times not even then.

Keep in mind that many German accounts of being swamped by Soviet "hordes" ignore the fact that Sov organizations generally carried about 1/3 of German manpower - i.e. a Soviet Heavy Tank Regiment was 21 KVs. 21.

As opposed to a regiment of German tanks, which was usually on the order of 100 tanks. So something like "Three regiments of Soviet tanks" is the equivalent, numbers-wise, to a German regiment. FYI.

But the ones you have left, man for man, are very good, and casualties among battalion level and higher staff tend to be less than those suffered on the front line.

So what?

Generally the Germans only lost on the operational level when Hitler had directly intervened in the planning and/or execuation of an operation.

Bull. Sh*t.

Operation Barbarossa was executed brilliantly by the Whermacht, as were the second (1942) and third (1943) battles of Kharkov. Kursk was a strategic disaster of the first magnitude, but on the corp, division and brigade level the Germans consistently outpreformed their Soviet counterparts. Manstien's counter-attack in 1942 outside of Stalingrad was brilliantly executed, and Rommel's campaigns in the North African desert were nothing short of magnificent. Towards the end of the war, you begin to see German leadership on the Army and Army Group level suffer, as Hitler had managed to get rid of most everyone competent by that point, but German mid-level formations still consistently outpreformed their Soviet counter-parts until the end of the war.

So you are playing the "Blame Hitler" card now, and ignoring the "German formations consistantly went into battle ignorant of their operational intelligence" reality?

I would make three points to counter this. First, by this point in the war most of the competent German generals were gone. Field Marshal Walther Model, the man who led the highly unsuccessful northern pincer at Kursk, gave a most unspectacular performance as head of Army Group B, and most of the generals in charge by this point in the war were not much better (although their staffs were generally pretty good). Second, the road network through the Ardennes really was insufficient to mount an armored thrust through, and the lack of infrastructure enabled American forces to move quickly to blocking positions. Finally, by this point in the war, Germany was incapable of massing the supplies necessary to support a major offensive, and so success was contingent upon living off of captured supply stocks. While this was not indicative of Germany's operational effectiveness per se (after all, this offensive was getting everything Germany could scrape together), it was demonstrative of Germany's strategic difficulties at that point.

Oh please. The Germans achieved 100% strategic surprise and couldn't even make the Meuse. That's a severe ass-kicking.

I haven't seen any evidence of this whatsoever. When one compares casualty ratios, especially on the Eastern Front, the unavoidable conclusion is that the Soviets simply had a lot more, and that Hitler did his level best to lose after 1942.

Myth myth myth.

I think that this had a lot more to do with it than allied operational talents (source is Paul Kennedy's "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers"):

Aircraft Production during 1944
US: 96,318
USSR: 40,300
Britain and Commonwealth: 40,000
Germany: 39,807
Japan: 28,180

Tank Production during 1944
Germany: 17,800
Russia: 29,000
Britain: 5,000
United States: 17,500 (29,500 in 1943)

Amount Spent on Weapons production in 1943 (in billions of 1944 dollars)
Germany: 13.8
Japan: 4.5
Russia: 13.9
Great Britain: 11.1
United States: 37.5

Read it, enjoyed it.

But in the end, my summation is more indicative of reality.

After sweeping the Minor Leagues, did Germany beat any Major League nations?

The answer is, of course, "No".

-dale

"Ike: Market Garden, Hurtgen Forest"

That was monty's brain child.

Originally Posted by M21Sniper

"Ike: Market Garden, Hurtgen Forest"

That was monty's brain child.

As dale pointed out, Ike should have said no. Hurtgen Forest was another blunder.

Back up a moment here. Even modern day considerations, Monty's plan was a hell of alot more better than Patton's plan. Patton's plan was a frontal assualt (crap througth a goose), Monty's plan was aimed at bypassing main German strengths.

The intel was wrong but there is ABSOLUTELY nothing wrong with the intent.

Ike should have and did say "yes."

Then sir, I am down to the last refuge of the "Ike bad" thesis, Hurtgen Forest.

Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers

Back up a moment here. Even modern day considerations, Monty's plan was a hell of alot more better than Patton's plan. Patton's plan was a frontal assualt (crap througth a goose), Monty's plan was aimed at bypassing main German strengths.

The intel was wrong but there is ABSOLUTELY nothing wrong with the intent.

Ike should have and did say "yes."

I agree that the intent was great, and the plan was good, but Ike should have been suspicious of Monty's plan and insisted Bradley ride herd to make sure the plan was great. Anyway, it's just "coulda woulda shoulda" crap from me. The Huertgen, on the other hand, was a 100% U.S. meatgrinding blunder. I forget who had the final checkoff on continuing that one.

-dale