Thread: The Last Stand Of The Tawakalna

Originally Posted by Big K

great read, thanks.

no compass in the abrams?

In the M1A1s there was a degree reading off the gunners sight but there was integral compass. TC should have carried one...but you don't wan tto shine a light at night.

M1A2s and M1A1 IP have FBCB2 on board which have integrated digital compass. All are post ODS.

Same for the M2A1/M3A1 and the M2A3/M2A2 ODSV

This thread started me on WAB.

What is a degree reading? Was the integral compass the same one carried by the TC, or something else that for some reason became disabled during the fight as described in the article?

Originally Posted by Triple C

This thread started me on WAB.

What is a degree reading? Was the integral compass the same one carried by the TC, or something else that for some reason became disabled during the fight as described in the article?

At the bottom of the gunner's sight you would get how many degrees off of the center line of the tank the turret was oriented. I.e. if it was over the right side it would be at 90 degrees, the left 270 degrees, etc. It was not a compass.

It was so you could keep gun tube orientation when you couldn't see out of the tank.

Originally Posted by Albany Rifles

At the bottom of the gunner's sight you would get how many degrees off of the center line of the tank the turret was oriented. I.e. if it was over the right side it would be at 90 degrees, the left 270 degrees, etc. It was not a compass.

It was so you could keep gun tube orientation when you couldn't see out of the tank.

Oh, you mean it indicated the horizontal clockwise angle of the line of fire in relation to the centerline of the chassis and expressed the reading in Degrees of arc?

Why didn't you just say that instead of confusing people

In the M1A1s there was a degree reading off the gunners sight

Cannot be a real "Gunners" sight. More like "The shooters or trigger pullers sight"

Gunners use mills

Gunners use mills

No they don't...they use MILS!

I learned at least THAT much at IMPC!)

And when I am looking at what I am killing, degrees work just fine.

Originally Posted by Albany Rifles

Gunners use mills

No they don't...they use MILS!

I learned at least THAT much at IMPC!)

And when I am looking at what I am killing, degrees work just fine.

I'm blaming the spellchecker auto correction feature.)

This was a very interesting and well-written article. I've studied aspects of this battle, but this is enlightening in the way that the author captures of the heat and violence of the fight, not just the "textbook" numbers of the opposing forces and the casualties / battle losses on each side.

I have to say though, that there's kind of an undefinable attitude in the way the article is written that bugs me a little bit. This is just me personally, but something bothers me about the way the article seems to attempt to glorify the bravery of the Republican Guard in some fashion. Yes, they were better trained, equipped, and disciplined than regular Iraqi units, but that also went along with the indoctrination that came as part of ensuring their loyalty to Saddam and his regime. In my opinion, they probably held their ground out of a combination of discipline that other regular units lacked, confidence (or perhaps arogance) that they were the best, and perhaps even the belief that they could stand up to the Coalition, as Saddam's propoganda proclaimed, and as was undoubtedly reinforced by the RG leadership. But most of all, I would say that they were overwhelmed by the mass of the Coalition's attack and never really had a chance to break contact even if they had wanted to. I'm just uncomfortable with the author's subtle way of seeming to praise the courage of the RG for standing their ground - in the same way that I would probably be uncomfortable with praising the heroism of the Waffen SS, knowing their background, beliefs, and loyalty to a brutal regime. But perhaps I'm involving my personal feelings too much instead of looking at this from a purely military perspective.

Aside from that, there's a couple things I'd like to clarify about the article:

Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers

The 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment had approximately 39 infantry fighting vehicles and probably ten tanks.

I'm not sure where this statement came from. By MTOE, a heavy ACR has 123 tanks and 125 Bradley Cavalry fighting vehicles - that's what 2nd ACR had before they were converted to a light (wheeled) Cavalry Regiment after Desert Storm. A Cavalry Troop has 9 tanks and 13 Bradleys, and the tank company in each Squadron has 14 tanks. A Squadron (at that time) had 41 tanks and 41 Bradleys, so what the author is referring to here is obviously some portion of 2nd ACR and not the whole Regiment. He might be referring just to Eagle Troop, then-CPT McMaster's Cavalry Troop, which was one of the first units to make contact in the Battle of 73 Easting. Anyway, I just wanted to point out that this sentence is kind of misleading.

The second American battalion (Task Force 2-34 Armor) that passed through the passage lane became momentarily lost because it was dark and the combat equipment (in spite of rumors about super technology) did not have a compass or directional aid built into the vehicle.

This statement, again only in my personal opinion, seems to reflect an undertone in the article of finding faults with the Americans, which seems to tie in with what I referred to above about the bravery of the RG. It just sounds to me like it's meant to imply that the U.S. Army was not perfect (obviously) - the comment about "in spite of rumors about super technology" just sounds kind of loaded to me.

I guess there's a public perception that U.S. equipment has every kind of gadget imaginable. The Abrams has a lot of advanced systems, but at the time, a compass was not part of the vehicle. Even up until a fear years ago, it was up to the crewmen to navigate the vehicle using maps, terrain orientation, and dead-reckoning. More recently, before the introduction of the M1A2SEP, hand-held GPS was the best way to navigate, using the device to determine your location and then orient yourself to your map and the terrain to guide your driver.

A compass will not work inside or on top of a tank because all that metal throws off the needle. You have to walk about 10-20 meters away from the tank before you can use it effectively - not something you want to do on the battlefield unless absolutely necessary.

Anyway, it's very difficult to navigate armored vehicles, and on the battlefield in the middle of a fight, at night, it's even worse. I think it's sufficient to say that some of the vehicle crews became disoriented as they conducted passage of lines and strayed across each other's boundaries.

I don't mean to take away from the great information that this article contains, it's just that there's a few points in it that bother me (I guess that's always the case with any historical interpretation).

Thanks for sharing this one - it's hard to find good accounts of Desert Storm.

Dave

Originally Posted by 3ACR_Scout

This was a very interesting and well-written article. I've studied aspects of this battle, but this is enlightening in the way that the author captures of the heat and violence of the fight, not just the "textbook" numbers of the opposing forces and the casualties / battle losses on each side.

I have to say though, that there's kind of an undefinable attitude in the way the article is written that bugs me a little bit. This is just me personally, but something bothers me about the way the article seems to attempt to glorify the bravery of the Republican Guard in some fashion. Yes, they were better trained, equipped, and disciplined than regular Iraqi units, but that also went along with the indoctrination that came as part of ensuring their loyalty to Saddam and his regime. In my opinion, they probably held their ground out of a combination of discipline that other regular units lacked, confidence (or perhaps arogance) that they were the best, and perhaps even the belief that they could stand up to the Coalition, as Saddam's propoganda proclaimed, and as was undoubtedly reinforced by the RG leadership. But most of all, I would say that they were overwhelmed by the mass of the Coalition's attack and never really had a chance to break contact even if they had wanted to. I'm just uncomfortable with the author's subtle way of seeming to praise the courage of the RG for standing their ground - in the same way that I would probably be uncomfortable with praising the heroism of the Waffen SS, knowing their background, beliefs, and loyalty to a brutal regime. But perhaps I'm involving my personal feelings too much instead of looking at this from a purely military perspective.

Aside from that, there's a couple things I'd like to clarify about the article:



I'm not sure where this statement came from. By MTOE, a heavy ACR has 123 tanks and 125 Bradley Cavalry fighting vehicles - that's what 2nd ACR had before they were converted to a light (wheeled) Cavalry Regiment after Desert Storm. A Cavalry Troop has 9 tanks and 13 Bradleys, and the tank company in each Squadron has 14 tanks. A Squadron (at that time) had 41 tanks and 41 Bradleys, so what the author is referring to here is obviously some portion of 2nd ACR and not the whole Regiment. He might be referring just to Eagle Troop, then-CPT McMaster's Cavalry Troop, which was one of the first units to make contact in the Battle of 73 Easting. Anyway, I just wanted to point out that this sentence is kind of misleading.



This statement, again only in my personal opinion, seems to reflect an undertone in the article of finding faults with the Americans, which seems to tie in with what I referred to above about the bravery of the RG. It just sounds to me like it's meant to imply that the U.S. Army was not perfect (obviously) - the comment about "in spite of rumors about super technology" just sounds kind of loaded to me.

I guess there's a public perception that U.S. equipment has every kind of gadget imaginable. The Abrams has a lot of advanced systems, but at the time, a compass was not part of the vehicle. Even up until a fear years ago, it was up to the crewmen to navigate the vehicle using maps, terrain orientation, and dead-reckoning. More recently, before the introduction of the M1A2SEP, hand-held GPS was the best way to navigate, using the device to determine your location and then orient yourself to your map and the terrain to guide your driver.

A compass will not work inside or on top of a tank because all that metal throws off the needle. You have to walk about 10-20 meters away from the tank before you can use it effectively - not something you want to do on the battlefield unless absolutely necessary.

Anyway, it's very difficult to navigate armored vehicles, and on the battlefield in the middle of a fight, at night, it's even worse. I think it's sufficient to say that some of the vehicle crews became disoriented as they conducted passage of lines and strayed across each other's boundaries.

I don't mean to take away from the great information that this article contains, it's just that there's a few points in it that bother me (I guess that's always the case with any historical interpretation).

Thanks for sharing this one - it's hard to find good accounts of Desert Storm.

Dave

rd ACR, welcoem and a generally good review. However by playing up the RG troops the authors actually makes the US victory that much more impressive. Instead of beatign on the 90 ound weakling we now took on the 150lb average man and still won handily. Plus the Rg did stand and fight and did display bravery and initive. Keeping the tanks off and fightign them cold was probalby the best move they could have made and they made the right choice for all the good i did them. And the Tawalkana's stand did let the rest of the RG not already engaged in combat escape to Iraq where they proved crucial in putting down the Shia revolt.