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Reply With QuoteBoth Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were commissioned in 1940. Gneisenau was operational by the beginning of 1941.Originally Posted by fredleander
Those are biplanes if i recall , granted that the F. SWORDFISH was one too but still...
J'ai en marre.
Both Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were commissioned in 1940. Gneisenau was operational by the beginning of 1941.
The He 115 was a (relatively) modern twin-engine float monoplane. Definitely not practical for use in contested skies but they historically had some success against merchant convoys when used in the anti-shipping role.
"Nature abhors a moron." - H.L. Mencken
Sorry, you are of course correct - I mixed up Gneisenau and Lützow. That said, while Prince Eugen was commissioned it was far from "worked-up".
Were the Swordfish and Albacores practical in contested skies...? The He115 flew faster, longer and carried more ordnance. As a matter of fact the older He59 and Arado 95 were on par with the Swordfish. Were there any more modern floatplanes than the He115...?
They certainly had. As much as they were allowed in-between their reconnaissance and air-mining jobs.
Last edited by fredleander; 25 Jul 11, at 23:45.
Certainly not. In fact, I think that's a very useful parallel to draw. In the scenario we are discussing, I would expect the He 115s to fare about as well as the British did historically when using the Swordfish (the Channel Dash) or Albacore (the Kirkenes Raid) in the face of enemy fighter opposition.
"Nature abhors a moron." - H.L. Mencken
Clackers, you are a waste of bandwidth.
Gentleman, may I offer that it wasnt just the possibility of subs lurking it was also no doubt the E-Boats and mines from the very beginning and long before D-Day's actual date. This is a story of training for D-Day in which the German E boats attacked American LST's with disasterous results. Operation Tiger which almost gave away the D-Day landings.
Do note exactly where these attacks took place.
The only reason I offer this is it was relayed to me from a close friend of how his uncle (aboard the very same LST-496 as his father). were attacked and survived the first time by German E boats. Unfortunately on D-Day their LST struck a german laid mine and very few survived from the ship. His uncle was killed and went down with her but his father did survive only because he was in a seperate part of the ship at the time. The only real account and I cannot find it immediately came from the surgeon aboard who also survived. I printed this article years back and gave it too him which confirmed exactly what was relayed to him from his father about that entire time period between the real life attacks on them and the D-day landings actions aboard ship. It is also mentioned that air attacks also played part in this.
OPERATION TIGER - 27/28th of APR 1944 Exercise
http://www.secondworldwar.org.uk/tiger1.html
D-Day LST-496 Sinks.
At Londonderry on 1 June 1944, Amesbury reported for duty with TF 124, TG 124.7 and, two days later, sailed to take part in the invasion of Normandy. Arriving in the assault area on 6 June, she took up her assigned area on a screen and fire support station in the "Mason Dixie" grid. During the next week on station, Amesbury took part in several anti-aircraft actions against attacking German planes bedeviling the ships offshore.
Between air attacks and drifting mines, the work of the escorts was brisk. At 2112 on 11 June, LST-496 struck a mine while proceeding in convoy through a channel to the assault area, and Amesbury hastened to her assistance. Three smaller craft arrived on the scene and were busily picking up survivors before the destroyer escort reached the tank landing ship's side. As soon as PC-568 cleared LST-496, LCDR Wilber skillfully maneuvered Amesbury alongside the stricken amphibious ship and moored her to remove the remainder of the LST's crew and embarked troops, summoning a doctor from LCI-530 to treat the injured men taken on board.
Meanwhile, the tug ATA-125 arrived on the scene and, with the assistance of Amesbury's sailors on board LST-496, secured a tow line to the crippled ship. However, a short time later, LST-496, barely underway, began to capsize to port. Amesbury promptly cut her lines and maneuvered to clear, the sailors she had put on board the doomed ship to handle the lines being ordered off. Lieutenant H. J. Riley, USNR, in charge of Amesbury's detail, made certain that all of his men were safely away before he jumped to safety. Ultimately, all of the destroyer escort's sailors were picked up, uninjured, but the ship they had attempted to salvage soon sank.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Amesbury_(DE-66)
Last edited by Dreadnought; 27 Jul 11, at 01:50.
Fortitude.....The strength to persist...The courage to endure.
As I see it the German problem in the Channel in 1944 was that they were simply totally swamped by the enemy. The Allies had losses, yes, but their margins were enormous. Every warship of some sort had radar to detect eventual incoming surface or flying enemies, AAA was very effective, anti-uboat systems were effective, short-range defense was effective.
If we compare this with 1940 there were huge differences. Very few British or German vessels had radar but this was an advantage to the S and U-boats. OTH, in September 1940 the German coastal artillery had established their own radar system in the Channel, the British not. As we know, the German coastal artillery was under the navy so they worked on the same communication systems as the vessels at sea.
Luftwaffe had concentrated their dedicated anti-ship units, KG's 26 and 30, 9th fliegerdivision and the Küstenflieger units at each side of the Channel. Long-range air reconnaissance was extensive. The main part of their rested Stuka units (withdrawn in August for the purpose) were stationed at the narrowest part of the Channel.
Last edited by fredleander; 27 Jul 11, at 12:56.
Rather more ships had radar than youtr admitting to.
And your point? Unless the radar is simply being used to provide eyes for the fleet its useless, the coastal guns will not influence a channel battle. Even if the radar is used as a ground mounted naval awacs, the convoluted and clumsy enigma system is going to make Germany choose- messages in the clear or with a signifigant delay.OTH, in September 1940 the German coastal artillery had established their own radar system in the Channel, the British not. As we know, the German coastal artillery was under the navy so they worked on the same communication systems as the vessels at sea.
Which means the Luftwaffe never had full combat power at either end.....Luftwaffe had concentrated their dedicated anti-ship units, KG's 26 and 30, 9th fliegerdivision and the Küstenflieger units at each side of the Channel.
No it was not, flying a Condor deep over the Atlantic is a far cry from trying to get those birds within eyes sight of Scapa Flow and other anchorages covered by spitfires. As I am sure you recall- semi-suicide catapult launched Hurricanes so scared the Germans the Condors stopped attacking merchies.Long-range air reconnaissance was extensive.
No the Stukas were pulled out becuase the short range, light bomb load and slow speed mde them worthless over England, those rested units you claim are for the most part short of airframes, pilots and munitions. Of the muntions they do have, 100kg HE and fragmentation bombs are less than ideal. 250kg/500lb armor piercing bombs seems to be the generally accepted minimum size for success in dive bombing warships. The German torpedoe units wont fair much better, Germany still hasn't discovered the problem with her magnetic fuses. They only recently got the information to fix the problem via HMS Seal.The main part of their rested Stuka units (withdrawn in August for the purpose) were stationed at the narrowest part of the Channel.
I am not sure if you misinterpreted me. I was referring to the Channel September 1940.
If so, we are differently informed. I would appreciate very much if you could inform me which RN vessels based in the Channel/North Sea area had radar in September 1940. Preferably destroyers, as this was the most actual type to be used against an eventual German invasion. This is of interest for the upcoming redux of my book about the invasion.
That was my point exactly, eyes for the fleet.
You are free to have your opinion on that but the German Pas de Calais coastal artillery (it was quite extensive) was never used for its real purpose, to counter a massive RN intrusion into the eastern part of the Channel against a German invasion fleet.
Yes..?
That is one way to put it. The same could be said about the Royal Navy......
The air reconnaissance I am hinting to is not the aircrafts working for Dønitz but the units specifically positioned to detect RN movements against an invasion fleet. That said, I believe those anchorages you are referring to were regularly overflown.
To my knowledge, there were no CAMS in September 1940.
The Stuka units did have losses, that is why they were pulled out to replenish to be ready for an eventual Sea Lion operation. Most of the units were also transferred to Luftflotte II and based at the narrowest part of the Channel to support the landings at Beach "B".
I don't know about that but the Ju87 did carry both 250 and 500 kg. bombs. The Luftwaffe sank approx. 200 Allied vessels in mainly 2 1/2 effective flying days during the Dunkirk evacuation. Hundreds were damaged.
As most other navies the Germans also had problem with their torpedoes. The massive Torpedokrise during the Weserübung operation (April/May 1940)was mainly caused by magnetic disturbances in the Northern waters. While the problems were not fixed in the fall, it was at least recognized.
After all, the German uboat fleet was credited for more than 1.000.000 tons in the four months preceeding September 1940. So, how bad could it be?
Last edited by fredleander; 28 Jul 11, at 09:50.
While U boats were very effective in deep water (where much of the tonnage was sunk), the shallow waters of the channel gave them much less room to hide - in 50-100m of water - a uboat operating in the channel would often be visible to aircraft (remember a uboat is 20-25m deep itself and can't move very much when close the bottom). My point is the uboats wouldn't be so decisive in the channel (sboats and light destroyers would be bigger threats). The RN was extremely audacious - I wouldn't put it past them to charge in with battleships and cruisers. Also Stuka's in the channel were not that effective, and the Germans were behind on torpedo bombers - the RAF was very effective against these aircraft (FW190's were much more trouble - but even they weren't very effective against shipping).
"If your plan is for one year, plant rice. If your plan is for ten years, plant trees.
If your plan is for one hundred years, educate children."
Hi, Wisc.,
How decisive a uboat would be is difficult to estimate - there are many parameters to consider - not the least the crews. The best ones were still alive September 1940. The Channel has an average depth of 120 meters. Deepest is 200 meters. Even at the narrowest point it is still 45 meter deep. Water isn't particularly clear and there are distinct salient levels coming in from the Atlantic. I believe much of the superstition about uboat problems in the Channel stems from early war when three boats hit mines in the eastern end. This was before the occupation of Belgium/France and the clearing of these minefields. Already at Dunkirk an RN destroyer was sunk by a uboat. The uboats would come in addition to all the other assets. The S-boats were deadly in night fighting, more so as very few RN destroyers, if any, had radar at the time.
This is a popular view but it cannot be sustained by historic facts - on the contrary. Some cruisers maybe, but not battleships. And why should they?
I cannot agree with you on that one. Over the UK yes, but not over the Channel. Certainly it needed escorts. You can say they were vulnerable but not ineffective.
Not true. They had more torpedo-capable (all, actually) He115's available (Küstenfliegers) than the FAA Swordfish. Coastal Command Beauforts had only recently started conversion on torpedoes.
Is view that the Royal Navy would stop at nothing to prevent an invasion of the home islands right?
I was under the impression that the government of the UK was more prepared to lose the Isles than it was to lose the the Royal Navy. The rationale was that the Isles could be re-taken but the Royal Navy could not be rebuilt. With the Royal Navy intact the British would retain a large bargaining chip even after an occupation.
Ive heard this before but don't have any sources so I'll just call it my opinion. Anyone else heard this view?
Hi Fred,
How about Warspite at the battle of Narvik?This is a popular view but it cannot be sustained by historic facts - on the contrary. Some cruisers maybe, but not battleships. And why should they?
RN battleships were typically very audacious - look at Hood and PoW (I know Hood was sunk) at the battle of Denmark Strait and the Rodney and KGV at the sinking of Bismark.
The RAF and RCAF had Catalina's and other torpedo aircraft as well - the Germans only built about 138 He 115's. And they were quite vulnerable to fighters.
Last edited by USSWisconsin; 29 Jul 11, at 01:48.
If your plan is for one hundred years, educate children."
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