FSV

I would recommend “Touched with Fire” The Land War in the South Pacific by Eric Bergerud. It is well written & a good read. He brings together the effects of climate, terrain & weapons. He does a very good study of the different military forces, not just their organization & tactics; but their ‘mind set’ as well. He offers some very balanced views of MacAuthur.

IMHO:
MacAuthur’s forte was Operational Maneuvers and Tactics. His development of the By-Passing of Japanese Forces procedures during the New Guinea Campaign is a good example. He was the 1st General Staff Officer to realize that in the Pacific;
(1) The Effective Combat Range of aircraft would be the major determining factor, when deciding where next to strike the Japanese.
(2) That enemy forces could be by-passed, and left in our rear areas, with very few adverse effects. That ‘by-passing’ played to our strong points.

In Strategic Planning & Operations, MacAurtur was a poor performer. He really did know and understand a great deal about strategic matters, but his personality made it almost impossible for him to properly execute strategic plans that he had not developed.

MacAuthur really did have a ‘brilliant’ mind as far as military matters went. Few know that as the Army Chief of Staff, he forced the US Calvary to ‘Mechanize’!

If for not his ego (and its detrimental effects), MacAuthur would be considered Robert E. Lee’s equal!!! Both had brilliant ‘military minds’.

Lee’s personality engendered trust from his people. They just ‘knew’ that what ever Lee ordered was in the “Cause’s” and their best interest. So when “Bobbie Lee” (said with a reverent tone) said fight here; they fought with all their might and skill, holding back nothing! And when Lee said “It’s Over”, “Lay down your arms”, his people ‘stacked arms’ and peacefully went home; because “Bobbie Lee” knew best!

As a military leader, MacAuthur’s people (right down to the lowest ranks) didn’t trust him. They felt that MacAuthur’s interest came before all else. Ie.....That MacAuther did what was good for himself, above all else.

MacAuthur’s ego & personality reminds me of George B. McClellan (especially in their views of and dealings with their civilian leaders). [Read “The Civil War” series by Shelby Foote.] Both were extremely capable and skillful individuals, with brilliant minds. But, their personalities and egos greatly reduced their performance levels. MacAuthur was the better of the two, because he would ‘act’; whereas McClellan would often hesitate, waiting for the perfect conditions.

MacAuthur was the last of the “Aristocrat Officers”. He just didn’t realize that there was no longer a place in modern society, or warfare for this type of individual.

Gunny Jake

Amled

Will try to find the book over here, thanks.
As for George B. McClellan , didn't he also share another similarity with Doug? That of being sacked by his CiC?

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When we blindly adopt a religion, a political system, a literary dogma, we become automatons. We cease to grow. - Anais Nin

Officer of Engineers

I have to disagree with MacArthur coming up with manouver concepts and tactics. The bulk of the work was already being done in the USSR at the time. He was trying (keyword trying) to keep up with the times but when compare to Deep Battle or Blitzkreig, MacArthur's work was surely lacking.

Also, when compared to the manouver generals (Patton, Zuhkov, Rommel, Von Manstein, Guderian) in the ETO, MacArthur is even more lacking.

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Chimo

FSV

Actually; McClellan was 'sacked' twice by his CIC.

FSV

I’ll agree that MacAuthur was no tactical innovator. But he was very adept at adapting the Deep Battle concepts to his Theater of Operations.

As far as the comparisons to the other great maneuver generals; IMHO I think you are in error. I think that the small areas that his land battles covered throws people off, in their evaluation of his tactical skills. And the jungle does not actually lend its self to ‘sweeping’ maneuvers. You really should read Touched by Fire.

Overlay a map of MacAuthur’s AO over maps of these other generals AO’s. After the Port Moresby/Kokoda Trail operations; MacAuthur almost always ‘struck deep’, at the range limits of his air cover & logistics capibalities. He worked his “Gator’ Navy ‘hard’. In fact I believe (as much as it ‘pains me’ to admit it) the his Army/Navy team conducted more Amphibious Landings than the Navy/Marine Corps team did.

I agree that MacAurther would have done poorly in the ETO! His ego/personality would have caused his failure. In comparison to MacAuthur; Montgomery was the epitome of the general that was respectful of the skills of his peers, who deferred to the wishes of his seniors, and was easy to work with/for. Heck; Patton would have been considered “Politically Astute”, and always mindful of the feelings & cares of others.

Gunny Jake

Officer of Engineers

To which I would readily agree. He was a general afterall and he did beat the IJM. However, he was a top ace student but I would not rank him a master.

We do have in fact two examples of his manouvering skills. The Inchon Landing and the 8th Army's Retreat from the Yalu. When examined in detail, neither can match those of ETO manouver generals. The Inchon Landing sent the NKPA into chaos and yet, MacArthur was never able to cut the NKPA's LOC and it took the Pusan Breakout to finally send the NKPA scurrying for home. And this after the NKPA already exhausted itself on the Pusan Perimeter. The 8th Army's Retreat is self explainatory. The Chinese PVA managed to outrun the 8th Army no less than 6 times. MacArthur's saving grace was that the Chinese was even more inept than he was, having to leave all their artillery behind at the expense of foot infantry outracing the Americans.

My wife is going to hate you. I've already ordered it from AMAZON today.

sparten

How much was Ike influenced by MacArthur? I know they did not get along at all, (Philippines) but was the influence there. Cause if it is I really do not see it.

As for comparisons with McClellen, well he was defeated more by his own demons than anything Lee did. I have also wondered how much the fact that he went from having command a company, to suddenly commanding an Army had to do with his failers. Plenty of Civil War Generals who were considered compotent before the war, could not handle a high command (AS Johnston comes to mind.).

MacArthur on the other hand had been commanding general of the US Army, hence he had little in common with young Napoleon.

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"Any relations in a social order will endure if there is infused into them some of that spirit of human sympathy, which qualifies life for immortality." ~ George William Russell

TopHatter

I have never really read anything about Ike, only MacArthur, so I cannot really say in full and complete detail, only an anecdote later on in this post.
You could say that MacArthur was born and raised to be a leader of men.
He was bold, brilliant and utterly fearless in face of enemy fire.
He proved his courage long before he even set foot on the field of battle in France during World War I.
It is one of history's supreme ironies that his World War II troops scorned him as "Dugout Doug". The truth is that he deliberately exposed himself to enemy fire in order to see what was really happening on the front lines.
They had thought he was living in luxery hundreds of miles behind the islands being assaulted.
Brave? Foolhardy? Suicidal? I cannot say. I can say that Ike never placed himself so close, so often to the frontlines to see what his men were facing.
Ike was a fine, popular leader, unquestionably. He had to reconcile the members of the other U.S. services, members of his own service and government, not to mention countless members of other Allied militaries and governments.

What did Ike learn from MacArthur? Let's let Ike himself tell us.

During World War II, a woman once asked Ike if he had really served under General MacArthur. His reply: Not only did I serve under him Madam, but I studied drama under him for 4 years as well.

Officer of Engineers

I challenge that assertion. His men certainly were not willing to follow him to hell and back. And he obviously could not inspire his men to do the impossible and his read of the enemy was severely lacking. No better example than the 8th Army's Retreat against an over-extended and exhausted Chinese army.

Amled

From the opinions that have been expressed in this thread, he certainly did'nt live up to expectations!
F.ex.
A pretty damming indictment, especially when you take the source of it into consideration.

TopHatter

Oh believe me, he had some major fook-ups in his career.
He made decisions and mistakes that are impossible to defend, especially his handling of the Bonus Army.
However, if one looks at this entire career, and in this case was thinking of his World War I experiences, he also had an excellent history of brilliance in addition to blunders.
MacArthur's biggest enemy was....MacArthur.

Officer of Engineers

The measure of any good army or general is not when things go right but when things go wrong (Guadal Canal for example). There are many instances when everything went right for MacArthur but not one incidence where he could punch himself out of a wet paper bag when he was in crap.

TopHatter

I believe that MacArthur's successful retreat to Bataan and Corregidor were a good example of escaping from a really crappy situaition.

However, like William Manchester, I would hasten to point out that it was MacArthur as Commanding General of the PI that was ultimately responsible for knowing what his air force was doing and therefore responsible for it's shameful destruction on the ground, hours after Pearl Harbour.
He also screwed up royally in not providing for sufficient provisions on Bataan before the retreat.

He also masterminded the Inchon landings, without which the breakout of the Pusan Perimeter would not have gone so "easily" (though I doubt any vet would tell you that it was a cakewalk).

The problem with MacArthur later in life was that he was a man of the Victorian era and so his prose, bombast, posturing and personality were viewed with disgust by his men in WWII and Korea because of a huge generational difference.
His men in the Rainbow Division during World War I absolutely adored him and would have been shocked by how the average GI in the 40s and 50s regarded him.

Just my opinion of course

Broken

A crappy situation of MacArthur's own making. MacArthur was specifically tasked with making the Philippines defensible against Japanese attack, had six months to do so, and did almost nothing except to make matter worse.

Despite repeated warnings that his aircraft at Clarke were too forward and concentrated, he did nothing to make them less vulnerable. The eight divisions of the Philippine Army were poorly trained, which MacArthur did nothing to rectify. In fact, these divisions were not even mobilized or at full strength when war came.

The problem of defending the Philippines had been studied by Army officers present on the Philippines for decades. When MacArthur was put in charge, this headquarters was removed from tactical control and replaced with MacArthur's inexperienced staff.

Supplies to support the Bataan stronghold were removed by MacArthur and placed in forward positions to support MacArthur's plan to "fight on the beaches". MacArthur then did nothing to make his plan realistically workable.

Consequently, MacArthur's aircraft were destroyed on the ground, despite 10 hours warning. No orders to disperse or even mount a CAP were given.

The 43,000 Japanese troops which landed on Dec 22 promptly routed MacArthur's 75,000. So much for "fight on the beaches". MacArthur then made his one good execution in manuvering his remaining troops to defend Bataan. Unfortunately, the logistic support needed to defend Bataan had been removed for his "fight on the beaches" plan.

During this fight, MacArthur left his tunnel headquarters only once, earning him the nickname "Dugout Doug". When MacArthur requested that the US back Philippines President Quezon's plan to declare the nation neutral and withdraw US forces, President Roosevelt told MacArthur to stand and fight. However, it was Roosevelt's decision, after the collapse of Bataan, that MacArthur withdraw to Australia.

Further MacArthur myths:

It is claimed that MacArthur conducted an efficient and lowcost conquest of New Guinea. There were 33,000 Allied troops in New Guinea and they suffered 8,546 casualties including 3,095 killed. In comparison, on Guadalcanal, fought in the same time period, there were 60,000 troops which suffered 5,845 casualties including 1,600 killed.

After MacArthur blundered in his first attempts to attack Japanese positions on New Guinea's north shore, Marshall sent him two very good commanders who subsequently saved MacArthur's butt. General Eichelberger took command of the ground command and General Kenney took charge of the airforce. These two generals were very hands-on, "fight from the front" types, while MacArthur stayed back in Australia or Port Moresby. Eichenberger planned and conducted the subsequent and successful ground campaign, while Kenney performed a classic long-range air campaign. MacArthur's one contribution was to take claim for the successes of these two men.

MacArthur is claimed by some to have originated the technique of "leapfrogging", which if anybody can take claim, it would be General Marshall and Admiral King. While MacArthur did conduct a successful bypass operation of the Japanese position at Lae, New Guinea, much of the credit for sucess of the operation belongs to Australian General Blamely.

The first significant Japanese position to be leapfrogged was the key base at Rabaul in the Bismarks. MacArthur continually insisted that the base be taken. Marshall and Admiral King overruled him, and MacArthur finally agreed to their plan that he bypass Rabaul by attacking in the Admiralties instead. This attack was well conducted by MacArthur in 1944, perhaps his best effort in the war, but the plan was not his.

The concept of leapfrogging was discussed by Naval War College staff planners in 1940 and by Naval Institute Proceedings in 1943. Even Roosevelt, at the January 1943 Capablanca Conference, stated that, "an island-by-island advance across the Pacific would take too long to reduce Japanese power. Some other method of striking at Japan must be found".

A good, fifty page thumbnail on MacArthur can be found in the book Commander in Chief: Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and their War

The landing at Inchon was simply a repeat of WWII Pacific Island tactics. MacArthur deserves credit, but it was hardly a mastermind concept.
MacArthur did fight well in WWI. He led from the front, earned two purple hearts, and was very hands on. What happened to him between the wars is somewhat of a mystery. Hard to believe it was the same man.

TopHatter

I completely agree that MacArthur was responsible for the PI debacle.
He was also ultimately responsible for his air power being destroyed on the ground.
However, I have to say, for example, that the entire USAAF contingent on the PI was not exactly screaming bloody murder for their aircraft to be dispersed.
Also, it is rather hard to train an army when there is no money, equipment, weapons or ammunition available.
MacArthur tried to obtain these things and was denied time and time again.
He did get some good assets, such as the B-17s, but what about AA guns to defend their airfield? Why was there not slit trenches and air-raid shelters dug at the airfields? Yes, MacArthur could have and should have ordered it. But did the air corps need to have their hand held to do such things? Was initiative that lacking?

I'm not trying to be an apologist for a man that has been dead for many decades, but I do think that most people don't really have all the facts.
Once again, I recommend American Ceasar to anyone wanting to get another opinion. It's hardly biased in MacArthur's favor either, which is one of the prime reasons I recommend it.

Great post by the way Broken, this is a very stimulating thread.