logistics and the battle of britain .

**1979** · 15 Jun 12,, 11:16

Originally Posted by clackers

Following your lead, this'll be my last BoB diversion in this thread, but for a different reason. The pattern of posts is now horribly circular.

The definitions between nations are not the same. As I understand it, the German records of damage were kept locally, not centrally, and were based on nominal percentages. But somewhere I've read that in actual practice, while formally 60% was a write off, many planes with an IIRC 40% assessment or more also did not fly again.

In the RAF, the term 'wastage' included operational and non-operational losses, and simply, any repair not undertaken at the base itself, even if it returned to service after a stint at a civilian centre.

Attachment 29402

Note from the diagram how many of the 'wastage' planes in Fighter Command returned to the frontline squadrons - in November, they almost equal the new aircraft coming to them off the assembly lines.

But also note that the graph only applies to those frontline squadrons. It does not talk about planes coming off the production lines or out of the repair centres that end up being placed in reserve, for instance:

Attachment 29403

If anyone else wants to see the article complete with diagrams, Google books has it: Air Force journal of logistics: vol24_no4 - Google Books

I don't enjoy sifting between competing bureucratic definitions, so I personally think sticking with planes destroyed and pilots lost is easier. Even those figures can get to be problematic.

But I think we need to get over the Churchillian rhetoric that a valiant few saved Britain in 1940 - the article is one of many scholarly works over the last decade showing that line of logic in the Michael Caine 'Battle of Britain' film and various books is recycled propaganda.

If you are still intrested in the topic i will reply here:
figure 11:

shows a fighter production of roughly 1500 planes between july and november, this is included in a overall fighter production of all fighter types ( blenheim, defiant etc ) of 1908 aircraft.
repair in the same period is around 820 aircraft.

The problem with this figure is that repairs are counted on a case basis in plane english the same aircraft can be repaired several times over .
production however is counted on a aircraft basis ie one plane is counted once.

Disregarding the repair factor and counting only new production and losses , by october 1940 the strenght of Raf fighter squadrons should
have increased by at least 600 aircraft ( 1500 new build minus 900 losses. )
however the data posted in figure 3 shows a more modest increase : only 100 aircraft in the same timeframe.

The are only 2 posibilties :

1) the repair factor on a aircraft basis was in fact negative (500 aircraft still avait repairs ) even thou the repair on a case basis reached 820. In this case the aprisal of the CRO is woefully overstated.

2) the data on raf strenght in july and october is wrong.

Personally I am leaning towards option 1.

**clackers** · 18 Jun 12,, 07:56

Again, Figure 3 refers to the 52 frontline squadrons of Fighter Command (something explicitly mentioned in the text of the article), a number that remains fairly constant around the 900 mark because each unit is limited to an establishment of some 16-20 aircraft. The bottleneck is pilot supply.

It does not refer to the additional planes held in reserve or sent overseas. Once again, see Figure 12 for how complex that can be.

**1979** · 18 Jun 12,, 10:40

Originally Posted by clackers

Again, Figure 3 refers to the 52 frontline squadrons of Fighter Command (something explicitly mentioned in the text of the article), a number that remains fairly constant around the 900 mark because each unit is limited to an establishment of some 16-20 aircraft. The bottleneck is pilot supply.

It does not refer to the additional planes held in reserve or sent overseas. Once again, see Figure 12 for how complex that can be.

Self contradictory , the single engine pilot strenght in october was 1600 acording to the same article, also aircraft strenght does not equal seviceability which is always less.
And for figure 3:
the reserve buffer amounts to one week production by october ( see post nr 162 in the other thread) , the aircraft under repair by cro being just that under repair.

**clackers** · 22 Jun 12,, 05:38

Originally Posted by 1979

the single engine pilot strenght in october was 1600

They wanted the number of pilots to be about 50% larger than the number of aircraft ie a 12 plane squadron with about eighteen pilots.

Originally Posted by 1979

also aircraft strenght does not equal seviceability which is always less.

See German and British serviceability figures in the other thread.

Originally Posted by 1979

the reserve buffer amounts to one week production by october

What you want from your reserve is a buffer to cover losses, not production.

The total holdings in the ASU in October are closer to 300 than 100, even leaving out those being worked on at the CRO facilities.

By that month, the Luftwaffe has due to its hurtful plane and aircrew losses called off operations except for nuisance night bombing, and Hitler has cancelled Sealion.

**1979** · 22 Jun 12,, 08:33

Originally Posted by clackers

They wanted the number of pilots to be about 50% larger than the number of aircraft ie a 12 plane squadron with about eighteen pilots.

See German and British serviceability figures in the other thread.

What you want from your reserve is a buffer to cover losses, not production.

The total holdings in the ASU in October are closer to 300 than 100, even leaving out those being worked on at the CRO facilities.

By that month, the Luftwaffe has due to its hurtful plane and aircrew losses called off operations except for nuisance night bombing, and Hitler has cancelled Sealion.

Nope, they wanted two flights of 9 aircraft each but that was not posible.

the ones I posted myself or overy ?
German records exist for anyone who is intrested in seeing them,
the german serviceable figures you posted are compared to extablishment strenght( 1132 aircraft (27 fighter groups),
not the aircraft on strenght ( 920 Me 109 by the by the end of september ) .
Murray has publised both , the first in text and the second in Table 8.

In the case of RAF , you want reserves to cover both losses and damaged aircraft ( they allready had a backlog aproaching 500 spit and hurricane which were not repaired ), they could only do that once the germans switched to bombimg London. Between august 29 september 5 (one week ) the british had 170 fighters destroyed and 42 damaged needing repair at depot or contractor , that is twice the
production numbers in the same period .

I am not disregarding the total asu holding , it is just that they cointain also obsolete aircraft of different types that are no longer suited not just spitfires and huricanes .

Sumary:
We know that the british produced 1500 single engine fighters between july and november, substracting only permanent losses either the
asu holdings should increase by 600 (they actually drop ) or fighter strength should increase ( it does but only by 100 aircraft ).
In my wiew things are clear , the british maintance service despite what the article claims it was not able to cope with the increase of combat damaged aircraft . It does not mean that that they did not eventually repaired those airframes but they could not do it in a timely fashion.

**Doktor** · 22 Jun 12,, 08:45

To be perfectly honest I am lost between you two.

Any links in your debate would be nice

1979, let's get back to your math...

With how many planes Britain started BoB and with how many it ended it?

How many were produced in that period of time?

How many were shot down?

Has there been a shipment of planes from elsewhere?

The difference between those numbers should give you the figure of the serviced frames.

**Parihaka** · 22 Jun 12,, 10:03

Logistics and the Battle of Britain | Air Force Journal of Logistics | Find Articles

**1979** · 22 Jun 12,, 10:37

there are plenty of old books published on line wrt the battle of britain which are linked on the highjacked thread.
these are the figures posted in the article at hand.
fighters at start :

320 reserve fighters
230 aircraft under repair
850 aircraft in combat squadrons
roughly 1400 without stored aircraft

fighters by november.

170 reserve fighters ( new builds)
480 aircraft under repair
950 aircraft in combat squadrons
roughly 1600 without stored aircraft.

1908 fighters were produced in the same timeframe , 1500 being spit and hurricane

British figures say 900 but the figures do not add up...

Not that I am aware of , in any case the export figures need to be around 800 fighters to explain the disparity.

In fact it suppose to show strength not serviceability.