Battle of the Atlantic

**Chogy** · 27 Apr 12,, 14:31

I'm interested in hearing members' opinions on why the United States was so desperately incompetent in the first few months of 1942, when German U-boats took an immense toll of valuable shipping on the Eastern seaboard.

Ships did not zig zag, sailed with lights on, did not convoy, and cities on the coast remained lighted at night, creating silhouettes of the ships. The result was carnage. It wasn't as if the USA did not have knowledge of the threat, as we had been running convoys to the UK prior to the declaration of war, and we understood the threat.

What was the root of the failure to take the U-boats seriously in home waters, and why did it take so many months before even the most basic precautions were taken?

**Officer of Engineers** · 27 Apr 12,, 15:00

Lack of experienced personnel. There was a choice between committing to the transport of men or the transport of cargo. The experienced escourts and crews went to the transport of soldiers to the British Isles, leaving the cargo ships with woefully inexperienced protection.

The other part is that the Wolf Pacts found easier prey outside the US than facing experienced RCN onslaughts. The Wolf Pacts were hounded out of Canadian waters and found American waters with easier prey.

RCN protection during the beginning of the war were just as inadequate as the USN during the Happy Times.

**1979** · 27 Apr 12,, 16:03

perhaps in 1943 ,
the royal canadian navy in 1942 was not better than the Americans otherwise the
Germans would not have attacked ships in Saint Laurent gulf.

**Albany Rifles** · 27 Apr 12,, 16:32

Once the RCN got pulled off of Atlantic duties and back to home waters they began to turn the tide in the fall of 1942. The German successes were more the results of change in their tactics from mid-Ocean to the Atlantic Seaboard against overmanned Allied forces.

Chogy,

I recommend you read Operation Drumbeat by Michael Gannon.

Also Homer Hickam's Torpedo Junction. The title of the book came from the sardonic play on words by Coastguardsmen on a popular Glenn Miller song, Tuxedo Junction. It referred generally to the US Eastern seaboard in general and the Outer Banks in particular.

**Chogy** · 27 Apr 12,, 17:42

Thanks for the replies so far.

I understand that assets (destroyers, DE's etc) were limited. However, I would have expected a shorter Happy Time vs. the many months that ensued. The US response seemed painfully sluggish. After several valuable tankers were destroyed within a stone's throw of the coast, I'd have thought someone with authority would make the decision to cease launching unprotected shipping between Maine and Texas.

It was as if they were unable to digest the truth that German boats could indeed create carnage close to home shores. The USA had seen the results of the U-boat onslaught on Canada and GB between 1939 and Pearl Harbor... it was as if they weren't taking them (the U-boats) seriously. Personnel and assets aside for just a moment, it was as if Command said "How dare they attack us close to our shores?" It's very strange to me.

Chogy,

I recommend you read Operation Drumbeat by Michael Gannon.

Also Homer Hickam's Torpedo Junction.

Thank you, Amazon should have a few copies.

**Parihaka** · 27 Apr 12,, 20:49

Originally Posted by Chogy

Thanks for the replies so far.

I understand that assets (destroyers, DE's etc) were limited. However, I would have expected a shorter Happy Time vs. the many months that ensued. The US response seemed painfully sluggish. After several valuable tankers were destroyed within a stone's throw of the coast, I'd have thought someone with authority would make the decision to cease launching unprotected shipping between Maine and Texas.

It was as if they were unable to digest the truth that German boats could indeed create carnage close to home shores. The USA had seen the results of the U-boat onslaught on Canada and GB between 1939 and Pearl Harbor... it was as if they weren't taking them (the U-boats) seriously. Personnel and assets aside for just a moment, it was as if Command said "How dare they attack us close to our shores?" It's very strange to me.

Thank you, Amazon should have a few copies.

Poor command structure, Kings dislike of anything 'British' and refusal to listen to any of their lessons, and poor planning in not prioritizing building anti submarine assets. Apart from eventually convoying and daylight sailings, did the US ever develop effective protection?
It seems to me more like the RCN and RNA took on the job and ended the threat, and that the US never really developed an effective force.

**zraver** · 28 Apr 12,, 03:19

Originally Posted by Parihaka

Poor command structure, Kings dislike of anything 'British' and refusal to listen to any of their lessons, and poor planning in not prioritizing building anti submarine assets. Apart from eventually convoying and daylight sailings, did the US ever develop effective protection?
It seems to me more like the RCN and RNA took on the job and ended the threat, and that the US never really developed an effective force.

Yes the US was active and developed the most effective counter to the U-boat of the entire war- blimps. Of 89,000 or so ships guarded by air ships only 1 was sunk. Airships using MAD finally closed the entrance to either the med or Atlantic around Gibraltar and were invovled in the last sinking of a U-boat in the war. Out of around 150 build only one was lost to enemy fire.

Likewise the escort carriers forced the U-boats to stay submerged and out of position.

**Parihaka** · 28 Apr 12,, 04:26

Originally Posted by zraver

Yes the US was active and developed the most effective counter to the U-boat of the entire war- blimps. Of 89,000 or so ships guarded by air ships only 1 was sunk. Airships using MAD finally closed the entrance to either the med or Atlantic around Gibraltar and were invovled in the last sinking of a U-boat in the war. Out of around 150 build only one was lost to enemy fire.

Likewise the escort carriers forced the U-boats to stay submerged and out of position.

Ah that makes sense, I'd heard vaguely of the blimps but hadn't made the connection. The escort carriers were built primarily at the request of the British and operated by them with mixed results, though I understand they had good use by the US in the Pacific

**Albany Rifles** · 28 Apr 12,, 14:32

Originally Posted by Parihaka

Ah that makes sense, I'd heard vaguely of the blimps but hadn't made the connection. The escort carriers were built primarily at the request of the British and operated by them with mixed results, though I understand they had good use by the US in the Pacific

Pari, the USN ran dozens of Hunter Killer groups in the Atlantic as well as the Pacific.

While the RN produced the first CVE and six total all the rest were built in American yards. USN CVE hunter killer groups were in use as early as Operation Torch. USN CVEs handled the western and southern parts of the Atlantic and RN the east and Northern convoy routes.

Remember the only Uboat captured by a CVE hunter killer group TG 22.3 centered on the USS Guadalcanal with 5 DE escorts in the South Atlantic.

The RN had the start but the USN pulled more than its own weight in the Battle of the Atlantic. It was a victory for the RN, RCN and USN.

The US got its act together once King got over his Anglophobia and formed the 10th Fleet. I recommend William Y'blood's Hunter Killer and Ladislas Farago's The 10th Fleet.

**zraver** · 28 Apr 12,, 22:39

Also when looking at records for the Battle of the Atlantic. In the period from Sept 39 to Dec 41 Germany lost 68 U-boats from all causes. From Jan 42 to Dec 42 the RN/RCN joined by the USN failed sank 79 u-boats out of 86 total losses. Of those 79 the US claimed 18. So while shipping losses spiked the addition of the USN even at this early stage is evident. If US supplied aircraft like the Hudson and Liberator are subtracted from the RN/RCN totals the number of sunk u-boats goes way down.

In 42 the Hudson, Catalina and Liberator were the most effective ASW platforms that allies had regardless of user.

**Captain Worley** · 30 Apr 12,, 14:10

Black May was also a pretty good book that detailed US (and allies) efforts to improve tactics and weapons, leading up to the defeat of the U-boats.

**USSWisconsin** · 30 Apr 12,, 15:34

The US developed the jeep carrier and created HK groups with them, they fielded the B-24 which allowed the mid atlantic gap to be patrolled - a late start perhaps - but it could hardly be considered doing nothing during the war. They also built 100's of DE's and produced corvettes for the RN.

**tbm3fan** · 30 Apr 12,, 22:35

U-boat losses and how...

U-288 in April 1944 has photos of attack on sub

Cool site

U-boat losses 1939-1945 - Fates - German U-boats of WWII - Kriegsmarine - uboat.net

**Dreadnought** · 30 Apr 12,, 23:20

The best book to read about this and understand the convoy system to Russia, The Brits etc is Convoy by Paul Kemp. Its pretty in depth.

One must also remember that the US at the time was also gearing up for war with two opponents. Escorts were scarce until they started arming the merchant ships and developing ASW tatics with the Canadians and British all the while while ship building increased greatly.

**Stitch** · 01 May 12,, 05:27

I'm going to say that the reaction, or lack thereof, was partly psychological; the US, emotionally and psychologically (in 1942), was not prepared to participate in a "world war" yet. In a lot of people's minds (and this included the military), the European war was still "someone else's war"; it didn't have the immediacy of the Pacific war and Pearl Harbor. Therefore, I don't think a lot of people (again, the military included) had the inclination to devote a lot of resources to the Atlantic, aka "European", war; it wasn't until US assets were DIRECTLY involved (i.e.: ships, personnel, etc.) and got destroyed that the US got serious about the Atlantic war.