Pocket battleships or U-boats?

**zraver** · 30 May 12,, 05:34

Originally Posted by clackers

As I understand it, the Sandhurst exercise partly out of courtesy to its German participant (Admiral Ruge) let the first wave make it to shore, and then spent its time examining the subsequent land battle (Sandhurst is the Army college, after all!).

The first wave making it ashore is much less challenging than the follow on waves. All the factors that can favor the Germans do since they pick the time to start the dance and the UK will need time to develop and fix the attack, organize and strike. The land battle is the least believable part of the exercise since it has British territorial units fighting well above their weight.

**clackers** · 31 May 12,, 06:32

Originally Posted by zraver

a patently false comment since the British were busily sinking block ships, building defensive lines, assembling mobile reserves, hauling out Great war surplus for the home guard and putting together anti-invasion flotillas...

And we can add to that all the German preparations. The sailors moving barges down the Rhine and into Dutch harbours, the soldiers trying on life vests for the first time, and fearing for their lives at the first rehearsals.

They needn't have worried.

Here's the preamble of Hitler's order for Sealion's planning, from 16 July, 1940, which was followed by his radio speech a week later requesting Britain to come to its senses and finish the war:

"As England, despite her hopeless military situation, still shows no sign of willingness to come to terms, I have decided to prepare, and if need be, to carry out, a landing operation against her. The aim of this operation is to eliminate the English motherland as a base from which war against Germany can be continued and, if necessary, to occupy completely."

Note the uncertain language of 'if need be', 'if necessary', etc.

During July, on Hitler's orders the OKW and the OKH independently started planning for Barbarossa.

Goering reported Hitler had told him privately that he didn't intend to carry out Sealion.

The lead Bf 109 pilot Adolf Galland didn't think the project was for real.

Von Rundstedt, who as C-in-c Army Group A was on paper the commander of the invasion force, didn't even bother to attend the amphibious landing exercises.

The navy was naturally terrified about the whole thing, and Raeder told the Army that the navy would only be ready after September 26th, and the necessary combination of tides, moon and weather would mean if the window was missed the invasion would have to be postponed to May 1941.

September 15th is remembered as a BoB climax, but actually Hitler had already told his commanders he had cold feet about the project the day before, and a formal order stopping further preparations went out on September 17.

**USSWisconsin** · 31 May 12,, 15:26

Originally Posted by zraver

Your comment was NO ONE, a a patently false comment since the British were busily sinking block ships, building defensive lines, assembling mobile reserves, hauling out Great war surplus for the home guard and putting together anti-invasion flotillas...

The British preparations were very imaginative, and dug even further back than the great war, they had a few 68 Pdr's they intended to use with canister shot - while admittedly very primative, I bet they would have made quite an impression had they been used - billowing clouds of black powder smoke and a nasty spray of iron marbles... While reloading them might never have been accomplished, those first shots would have lent some drama to the battle.

**clackers** · 01 Jun 12,, 01:46

Originally Posted by USSWisconsin

The British preparations were very imaginative, and dug even further back than the great war, they had a few 68 Pdr's they intended to use with canister shot - while admittedly very primative, I bet they would have made quite an impression had they been used - billowing clouds of black powder smoke and a nasty spray of iron marbles... While reloading them might never have been accomplished, those first shots would have lent some drama to the battle.

There were all sorts of schemes, Wisconsin, including RAF Bomber Command stockpiling mustard gas to drop on the invasion beaches, flaming jets of oil and rumours of exploding postboxes ... as this link shows, morale and propaganda were heavily involved:

http://www.psywar.org/sibs.php

**1979** · 02 Jun 12,, 18:05

Originally Posted by clackers

The Luftwaffe was IIRC down to 600 single engined fighters by late autumn 1940. By September 14, there was a crisis similar or worse to RAF's 11 Group. As an indicator, Bf 109 squadrons were down to "only 67 percent operational aircrew against authorized aircraft. For Bf 110 squadrons, the figure was 46 percent; and for bombers, it was 59 percent. A week later the figures were 64 percent, 52 percent, and 52 percent respectively.

Murray I presume ?

Interestingly enough the same author list LW single engine losses at 398 aircraft due to enemy action and another 47 damaged.
Overall German losses were higher but the British hardly can claim credit for those.
The jagdgruppe strength during adlertag was 976 fighters ( 853 serviceable ).

**Monash** · 03 Jun 12,, 08:06

[QUOTE=clackers;873570] Geoff Hewitt says the two options presented by Raeder to Hitler as late as January 1939 were for "a force of submarines and pocket battleships, which could threaten the sea lanes to Britain and be constructed comparatively quickly; or a much larger fleet, with a nucleus of heavy capital ships, which though it would take longer to build, would not only threaten the sea lanes but could also challenge the British fleet itself."

Raeder was a surface ship man (along with most of the KM guys, who thought that the U-boat had been a defeated weapon in WWI, and that in the next war it would be subject to new countermeasures like sonar), and Hitler went with the more ambitious option, supposedly reassuring Raeder that the fleet wouldn't be required before 1946.

When the Navy went to war just four years after the post-Versailles expansion began, Raeder knew he had the wrong kinds of vessels and was in no way ready, writing gloomily in the SKL war diary that "The surface forces ... can do no more than show that they know how to die gallantly."[QUOTE][QUOTE]

So Clackers, in that case what do you think of the "massed sortie" scenarios I have been mulling over? Assuming say a start date around early to mid 41 for the first attempt with the task group based around the Bismark and Tirpitz together or alternately just the Bismark with a 2nd follow up sortie shortly afterwards by the Tirpiz and Lutzow plus any intact units from the first sortie.

Would it have resulted in a greater tonnage of allied warships/merchant vessels being sunk than was otherwise achieved? Even noting the likelhood that all the German units involved would most likely be sunk/battle damaged by the end of 41 or early 42.

**Monash** · 03 Jun 12,, 14:55

Everything I have ever read from credible researchers about Sea Lion has indicated that it had no real prospect of success. The principal problem identified is almost always the inability of the Luftwaffe to defeat/neutralise the RAF. Figures I have may have quoted before inidcate that even at the height of the BOB when the Germans were making an all out effort to destroy figher command by attacking its airbases they never managed more than aprox a 1:1 loss rate in aircraft. And that was the best they managed -by putting an all out effort into the assault using every servicable aircraft they had available on the days in question. Loss rates during periods of lower tempo operations were even worse. And of course the loss rate in trained personnel was always much higher for teh Germans since any German aircrew who bailed out of damaged aircraft over Britain were lost to the war effort while Britsh pilots who did the same thing and survived were not.

So the German's coudn't "destroy" the RAF without taking what amounted to reciprical losses themselves. After which they were then expected to maintain air superiority over the Channel during the invasion, provide ground attack support for the troops and seek out and destroy the RAN, all at the same time! It simply wasn't possible, it was asking them to be in too many different places doing to many different jobs all at the same time. Which leaves the Kreigsmarine and as well trained and professional as they were their surface forces were completly outgunned. So as I see it the only way large numbers of German men were ever going to get the chance to rampage though the streets of London would be on pub crawls after a good football match. ... Cheers

**Chogy** · 03 Jun 12,, 19:51

flaming jets of oil and rumours of exploding postboxes ...

I don't know about post boxes, but the flaming oil jets were spectacular. There's probably video somewhere on the internet. They laid some massive pipes on and in likely beaches, with the open ends simply terminating 20 to 50 meters off shore. The entire manifold was charged with some sort of diesel/gasoline mixture, and the mix flowed up to the ocean surface and was ignited. The result was a spectacular maelstrom of flame that completely blocked the beach.

I'm guessing it was a one off (if very impressive) setup that was filmed and released as a dual-purpose propaganda piece... to encourage GB, and to terrify the Axis soldiers. With regards to the latter, it probably did a good job.

**clackers** · 05 Jun 12,, 07:44

Originally Posted by 1979

Murray I presume ?

Interestingly enough the same author list LW single engine losses at 398 aircraft due to enemy action and another 47 damaged.
Overall German losses were higher but the British hardly can claim credit for those.
The jagdgruppe strength during adlertag was 976 fighters ( 853 serviceable ).

Yes, it's from US Luftwaffe expert Williamson Murray, 1979.

The quoted stats were of course his analysis of personnel losses.

As far as planes, I think it's handy to give a month by month comparison of the Luftwaffe and the RAF, so here's some based on Richard Overy's The Air War 1939-45:

Single Engined Fighter statistics, separate numbers representing strength/serviceable:

July: Luftwaffe 893/725 RAF: 871/644
August: Luftwaffe 860/unknown RAF: 1061/708
September: Luftwaffe 680/438 RAF: 1061/746
October : Luftwaffe 700/275 RAF: 1048/732

Production is useful to know, too:

July: German 220 British 496
August: German 173 British 476
September: German 218 British 467
October: German 144(acceptances) British 469

We can see that the RAF finished the Battle of Britain stronger than it had begun (and its rookie pilots gaining fighting experience), while the German airforce pre-Barbarossa in March 1941 is smaller than it had been in March 1940!

The loss of expensive multi-engined frames (Bf110s and the bombers) along with their multiple crewmen (including many of the service's best fighter pilots who had transferred to Goering's prestigious 110 staffeln) hurt tremendously.

Depending on when you count the start and end of the battle and your accounting system, the comparison is something like 900 RAF planes lost in exchange for 1,700 German ones during the campaign.

Ouch!

**clackers** · 05 Jun 12,, 08:06

Originally Posted by Monash

So Clackers, in that case what do you think of the "massed sortie" scenarios I have been mulling over? Assuming say a start date around early to mid 41 for the first attempt with the task group based around the Bismark and Tirpitz together or alternately just the Bismark with a 2nd follow up sortie shortly afterwards by the Tirpiz and Lutzow plus any intact units from the first sortie.

Would it have resulted in a greater tonnage of allied warships/merchant vessels being sunk than was otherwise achieved? Even noting the likelhood that all the German units involved would most likely be sunk/battle damaged by the end of 41 or early 42.

Personally, I wouldn't be sending servicemen to their deaths in what is essentially a futile gesture, Monash.

They're not to blame for the timing of the war, like WWI designed to maximize the chances of Germany's army succeeding before the opponents had re-militarized.

Replays of Battle of the North Cape - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia are best avoided. Trading capital ships for a bunch of merchant ships here and there is a losing game.

**1979** · 05 Jun 12,, 10:19

Originally Posted by clackers

Single Engined Fighter statistics, separate numbers representing strength/serviceable:

July: Luftwaffe 893/725 RAF: 871/644
August: Luftwaffe 860/unknown RAF: 1061/708
September: Luftwaffe 680/438 RAF: 1061/746
October : Luftwaffe 700/275 RAF: 1048/732

Overy as usual does not know what he is writing about :
the RAF single engine fighter aircraft includes : Blenheim ( pretty sure that is a twin engine aircraft ) Defiant (with no foward firing guns ? )
Gladiator ( byplane )
For september 1st see:
RAF - Campaign diariesBattle of Britain
for september 15th see:
RAF - Campaign diariesBattle of Britain
for september 30 th see:
RAF - Campaign diariesBattle of Britain

not even near the 746 figure quoted , that leaves two options
1: overy does not know the history of his own nation , therefor it is a Luftwaffe expert.
2: Raf fighters includes all fronts not just the british islands and therefor should be compared with LW and Italy combined,

**1979** · 05 Jun 12,, 11:05

Originally Posted by clackers

Production is useful to know, too:

July: German 220 British 496
August: German 173 British 476
September: German 218 British 467
October: German 144(acceptances) British 469

Yes it is usefull in regard that we see Raf lossing as much fighters as they are able to build :
Name: UK-RAF-I-7.jpg
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rough count between august 17 and octomber 19 (just 2 months ) 1600 fighter aircraft, or 800 per month ?

At least Raf enthusiats can take confort in the fact that only a fraction were destroyed in air combat , but counting aircraft destroyed on
the ground, training acidents, wear and tear, or aircraft that were so damaged in combat that need to be written off amounts to quite
bit .
But the most instresting thing is that after the germans switched to bomb London, the RAF gets a break and the wastage are somewhat
more bearable ( aprox. 500 between 7 september and 5 october )

ROYAL AIR FORCE 1939–1945 VOLUME I
THE FIGHT AT ODDS
By Dennis Richards

**Doktor** · 05 Jun 12,, 12:01

1979,

I don't get where are you going to.

RAF destroyed more aircraft then Luftwaffe, and the Brits outproduced the Germans, so what is the point, when clearly Brits had more planes then Germans.

**1979** · 05 Jun 12,, 14:19

Originally Posted by Doktor

1979,

I don't get where are you going to.

RAF destroyed more aircraft then Luftwaffe, and the Brits outproduced the Germans, so what is the point, when clearly Brits had more planes then Germans.

yet in september the defense of britain rested in fewer than 200 spitfire and 400 huricanes pitted against 1681 serviceable combat aircraft of the LW . For the sake ouf clarity I left out tactical-reconnaissance aircraft or aircraft not deployed aganist UK .

The fallacy of you assesment comes from :
1 comparing only fighter production.
2 not acounting all causes of RAF fighter losses.

SEE
Appendix XVII
Equipment, Strength, Serviceability and Location of Luftwaffe Units
deployed for use against the United Kingdom
7th September, 1940 serviceable combat aircraft of the LW .
Bassil Colier , THE DEFENCE OF UNITED KINGDOM

**Doktor** · 05 Jun 12,, 14:23

Originally Posted by 1979

yet in september the defense of britain rested in fewer than 200 spitfire and 400 huricanes pitted against 1681 serviceable combat aircraft of the LW . For the sake ouf clarity I left out tactical-reconnaissance aircraft or aircraft not deployed aganist UK .

The fallacy of you assesment comes from :
1 comparing only fighter production.
2 not acounting all causes of RAF fighter losses.

SEE
Appendix XVII
Equipment, Strength, Serviceability and Location of Luftwaffe Units
deployed for use against the United Kingdom
7th September, 1940 serviceable combat aircraft of the LW .
Bassil Colier , THE DEFENCE OF UNITED KINGDOM

Fixed it for you