Thread: Are Historians Now Overstating the Role of the U.S.S.R. in defeating Nazi Germany?

Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers

Jason, the paper does state that most vehicle kills were mobility kills.

Yes sir it does but it does not differentiate between vehicles knocked out by guns, breakdowns, and German logistical problems. Another example are the Ferdinands, most were lost due to breakdowns with less than 10 being lost to mines but the report makes it seem like 20+ were.

Originally Posted by Tanker

It is backed

Okay, I'll bite, Tanker.

You popped your head up again when you had a chance to back out.

So, where?

Chapter and verse please.

I can't wait.

Originally Posted by zraver

Yes sir it does but it does not differentiate between vehicles knocked out by guns, breakdowns, and German logistical problems. Another example are the Ferdinands, most were lost due to breakdowns with less than 10 being lost to mines but the report makes it seem like 20+ were.

Jason, how do I describe this. Minefields by themselves have never been show stoppers. Never has. Never will. As an engineer, I will state this to a tee. That is why within every engineers sqn is a machine gun section. Mines are force multipliers. They never have been show stoppers. They can't be.

Our Brigadier Ray is one example. He lead a re-enforced platoon through a Pakistani minefield while wounded and losing no men.

Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers

Jason, how do I describe this. Minefields by themselves have never been show stoppers. Never has. Never will. As an engineer, I will state this to a tee. That is why within every engineers sqn is a machine gun section. Mines are force multipliers. They never have been show stoppers. They can't be.

Our Brigadier Ray is one example. He lead a re-enforced platoon through a Pakistani minefield while wounded and losing no men.

I agree sir, that is what I've been saying, minefields can't do it by themselves unless the enemy formation has no means of clearing the mines like the panzer brigades which had only 1 infantry battalion and no organic engineer, scouts or artillery assets.

A look at Kursk from the stand point of what the German divisional units actually achieved compared to what they were facing paints a rather different picture of the campaign and reveals the true nature of the German's tactical skill. They attacked into a defensive belt even more fearsome than those seen in WWI- more pre-sighted artillery, more mines, more machine guns, more men plus bad weather (post war Soviet propaganda dried the battlefield out). The German's breached several of the defensive belts and only suffered 11,000 dead/missing/POW and 43,000 wounded (6.92% of man power at the beginning of the campaign). Armored losses (destroyed or not recovered) for Citadel were 252-333 AFV's (11.3% of pre-campaign strength.

The Soviet's fighting from this massive defensive work suffered over 70,000 dead, 107,000 wounded and over 2500 AFV's knocked out for manpower losses of 9% and AFV losses of 37.5%. The Soviets also lost 1 in 6 guns deployed compared to 1 in 18 for the Germans. It is unlikely the Soviets were able to recover and repair nearly as many of their own AFV's as the Germans were. While the T-34 used the less flammable diesel the primary tank was located under the front glacis in front of the driver. T-34's tended to brew up easily in 1943 as German AT weapons the 50mm L60, 75mm L48, 75mm L70, and 88mm L56 could punch it easily at increasing distances.

Originally Posted by zraver

The Soviet's fighting from this massive defensive work suffered over 70,000 dead, 107,000 wounded and over 2500 AFV's knocked out for manpower losses of 9% and AFV losses of 37.5%. The Soviets also lost 1 in 6 guns deployed compared to 1 in 18 for the Germans. It is unlikely the Soviets were able to recover and repair nearly as many of their own AFV's as the Germans were. While the T-34 used the less flammable diesel the primary tank was located under the front glacis in front of the driver. T-34's tended to brew up easily in 1943 as German AT weapons the 50mm L60, 75mm L48, 75mm L70, and 88mm L56 could punch it easily at increasing distances.

That is an extremely unfair assesement. What's left out of your equation was the decreasing capabilities and ferocity of opposing units. The Germans while inflicting superior casualties was sufferring a decrease in combat effectiveness against their Soviet oppenants who had planned for such contingencies.

In short, the Germans were rapidly being reduced in combat effectiveness while the Soviets were increasing in theirs. What's more, the Germans were rapidly being reduced in strong forces while the Soviets were throwing fresh strong forces into the fight.

All this because the Germans could not and did not penetrate the belts.

Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers

That is an extremely unfair assesement. What's left out of your equation was the decreasing capabilities and ferocity of opposing units. The Germans while inflicting superior casualties was sufferring a decrease in combat effectiveness against their Soviet oppenants who had planned for such contingencies.

In short, the Germans were rapidly being reduced in combat effectiveness while the Soviets were increasing in theirs. What's more, the Germans were rapidly being reduced in strong forces while the Soviets were throwing fresh strong forces into the fight.

All this because the Germans could not and did not penetrate the belts.

Sir I disagree, the Soviet's were not getting stronger relative to the Germans but that the Germans were getting stronger relative to the Soviets. The only thing declining faster for the Germans than the Russians was Hitler's nerve. For the entire campaign Citadel and the follow on Soviet offensives, German losses in tanks were well within and below production levels and manpower losses were sustainable. Soviet losses in tanks however exceeded monthly production by a factor of 4.

Originally Posted by zraver

Sir I disagree, the Soviet's were not getting stronger relative to the Germans but that the Germans were getting stronger relative to the Soviets. The only thing declining faster for the Germans than the Russians was Hitler's nerve. For the entire campaign Citadel and the follow on Soviet offensives, German losses in tanks were well within and below production levels and manpower losses were sustainable. Soviet losses in tanks however exceeded monthly production by a factor of 4.

I was speaking about within Kursk action itself.

As for your other assesement, unfortunately history has another factor - Normandy. Without the threat of Normandy, would Nazi Germany committed to the same production schedule? A very debateable subject.