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#16 (permalink) |
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New Member
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"Grenada, the bombing of Lybia, Operation Joint Endevor (ie IFOR), the Persain Gulf Tanker War (a strategic trap)."
Grenada was such a minor operation, that i didn't even consider it. I suppose that was strategic surprise. The Serbs were certainly expecting us. The tanker war was strategic surprise only in that the Iranian's didn't know the US would be actively engaged in the shooting, but they certainly knew that hostilities were imminent and ongoing with Iraq, so i don't know if it is a good example of strategic surprise. Technicly, i suppose it is. Cambodia is still the best example. The NVA had NO IDEA we were coming until there were Rangers running roughshod all over the place. |
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#18 (permalink) |
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Senior Contributor
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Japan's political and military aims in the pacific would not have been tolerated by the US and would have led to military conflict.
Japan therefore used a pre-emptive strike on the US and calculated that it would take the USN 6 months to recover to a position to engage fully with Japan, by which time the Japanese would be dug into their strategic goals in the pacific. On that basis it was the "right" thing to do and indeed the only way that their strategy could be progressed. Clearly it was the wrong strategy, but once they were set on that they had to be pre-emptive. |
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#20 (permalink) | |
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Burgomaster
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Quote:
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The Buck Stops Here |
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#21 (permalink) | |
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Military Professional
Moderator Scotch taster |
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Chimo |
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#22 (permalink) | |
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Contributor
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Quote:
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Your look more lost than a bastard child on fathers day. |
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#24 (permalink) |
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Contributor
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Yamamoto didn't want to attack America period. He was told to form a plan that could beat the US he did the best he could but luck was against him, not poor intel. The Combined fleet had sailed 2 weeks prior to the attack on a complete Coms blackout and Japan was past the point of no return anyway. The intel was good, so good that each Japanese pilot new the name of the ship he was attacking.
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#26 (permalink) |
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Contributor
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No the Japanese, like everyone else, placed immense faith in Battleships. However they have more respect for the offensive power of Carriers, and Battleship row was not the only target attacked at Pearl. Nearly all the airbases were badly damaged and better than 90% of the aircraft available to the US PACFLT and Army Air Corp were damaged or destroyed outright. Where Nagumo screwed up was in not sending the third wave, that would have targeted the Submarine pens, drydocks and fuel farms. In hindsight the Japanese did us a favor by knocking out our BB's, and not destroying our fuel depots, drydocks and sub pens hindsight is always 20/20. Once again though the intel was outstanding.
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#28 (permalink) | |
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Burgomaster
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#29 (permalink) |
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Administrator
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Ironically enough, even though the Japanese proved beyond a shadow of a doubt at Pearl Harbor and elsewhere (such as the sinking of the Royal Navy's Force Z near Singapore), the IJN remained firmly wedded to the idea of the "decisive battle" that would be decided by His Imperial Japanese Majesty's battleships.
It wasnt even until after Midway that they realized just how much value their carriers REALLY had that they started to convert superbattleship Shinano to a carrier. IMHO, there is a great "what if" about the Battle Of Midway. What if Yamamoto had concentrated his battleships together with Nagumo's carriers? Would the extra AA have made a difference? OR, would Yamamoto's very presence made a difference? After all, he would have been riding on Yamato practically right next to Akagi and would have actually been in a position to exert real influence on the cautious Nagumo. Not to mention that the superior radio receivers on Yamato would have kept Nagumo's First Air Fleet MUCH better informed on intelligence, or lack thereof, such as the cancelled Operation K recce of Pearl Harbor. It would be an interesting problem to wargame out.
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If your actions inspire others to dream more, learn more, do more and become more, you are a leader. ~John Quincy Adams Last edited by TopHatter : 12-25-2003 at 13:37 PM. |
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